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Summary 
1. Summary 
This report assesses the economic consequences of completing the single energy market. It is 
one of a group of studies being undertaken on behalf of the European Commission to assess 
the effects of completing the European Union's single market. The study examines potential 
changes to costs, prices and trade flows in the electricity and natural gas industries. In many 
respects, the single market in energy is incomplete, and this study looks at measures yet to be 
taken. In this it differs from the studies of most sectors, which review the effects of previous 
changes. 
Electricity and gas are transported by networks that are essentially 'natural monopolies", 
because it will never be economic to build competing networks to serve the same customers. 
This tendency towards monopoly has been furthered in some cases by exclusive jurisdictions, 
which restrict rights to build competing infrastructure even where it is economic to do so, as is 
sometimes the case for large long-distance transmission lines. Exclusive state ownership and 
vertical integration have further limited the extent of competition even where, as in the case of 
electricity generation, an activity is not naturally monopolistic. 
The lack of competition in electricity and gas has permitted wide divergences of price in 
neighbouring markets. It has also enabled national policy goals to be pursued, leading to 
divergences in the mix of fuels and plant type used in electricity generation, and variations in 
the market share of gas, that appear larger than would result from differing economic 
circumstances alone. 
These differences have raised concerns at two levels. At the national level, there have been 
concerns that prices may be unnecessarily high, damaging national competitiveness and 
leading to a loss of consumer welfare. At the European Union (EU) level, there has been 
concern that present practices, in effect, create internal frontiers and restrict the free movement 
of goods and services that is central to the completion of the single market. This study does 
not seek to address those issues which are a matter of national policy alone, but does consider 
those issues which affect trade, and the ability of consumers to choose their source of supply 
freely from within the EU. 
In practice, most of the discussion of liberalization centres on providing non-discriminatory 
access to the natural monopoly networks (i.e. third party access, TPA). TPA has formed the 
core of the Commission's draft directives on liberalization. The removal of exclusive rights to 
build and operate transport infrastructure and generating plant is also an important aspect of 
liberalization as, in some respects, is unbundling of functions. The work presented in this 
report was mainly completed before apparent agreement on the proposed Electricity Directive 
in June 1996. Consequently, the final proposed Directive is not explicitly considered, but the 
study is consistent in broad terms with the agreed text. 
1.1. The approach 
This study assesses the effect of liberalization at the EU level by comparing three scenarios for 
the future evolution of each industry. A continuation of the present industry structure is taken 
as a base against which other scenarios can be measured. An open market scenario (including 
full compulsory TPA, unbundling, and the removal of exclusivity rights) is assessed to identify 
the potential benefits of competition. An intermediate competition scenario, including 
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negotiated TPA, is used to analyse the effects of partial reform, which is more likely than full 
competition in the near future and is close to the measures agreed at the Council of Ministers 
meeting at the end of June 1996. The scenarios are examined by modelling rather than analogy 
with other liberalized markets. This is because the circumstances of the European energy 
industries are different from those of other markets, especially for the gas industry, and 
liberalization internationally remains uncommon and recent, so experience on which to base 
comparisons is limited. Two well established models of the European electricity system. 
EIREM and MIDAS, have been used to model the electricity industry. A conceptual model 
developed for this study has been used to analyse the gas industry. 
1.2. Electricity results 
There are several potential sources of gains from liberalizing the electricity industry. Potential 
gains from trade include the siting and use of least cost plant across borders, the facilitation of 
trade with Eastern Europe, and the ability to exploit differences in the timing of demand 
peaks. Also, the margin of surplus capacity in each country required to cope with unusual 
demand peaks and plant outages may be reduced as increased interconnection between 
systems provides additional resilience. Cost savings from increased efficiency, resulting from 
increased competition, will potentially be realized in the form of lower construction and 
operating costs, and the choice of which type of fuel the plant will burn on economic rather 
than policy grounds. The total cost of generation in the EU is greater than ECU 100 billion p.a. 
Savings, therefore, tend to be large in absolute terms, even from modest percentage gains. 
The estimates in this study show savings of ECU 10-12 billion p.a. in the open market 
scenario, with savings of approximately ECU 4-6 billion p.a. in the intermediate competition 
scenario. There are corresponding price falls of ECU 2-4/MWh, with consequent benefits to 
the competitiveness of Community industry. This is equivalent to a price reduction of 5-11% 
for large industrial consumers, and 2^1% for residential consumers, although in practice 
residential consumers may not experience all of these gains as some may be appropriated by 
local distribution companies. The majority of the savings arise from lower construction and 
operating costs for generating plant, and the less frequent choice of higher cost plant type on 
policy grounds. In view of the cost of generation, and the present cost and price differences 
across the EU, these estimates appear conservative and greater savings may be achievable in 
practice. The savings greatly outweigh the potential increase in costs from any additional 
regulation. 
Trade is expected to increase in the short term, requiring new transmission links, including 
links specified in the Commission's TENs programme, although trade reduces from its 
maximum level in the longer term as costs converge. Liberalization is also likely to lead to an 
increase in the use of gas in generation, with corresponding environmental benefits from 
reduced emissions of CO2. 
Such savings indicate that it is desirable to introduce TPA for as wide a range of consumers as 
possible, including large industrial consumers and distribution companies. Mechanisms for 
non-discriminatory construction and despatch of plant, including unbundling of generation and 
transmission, are also required to achieve maximum savings. Interconnection of networks is 
likely to increase, and abolition of exclusive rights to build new infrastructure, and other 
policy measures, should facilitate this. 
Summary 
Security of supply will remain a legitimate concern of policy because of the wider economic 
and social effects of supply disruption. In particular, increased use of gas for power generation 
is likely to lead to increased reliance on imports from Russia and Algeria. However, policies 
to promote security of supply can be compatible with liberalization. For example, if 
obligations are placed on distribution companies to ensure security of supply, this will lead 
them to contract appropriately with generators. Similarly, measures to encourage the 
installation of dual firing can be applied in a non-discriminatory fashion, making them similar 
in character to requirements to meet environmental standards. This need not impair the 
operation of a competitive market, and gains from liberalization can still be realized. 
1.3. Gas results 
The introduction of TPA in gas is likely to lead to some benefits for large consumers but not 
necessarily for small consumers. Liberalization in gas is more problematic than in electricity 
because most incremental supply to the EU is likely to come from one of three main sources 
outside the EU (Russia, Algeria and Norway) and in each case, exports from these countries 
are effectively under state control, and may remain so. This makes the introduction of true 
competition much more difficult. We have therefore examined two cases. The first includes 
very limited competition between producers. The second, more favourable, case includes 
significant price competition among producers. 
If competition between producers is limited, monopoly economic rents may be present, 
because demand for gas is inelastic at prices below the cost of using a competing fuel, leading 
to the potential for prices to be raised to close to the ceiling imposed by competing fuels 
without a corresponding loss of volume. Rents are likely to be present in both the industrial 
and power sectors, and are especially large in the power sector. 
The presence of oligopoly power in the upstream and rents in the value chain leads to 
questions over who will be able to appropriate the rents. At present, the majority of rents 
appear to accrue to producers, with some accruing to transmission companies. TPA is likely to 
lead to transmission companies losing rent to consumers and producers, and potentially to 
consumers gaining rent from producers. If consumers arc more effective bargainers than 
transmission companies, they will secure additional rents from producers, leading to price falls 
at the EU border. However, if they are less effective negotiators, then producers will 
appropriate some of the rent that presently accrues to transmission companies, with limited 
gains to consumers, and a rise in border prices. 
Consideration of the influences on negotiations suggests that power companies and large 
industrial consumers are likely to be more effective negotiators than transmission companies, 
as they have stronger incentives to negotiate effectively. However, the position is less clear for 
distribution companies. 
This leads to the conclusion that TPA for large consumers, including power plants, is likely to 
have advantages. Price reductions of 5-8% are expected to be achieved in the power sector, 
and 3% for large industrial consumers. This will lead to savings of some ECU 300-900 
million p.a. with corresponding benefits for the competitiveness of EU industry. However, 
these gains are less clear for distribution companies and it is possible that no significant price 
reductions may be achieved by residential consumers. 
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If there is limited competition in production, delivery to the European border, and distribution 
(the major components of cost), the potential for productive efficiency gains is also limited. 
The other scenario, in which there is significant price competition between producers under a 
TPA regime, has a very different outcome. Gains to consumers would be very large, as they 
would be able to appropriate rents and productive efficiency gains may also be present. There 
could be very large gains (several billions of ECU p.a.) if TPA were to lead to full gas-to-gas 
competition. 
Removal of exclusivity rights for pipelines is likely to be advantageous, for example because it 
enables short independent pipelines for the power sector, and may increase the 
interconnectivity and operational effectiveness of the EU gas system. The construction of 
independent pipelines and the introduction of TPA may allow independent power projects to 
proceed which otherwise would not. This may increase consumption with corresponding 
environmental benefits to the extent that gas displaces other fuels. Otherwise effects on 
consumption will be limited. Any increases in consumption will be met from additional 
imports as there is very limited scope for increasing production within the EU in the longer 
term. 
The problem of upstream oligopoly may be addressed by measures to increase the diversity of 
suppliers to the EU. The problem of rent flows may also potentially be addressed by policy 
measures, for example by fiscal measures (perhaps analogous to the transit fees often presently 
levied on gas pipelines). Simply retaining the existing concentration of buyer power in the 
transmission companies seems very unlikely to be the most effective route of counteracting 
upstream power from the point of view of the consumers or the EU as a whole, as it does not 
enable consumers to gain any of the rent appropriated from the upstream, which remains with 
the transmission companies. 
The growth of demand from the power sector causes potential concern on security of supply, 
but interruptible contracts with electricity generators may have the effect of increasing security 
of supply for other sectors. Indeed, the potential growth of gas demand from the power sector 
is among the greatest challenges presently facing the European gas industry. Consequently, 
measures that encourage growth of gas demand, such as liberalization of the power sector, 
may have as great an effect on the gas industry as reform within the gas sector itself. 
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2. General introduction 
.1 The European Commission has asked a consortium led by London Economics to report on the 
economic consequences of completing the single energy market. This report describes the 
study, the results obtained and the policy implications of the work. This study is one of several 
being undertaken on behalf of the Commission to assess the effects of completing the single 
market on various industries, in accordance with the mandate laid down in Council Resolution 
92/1218. Unlike the studies of most other sectors, this study assesses the potential benefits 
from future measures, rather than assessing the effect of existing programmes. This is because 
measures for completing the single market in energy have yet to be introduced. 
The work is directed at determining the effects of completing the single energy market by 
comparing projections based on the continuation of existing energy market structures with 
alternative scenarios that represent differing degrees of reform at the level of the EU. The 
focus is on the benefits and costs of market reform. 
The principal indicators to be used to measure the effect of completing the single market are: 
(a) energy consumption patterns; 
(b) prices and costs for each stage of the value chain; 
(c) levels of investment; 
(d) changes in the pattern of inter-state trade; 
(e) costs of production of the Community's energy system as a whole; and 
(f) environmental effects. 
The study covers the period to 2020. 
The original terms of reference for the study indicated that the assignment has four interlinked 
phases: 
(a) Defining alternative market frameworks required to create a single energy market and 
their regulatory and institutional characteristics. This is achieved by specifying scenarios 
and, in practice, centres around consideration of third party access (TPA) to transmission 
infrastructure, rights for the exclusive construction of infrastructure, and the completion 
of Trans-European Energy Networks (TENs). 
(b) Evaluating the impact of these alternative frameworks on the structure of production, 
consumption, and trade. This is achieved largely by modelling, because the institutional 
and industry circumstances of the EU are unique. However in discussing the prospects 
for reform, reference is made to experience elsewhere. 
(c) Assessing the impact of the alternative frameworks on the efficiency of the EU energy 
system compared with what it would be under a continuation of present arrangements. 
This is derived from a comparison of the results under the various scenarios. 
(d) Identifying the key policy issues that emerge from the analysis for the successful 
completion of the single energy market and making recommendations as to how these 
may be addressed. 
The other members of the consortium are EWI (Energie Wirtschaftliches Institut|) based in Köln. NTUA based in 
Athens, and AUPEC based in Aberdeen. 
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This report describes each of these stages of the work. It has separate sections on electricity 
and gas, because the issues involved and the modelling approaches adopted are different for 
the two industries. Each section comprises the following: 
A description of the industry environment. This section outlines the present situation in each 
industry, and the institutional framework in which it operates. The description is more detailed 
for gas than for electricity as the particular character of the market has a more direct and 
profound effect on the outcome of the modelling than is the case in electricity. This section 
also summarizes the industry data which is used as input for the models. 
A description of the scenarios for the evolution of each industry. This section describes the 
industry structures that might arise from completing the single market and compares this with 
the present structure. For electricity, there is a separate section describing the likely sources of 
benefits and costs from liberalization. 
A description of the modelling work. This describes how the scenarios have been realized in 
modelling terms. 
Results. This section describes results of the modelling work. This includes calculation of the 
output measures identified above. 
Discussion of results. A detailed assessment of the implications of the results, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. 
Policy implications. The key policy issues are discussed and the results are described. 
Recommendations regarding policy are made on the basis of this analysis. 
This report considers reform at the level of the present EU as a whole. It does not seek to 
identify or assess the possibilities for alternative industry structures within countries, and does 
not consider issues of ownership. Each of these is important, and there is scope for a wide 
variety of structural reform within individual Member States. However, consideration of such 
issues is beyond the scope of this report except where they relate directly to the completion of 
the single market in energy. 
2.1. Background to this report 
The Single European Act defined a single market as 'an area without internal frontiers in 
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured'. As part of 
implementing the Single European Act the European Commission is attempting to create an 
'Internal Energy Market'.2 This has proved to be an extremely complex and controversial issue 
and the Commission's proposals have been widely resisted by some Member States. 
For the first stage of the market the Council of Ministers have agreed: 
European Commission. The Internal Energy Market, Brussels, COM(88) 238, 2 May 1988. 
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(a) Greater transparency of prices charged to large customers.3 The Commission now 
collects and publishes price statistics. 
(b) Free competition among EC companies to sell equipment to energy undertakings. 
(c) Mandatory transit of power between authorized grid operators in Member States across 
intervening grids." 
In January 1992 the European Commission published its proposals for the subsequent stages 
towards the 'Completion of the internal market in electricity and gas'.6 For the second stage of 
the integrated electricity market the Commission proposed: 
(a) Liberalizing line construction and providing a right of connection of new lines to 
existing transmission systems. 
(b) Opening up electricity generation to competition. 
(c) Freedom of purchase and third party access (TPA). This applied in electricity to 
customers buying more than 100 GWh p.a., and a hundred or so distribution companies 
selling more than 3% of the energy within a Member State (the access was to be subject 
to capacity being available). It also applied in gas to large industries or distribution 
companies. 
(d) 'Unbundling', i.e. separation of the management (by splitting activities into separate 
divisions in integrated utilities) and of accounts between generation, transmission and 
distribution. The aim was to ensure transparency of operations. 
(e) 'Harmonized, transparent and non-discriminatory procedures', which included fair terms 
for use of transmission and distribution systems. 
(f) Reduction of governmental influence on electricity and gas industries and increased 
commercial freedom for undertakings, which the Commission regards as essential to 
allow undertakings to face competition on equal terms. 
(g) Harmonization, which was interpreted to mean: 
(i) control of state aids and of discriminatory pricing in favour of large 
customers, and 
(ii) 'non-discriminatory procedures with which producers, suppliers and 
consumers who wish to buy and sell electricity on the interconnection 
network must comply'. 
These proposals were then amended in December 19938 in the face of widespread opposition 
to try and achieve consensus. These amendments included: 
Council Directive of 29 June 1990 concerning a Community procedure to improve the transparency of gas and 
electricity prices charged to industrial end-users. 90/337/EEC, OJ L 185/16, 1992. 
Council Directive of 17 September 1990 on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy 
transport and telecommunications sectors, 90/531/EEC, OJ L 297/1, 1990. 
Council Directive of 29 October 1990 on the transit of electricity through transmission grids, 90/547/EEC OJ L 
313/30. 1990. 
European Commission. Completion of the internal market in electricity and gas. Brussels. 21 January 1992. 
To cater for national security concerns the proposals also allowed for the protection of indigenous sources of electricity 
generation up to 20% of total requirement. There was also a provision for subsidizing schemes of less than 25 MW that 
are based on renewable sources of energy and waste. 
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(a) making third party access (TPA) to the network negotiated, rather than compulsory; 
(b) permitting Member States a second option in introducing competition in electricity 
generation by permitting either licensing or calls to tender; 
(c) restricting 'unbundling' to financial accounts, rather than operational management 
although maintaining the independence of system operation; and 
(d) increasing the role and importance of public service. 
The proposals reflected the view of the Council of Ministers, set out in November 1992, that 
more competitive, transparent and efficient gas and electricity markets are desirable, and that 
the internal market should comply with six principles: 
(a) security of supply; 
(b) environmental protection; 
(c) protection of small consumers; 
(d) transparency and non-discrimination; 
(e) recognition of the differences between national systems; and 
(f) transitional provisions. 
In response to the revised proposals from the Commission, the French Government proposed a 
'Single Buyer Model' (SBM) as a form of organization of the sector which it believed to be 
consistent with EC objectives of promoting competition and creating a single energy market. 
The SBM proposals are seen, by others, as being an attempt to protect the right of national 
governments to pursue their own industrial policies in the power sector (such as the 
development of nuclear power). The proposals were extensively discussed and were the 
subject of a report by the research institute EWI in early 1995.9 In March 1995. the 
Commission published a Working Paper.10 It concluded that the negotiated TPA (nTPA) and 
the Single Buyer (SB) systems were not economically equivalent and that the SB system falls 
short of what is desirable or achievable from a competition point of view. The paper goes on 
to say that the SBM, with its effective import monopoly, appears to run contrary to Article 30 
of the Treaty of Rome, which prohibits such import restrictions. Maintaining exclusive rights 
over imports, transmission and distribution appears contrary to the principle of the free 
movement of goods and services. 
The debate continued under a proposal from the Italian Presidency, under which the 
controversial issue of whether distributors were granted TPA rights would be at the discretion 
of Member States, at least initially, subject to a certain proportion of the market being opened 
up. At the time of finalizing this report (July 1996) it appears that agreement has been reached 
that Member States must open 22% of their markets to competition, rising to 33% by 2003. 
The threshold at which large consumers will have access will be successively lowered from 
40 GWh p.a. (although this is not legally enforceable) to 9 GWh p.a. Progress will be 
European Commission COM(93) 643 final. Amended proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity (COD 384) and natural gas (COD 381). 
TPA and single buyer systems: producers and parallel authorizations: small and very small systems. EWI (Energie 
Wirtschafliches Institut). Köln. March 1995. 
10 SEC (95)464 final: working paper of the Commission on the organization of the Internal Electricity Market. Proposal 
for a European Parliament and Council Decision on guidelines for the Trans-European Energy Networks (Common 
Position (EC) No 12/95 of 29 June 1995. OJ C 216. 1995). 
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reviewed, with possible further liberalization after 2003. This agreement was reached too late 
for its details to be reflected in the analysis for this report, and the extent to which the 
measures will lead to a genuine opening of markets remains unclear. However, it appears 
broadly to correspond to the Intermediate Competition scenario described in this report. 
The Commission has also been reviewing the completion of the Trans-European Energy 
Networks (TENs), which is an important objective of EU policy, and has recently issued an 
information document on the subject." The completion of TENs is discussed in this report 
within the broader context of completion of the single market. 
Community Guidelines and Projects of Common Interest, November 1995. 
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3. Part A: Electricity 
3.1. Introduction 
This part of the report describes the consequences of completing the single market for 
electricity. The characteristics of the industry are first briefly described, to provide a 
background to the scenarios. Present consumption patterns are outlined, and the future 
underlying growth of demand is forecast. Included in this is a description of the present pattern 
of trade. The costs of different types of generating plants are then described. The commercial 
structure of the industry is also briefly reviewed to highlight the principal drivers behind the 
introduction of TPA. 
The remainder of this part of the report is divided into the following chapters: 
Chapter 4. Industry characteristics: describes demand, supply, trade flows and the 
commercial structure of the industry. 
Chapter 5. Scenarios: describes the scenarios for the future evolution of the electricity 
industry. The scenarios are: 
(a) Present trends: a continuation of present industry structures. 
(b Negotiated Third Party Access (nTPA): negotiated access to the transmission 
system by independent producers and industrial consumers, and perhaps by 
distribution companies, is discussed. The extent to which a single buyer 
model (SBM) might have the same effect is also considered. 
(c) Third Party Access (TPA): full competition with open buying and selling of 
electricity, including compulsory access to networks for independent power 
producers (IPPs) and large consumers. The right of access is also assumed to 
be extended to distribution companies. The right of independent parties to 
invest in transmission and distribution infrastructure, and unbundling of 
functions, are also included as part of this scenario. 
This chapter includes a review of the sources of liberalization, and the potential gains and 
costs including preliminary quantifications of the order of magnitude of likely gains. 
Chapter 6. Modelling of scenarios: a description of the use of models to examine the 
scenarios. 
Chapter 7. Results of modelling: the effect of each scenario on key economic variables 
(consumption, costs and trade flows). 
Chapter 8. Conclusion and policy implications: the policy implications of the results are 
described. 
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4. Industry characteristics 
4.1. Demand 
Electricity demand growth rates have usually been forecast on the basis of forecasts of GDP 
growth. The overall level of activity in an economy, as measured by GDP, has been taken as 
the principal driver of demand, because electricity is not highly price elastic, and pricing 
regimes have been relatively stable. In the past, demand often grew at about the same rate as 
GDP. or even more rapidly. However, more recently there has been evidence that increasing 
efficiency of electricity use and saturation in some markets, especially the residential sector, 
has led to growth rates for electricity demand below those for GDP. This trend is expected to 
continue. 
The base case electricity demand used in this study is taken from the Conventional Wisdom 
Scenario in the 'Energy Futures to 2020' study carried out for the Commission using the 
MIDAS model, which includes both economic growth and price as drivers of demand. This 
shows demand growing at 1.7% p.a. in the period 1990 to 2000. and at 1.2% p.a. thereafter. 
This corresponds to a GDP growth rate of 2.1% p.a. throughout the period. Prices are forecast 
to remain static in real terms or fall slightly but further moderate price falls would not have a 
large effect on demand. The forecasts are shown in Figure 4.1. Demand varies slightly from 
this base level in the various scenarios. A breakdown of consumption by sector is shown in 
Table 4.1. This shows industrial electricity use accounting for some 40% of consumption, 
residential use a further 30%. with the remainder commercial and other use. 
Figure 4.1. Electricity demand in the EU 
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Table 4.1. Electricity demand by sector (EU­12,1993) 
Sector 
Industry 
Residential 
Commercial 
Other 
Consumption 
Own use and losses 
Total production and 
imports 
Million toe 
68.7 
49.0 
37.5 
7.8 
163.0 
29.0 
192.0 
% of consumption 
42 
30 
23 
5 
100 
N/A 
N/A 
TWh 
799 
570 
436 
91 
1896 
337 
2232 
1 toe = 10' kcalNCV 
1 million toe = 11.63 TWh 
Source: IEA, EU­12 refers to the then 12 Member States of the EU. 
4.2. Supply 
4.2.1. Capacity 
There are presently some 550 GW of generating capacity in the EU. Figure 4.2 shows this 
divided by main plant type. The majority of this is thermal generating capacity, although 
nuclear and hydro are both significant. 
Figure 4.2. Generating capacity in the EU (1995) 
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Source: Energy Futures to 2020. 
Figure 4.3 shows generation from thermal power plants by fuel type. Coal is the main source 
of thermal generation, accounting for just over half the total. Oil use is also significant, 
especially in Italy, and gas consumption is increasing rapidly, especially in the UK. 
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Figure 4.3. Fuel use in thermal power generation (1995) 
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Source: Energy Futures to 2020. 
4.2.2. Costs 
The capital costs of generation from various technologies shown in Figure 4.4 are taken from 
the assumptions used in the 'Energy Futures' study {Energy Scenarios to 2020 for the 
European Union, Report to the European Commission, DG XVII/A2 by NTUA and ESAP, 
October 1995). OCGT has the lowest capital cost, but high fuel costs mean that it is used as 
peaking plant. CCGT has a low capital cost and high thermal efficiency, which often makes it 
an attractive choice for new plant. Coal plant (including IGCC in the longer term) remains a 
frequent plant choice, but nuclear plant tends to be ruled out by high costs and political 
difficulties (except in France). Projections of these through time are shown in the Appendices. 
Costs are assumed to differ between countries, as shown in Table 4.2 the most significant 
variation is the lower cost of nuclear power in France. These differences are assumed to 
decline by 70% by 2005 and 90% by 2010 under full compulsory TPA. Under nTPA the 
corresponding rates are 50% and 70%. 
The cost data is based on the inputs for the 'Energy Futures to 2020' study, to maintain 
consistency with the Commission's other work in the energy sector. Comparison with London 
Economics' data shows that lower costs may be achievable. In particular the price of gas 
fuelled CCGT relative to other plant may be lower than shown. However, this would only 
serve to further the already very strong position of gas in the market, and so reinforce the 
conclusions derived. 
Fuel costs at the European border are treated as an exogenous variable for modelling purposes. 
The assumptions are in line with the conventional wisdom scenario in the Energy Futures 
study and are shown in Figure 4.5. Coal prices rise very slightly; oil and gas prices rise more 
strongly. 
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Table 4.2. Variations relative to baseline of generating costs at present1 
Plant Type 
Nuclear 
Coal 
Country 
Germany 
France 
Belgium 
Spain/Portugal 
Spain/Portugal 
Variation (%) 
+ 15 
­ 12 
­6 
+ 6 
+ 5% 
Source: modelling assumptions 
Baseline assumptions are from the Energy Futures to 2020 study and are shown in Figure 4.4. 
Figure 4.4. Comparison of capital costs of various type of plant 
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Industry characteristics 
Figure 4.5. Fuel import price projections 
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A sensitivity to the assumption on gas prices is examined in the light of the resource costs 
shown in the section of this report dealing with gas. These resource costs imply that 
potentially very large quantities of gas are available for delivery to the European border for 
costs in the range of US$ 2.70-3.50/ MMBtu. In the high gas price scenario, the price of gas 
for baseload is assumed to remain close to US$ 3.50/MMBtu (approximately US$ 140/toe) 
which leads to a very large rise in the amount of gas to the power sector. 
A coal price constant in real terms appears a plausible scenario in view of the nature of the 
reserve base. However, the key determinant of the fuel mix is the relative, rather than absolute, 
price of fuel, and here the major issue is whether gas will retain its present very strong 
competitive position. This is addressed by the contrasting low and high gas price scenarios. 
A carbon tax is not treated explicitly in the base scenarios, although it remains a possibility. It 
has the effect of further improving the competitive position of gas in generation, because gas 
emits the least CO2 per unit of energy produced. This would tend to reinforce the trends shown 
in the low gas price case. A carbon tax also favours nuclear power on economic grounds, 
although this is assumed to stay unacceptable on policy grounds in most of the EU. 
4.3. Existing trade flows 
There are presently large flows of electricity within the EU. The map in Figure 4.6 shows 
export capacities of main trade links in GW. The largest flows are exports from France and the 
capacity of the links reflects this, with links from France to other consuming regions. Present 
trade flows are illustrated in Section 7 (Figure 7.3) and compared with forecasts. 
Figure 4.6. Present export capacities in GW 
Source: EWI 
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4.4. Industry structure 
4.4.1. Activities carried out within the electricity industry 
The production and delivery of electricity to the consumer comprises several activities: 
(a) generation of electricity in a power plant; 
(b) transmission of electricity at high voltage to distribution companies and large industrial 
consumers; 
(c) distribution of electricity at low voltage to the final consumer. 
In liberalized environments with access to the networks, there is the separate commercial 
activity, referred to as the supply or merchant function. This involves buying bulk power from 
the generator, buying transmission and distribution services, and collecting payment from the 
consumer. It is a trading function and, in principle, distinct from the physical activities of 
generation, transmission and distribution. However, at present, supply is integrated with 
transport activities in continental Europe (but not in the UK). 
4.4.2. Special characteristics of the electricity industry 
Electricity has two characteristics that make it distinct from other commodities: 
(a) it is effectively impossible to store (except in limited quantities in expensive pumped 
hydro plants); 
(b) power is supplied over a network, which makes it impossible to unambiguously assign 
an individual customer's consumption to production from a specific generating plant. 
In addition, there is the natural monopoly character of the network, which electricity has in 
common with other activities (gas, water and, to some extent, telecommunications) where the 
economies of scale and scope are so large that it is uneconomic to build competing networks. 
It is this natural monopoly characteristic that creates the need for TPA to networks as a key 
element of introducing competition to electricity markets. 
4.4.3. Present structure in Europe 
At present generation and transmission are vertically integrated in most of Europe, being 
carried out by a single utility (as in Italy) or a group of utilities (as in Germany). There is also 
often a monopoly of imports. Distribution is typically carried out by local distribution 
companies, often with some form of municipal involvement. Distribution is also controlled by 
the generator in some countries, making the entire chain vertically integrated. In some cases 
the degree of vertical integration is moderated, for example in Spain, Denmark and the 
Netherlands. In the UK, there is effective separation of generation and transmission. 
Independent power producers (IPPs) have not, until now, been widespread in continental 
Europe. 
The principal problem, caused by the present structure of the industry, for the introduction of 
competition in generation and supply is the integration of generation and transmission. Large 
consumers, who often take electricity directly from the high voltage transmission grid, may be 
unable to secure access to imports or electricity from IPPs because the incumbent generator 
controls the grid. This is one of the problems that TPA is designed to address. Distribution 
companies may also have problems of access if they are not part of the integrated utility, and 
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they may also be granted right of access under TPA. The right of access for distribution 
companies has been a contentious issue in the debate over the Commission's draft directive, 
mainly because of concern over security of supply. This is discussed further in the section on 
policy issues. 
The integration of generation and transmission may continue to raise important issues even in 
a TPA environment. For example, if the utility remains dominant, issues of system security 
and back-up power may become contentious. In addition, if liberalization proceeds differently 
in different national systems (for example, with national pools in some but not others) there 
will be technical issues of integration and commercial issues such as reciprocity. However 
consideration of these detailed matters is beyond the scope of this study. 
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5. Scenarios 
There is a very wide range of possibilities for evolution towards a completed single energy 
market. Policy may be changed on a number of dimensions, with a correspondingly diverse set 
of outcomes. This in turn creates a very large number of potential scenarios. However, the 
original terms of reference for this study indicated that three scenarios were to be considered, 
and guidance from the Commission indicated that the three scenarios of principal interest are: 
(a) Base case. The present situation. 
(b) Increased competition scenario. This includes partial opening up of the market and 
negotiated third party access and is broadly consistent with the agreement reached 
among EU Energy Ministers in June 1996. It is also broadly equivalent in terms of 
economic results to a single buyer model modified to remove the problems described in 
the introduction. 
(c) Open market scenario. This represents a full completion of the single energy market, 
including full third party access, unbundling, and liberalization of investment. 
In outline the scenarios are: 
(a) Base case. A continuation of the present situation, with national or regional utilities 
engaging in limited trade. 
(b) Increased competition scenario. In this scenario large industrial consumers have the 
right of negotiated access to the transmission system. Any disputes will be settled by 
arbitration, and this is expected to maintain the price of access to the network within 
well defined limits. The right of access may also be extended to distribution companies. 
However, under this scenario, policy influences on prices continue to have an effect 
through the purchasing strategy of the distribution companies. In all, some 30% or so of 
the market is assumed to become moderately competitive, with the remainder subject to 
strong policy influences. 
(c) Open market scenario. Fully effective compulsory TPA to networks is the key feature of 
this scenario. It is assumed that utilities are unable to obstruct progress towards more 
open access to networks. Increased competition within each country, by the creation of 
non-discriminatory optimal contracting and despatch of all generators (IPPs, imports and 
utility plant), is considered in the context of this scenario as many of the effects of 
increased competition are similar, irrespective of whether competition is within a 
particular Member State, or is the result of trade. The key feature of this scenario is that 
customers (large industrial consumers or distribution companies) are able to obtain the 
lowest cost electricity without restrictions, so under TPA national policies that impose 
higher costs in an individual Member State become unsustainable. ~ 
These scenarios represent successive steps towards a fully open and competitive market. They 
reflect different degrees of competition and market openness, which is the key feature of the 
completion of the single market. In line with the original Terms of Reference, differences are 
attributable only to differences in the level of market integration, and not to other 
considerations. 
12 
Cost differences can persist provided that they are not greater than the cost of transport. 
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5.1. Ownership 
The issue of ownership of generating plant and networks is also important. Both market 
structure and ownership are likely to have an influence on efficiency. The consequences of 
privatization in the UK provide evidence of this. Major efficiency gains have been made by 
the state owned Nuclear Electric, because it has been operating in a competitive environment. 
Productivity (measured in p/kWh produced) has increased at 12% p.a. since liberalization, 
mainly reflecting the extremely poor previous performance of the plant. However, additional 
efficiency improvements have also been made by privatized distribution companies operating 
in a non-competitive environment, because a clear regulatory structure has given management 
incentives to improve performance. Efficiency improvements in the last two years have been 
some 10% p.a. compared with a historic trend of 2% p.a. (see Appendix A.5 for details of the 
performance of UK companies since liberalization). In Norway the introduction of 
comparative efficiency measurement among distribution companies (many of which are 
municipally owned) has also led to pressure for performance improvement. 
In some cases a transfer of ownership may increase gains in the open market scenario. 
However, ownership is considered, by the European Commission, to be a matter for Member 
States and not a prerequisite for completing the single market, and so it is not considered 
explicitly here. The emphasis is on defining the incentive structure to which companies (public 
or private) are subject, which appears, on the basis of international experience, to be the main 
influence on behaviour. 
The main qualification to this view is that ownership may affect the means by which 
distribution companies are influenced to conform to national policy objectives under an nTPA 
environment. The use of state capital (including low discount rate) is another potentially 
contentious area in which ownership has an influence on scenario outcomes. It is unclear how 
far the use of state capital would be regarded as anti-competitive under a TPA environment. 
In the following section the scenarios are described in more detail. The structures of scenarios 
are summarized in Figure 5.1, which shows, in outline terms, the main commercial 
relationships. 
5.2. Detailed description of each scenario 
This section describes the three scenarios in greater detail. 
5.2.1. Present situation (base case scenario) 
This scenario represents a continuation of present institutional arrangements and national 
policies. National or regional monopolies continue, as do present exclusivity and demarcation 
rights. The Transit Directive (OJ L 147, 12.6.1991) and Procurement Directive (OJ L 199, 
9.8.1993) do not have a significantly greater impact than at present. Regulatory structures are 
largely unchanged. 
Institutions continue to operate broadly as at present. Levels of trade, costs and prices continue 
to follow present trends. This includes the continued evolution of existing policy. For 
example, it is assumed that the high costs of German coal are met by direct tax subsidy, rather 
than a levy on electricity prices, resulting in a fall in the price paid by generators from present 
levels. This is due to occur from 1996. 
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Figure 5.1. Structure of scenarios for electricity 
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5.2.2. The increased competition scenario (nTPA) 
Larger consumers (and perhaps distribution companies) have the right, at least in principle, to 
purchase their own imports via the existing transmission system. This results in some degree 
of effective competition. However, distribution companies, supplying smaller consumers, are 
assumed to continue to be subject to the influences of national policy. This influence may be 
explicit if the distribution company does not have access to the network, or may be implicit 
through indirect influence, including via state or municipal ownership. 
The Commission has stated that measures aimed at achieving public service obligations must 
be defined to fall into one of five categories: 
(a) security of supply; 
(b) quality of supply; 
(c) regularity of supply; 
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(d) price of supply; 
(e) protection of the environment. 
The scope of these is presently unclear, but for the purpose of this report, it is assumed that 
policy will continue to have an influence in the following areas: 
(a) security of supply and capacity margins, which a distribution company may regard as a 
key issue; 
(b) plant type (technology etc.), including favouring local generation (combined heat and 
power (CHP), autogeneration, etc.); 
(c) diversity of fuel choice, which relates to the distribution company's security of supply; 
(d) sources of fuel, which may be affected by local, regional or national policy concerns: 
(e) environmental objectives (including taxes), which may be subject to strong political 
concern; 
(f) setting of prices to meet social objectives. The issue of the existence of cross-subsidy is 
complicated by difficulties in unambiguously allocating costs. 
For the increased competition scenario to deliver economic benefit it must involve access to 
significant amounts of lower cost generating capacity. For this reason it is assumed that 
purchase of electricity from IPPs or by import becomes a realistic possibility for large 
industrial users. The present physical constraints on the European transmission system are 
partially removed, but some constraints remain. 
The scenario does not extend to ensuring strict merit order despatch across trading nations 
because most trade is assumed to be governed by long-term energy and capacity contracts. 
There are limited changes to the behaviour of existing utilities because national policy 
objectives remain to some extent, and only a part of the market is open to competition. 
However, the transit directive is assumed to become more widely invoked. The increased 
competition scenario allows cost differences to persist because the market remains imperfect. 
Such differences may result from: 
(a) national policy objectives (see above); 
(b) differing tax regimes (e.g. environmental taxes); 
(c) different fuel prices (e.g. due to use of indigenous resources); 
(d) choice of technology; 
(e) encouragement of energy efficiency/CHP/DSM; 
(f) indirect subsidies, including favourable financial terms from the state for debt etc.; 
(g) differences in national regimes, for example in environmental, health and safety 
legislation and enforcement. 
Trade flows are restricted by policy as distribution companies continue to favour local 
generation, subject to cost competitiveness of the national utility. However, costs are expected 
to influence trade flows. If costs of the national utility do not converge to those of potential 
imports and IPPs, there is assumed to be an increase in the amount of imports and IPP 
production bought by the distribution company. 
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A fully functioning single buyer model, incorporating the modifications proposed by the 
Commission, may achieve some of these gains. However, there remain important differences 
of principle between a nTPA environment and a SBM, and this scenario more closely 
resembles nTPA.14 The net effect of the scenario may be that approximately 30% of the 
market becomes somewhat competitive. The figure of 30% was chosen to be in the mid-range 
of the figures under debate (following the Italian proposal designed to overcome the 
negotiating obstacle arising from differences between Member States) when the modelling 
work was carried out in late 1995 and early 1996. It is close to the subsequently agreed figure 
of 33%. 
5.2.3. Open market scenario 
Under this scenario there is full access to the network, both within a country and between 
countries, and all distribution companies and large consumers have the right to buy electricity 
independently from any source. Extending the interpretation of the Transit Directive 
(OJ L 147, 12.6.1991) to apply to a wider range of parties, including those taking at lower 
voltages (e.g. 110 kV), may be a first step towards full TPA. TPA provides access to both 
imports and IPPs within a country. This is assumed to be accompanied by the introduction of 
non-discriminatory optimal despatch, to facilitate the purchase of electricity from other 
sources, and to optimize despatch within the country. National utilities may remain, but they 
are prevented by regulation from exercising market power, and are likely to be horizontally 
and vertically unbundled. The introduction of competition and TPA within any country to 
facilitate EU-wide trade and competition is at least as important in this scenario as the removal 
of restrictions on international trade itself. 
Under full competition the market develops rapidly, with buyers actively seeking more 
favourable terms from producers. Indigenous producers are forced to compete with both 
exports and IPPs selling direct to customers. Novel forms of contract and commercial 
relationship emerge and there is continuing downward pressure on costs. The existence of a 
market makes prices more transparent, and enables all buyers to readily assess whether they 
are paying above the market price for electricity. Consumers buy from the cheapest available 
source as a matter of routine. 
National regulators are likely to be necessary to ensure effective operation of the commercial 
framework, especially access to the transmission system. There may be some need for a 
mechanism to resolve disputes at an international level. 
There are numerous technical and commercial issues involved with the introduction of 
competition (e.g. transmission access and pricing, and the structure of spot markets, where 
these are introduced). These are described further in the Appendices. For the purposes of these 
scenarios it is assumed that the net effect of these is to give unrestricted, transparent buying 
and selling of bulk electricity, with sufficient generating capacity available. It need not include 
a Europe-wide power pool. 
13 
Throughout this report, references to the single buyer model refer only to the French proposal, or modifications of it. 
They do not include the variety of potential structures for a liberalized electricity industry referred to in various contexts 
as single buyer systems, many of which can involve a large amount of competition. 
14 
The report by EWI referred to in the introduction reviews the difference between the SBM and nTPA. 
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This scenario includes the most radical reform, and so provides a useful benchmark against 
which the effects of partial competition can be judged. The market becomes fully competitive 
(except for any remaining restrictions on competitive supply to small consumers), with costs 
forced down to international best practice, and price differentials between markets limited only 
by transport costs. There is continuing downward pressure on costs as consumers optimize 
purchases and technological developments produce lower cost energy. 
5.2.4. Distribution and transmission 
The completion of the single market is assumed to have limited effect on distribution costs, as 
networks are local natural monopolies. The main driver of costs in these sectors will be the 
degree of unbundling, and the national policy and regulatory framework for encouraging 
efficiency. The national policy framework is outside the scope of this study, and so not 
considered. TPA implies unbundling of transmission costs. This may make the present cost 
structure more transparent, and so may place downward pressure on costs in the full 
competition scenario. 
A further limitation on efficiency gains may arise if distribution companies are allowed to pass 
costs through to consumers because the distribution companies will have limited incentives to 
purchase electricity as cheaply as possible. This limitation is likely to be overcome only by 
careful regulation of distribution and supply and the eventual introduction of competitive 
supply to all consumers (as is already scheduled in the UK and Sweden). However, this will be 
a matter for national policy and is outside the scope of this study. 
The natural monopoly characteristics of networks will lead to the need for continuing 
regulatory oversight to ensure that gains for consumers are secured. Experience in the UK has 
shown that regulation is most effective where it acts to stimulate competition and provide 
incentives, rather than seeking to prescribe behaviour in a legalistic manner. 
5.3. Summary of scenarios 
This section summarizes the three scenarios. The main characteristics of the three scenarios 
are structural and the assumptions are summarized in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1. Key structural characteristics of scenarios 
Structural characteristic 
TPA to international transmission capacity 
TPA to national networks 
Non-discriminatory national despatch 
Physical restrictions on trade 
Policy restrictions on trade 
National control over fuel/technology choice 
Equal access to natural resources 
Tax differences/implicit subsidies persist 
Unbundling of transmission costs 
National regulator 
Mechanism for resolving international disputes 
Base case 
scenario 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Increased 
competition 
scenario 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Some 
Some 
No 
Some 
Limited 
Arbitration 
Yes 
Open 
market 
scenario 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Source: modelling assumptions 
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Costs are discussed to converge in the competitive scenarios, and trade restrictions are 
assumed to be removed. The broader economic environment is held constant between the three 
scenarios. The key non-structural assumptions are shown in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2. Other aspects of scenarios 
GDP growth etc. 
% market liberalized" 
Fuel prices 
Cost convergence 
Restrictions on trade 
Additional capital cost 
reduction 
Base case scenario 
Conventional wisdom' 
0 
Exogenous' 
None 
Trade may not exceed 
present levels 
None 
Increased competition 
scenario 
Conventional wisdom' 
30 
Exogenous3 
Differences reduced by 
50% by 2005. 
70% by 2010 
Average of other scenarios 
0-1% p.a. 
Open market 
scenario 
Conventional wisdom' 
100 
Exogenous' 
Difference reduced by. 
70% by 2005. 
90% by 2010 
Unrestricted 
l%p.a. 
Source: modelling assumptions 
' Refers to the conventional wisdom scenario in the Energy Futures to 2020 study. 
: Defined as large customers and distribution companies having access to the network. Full liberalization, including 
competitive supply to residential consumers is not included. 
1 See Chapter 4. 
5.4. Phasing of scenarios 
Each of the scenarios may be examined in isolation with the specified degree of competition 
imposed uniformly across the EU. However, the introduction of these may be phased, with the 
Community moving in steps towards a fully competitive market in a co-ordinated manner: 
Present situation —> increased competition —> open market 
A more complex alternative, which now appears quite likely, is that individual Member States 
introduce competition in different ways at different rates. Some countries may go directly to 
full competition, others may go via an intermediate stage, and others may not reach full 
competition at all. The introduction of different regimes at different times in the various 
Member States clearly creates potential problems of reciprocity: allowing each country to 
determine its own policy, under the subsidiarity principle, would run into limitations because 
of potential distortions to trade. 
For the purpose of this report, we have adopted the simplifying assumption that completion of 
the single market is co-ordinated across the EU, and measures are introduced at a similar rate. 
This allows the boundaries to be assessed, and a central case to be identified. In particular, the 
open market case allows for the full benefits of liberalization, and the base case provides a 
reference point from which benefits may be calculated. The increased competition case 
represents one of a very large number of intermediate states, among which are also those with 
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countries proceeding at different rates. The case of all countries proceeding in a consistent 
fashion in response to the Electricity Directive (OJ L 27, 30.1.1997) is presented here for 
clarity. 
5.5. Assumptions common to all scenarios 
The purpose of the scenarios is to assess the effect of completing the single energy market. To 
achieve this purpose all variables that do not directly influence the consequences of 
completing the single market are held constant. The assumptions for economic variables are 
those made for the conventional wisdom scenario in the Energy Futures to 2020 study, in 
order to retain consistency with other Commission studies. Consequently, the scenarios have a 
number of common assumptions. This allows the effect of policy measures to be isolated from 
the effect of other changes. 
For example, economic growth will not in itself be a key driver for the completion of the 
single energy market: it is an external force not under the control of policy. It is therefore kept 
constant and not changed between scenarios. It is possible that the scenarios would have 
different outcomes under different GDP growth regimes, so these may be examined as 
sensitivities, in each case comparing like with like (e.g. increased competition scenario vs. full 
competition scenario in a high growth scenario, and increased competition scenario vs. full 
competition scenario in a low growth environment). However, the range of uncertainties on 
the changes is sufficiently large that these effects are considered to be within the existing 
range of outcomes. 
It is also recognized that there will be some feedback from the consequences of the scenarios, 
for example the influence of reduced electricity prices on the levels of industrial activity and 
economic growth. However, these effects are considered to be second order for modelling 
purposes, because the effects are much smaller than the overall uncertainty in growth 
forecasts. These feedbacks are therefore excluded from the modelling. 
5.6. Costs and benefits of liberalization 
Until recent years, electricity industries throughout the world tended to be vertically 
integrated, with plant construction and despatch managed by a single entity. Some degree of 
state ownership has also been common, although not universal. However, more recently there 
has been a trend towards introducing greater competition. This has taken three main forms: 
(a) competition in construction of new capacity (IPPs); 
(b) granting access to networks to enable competitive supply to consumers (TPA); 
(c) introducing power pools to ensure competitive despatch. 
The reforms proposed for completing the single energy market include the first two but not the 
third of these measures, which is regarded as a matter for individual Member States under the 
principle of subsidiarity. 
The main motivations for increasing competition around the world have been: 
(a) a desire to introduce private capital into the electricity industry; 
(b) a belief that efficiency gains will result from competition. 
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However, such measures are not always regarded favourably. In particular there is often a 
belief that: 
(a) electricity systems already function reliably and efficiently and there are limited gains to 
be made; 
(b) the costs of introducing competition (set up costs and running costs) are high compared 
with the benefits; 
(c) there is a danger to security of supply; 
(d) a competitive system cannot give proper recognition to long-term strategic interests. 
This section reviews the experience of liberalization in various countries. It then attempts to 
assess the potential benefits of liberalization in Europe and to quantify the effects. The costs 
and potential drawbacks to liberalization are also assessed. 
5.6.1. Experience of liberalization elsewhere 
Experience of liberalization in electricity is limited because the trend towards liberalization is 
recent and not yet widespread. The USA now has a long history of IPPs and these have gained 
a significant market share. IPPs are now becoming common in countries where demand 
growth is very rapid, such as those in southern Asia. Network access to consumers and pooling 
arrangements have also been introduced in some countries, most notably the UK. Norway, 
Argentina and some states in Australia. There are now moves towards greater competition in 
Australia. South Africa, the USA, and parts of South America. However, in many respects, 
these reforms remain in their early stages. 
The reforms have been aimed at introducing competition more widely and establishing a 
structure of incentives and prices to promote low cost production and cost reflective pricing. 
In this way, it was believed that the goals of allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency 
gains could best be achieved.13 Table 5.3 summarizes some of the key early gains in four 
markets where competition has been introduced. In several cases, there are additional gains 
now accruing. In the countries shown in the table competitive pooling formed the centrepiece 
of reforms. 
Yet it is not a simple exercise to separate the benefits achieved by competitive pooling from 
the benefits achieved as a result of introducing competitive pressures more generally. For 
example, privatization accompanied liberalization in the UK and served to encourage the 
privatized electricity companies to seek efficiency gains. Similarly, it is not easy to distinguish 
between underlying trends in efficiency improvement and the incremental gains that can be 
attributed to the introduction of competition. The table focuses on presenting the major 
changes following the introduction of competition which represent a break from past 
15 Under allocatively efficient conditions the prices of industry inputs and outputs are cost-reflective, so that when 
resources are purchased they are not misallocated within the sector or in the economy generally. Thus, when consumers 
make purchase decisions which balance the marginal costs of purchasing a resource with the marginal benefits it 
provides, they do so on the basis of correct measures of costs and benefits. Productive efficiency means that inputs 
(whether or not the inputs have been purchased on an allocatively efficient basis) are used efficiently so that a given 
output is produced with the minimum of inputs. Static productive efficiency refers to short-term operational efficiency, 
while dynamic productive efficiency includes the efficiency with which capital expenditure is made and technological 
improvements introduced. 
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performance and which can (though without formal proof) be attributed to the new 
competitive pressures. 
However, designing competitive markets can involve not only substantial set-up costs but also 
the introduction of significant transaction costs from creating contracts and regulatory 
arrangements that bring together functions which were previously the responsibility of one 
organization. These costs need to be weighed against the prospect of the efficiency gains they 
are designed to achieve. 
The exact benefits achieved from the introduction of competition depend upon the starting 
position in each country, and some of the examples in the table may not be of direct relevance 
to continental European utilities. In particular, power pools are unlikely to be introduced on a 
Europe wide basis. However, the efficiency gains achieved in other countries provide evidence 
of the main types of improvements that can be produced through competition: 
(a) reinforcing the motivation of industry participants to make efficiency gains; and 
(b) providing the appropriate flows of information to support efficient decision-making. 
Examples of sources of gains include: 
(a) productivity gains from: 
(i) improvements in plant performance in terms of availability, thermal efficiency and 
flexibility of running; 
(ii) reduction in manning levels and improvements in MWh sent out per employee ; 
(iii) more cost effective fuel procurement; 
(iv) allocative efficiency gains from more cost reflective pricing and price reductions; 
(b) dynamic efficiency gains from: 
(i) the introduction of new generating technology; 
(ii) rationalization of investment in new capacity. 
Most of these gains appear to flow from the introduction of competition itself rather than from 
any particular organizational arrangements. Power pools do not appear necessary to achieve 
the majority of these gains. The applicability of different types of gains is discussed further 
below. 
5.6.2. Potential sources of gains from competition in Europe 
There is a diversity of potential gains from competition. We have classified these into gains 
from trade and various types of efficiency gains. The efficiency gains are also indirectly 
among the benefits of trade, as increased trade creates competitive pressure to increase 
efficiency. Consequently, all of these gains are potential benefits from completing the single 
energy market. 
Table 5.4 summarizes these gains. Each is discussed further in the next section (5.7). 
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Table 5.3. The benefits of competition 
Reform 
Market culture 
England & Wales 
Open access pool 
Privatization 
Unbundling 
• 
Argentina 
Open access pool 
Privatization 
Unbundling 
V 
Norway 
Open access pool 
Unbundling 
·/ 
New South Wales 
Closed pool 
Business units 
separate 
• 
Productive efficiency gains 
Labour 
Fuel 
Plant 
performance 
Dynamic 
efficiency 
gains 
Allocative 
efficiency 
gains 
50% reduction in numbers bv 
NP/PG: NP output per 
employee increased from 
7.2 GWh p.a. in 1989/90 to 
17.4 GWh in 1994/95 
Reduction of coal subsidy by 
UK£ 1 bn p.a.: NP reduced 
fuel costs from 1.9 p/kWh in 
1990/91 to 1.7p/kWh 
(current prices) in 1993/94 
Exploitation of lower cost gas 
NE availability improved 
substantially: 46% increase in 
AGR output 
Reduction in expenditure on 
repairs and maintenance: for 
NP reduced from UK£ 250 m 
in 1992 to UK£ 213 m in 
1994 
Increased flexibility of plant 
operation 
8.5 GW coal plant retired; 
9.5 GW new CCGTs from 
existing generators and IPPs 
with consequent 
improvements in thermal 
efficiency: 38% for coal to 
around 50% for CCGTs 
Half hourly pool prices 
responding to demand/supply 
conditions introduced, though 
some problems with 
dominance of NP/PG 
Average real price reductions 
of 10% 
30-35% reduction in 
numbers at C.Puerto and 
C.Costanera: C.Puerto 
increased capacity per 
employee from 0.47 MW 
in 1990 to 1.21 MW in 
1994 
n.a. 
Thermal plant 
unavailability reduced 
from 60% to 20% 
Private sector investment 
in 1231 MW plant 
Neuquen against pool 
price risk 
Wholesale price reduction 
of 40% from winter 1993 
to summer 1995 
20% reduction at 
Oslo Energi 
n.a. 
n.a. 
Reduction in annual 
rate of investment in 
generation by over 
50% while 
consumption 
increased at under 
2% p.a. 
Contract price 
reduction of 38% 
(partly due to water 
availability) and for 
domestic consumers 
of 2%. reduction of 
cross-subsidy 
between industrial 
and domestic 
sectors 
n.a. 
n.a. 
Reduction in forced 
outage rate from 6% 
to 5% 
Improvement in 
thermal efficiency 
and operational 
procedures 
Increased flexibility 
of plant operation 
including two-
shifting 
n.a. 
Pool prices 
dominated by coal 
contracts but 
reflecting load 
shape 
Notes: NP = National Power; PG = PowerGen: NE = Nuclear Electric; AGR = Advanced gas-cooled reactor. 
Central Puerto and Central Costanera are main successor companies to SEGBA. 
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5.6.3. Conditions necessary to realize these gains 
As noted above, the experience of liberalization in other countries has tended to involve 
pooling arrangements. It is therefore difficult to separate which gains are due to competition in 
general and which are specific to the establishment of pools. Based on our knowledge and 
experience of these markets in practice, we believe that pooling arrangements are not 
necessary to realize most of these gains, although in some circumstances it may be desirable or 
may reinforce the gains. Gains identified as specific to pooling are excluded from Table 5.4. 
For example, pooling provides strong incentives for increasing plant availability and reducing 
fuel costs for existing plant. TPA is unlikely to be sufficient for all of the potential gains in 
these areas to be realized and such gains are thus excluded. Other benefits, such as gains to 
allocative efficiency, may be realized under TPA, but to a more limited extent than under a 
system involving pooling. 
Table 5.5 shows the gains we have assumed to apply in each scenario following the 
classification shown in Table 5.4. The introduction of IPPs and network access is likely to 
create many of the conditions for gains to be realized. 
Table 5.4. Gains from liberalization 
Trade 
• Use of least cost plant 
across countries 
• Facilitation of trade 
with Eastern Europe 
• Reduced plant margin 
due to greater 
interconnection 
• Ability to exploit 
differences in times of 
peak demand 
• Siting of plant in least 
cost country 
Allocative 
efficiency 
• Reduced cross subsidies 
between classes of consumer 
Productive 
efficiency 
• Lower operating costs 
Dynamic 
efficiency 
• Lower construction 
costs, reduced cost 
overruns, etc. 
• Fuel choice on 
economic grounds 
• Optimal siting of new 
plant 
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Table 5.5. Gains under each scenario 
Potential gain 
Use of least cost plant across countries 
Facilitation of trade with Eastern Europe 
Reduced plant margin due to greater interconnection 
Ability to exploit differences in times of peak demand 
Siting of plant in least cost country 
Reduced cross-subsidies between classes of consumer 
Lower operating costs 
Lower construction costs, reduced cost overruns, etc. 
Fuel choice on economic grounds 
Optimal siting of new plant 
Base case scenario 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Intermediate 
competition 
scenario 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Some 
Some 
No 
Open market 
scenario 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
5.7. Preliminary quantifications of sources of gains 
Each of these effects is now described in turn. Preliminary quantifications of the effects are 
described, based on approximate assumptions about the scale of potential gains. More detailed 
quantifications of the effects of liberalization are described in the subsequent sections on 
modelling. 
Initial analysis is presented here to develop basic indications of the orders of magnitude of 
gains, and to assist in identifying the major sources of gains. These preliminary quantifications 
also give a benchmark against which modelling results can be judged, but do not directly 
affect the modelling itself. The estimates are based on broad judgements of the magnitude of 
efficiency savings, drawing on cost and price comparisons and the experience of liberalization 
elsewhere. Such estimates are inevitably judgemental, even with the use of best available 
evidence. Experience in the UK and elsewhere, where efficiency gains have been larger than 
expected, provides evidence of the difficulty of making reliable estimates of the scale of gains 
in advance. Given these uncertainties we believe that simple and transparent estimates of this 
nature offer useful insight into the scale and sources of gains. 
Quantifications are based on a total cost for new baseload generation (the long-run incremental 
cost of new plant) of ECU 0.04/kWh. This includes operating, fuel and investment costs and a 
return on capital. The cost would be higher for new midload plant, but new plant usually goes 
into baseload, and midload demand is usually met by older plant with partially or fully 
amortized capital costs. Demand in the EU in 2000 is expected to be 2,500 TWh, giving a 
total long-run cost of generation, adopting this simplification, of ECU 100 billion p.a. This is a 
very large sum, and the savings achievable are therefore large in absolute terms, even if they 
are only a small percentage of the total. Specifically each 1% saving in total costs results in a 
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saving of ECU 1 billion p.a. in the long term. Putting in a higher cost for midload and peak 
capacity would clearly increase the figure, and thus the absolute savings derived below 
(provided they remain constant in percentage terms), so this figure may be taken as a lower 
bound. 
Distribution costs are assumed to be fixed, and any savings on unit transmission costs or 
reduction in losses from better optimization are ignored. Fuel costs are also assumed to be 
fixed and to comprise 25% of total generation costs. Non-fuel operating costs account for 15% 
of the total, and capital costs the remaining 50%.I6 
The gains from each source are outlined and summarized in Table 5.7, which also shows the 
extent to which they are expected to apply in each scenario. 
5.7.1. Benefits of trade 
Use of least cost plant across countries.1' Increased interconnection will allow the optimal 
despatch of plant across countries. However there will be transport costs to be paid. The 
savings from this source are not expected to be large. For example, assuming that a 10% 
saving on non-fuel variable costs is achievable, and that this applies to additional trade 
equivalent to 5% of total generation, implies a saving of ECU 0.1 billion p.a. 
Facilitation of trade with Eastern Europe and Norway. Trade with countries outside the EU 
may be made easier by the liberalization of markets. In particular, there is potential for 
expanded trade with Norway and exports from plant in Poland located close to low cost coal 
supplies. However, again the effect of this is likely to be small provided that generation within 
the EU is efficient. This is because savings will not be large compared with the cost of 
efficient generation in the EU since the cost of fuel transport is a small proportion of total 
costs. Assuming an additional 6 GW (i.e. about 10% of a large country's system) of baseload 
imports (40 TWh) with a total saving of 10% over indigenous production generates savings of 
ECU 0.2 billion p.a. Savings on imports from Norway may be greater than this, but there is 
limited potential for additional exports without diverting power from indigenous use in energy 
intensive industries, and so far there has been an apparent reluctance to do this. There may, 
however, be indirect benefits if the threat of imports causes EU generators to increase their 
efficiency. 
Reduced plant margin due to greater interconnection. This is potentially a more significant 
source of gains. Plant margins are required to cope with unexpected demand peaks and 
unexpected plant outages. Exceptionally high demand on two systems simultaneously is less 
likely than on one (although it may occur, e.g. due to widespread cold weather), and 
simultaneous plant outages on two systems would also be very rare. Greater interconnection 
can therefore be expected to result in cost savings due to avoided investment in new capacity. 
16 
17 
The breakdown of costs is based on a large coal plant. Gas has proportionately higher fuel costs, nuclear plant 
proportionately higher capital costs. 
This is in no way related to Least Cost Planning, which refers to integrated consideration of supply and demand side 
investments. 
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We have estimated savings on the basis that additional interconnection eliminates the need for 
spare capacity sufficient to cover two large units becoming unavailable. Two large units are 
assumed to be equivalent to 4% of total capacity (based on the maximum size of generating 
units in the larger markets, e.g. two 1,000 MW units on a 50 GW system). The avoided spare 
capacity is assumed to be reflected in avoided investment in gas turbines. Total EU generating 
capacity is some 550 GW, and if 4% of this (22 GW) were to be avoided at a gas turbine 
capital cost of ECU 300/kW, this would result in an annualized saving of ECU 0.7 billion p.a. 
If capacity margins were further reduced savings would be correspondingly greater. 
Ability to exploit differences in times of peak demand. System peaks in different countries or 
regions do not necessarily coincide and interconnection may help balance this, again reducing 
the need for capacity. Some of these gains are already being realized, for example due to the 
interconnector between France and the UK. The gains are similar in character to the reduced 
need for plant margin noted above, because additional capacity is required at the peak. There 
will also be some additional gains from least cost despatch. However, to avoid double 
counting, savings from this source are assumed to be small. 
Optimal siting of plant. The tendency towards more open trade may result in the siting of plant 
outside the country in which the power is consumed. The siting of plant in Eastern Europe is a 
special case of this. However, it is not clear that any country within the EU should have a 
natural comparative advantage: similar plant is likely to be built, often by the same companies 
constructing IPPs under turnkey contracts. In view of the high costs of long-distance electricity 
transport (mainly due to power losses), the long-term trend seems likely to be towards siting 
plant close to demand. However, as noted above, the potential to site plants elsewhere will put 
competitive pressure on generators to conform to international best practice. This is likely to 
result in efficiency gains. The effects of trade in this respect are therefore likely to be 
significant, but indirect, and they are considered under the heading of efficiency gains. 
5.7.2. Efficiency gains 
Reduced cross subsidies between classes of consumer. The benefits here will arise from 
correct price signals leading to efficient allocation of resources within the economy. In 
particular the reduction in subsidies to large industrial consumers and to residential 
consumers, where these exist, will result in long-term gains. 
Immediate effects may not be large. Demand for electricity is relatively price inelastic, and for 
commercial consumers electricity is only a small component of costs, and therefore not a key 
determinant of business profitability. For energy intensive industry, the capital costs are sunk 
and therefore price rises are less likely to cause premature closure, although they may deter the 
siting of new plant. Furthermore any price rises due to the removal of cross-subsidies are 
likely to be compensated for in the medium term by efficiency gains. 
In the light of these considerations, gains from the removal of cross-subsidy appear likely to be 
long-term, and partly indirect. There must also be some question as to the extent that such 
gains will be realized, especially if distribution companies are not granted rights to buy 
electricity freely under TPA. The retention of any exclusive market share may result in the 
retention of the ability of the incumbent generator to continue cross-subsidy, short-term gains 
may be further reduced by temporary economic dislocation (stranded assets and redundant 
resources). 
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Lower operating costs. If competition leads to increased efficiency, then operating costs may 
be directly reduced. This is a potentially very large source of gains where there are significant 
inefficiencies at present. A potential saving of 10% on non-fuel operating costs leads to 
savings of ECU 1.5 billion p.a. Such estimates seem modest in view of the increases in 
efficiency that have followed liberalization in the UK. However, pressure to reduce operating 
costs is expected to be less severe in the intermediate competition scenario and assumed to 
apply only to the 30% of the market open to competition. 
Lower construction costs, reduced cost overruns, etc. This is potentially a source of very large 
gains. A 10% saving on the 50% or so of total costs accounted for by capital leads to potential 
savings of ECU 5 billion p.a. (i.e. 5% of the total) in the open market scenario. This includes 
both avoided investment costs and avoided interest payments (return to debt and equity) on 
avoided investment. These savings may be expected to apply to the 30% or so of the market 
open to competition in the increased competition scenario. There is also likely to be a reduced 
effect on the remaining 70% of the market. In all, savings in the increased competition 
scenario are estimated as 65% of those in the open market scenario. 
Table 5.6. Preliminary estimates of sources of potential gains 
Potential gain 
Use of least cost plant across 
countries 
Facilitation of trade with Eastern 
Europe 
Reduced plant margin due to greater 
interconnection 
Ability to exploit differences in times 
of peak demand 
Siting of plant in least cost country 
Reduced cross-subsidies between 
classes of consumer 
Lower operating costs 
Lower construction costs, reduced 
cost overruns, etc. 
Fuel choice on economic grounds 
Optimal siting of new plant 
TOTAL 
Amount at stake 
(billion ECU) 
15 (total operating 
costs) 
1.6 (40 TWh at 
ECU 0.04/kWh) 
6.6(costof22GWof 
GT capacity) 
Small 
Indirect 
Small, long-term 
15 (total operating 
costs) (5 in nTPA) 
50 (32 in nTPA) 
15 (premium for 
uneconomic fuel 
choice) 
Indirect 
Magnitude of saving 
10% on 5% of 
generation 
10% of total costs 
Annuitized saving on 
this much capital 
( 10% annuity factor) 
Small 
Indirect 
Small, long-term 
10% cost reduction 
due to competition 
10% cost reduction 
due to competition 
20% of total plant 
now chosen on 
economic grounds 
that othenvise would 
not be 
Indirect 
Estimated 
saving under 
TPA 
(billion ECU 
p.a.) 
0.1 
0.2 (plus 
indirect 
benefits) 
0.7 
Small 
Indirect 
Small, long-
term 
1.5 
5 
3 
Indirect 
10.4 
Estimated 
saving under 
nTPA 
(billion ECU 
p.a.) 
0.1 
0.2 
0.7 
Small 
Indirect 
Small, 
long-term 
0.5 
3.2 
2.0 
6.7 
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Fuel choice on economic grounds. This is a further source of large potential gains. We assume 
that the optimal choice of generating technology leads to a 15% saving in costs, based on the 
difference between the cost of a new coal plant and of a new CCGT. We further assume that 
20% of present plant is chosen sub-optimally for new generating capacity. This may be an 
underestimate in view of the large differences in plant mix within Europe, and the limited 
evidence to date of the willingness by utilities to invest in CCGT, although this is clearly the 
lowest cost choice. This leads to potential savings of ECU 3 billion p.a. Again, savings in the 
increased competition scenario are estimated as 65% of those in the open market scenario. As 
noted, such gains exclude savings from using cheaper fuel for the same type of plant as a 
result of more effective purchasing, although clearly there is some potential for such gains. 
Optimal siting of new plant. Gains here are probably limited, although there may be an indirect 
effect in encouraging cost savings, because the threat of locating plant elsewhere may force 
costs down. 
In total these differences suggest total available savings of about 10% from liberalization. 
5.7.3. Effect on consumption 
Table 5.7 shows estimates of long-run elasticities of demand for electricity. Elasticities are 
below 1 in all sectors, i.e. a 1% change in the price causes demand to change by less than 1%. 
These estimates are consistent with others. The use of GDP to forecast demand growth in most 
models emphasizes that demand is not especially sensitive to price. 
Table 5.7. Long-run price elasticity of electricity demand (% change in demand/% 
change in price) 
Sector 
Residential 
Commercial 
Industrial 
Long-run price elasticity 
-0.6 
-0.2 
-0.4 
Source: Helm, Kay and Meyer, The Market for Energy, Clarendon Press, 1989. 
If the cost savings achieved are reflected in an equivalent price decrease, the industrial 
electricity price will fall by almost 10% (as this is only a little above the cost of generation). 
Residential and commercial prices will fall by slightly less in percentage terms, as prices are 
higher because of additional distribution costs. 
Changes in demand can be approximately estimated on the basis of the 10% cost saving in 
generation, the prices shown below, and the elasticities in the table. These are weighted by the 
sectoral demand data given in the previous section. This leads to an overall estimated change 
in consumption of 2%. This is equivalent to about 1-2 years' demand growth. 
5.8. Costs of liberalization 
The costs of the administrative system necessary in a liberalized market are significant. The 
major cost is in operating pooling arrangements, which costs less than UK£100 million p.a. in 
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England and Wales.18 However, this includes many costs which would be incurred anyway in 
planning despatch, and this is not part of the proposals presently under consideration. The 
regulation of access and access charges is much less expensive. The cost of regulation in the 
UK (which includes all aspects of regulation, including consumer protection etc.) is 
UK£ 10 million p.a.19 The cost of regulation in Norway is significantly lower than this. 
Regulation of access and access pricing accounts for only a modest proportion of this. The 
cost of introducing the proposed access regimes should therefore be small, although the 
companies themselves will also incur modest additional costs. 
The view has been where markets have been liberalized, that the modest administration costs 
of liberalization are exceeded by the potential gains. The main qualification to this is that there 
is a need to avoid the very cumbersome regulation and high degree of litigation that has 
occurred in the USA. There will be a need to ensure that any such problems are avoided 
during the implementation of reform in Europe. There appears to be some danger of 
significant costs in view of the continuing resistance of some Member States to the 
liberalization process, which may lead to extensive disputes. However, the costs of 
liberalization are in any case likely to be significantly outweighed by the gains. 
5.9. Price comparison 
In order further to gauge the likely potential for savings from completion of the single market, 
we have compared electricity prices across Europe. These are shown in Table 5.8 for each of 
the main sectors. The variations between countries appear much larger than can be accounted 
for by differences in national circumstances or exchange rate fluctuations alone. Prices to the 
residential sector vary by almost 50% from the lowest, prices to industrial consumers by over 
70%, and prices to commercial customers by over 100% (Greece is excluded from these 
comparisons due to the anomalously low prices). In some cases these differences clearly 
represent different cost allocations. For example, Belgium had among the highest residential 
prices but among the lowest industrial prices. However, this does not account for all the 
differences: for example, prices in Germany are high in all sectors, and prices in the 
Netherlands are low. 
In many cases the differences are significantly greater than the savings of approximately 10% 
or so identified as available from completion of the single market. This suggests that the price 
and cost convergence that would be expected to follow from completion of the single energy 
market could yield significant gains, and that the estimate of 10% derived in this section may 
be conservative. 
We have also examined the level of price reductions achieved in the past few years (see Table 
5.9). For a mature commodity such as electricity the rate of price reduction would be expected, 
broadly speaking, to match the rate of economic and productivity growth in the country 
concerned, excluding exogenous factors such as world fuel prices. This should be the case 
18 
The direct cost of the pool itself is some UK£ 30 million p.a. 
19 
Annual budget for the Office of Electricity Regulation (Offer). The utilities themselves may also incur additional costs 
of approximately this amount. 
20 
Fuel prices should not have been quite stable since 1987. falling slowly in real terms approximately in line with the 
trend suggested, so this is not a major influence over the period shown. 
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even if operations are already efficient. The potential gains for inefficient operations will be 
greater. We see that some countries have secured significant price reductions, notably the 
Netherlands and Ireland. However, in other cases the average price fall across sectors is less 
than 2%. The absence of large price reductions in these countries again raises questions about 
whether prices are as low as they would be in a competitive market with full pressure to 
reduce costs. 
The position of the UK warrants specific comment as it is the market with the longest 
experience of liberalization. Prices are among the lowest in the residential sector and about the 
middle of the range for the industrial sector. Average price reductions over the last five years 
are towards the middle of the range (better than average for industrial and commercial 
customers, worse than average for residential customers). However until recently almost all 
the gains form liberalization have gone to shareholders (who have seen very large returns) 
rather than consumers, reflecting the favourable terms put in place at the time of privatization 
to ensure its success. Over the next five years, many of the gains will feed through to 
consumers as competition increases and regulation tightens for the natural monopoly parts of 
the business. For example, there have already been large reductions in charges for 
transmission and distribution, which will continue, and falls in electricity generating costs 
should also flow to consumers to a greater extent as contractual arrangements expire. It is 
estimated that prices to the residential sector will fall by some 20% between 1995 and 2000 
(see Appendices for forecasts of price reduction and estimates of efficiency gains in the UK). 
Price falls to industrial and commercial consumers are also expected to be significant. This 
will give the UK among the lowest prices in Europe in all sectors. Again, these considerations 
suggest that the estimate of savings of 10% or so of costs is conservative. 
Table 5.8. Comparison of electricity prices in Europe in 1995 (1990 UK pence per 
kWh) 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
Residential 
(excl. VAT) 
9.68 
7.94 
8.72 
9.83 
3.06 
6.51 
7.70 
8.58 
6.21 
7.53 
7.56 
7.26 
Commercial 
5.30 
2.91 
4.45 
7.31 
2.19 
4.68 
6.34 
6.26 
3.41 
4.31 
4.31 
4.10 
Industrial 
2.91 
2.63 
2.85 
4.74 
1.49 
3.00 
3.50 
3.94 
2.74 
3.31 
3.06 
3.12 
Source: LE estimates based on LIK Electricity Association data. 
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Table 5.9. Reduction in prices 1990-95 (percentage p.a. real terms excluding VAT) 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
Residential 
(excl. VAT) 
1.6 
3.2 
0.7 
1.2 
4.6 
3.1 
n.a. 
2.2 
3.5 
-1.2 
0.0 
0.3 
Commercial 
0.7 
4.7 
-1.2 
1.3 
4.7 
2.9 
n.a. 
-0.5 
3.7 
1.9 
2.6 
3.8 
Industrial 
1.6 
3.4 
-0.9 
2.0 
6.8 
2.9 
n.a. 
0.9 
1.8 
2.6 
3.0 
3.3 
Source: LE estimates based on UK Electricity Association data. 
Note: Negative number indicates price rise. 
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6. Modelling of scenarios 
This chapter describes the use of models to enhance and refine the estimates of the savings 
available from completion of the single market for electricity. Two well established models of 
the European electricity industry have been used: 
(a) the EIREM model developed by EWI; 
(b) the MIDAS model developed by NTUA. 
The assumption on data input (plant capital costs etc.) are described in Chapter 4 and in the 
Appendices, and are consistent between the two models. 
6.1. Modelling approach 
The EIREM model calculates the least cost way of meeting a specified level of demand from a 
mixture of generating plant and power imports. Unit costs of various technologies, fuel prices 
and electricity demand are treated as exogenous variables in the model. The cost of new 
transmission capacity is explicitly included. This allows the magnitude of changes in costs and 
trade patterns arising from the scenarios to be identified. EIREM treats the expansion of 
generation and transmission capacities and their utilization within a unified framework. 
Building and utilization decisions over the entire time horizon are made so as to minimize the 
present value of overall system costs of meeting a given demand pattern, assuming perfect 
foresight with respect to cost parameters and fuel prices. Resulting expansions of transmission 
capacity are rational (according to this criterion) even if utilization rates may drop in the long 
run. Thus, transmission capacity expansions are entirely a consequence of cost differences 
between neighbouring areas. EIREM assumes 10% transmission losses per 1,000 kilometres. 
Italy is treated as an exogenous variable in the model because Italy already has a large import 
share, which is unlikely to increase even under competition. Even if this were to happen for 
strictly economic reasons, it would most likely be avoided for political reasons (national 
independence). Analysis based on cost minimization alone is therefore likely to give a 
misleading picture. The UK is also treated exogenously because its electricity system is 
already liberalized, and therefore is a special case. 
The MIDAS model is more elaborate, and well suited to refining the results. It covers all 
energy sectors and ensures that results for the electricity sector are reasonable in terms of 
interaction with other sectors. The MIDAS model also provides a cross check that the trade 
flows identified in the EIREM are consistent. Among the major advantages of the MIDAS 
model is that it includes probabilistic elements, including system outages. This allows it to be 
used to model the cost savings arising from increased interconnection. 
The way the models have been used, and their interactions, are shown in Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1. Structure of model runs 
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6.1.1. Stage 1 : definition of common assumptions 
The assumptions for the MIDAS and EIREM models were made consistent, choosing the 
same value for each key input variable. The key variables are: 
(a) unit capital costs for each type of plant, 
(b) unit operating costs for each type of plant, 
(c) fuel price assumptions, 
(d) discount rates, 
(e) generating capacities, 
(f) thermal efficiencies, 
(g) plant life, 
(h) exogenous assumptions imposing restrictions on plant construction (e.g. restrictions on 
commissioning of new nuclear plant). 
The assumptions are those used in the Energy Futures to 2020 study for the Commission. 
Quantitative assumptions are also broadly consistent with independent estimates from London 
Economics and EWI. The major difference is that London Economics make slightly more 
favourable assumptions on costs and thermal efficiencies of CCGT plant. However, such 
assumptions would only further strengthen the already very strong position of gas in the 
marketplace. 
The EIREM model also requires that demand is specified. This is taken from the conventional 
wisdom scenario in the Energy Futures to 2020 study. 
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The modelling treats the UK and Italy as exogenous due to their special characteristics. The 
UK is already close to being a fully liberalized market, and most of the remaining barriers to 
competition will erode over time. In 1998 supply to the residential sector is to be opened to 
competition and contracts for generation based on indigenous coal generation are due to 
expire. This should make the UK market at least as competitive as that envisaged under the 
TPA scenario. It is therefore considered appropriate to maintain the UK unchanged between 
the three scenarios. There may be additional opportunities for UK exports to continental 
Europe, but in practice these seem likely to be small, and it seems more probable that gas will 
be exported to IPPs in Europe rather than IPPs being built in the UK for export. 
The situation in Italy is also assumed to be policy driven. At present it imports large amounts 
of power, and the presumption is that this would not increase under other scenarios. Italy is 
assumed to achieve self-sufficiency by 2005 in line with ENEL and UNÍPEDE assumptions. 
By this.time costs are assumed to be sufficiently harmonized to avoid further trade flows. 
Savings derived from the EIREM model are adjusted assuming similar unit savings to those 
achieved elsewhere. 
6.1.2. Stage 2: modelling of scenarios using EIREM 
The EIREM model has been used to estimate the effects of liberalization under the defined 
input assumptions. The EIREM model is a cost optimization model, producing the lowest cost 
means of meeting demand. The scenarios are represented as follows: 
(a) Open market (TPA). An unconstrained run of the model corresponds to the full 
competition scenario. Costs are shown to converge close to common levels (90% of 
present differences being eliminated) equivalent to present best practice and there are no 
restrictions on trade. A general decrease in capital costs of 1% p.a. is also included as a 
separate case. 
(b) Increased competition (nTPA). In the negotiated TPA scenario there is some 
convergence of costs, and import restrictions are reduced from present levels, but some 
cost differences persist. Cost differences are assumed to be reduced by 70% over the 
period 2000-2010. Trade restrictions are entered exogenously between present levels 
and those in the full competition scenario. 
(c) Present situation. In the present situation, costs continue at present levels, and trade is 
restricted to present levels. 
6.1.3. Stage 3 : incorporation of the trade flows in MIDAS 
The MIDAS model is very elaborate, and for practical reasons it treats each country 
individually. Trade flows are specified off line to be consistent with the results for each 
country. This is clearly to some extent an iterative process. 
The trade flows from the EIREM model are incorporated into MIDAS, along with the other 
input assumptions. 
6.1.4. Stage 4: MIDAS run to obtain the effects of the scenarios 
MIDAS is run to obtain the outcomes of the scenarios. The results are generally consistent 
with those of EIREM. As would be expected with two different models, there are minor 
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differences in output. However, these are mainly country specific and do not affect the overall 
picture. 
6.1.5. Stage 5: high gas case 
EIREM has also been run with a gas price constant throughout the life of the model. This 
shows a very high penetration of gas. EIREM was used for this case rather than MIDAS 
because it treats the European system as a whole in a straightforward fashion. 
6.1.6. Stage 6: high interconnection case 
High interconnection has been modelled by assuming that a lower level of national system 
security is acceptable than would be the case in the absence of interconnection because 
additional interconnection provides additional back-up. The MIDAS model has a probabilistic 
element and is therefore able to examine the probability of loss of load on the system (in terms 
of hours per year). The effect of interconnection is modelled by allowing this to increase in the 
absence of interconnection, assuming that interconnection would in practice prevent this from 
occurring. 
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7. Results of modelling work 
This chapter describes the results of the modelling work. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 summarize the 
results for the key economic variables of prices, costs, consumption and trade. This shows 
gains under the intermediate competition scenario, with further gains under the open market 
scenario. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 show results, respectively, with and without cost savings in 
capital and operating costs, a major source of potential gains. Savings are clearly much 
greater, in Table 7.1, which includes additional capital cost saving. 
These estimates are from the modelling, and are broadly consistent with the approximate 
estimates shown in Chapter 5 showing gains of ECU 4-10 billion p.a.. about half of which is 
attributable to reduced construction and operating costs. The majority of the remaining savings 
are due to optimal fuel choice. Increased system interconnection will also contribute to gains. 
The savings are long-run savings. Electricity generating plant has a long operational life, so 
gains from reduced investment costs take a long time to realize in full, because it takes many 
years for all plant to be replaced by new investment. 
The remainder of this chapter considers the results in more detail. The results from the EIREM 
and MIDAS models are considered together, as the results from the two models are broadly 
consistent. 
7.1. Prices 
The issue of prices is not directly addressed by the EIREM model. We have adopted the 
assumption that price changes reflect cost changes. The change in prices between the scenarios 
is therefore calculated as equal to the change in the average costs of supplying electricity. 
This is an average effect and there may be indirect effects on sectors not able to gain access to 
the network due to a redistribution of prices. For example, under nTPA and TPA prices to 
large industrial consumers are expected to become more cost reflective, as they are able to buy 
directly from generators. If the price is above cost they will choose to buy directly, and the 
existence of more transparent pricing is likely to make existing utilities increasingly unable 
and unwilling to subsidize industrial consumers, although a desire to retain market share may 
lead to predatory pricing in some instances. 
Distribution companies will continue to retain their ability to set prices which are not cost 
reflective to the market segments. This is because they will be able to disguise their allocation 
of costs etc., since charges for access to distribution networks will not be transparent. 
However, their potential to do this will be more restricted if they have the ability to buy direct, 
because prices for different load patterns will become more transparent. 
Under full TPA, prices for bulk electricity will become fully cost reflective as the market 
becomes much more competitive and transparent. However, other elements of the chain, in 
particular distribution, will continue to lack transparency for the foreseeable future, and be 
subject to varying cost allocation. There is, therefore, likely to be some retention of cross-
subsidies between different consumer groups. 
As noted in the preceding chapter, there are expected to be indirect long-term gains in 
allocative efficiency, but these are not treated by the model. 
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Table 7.1. Key results of scenarios: including reduction of construction costs due to 
competition 
Price difference from base 
case (average total costs 
ECU/MWh long term) 
Total cost savings (billion 
ECU p.a.. equal discount 
rate, long term) 
Consumption' 
Volume of trade (TWh 
p.a.) 
nTPA 
1. 
Generation 
Transmission 
Distribution 
2000 
2010 
8 
4.5 
0.04 
0 (considered fixed) 
0-2% 
192 
192 
TPA 
4.0 
10.0 
0.08 
0 (considered fixed) 
1-3% 
261 
264 
1 From off-line calculation/MIDAS model. 
Table 7.2. Key results of scenarios: excluding reduction of construction costs due to 
competition 
Price difference from base 
case (average total costs 
ECU/MWh long term) 
Total cost savings (billion 
ECU p.a.. equal discount 
rate, long term) 
Consumption' 
Volume of trade (TWh 
p.a.) 
nTPA 
1.4 
Generation 
Transmission 
Distribution 
2000 
2010 
3.6 
0.03 
0 (considered fixed) 
0-2% 
175 
162 
TPA 
2.1 
5.4 
0.06 
0 (considered fixed) 
1-3% 
217 
193 
' From off-line calculation/MIDAS model. 
7.2. Costs 
Non-fuel costs fall in the nTPA and TPA cases, reflecting the effect of increased competition. 
Fuel costs are exogenous, and change in line with the assumptions reported in Chapter 5 
above. They do not vary between scenarios. 
The assumptions show that a rise in gas prices causes gas fuelled capacity to become 
uncompetitive with coal fuelled technology after 2005, with a consequent reduction in the 
amount of new gas fired capacity that is commissioned. The idea that gas will become 
uncompetitive appears potentially unrealistic in view of the supply cost analysis presented in 
the gas work, and an alternative scenario with lower gas prices is described below. This shows 
a continuing growth in the market share of gas. However, other considerations, such as 
security of supply, are likely to prevent gas completely dominating the market for new 
generating capacity, even if its price is very competitive with that of other fuels. 
7.3. Demand 
This is also considered exogenous in the EIREM model. We have therefore not estimated the 
effects on demand here. However, changes would be expected to be small: electricity demand 
is inelastic in response to price changes, and other drivers of demand, especially GDP growth 
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and technological change, are kept constant across the scenarios. This is confirmed by the 
MIDAS model, which includes elasticities. 
7.4. Trade 
Trade tends to increase in the short tenn under TPA as present cost differences can be 
exploited. In the longer term there is a response from the utilities in high cost areas to cut 
costs, and trade decreases in the longer tenn. 
7.5. Costs and fuel shares 
The liberalization of the market tends to lead to convergence of fuel choice across the EU. Gas 
is favoured over coal as long as the gas price remains at present levels, leading to a very large 
increase in the market share of gas in the scenario showing sustained low gas prices. If gas 
prices rise, there is a general switch to favour coal. French nuclear power may also increase its 
market share if the cost advantage shown by some data is realizable in a competitive market. 
Each of the results are now discussed in more detail for the various countries. 
7.5.1. Germany 
In general, one would expect that the share of coal generation (which is capital intensive) is 
reduced and that of gas increased when moving from the present situation to competitive 
scenarios. However, in the case of Germany the possibility of importing in a competitive 
environment leads to a retention of the coal intensive generation structure, which is not 
possible under the base scenarios, imports making up the shortfall. Consequently, the market 
share of coal is less under base case than under competitive scenarios. The dominance of coal 
in the competitive scenarios is further reinforced by the fact that coal-based generation in 
Germany, which is initially rather expensive, becomes cheaper as costs converge to best 
practice. 
7.5.2. France 
In France, both coal and gas are boosted in the longer term by increased competition. The 
reason why this effect occurs only in the longer term is the cunent excess capacity of nuclear 
power. The crucial assumption underlying this result is the cost reduction in non-nuclear 
generation (which is cunently considered more expensive in France). 
7.5.3. Benelux 
Benelux imports large amounts of power from France, Scandinavia and Germany. Import 
restrictions under base case lead to new capacity requirements which are satisfied by gas fired 
units, whereas these capacity expansions can be avoided under competitive scenarios as in 
Germany. Therefore the gas share is higher and the coal share lower under base case than 
under competitive scenarios. As in the case of Germany, coal-based generation increases its 
market share in the course of time because this technology benefits more from cost 
convergence for best practice than does gas-based generation. 
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7.5.4. Austria/Switzerland 
The results for Austria/Switzerland are shaped by the assumption that coal and gas based 
generation is initially more expensive than elsewhere and that under competition, costs are 
reduced substantially. This leads to coal­ and gas­based generation being substantially larger 
under competition than in the base case. 
7.5.5. Spain/Portugal 
In this region, the choice of scenarios has only a small influence on fuel choice, because this 
region is the least expensive one, even in the base case. 
7.6. Import shares 
The import share is greater under the full competition scenario, reflecting the removal of 
restrictions. It is lower under the negotiated TPA scenario, as some restrictions remain, and 
lowest under the present situation. Imports increase to 2000 as present cost differences give 
rise to trade to exploit these. 
Figure 7.1. Share of imports in total demand 
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Figure 7.2 shows the total share of imports in the regions covered by the EIREM model, 
imports expressed as a proportion of total production. After that date the import share starts 
decreasing due to increasing harmonization of costs. Figures in the Appendices show this for 
each country. 
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The situation in each country is now reviewed. 
7.6.1. Germany 
Qualitatively Germany is similar to average. As long as cost differences persist, the import 
share may be as high as 20% under TPA. 
7.6.2. France 
Import share is generally very small (less than 1% until 2010). Under nTPA and TPA 
scenarios it increases significantly after 2010 because the cost advantage of French nuclear 
power is gradually eroded by generation cost reductions in other countries. Yet, in absolute 
terms, the import share remains rather small. 
7.6.3. Benelux 
Qualitatively Belgium is similar to the average. The maximum import share may be some 25% 
under TPA. 
7.6.4. Austria/Switzerland 
The share of import peaks in 2000, then decreases. Eventually, it is smaller in the competitive 
scenarios than in the base case. The reason for this is the assumed cost reduction under 
competition, which does not take place in the base case. 
7.6.5. Spain/Portugal 
This region is a high cost producer on the basis of assumptions derived from the Energy 
Futures to 2020 study. Therefore the single market leads to a strong increase in imports. With 
the cost disadvantage reducing in the course of time, imports decline strongly. 
7.7. Trade and transmission capacities 
The capacity of transmission connecting markets increases greatly under the more competitive 
scenarios. 
The strongest expansion due to the single market concerns the connections France-Benelux 
and France-Germany which presently have a relatively low capacity. The connections 
Germany-Austria/Switzerland and Germany-Benelux do not change, as they already have 
large capacities. The connection between France and Austria/Switzerland almost doubles 
under full competition, and that between France and Iberia increases by some 50% under 
nTPA and full competition. Additional transmission requirements arise in particular with 
respect to French exports. Under TPA substantial additions of transmission capacity from 
France to Germany (5,000 MW), Benelux (6,000 MW), Switzerland/Austria (4,000 MW) and 
Spain/Portugal (1,500 MW) would be required. The explanation for these requirements lies 
almost exclusively in the excess capacity and cost advantage of French nuclear power in the 
short term in combination with the sizes of the conesponding import markets. Such changes 
may, of course, cause political difficulties which reduce the effect from that shown here. 
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The changes in trade flows under competition are summarized on the maps (Figure 7.). These 
show imports and exports (measured in TWh) in 1995 and 2010 under the TPA scenario. 
Detailed figures are shown in Appendices. 
7.8. Requirements for additional transmission links between Member States in the 
Commission's TENs proposals 
Table 7.3 compares the new capacity requirements identified by the modelling with the new 
links planned as part of the TENs programme. A total of 15 GW of new transmission capacity 
are identified as being required under the Commission's proposals. 
Table 7.3. Comparison of proposed and modelled additional capacities 
Country 
Germany­
Denmark 
France­Belgium 
France­Italy 
France­Spain 
Belgium­
Luxembourg 
Spain­Portugal 
Finland­Sweden 
Austria­Italy 
Total 
Details 
Bjaeverskov­
Bentwisch 
Moulaine­
Aubange 
Grande lie— 
Pïossasco 
Cazaril­Aragon 
Aubange­
Bertrange 
Aldeadavila­
Douro Int 
Meson­Lindoso 
Lienz­Sandrigo 
Proposed 
capacity (MW) 
600 
2x 1.100 
2 χ 1,500 
2x 1,600 
1,400 
2.800 
300 
1.500 
15.000 
Modelling of required new capacity (MW) 
Base case 
1.200' 
0 
0 
0 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
400 
nTPA 
1.200 
2.000 
0 
1.500 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
400 
TPA 
1.200 
6.000 
0 
1.500 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
400 
' Scandinavia total. 
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Figure 7.2. Trade flows in TWh under TPA 
1995 
Note: arrow to Spain includes exports to Portugal: arrow to Switzerland includes exports to Austria 
2010 
Note: arrow to Spain includes exports to Portugal: arrow to Switzerland includes exports to Austria 
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The model shows large increases in linkages with Scandinavia being required. The 600 MW 
planned link with Denmark should make a useful contribution to this. The model also shows 
increases in the linkages for France with Spain and Belgium which are in line with the 
Commission's proposals. The model does not show a large increase in capacity between Italy 
and Austria or France (although some increased linkage with Austria is shown). However, 
such links may be required for operational or security of supply reasons that are not reflected 
in the model. Alternatively, there could be a less rapid return to self-sufficiency in Italy than is 
envisaged in the modelling assumptions, and this could result in the requirement for such a 
link. There are other links on which the model does not produce a view because they are 
considered part of integrated regions (e.g. Belgium and Luxembourg are considered together 
in the model). 
As noted, liberalization increases the amount of new capacity required, and in particular the 
links between France, Spain and Belgium are greater in a liberalized environment. 
7.9. High gas case 
The EIREM model has been used to analyse the potential for increased use of gas for 
generation if prices remain low. 
In the main scenario, the percentage of generation from gas rises from its historic level of 6% 
to 14% in 2010, before declining to 22% in 2020. However, in the case of a consistently low 
gas price, the market share of gas in generation reaches 20% by 2010 and 35% by 2020. Such 
very large levels of gas use would clearly cause major security of supply concerns and these 
are addressed in the following chapter. 
7.10. Increased interconnection 
The MIDAS model confirms that increased integration of markets leads to benefits from 
reduced capacity margins. The estimates derived in Chapter 5 are consistent with the 
modelling. 
7.11. Other issues 
7.11.1. Share of'new technologies' (i.e. combined cycle) in overall capacity 
The market scenarios do not necessarily have a significant or unique effect on the share of new 
technologies. Table 4.1 shows the market share of combined cycle technologies under each 
scenario according to the EIREM model. Their share will be highest in Germany and the 
Benelux and somewhat lower in Iberia, whereas in France and Austria/Switzerland it will 
remain quite low. The reason for the latter is the ongoing dominance of nuclear and hydro, 
respectively. Nevertheless, the percentage increase in France and Austria/Switzerland in 2000-
2020 is quite large (growing from a small base). It can be seen that increased competition 
leads to an increase in these technologies - in comparison with the base case - only in France, 
being a low cost region with major export capacity. In the other regions, importing is preferred 
to building additional 'new' capacity. 
The main effect of the scenarios in this respect is to make the high gas use case more likely. 
This would clearly lead to a major increase in the amount of combined cycle plant. 
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7.11.2. Capacity utilization: generation plant 
Table 7.6 shows capacity utilization in each scenario. The change in capacity utilization rates 
in each scenario partly reflects the conesponding changes in fuel shares. For example, in 
Germany, gas combined cycle tends to be used less under increased competition, whereas the 
opposite is the case in France. The utilization rate of conventional hard coal fired plant 
increased in France, the Benelux and Austria/Switzerland under competition because these 
countries experience a cost reduction of this technology. Increased competition leads to a 
lower utilization rate of gas combined cycle in the Benelux and a higher one in 
Austria/Switzerland. 
7.11.3. Capacity utilization: networks 
In the long term, when trade declines, increased competition has little influence on the 
utilization rate of networks. In the intermediate term, when competition induces large trade 
flows, there is in some cases a strong increase in utilization rates. A typical example is the 
case of France. As shown in Table 7.5, increased competition leads to a substantial increase in 
the intermediate-term utilization rate of networks from France. The increase in utilization rates 
takes place in addition to induced capacity additions. Since the expansion of network capacity 
is effectively permanent whereas the increase in trade is generally more short-lived, network 
utilization rates may eventually be smaller under increased competition than in the base case. 
However, the EIREM model, which is based on perfect foresight, ensures that such links are 
still economic even if utilized fully for only a few years. 
7.11.4. Investment in generation 
Table 7.7 shows investment in generation in billions of ECU. Note these figures are 
comparable with Table 7.1, and include the additional savings in investment costs. It should 
also be noted that the savings quoted in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 are long term annualized savings 
and therefore represent the cumulative effect of investment cost savings (annualized), which 
continues to grow beyond the period shown in Table 7.7 (which simply shows an investment 
saving over a particular period). For example, Table 7.7 shows a saving of approximately ECU 
10 billion (or nearly 20%) over the five-year period 2015 to 2000, which is an annualized 
saving of some ECU 1 billion p.a. (assuming an 8% discount rate). If such investment savings 
were realized every five years over a typical investment cycle (based on plant life) of 40 years, 
this would lead to an investment saving of ECU 80 billion.21 This is equivalent to an annual 
cost saving of some ECU 8 billion p.a., including interest payments and return to shareholders. 
In the intermediate term, investment expenditures tend to increase in some cases under 
increased competition because of the capital intensive coal based generation gains share. In the 
long term, unit investment costs converge to best practice, and investment expenditures 
consequently decline under increased competition. Investment requirements are reduced in the 
high gas case. 
21 
Compared with ECU 500 billion or so of total capital tied up in the EU electricity system (assuming an average capital 
cost of ECU 1.000/kW). 
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7.11.5. Investment in networks 
Table 7.8 shows investment in transmission in millions of ECU. Increased competition will 
lead to substantial additional investment in transmission networks in the early years, to 
accommodate increased trade in the medium term. In the longer term, investment in networks 
will not be very much greater under the liberalized scenarios as generation costs converge. 
Table 7.4. Share of 'new' technologies (%) 
Country 
Germany 
France 
Austria/Switzerland 
Benelux 
Iberia 
Scenario 
Base case 
nTPA 
TPA 
Base case 
nTPA 
TPA 
Base case 
nTPA 
TPA 
Base case 
nTPA 
TPA 
Base case 
nTPA 
TPA 
2000 
14.4 
10.5 
10.8 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
25.6 
24.7 
24.9 
0 
0 
0 
2010 
28.3 
26.5 
26.0 
9.1 
10.1 
10.3 
6.8 
6.8 
6.8 
33.2 
36.4 
36.4 
13.3 
12.6 
13.4 
2020 
51.7 
51.7 
51.6 
9.2 
9.9 
10.1 
9.0 
7.2 
6.5 
44.0 
45.6 
46.3 
32.4 
30.9 
30.7 
Source: EIREM model. 
Table 7.5. Capacity utilization of networks - example: exports from France (%) 
France 2010 
Scenario 
Base case 
nTPA 
TPA 
Germany 
63 
72 
89 
Austria/Switzerland 
50 
53 
54 
Benelux 
35 
54 
56 
Iberia 
23 
42 
43 
France 2020 
Scenario 
Base case 
nTPA 
TPA 
Germany 
50 
47 
43 
Austria/Switzerland 
53 
38 
28 
Benelux 
33 
37 
35 
Iberia 
27 
32 
26 
Source: EIREM model. 
σο 
o 
Table 7.6. Capacity utilization (hours per year), 2020 
Coal 
IGCC 
CCGT 
Brown coal 
OilCC 
OCGT 
Base 
case 
7.148 
7,617 
6.762 
7,437 
4,992 
0 
Germany 
nTPA 
7.148 
7.617 
6,762 
7.437 
4.453 
0 
TPA 
7.148 
7,617 
6.762 
7,437 
4.183 
0 
Base 
case 
6,015 
0 
0 
0 
1.058 
6.245 
France 
nTPA 
6.519 
0 
0 
0 
1.367 
6,293 
TPA 
6,984 
0 
0 
0 
1.569 
6,294 
Austria/Switzerland 
Base 
case 
1,503 
0 
0 
0 
1,099 
7.513 
nTPA 
5,785 
0 
0 
0 
984 
7,513 
TPA 
6,490 
0 
0 
5,089 
1.856 
7.513 
Benelux 
Base 
case 
3.995 
0 
0 
0 
6,580 
7,515 
nTPA 
7.166 
0 
6.027 
0 
4.955 
7,515 
TPA 
7.166 
0 
6.027 
0 
4707 
7.515 
Iberia 
Base 
case 
7.157 
7.617 
0 
0 
5,473 
7.504 
nTPA 
7.157 
0 
0 
0 
5.868 
7.504 
TPA 
7.157 
0 
0 
0 
5,947 
7,504 
Source: EIREM model. 
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Table 7.7. Investment in generation capacity (billion ECU) 
Country 
Germany 
France 
Austria/Switzerland 
Benelux 
Iberia 
Total 
Scenario 
Base case 
nTPA 
TPA 
Base case 
nTPA 
TPA 
Base case 
nTPA 
TPA 
Base case 
nTPA 
TPA 
Base case 
nTPA 
TPA 
Base case 
nTPA 
TPA 
2005-10 
12.0 
12.9 
10.6 
6.0 
5.3 
5.4 
1.9 
0.8 
0.7 
3.2 
3.5 
3.1 
5.1 
4.8 
3.7 
28.2 
27.3 
23.5 
2015-20 
30.8 
28.9 
25.7 
11.6 
11.6 
10.4 
1.8 
1.4 
1.3 
3.4 
2.0 
1.8 
4.7 
3.6 
2.6 
52.3 
47.5 
41.8 
Source: EIREM model. 
7.11.6. Environmental consequences in terms of CO2 
Table 7.9 shows CO2 emissions under the main scenarios. Until about 2005, there will be less 
CO2 under increased competition because a larger share of overall power generation will be 
accounted for by French nuclear power. In the longer term, there may be more CO2 under 
increased competition, because of the increase in coal based generation following a rise in gas 
prices. Of course, the latter does not occur in the 'high gas case', and as we judge that an 
increase in gas usage is in practice most likely in the TPA environment, this should ensure a 
continuing environmental benefit. 
These environmental benefits may be counterbalanced to some extent by the increase in 
'visual pollution' from an increased number of transmission lines, presuming they are not 
underground, and the potential increased emissions of methane from systems outside the EU 
(see Part Β of this report). 
Table 7.8. Investment in networks (million ECU), 1994-2000 
Country 
Germany 
France 
Austria/Switzerland 
Benelux 
Iberia 
Base Case 
1.583 
6 
93 
2.772 
0 
nTPA 
1.931 
788 
241 
3.085 
0 
TPA 
2.400 
3.239 
814 
3.966 
461 
Source: EIREM model. 
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Table 7.9. CO2 emissions in main regions (million tonnes) 
2000 
2010 
2020 
Base case 
503 
509 
449 
nTPA 
479 
592 
467 
TPA 
446 
516 
471 
Gas-TPA 
432 
442 
366 
Source: EIREM model. 
' Excluding Italy, the UK. Greece and Sweden, which are not covered by the EIREM model. 
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8. Conclusions and policy implications 
8.1. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
The model runs show substantial gains for consumers under increased competition. These 
amount up to ECU 4-6 billion p.a. under nTPA (increased competition scenario), and ECU 
10-12 billion p.a. under TPA (open market scenario) compared with a continuation of the 
present situation. This is equivalent to some ECU 30 p.a. for each citizen of the EU. The larger 
gains mainly arise from competitive pressure reducing costs. Examination of present price 
differentials across Europe suggests these estimates may be conservative. The problems 
potentially associated with TPA in gas (see Part Β of this report) do not apply to the same 
extent in electricity. This is because the issue of potential oligopoly power in production is less 
important than for gas, and the location of generation within the borders of the EU makes 
electricity generation more susceptible to policy influences than gas production. 
There may be additional potential for gains from the introduction of competition within 
countries, in the form of national electricity pools and supply competition. However, this is 
considered a matter for national policy, to be left to each Member State under the subsidiarity 
principle. The gains described in this report are limited to those arising from changes at the 
EU level. 
The fully competitive scenario needs to be realized as closely as possible for maximum benefit 
to be obtained. This implies the following policy outcomes: 
(a) TPA to be made available to as wide a range of consumers as possible, including 
distribution companies. 
(b) Mechanisms to ensure non-discriminatory despatch of plant and choice of new capacity 
to be put in place. 
(c) Substantial reinforcement of transmission capacity, especially between France and 
Iberia, and Benelux and Germany. It may be desirable to support such projects. Financial 
assistance may not be necessary as they are likely to be justified on economic grounds 
alone. However, it may be possible to speed up their construction by giving policy 
support of various types (speeding planning procedures, facilitating negotiations, etc.). 
The removal of exclusive rights to build new transmission capacity is likely to be a 
component of this policy support. 
(d) The full benefits of the open market scenario also require the unbundling of transmission 
and the regulation of grid access and charges. 
(e) The natural monopoly characteristics of networks will lead to a need for continuing 
regulatory oversight to enable competition, provide incentives, and prevent abuse of 
market power. 
8.2. Conclusions on issues specified in the terms of reference 
The original terms of reference for this study indicated a number of areas which were of 
particular interest to the Commission. This section of the report summarizes our conclusions 
on these points. The description is mainly at the level of the Union as a whole. The effects on 
individual Member States, where these diverge from the Community average, are described 
above. The consideration is in terms of the following. 
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8.2.1. Energy consumption patterns 
End use consumption patterns do not change greatly, because electricity demand is inelastic, 
and percentage price changes are not large (except for large industrial consumers). This is 
because most of the savings are in generation and this is only some 50% of the cost of 
electricity to a residential consumer (and so cost reductions affect only part of the value chain). 
Small percentage changes in price lead to even smaller changes in demand. Consequently, the 
benefits to consumers are likely to come more in the forni of price reductions than in 
additional consumption. Consumption overall is expected to change by some 2 to 3%. little 
more than a single year's underlying demand growth. 
8.2.2. Energy production patterns 
The main effects here are an increase in the use of gas and additional production from French 
nuclear plant in the short term. French nuclear production may not, in practice, increase in the 
way shown by the EIREM model. Studies by London Economics show alternative patterns of 
trade. The key result is the potential created for improving efficiency by trade (whatever the 
precise pattern) and the competitive pressure resulting from this. 
8.2.3. Price and effects for certain categories of consumer 
As indicated, price falls of ECU 2-4/MWh (8% for most industrial users, a slightly larger 
percentage for the larger industrial users) are expected in the industrial sector. This will reduce 
industries' costs accordingly. Price falls of this magnitude may also be experienced by 
residential and commercial sector consumers, who are served by the distribution network. 
However the reduced costs of purchasing bulk power may, to some extent, be appropriated by 
the distribution companies unless there is careful oversight and regulation to ensure that this 
does not happen, or a more widespread introduction of competition in supply. The percentage 
price decreases will in any case be smaller (approximately 2—4%) than for industry as the same 
decrease in ECU/MWh applies to a larger price. (Prices are assumed to be ECU 100/MWh for 
residential consumers and ECU 38/MWh for industrial consumers when calculating 
percentage price reductions.) 
8.2.4. Levels of investment in capacity and network links 
Over the period of the study (to 2020), investment in capacity in the base case is expected to 
total some ECU 150 billion, and investment in networks is expected to total ECU 13 billion. 
These totals will be larger in the long term because, as noted above, it takes a long time for all 
generating plant to be replaced. These are reduced in the competitive scenarios due to reduced 
investment costs, and more efficient capacity utilization, which more than compensates for 
any slight demand increase. We estimate savings of ECU 12 billion in the intennediate 
competition scenario, and ECU 27 billion in the full competition scenario. These estimates are 
clearly subject to significant uncertainty as the scale of efficiency savings achievable is 
difficult to estimate, for the reasons stated above. The majority of the savings are achieved in 
the latter part of the study period when the benefits of competition have taken effect. 
Investment in transmission infrastructure initially increases, then decreases as there is less 
need for trade as costs converge. There also may be some efficiency gains, although these are 
not explicitly included. Increased interconnection is therefore a benefit of liberalization. There 
are additional savings from the avoided interest payments (opportunity cost of capital) on the 
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avoided investment (e.g. typically ECU 2.7 billion p.a. assuming an avoided investment of 
ECU 27 billion at a 10% rate of return). 
8.2.5. Capacity utilization 
The level of utilization of generating capacity increases, as increased system interconnection 
allows a reduced capacity margin. This increases capacity utilization by some 16 percentage 
points. 
8.2.6. Level and pattern of cross-border trade and sourcing by independent parties 
The level of cross-border trade increases from 6% of total consumption to 15% of total 
consumption by 2000 in the TPA case. It then declines to 7% of total consumption. This 
compares with approximately constant trade in the base case. In practice the peak may be 
reduced to* 10-12% by delays in line construction and uncertainties about future trade patterns. 
8.2.7. Level of import dependency and sources of imports 
The level of import dependency for the Community as a whole remains low under all 
scenarios. There is some possibility of additional imports from Eastern Europe and Norway in 
the full competition scenarios, but these are in any case not likely to be significant as a 
proportion of the total market. 
The level of import dependency also decreases for individual Member States in the 
competitive scenarios. This apparently paradoxical result is due to competition forcing cost 
convergence between various countries, and electricity being produced close to where it is 
consumed. No country is considered to have a natural competitive advantage in this respect. 
However, the benefits for completion of the single market are greater for this reason (as noted 
above). 
8.2.8. Requirements for investment in interconnection 
The funds required for investment in interconnection are, as noted above, ECU 13 billion. 
8.2.9. Security of supply and balance of energy sources 
The Community energy supply is well diversified at present. There is a long-term shift to the 
use of imported rather than indigenous coal, which may be accelerated under a fully 
competitive scenario. However, as sources of coal supply are well diversified this is unlikely 
to raise major security of supply concerns. There is also likely to be an increase in the use of 
gas in the fully competitive market. This is likely to lead to an increased dependence on 
imports of Russian gas. It is suggested that this be addressed by the increased use of dual firing 
and increased strategic storage. This is described further below. 
8.2.10. Contribution to the competitiveness of Community industry and broader economic 
and social effects 
As noted above, prices to large industrial consumers are expected to decrease in the long term. 
This will aid the competitiveness of Community industry where electricity is an important 
factor of production. This may be mitigated in the short term if cross-subsidies to large 
industrial consumers are reduced. The magnitude of the cross-subsidy at present is difficult to 
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measure, but experience in the UK suggests that the effects may balance in the short term, 
with medium- and long-term gains for competitiveness. 
For commercial customers, electricity is typically only 2% or so of their costs. These will be 
reduced by only a modest percentage. The effect on competitiveness is therefore likely to be 
small. 
The UK experience has highlighted the fact that efficiency gains can be accompanied by large 
falls in employment levels. Output per employee has increased by 120% and 100% for 
National Power and PowerGen respectively since liberalization (although some of this is the 
replacement of direct employees by contracting out, so falls in employment are smaller than a 
simple consideration of company employment totals would indicate). This process is 
sometimes described as replacing hidden unemployment with actual unemployment because 
of the fear that those made redundant may not find other employment, imposing significant 
social and economic costs. The presumption in this report is that benefits to consumers and 
industry represent the main goal. There is a broader issue of employment policy that arises 
from present economic trends towards reducing employment levels in many industries, but this 
is beyond the scope of this study. 
8.2.11. Impact of difference in indirect taxation or subsidization of energy consumption 
There are presently few taxes on electricity. The completion of the single market may 
therefore have little effect. Taxes on gas and coal to the power sector are also not widespread, 
so again the effect would be small. Taxes on oil products are widespread but oil is a minor 
contributor to the fuel mix in power generation, except in Italy. The effect of taxes is therefore 
expected to be small. 
The main effect on subsidies in electricity is likely to be the removal of cross-subsidies to 
large industrial users referred to above. Subsidies on indigenous fuel production in Germany, 
Spain and Greece remain, but there is a trend to make these direct, rather than indirect through 
the electricity price. This trend may be expected to be accelerated by the completion of the 
single market. If differing levels of CO2 taxes are imposed in Member States this may 
introduce distortions. However, potential economic distortions caused by differing treatments 
of externalities is a broad subject affecting many industries and so outside the scope of this 
study. 
8.2.12. Environmental consequences 
The main environmental effect of the completion of the single energy market is likely to be the 
increased use of gas, which should reduce CO2 emissions. The reduction in CO2 emissions 
between the low and high gas cases is estimated as 105 million tonnes p.a. Decreased capacity 
requirements should reduce local environmental disruption, although the increase in 
interconnection causes additional visual pollution problems from the lines, which may need to 
be balanced against the benefits. There is also a potential problem with increased emissions of 
methane (a powerful greenhouse gas) from natural gas systems outside the EU (see 
Chapter 18). 
It may be argued that differences in environmental legislation and practices impose different 
costs in different countries, which distorts the market. However, the main thrust of policy at 
the level of the EU is towards harmonization of environmental standards in the energy sector. 
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To the extent that differences persist, the effect of such differences on trade is a very broad 
issue affecting many industries, and so beyond the scope of this study. 
8.3. Costs of liberalization 
There may be substantial transaction and administrative costs. However, such costs must be 
set against the very large scale of the potential gains. Costs, in the form of additional 
administrative and regulatory costs, are likely to be of the order of tens of millions of ECU 
p.a.: gains are forecast to be of the order of billions of ECU p.a. Furthermore, the majority of 
costs are likely to be incurred in setting up pooling anangements, which means that they will 
not be incurred under the draft Electricity Directive (OJ L 27, 31.1.1997). It therefore seems 
most unlikely that costs will be substantial compared with the potential gains. There is the 
potential to incur larger costs if the administrative anangements are not designed to minimize 
costs. Designing efficient anangements will be an important challenge for the implementation 
of the Commission's proposals. 
8.3.1. Efficiency of the existing system 
It may be argued that the existing system is already efficient, and therefore that the estimated 
gains from liberalization will not be realized. However, the proposition that there are no 
existing inefficiencies in any of the EU electricity systems does not appear tenable. Individual 
plants and companies may be efficient, but cost and price differences and the range of system 
configurations seem larger than can be accounted for by intrinsic variations in economic 
circumstances. Where systems are efficient there may be expected to be little change from 
liberalization, but increased competition will nevertheless act as a valuable discipline to help 
control costs. 
8.4. Security of supply 
This is the most difficult and potentially contentious issue raised by the prospect of 
liberalization. Disruptions of electricity supply could have very far reaching consequences for 
the economy, and major social effects, so they are considered to be the legitimate domain of 
policy. Security of supply includes avoidance of both short-term disruptions (e.g. blackouts on 
a cold winter evening), and longer-term problems (e.g. disruption during the course of a year 
due to fuel supply problems). The various types of supply intenuption and potential responses 
are described in Table 8.1. Supply intenuptions are classified according to duration, because 
the effects and remedies are very different. Short-term disruption is defined as a system outage 
of a few minutes to a few hours. Medium-term disruptions are outages persisting to some 
extent over a period of a week or more. Long-term disruptions are supply problems lasting 
over a year or more. Short-term local intenuptions occur on all systems at present, due to local 
technical problems. However, more widespread intenuptions, or longer-term intenuptions, are 
rare, reflecting the very high standards of security achieved by the European electricity 
industry. 
The need for security of supply is uncontentious, but the necessity for policy intervention to 
provide security of supply is controversial. The argument that electricity is a necessity is in 
itself insufficient. For example, food and clothing are basic necessities, but ensuring supply is 
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22 not the subject of national policy. z There are two main reasons why electricity generation may 
be a special case. The first is that electricity, and to a lesser extent gas. are very expensive to 
store, and supply must be effectively continuous. The second is that fuels are natural resources 
concentrated in only a few countries in the world. 
Table 8.1. Types of supply disruptions 
Short term 
Medium term 
Long term 
Typical sources 
• Unexpected plant outages 
• Fuel supply disruption 
• Prolonged, widespread technical 
problems with plant 
• Long-term fuel supply disruption 
Typical remedies 
• Plant margins 
• Interconnection with other systems 
• Interruptible contacts 
• Diversity of fuel sources 
• Strategic storage 
• Multifiring of plant 
• Interruptible contracts 
• Diversity of plant type 
• Plant margin (including mothballed 
plant) 
• Interconnection with other systems 
• Diversity of plants" fuel type 
• Diversity of fuel sources 
• Multifiring of plant 
The geographical concentration of fuel sources has tended to cause a reluctance to rely on oil. 
where in the light of events of the 1970s there is still a concern that there may be reliance on 
the Middle East. Such concern is now extending to gas, where there is concern that Europe 
may become over-dependent on supplies from Russia and Algeria. 
The solution to the problem of potential intenuptions to supply is to rely on a diversity of 
sources for each fuel, to the extent that this is available, and to rely on several different fuel 
types. Multifiring of plants can help greatly in securing the latter. The cost of security of 
supply is an insurance premium; the rewards must be balanced against the risks. 
8.4.1. Markets can provide security 
The first thing that should be noted is that markets are not necessarily less secure than planned 
systems. Coal in particular has well diversified sources of supply, found in politically and 
geographically diverse locations (Australia, South Africa, Indonesia, etc.). In the UK. 
liberalization has seen an increase in the diversity of the fuel mix (at least for the present), and 
indigenous UK gas is produced by a variety of companies from physically diverse operations. 
In contrast the UK's pre-liberalization CEGB found itself vulnerable to industrial action in the 
UK coal fields. The French nuclear programme has certainly reduced dependence on Middle 
East oil, but it may have left the system open to generic technical problems. The increase in 
interconnection seen in the TPA scenario will provide a significant contribution to security of 
supply. 
22 The Common Agricultural Policy clearly has some influence on food supply. 
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8.4.2. The case for central intervention 
The question then arises of whether insurance against intenuptions is needed, and if so who 
pays. In principle, in a competitive market those who want guaranteed supply will be willing 
to pay for it, while others may not. For example, an energy intensive industrial consumer 
might be willing to take the risk of occasional supply intenuptions in return for cheaper 
power, but commercial consumers, for whom electricity is a small part of their costs are likely 
to be unwilling to risk disruption of their businesses, and so will wish to pay a security 
premium. 
In a market system for electricity the mechanisms for dealing with this are contracts to 
guarantee supply and high peak prices. High peak prices give an incentive to produce at 
periods when demand is high, or other capacity is unavailable. Such mechanisms are more 
tailored to situations of temporary shortage, such as unexpected unavailability of plant or 
exceptionally cold weather. However, such mechanisms are less likely to be suitable for 
coping with severe or prolonged shortages, as this would require investment on the small 
probability of a large payoff, which few organizations would be willing to undertake. 
Contract provisions providing for very large penalties in the case of supply intenuption are 
likely to be much more effective. However, given the undeveloped nature of secondary 
contract markets in most of Europe, such routes are unlikely to be a practical means of 
securing the desired outcome for an individual consumer for the foreseeable future. 
Security of supply also, as noted, has wider economic and social effects and is, in economic 
terms, a quasi public good, because the benefits of security of supply do not necessarily accrue 
to those who pay for it. In addition, the main mechanism for security of supply (very high 
prices when capacity is in short supply) may be politically unacceptable, due to accusations 
that those charging very high prices were 'profiteering from misfortune'. Security of supply is 
therefore a legitimate area of concern, and policy intervention may be desirable. However, 
security of supply cannot legitimately be used to justify any policy which fits particular 
preferences of the government of the day or the management of a generator. 
8.4.3. Potential policy mechanisms 
Most of the concern on security of supply is likely to revolve around the effects of intenuption 
to consumers served by the distribution network, because large industrial consumers taking 
power directly from the transmission network will be less vulnerable to supply intenuption 
and more able to contract adequately on their own behalf. In contrast, there remain problems, 
such as illiquidity of contract markets and the political problems of high short-term prices, 
which may cause difficulties for small consumers for whom the cost of supply interruption is 
great, and where there are significant broader effects of supply intenuption. Consequently, a 
potential means of achieving the desired level of security of supply is to place a legal 
obligation on the distribution company to ensure security of supply in their region. This will 
lead to the distribution company contracting for the necessary level of security, while retaining 
competition in who provides this. This can be achieved, provided that supply to small 
consumers does not become competitive and the distribution company retains an effective 
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monopoly.23 An obligation of this type meets the objective of guaranteeing security of supply, 
while allowing the single energy market to be completed. It clearly implies there should be no 
restriction on the parties with whom a distribution company is able to contract. 
The prefened policy route for addressing security of supply directly in generation is likely to 
be that of encouraging greater fuel diversity. This may be in the form of IGCC which can use 
coal or oil, and dual firing of CCGTs, which may be the most cost effective option. Reliance 
on Russian gas imports is likely to be the largest single concern regarding security of supply in 
the emerging market. There may be a compulsory requirement for dual firing of plant if the 
penetration of Russian gas becomes large. The only risk then would be a simultaneous 
disruption of Russian gas supply and Middle East oil supply for long enough for strategic 
stocks to be exhausted.24 This seems extremely unlikely, and would probably leave sufficient 
time for conective action to be taken. Encouraging intenuptible electricity contracts will have 
a similar effect to dual firing, and have the indirect effect of increasing gas security because 
the ability to intenupt supplies to the power sector will free up gas for other uses. 
Incentives imposed on generators to achieve security of supply need not distort competition, or 
significantly dilute its benefits, provided that measures are applied equitably. Mechanisms to 
encourage dual firing, or any measures related to specifying certain fuels or sources of supply, 
must be applied in a non-discriminatory fashion, and each player in the market will then 
compete to provide electricity on the best possible terms given these constraints. In this respect 
measures to promote security of supply will resemble those which deal with other public 
goods and externalities such as environmental protection. The policy objective is met, but the 
imposition of requirements to meet certain standards does not impair the operation of a 
competitive market. 
8.5. Summary of policy recommendations 
In summary this study leads to the following policy recommendations: 
(a) Third party access to networks should be introduced for as wide a range of consumers as 
possible. Unbundling of transmission and generation and mechanisms to ensure non-
discriminatory despatch of plant should form part of this programme, as should 
liberalization of investment in independent generating plant. 
(b) Additional interconnection will be necessary. The Commission should act to facilitate 
additional grid connections such as those identified in the Commission's document on 
trans-European networks. 
(c) It may be desirable to place a legal obligation on distribution companies to ensure 
security of supply under full TPA. 
(d) Measures to encourage dual firing of CCGTs are desirable. 
23 
24 
The alternative is a fully competitive supply market in which no single party is charged with guaranteeing security of 
supply. Some individual Member States may go this route, but this is a matter for each under the subsidiarity principle. 
There are presently no proposals to introduce this on a Community-wide basis. 
There will also be logistical difficulties in restocking plant running on back-up distillate fuel for more than a short 
period, which will need to be addressed. 
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9. Part Β: Gas 
9.1. Introduction 
This part of the report describes the effects of completing the single energy market for gas. 
First, the European gas industry is described, with emphasis on the characteristics of the 
industry that most affect the consequences of completing the single energy market. The 
scenarios for the development of the single energy market are then defined, and the modelling 
approach to assessing the consequences of the scenarios is outlined. Results of the modelling 
are then described and their interpretation is reviewed. Finally, policy implications are 
discussed. 
Policy initiatives to introduce TPA, and to complete trans-European energy networks, 
recognize ìhe central importance of transport in the gas industry, and its natural monopoly and 
oligopoly characteristics. However, the consequences of reform will depend on the broad 
industry context in which it is introduced, and the analysis presented here is designed to take 
account of this context. Economic theory has traditionally tended to concentrate on perfect 
markets, with large numbers of sellers and buyers, and on monopoly. Neither of these is 
entirely appropriate to modelling the European gas industry which is oligopolistic in character. 
Standard oligopoly theory provides useful insights. However, the particular nature of the 
demand for gas and the pervasive potential existence of rents in the value chain, require care 
to be taken in the application of the theory. In this context, bargaining theory provides 
valuable insights, and is applied here. 
The industry characteristics which define the most appropriate framework for analysis are: 
(a) The small number of producers likely to be able to supply large incremental quantities of 
gas within the time frame of this study, and their location outside the EU. This implies 
that oligopoly theory will be relevant to the upstream. 
(b) The very large economies of scale in gas transmission capacity. This implies that 
monopoly and oligopoly theory will be relevant to the downstream. 
(c) The availability of substitutes for gas in almost all applications above a certain price, and 
the lack of substitutes below this. The availability of substitutes above a certain price 
defines the characteristics of demand, and in particular an effective price ceiling for gas 
in many sectors. The lack of substitutes at lower prices leads to the possibility of large 
economic rents if monopoly or oligopoly power is also present. 
(d) The separation of production and networks, and their linkage through long-term 
contracts. This implies a certain structure of industry participants in any bargaining. 
(e) The lack of transparency in costs and prices in the value chain. Despite progress from 
the publication of Eurostat data on prices, information on many topics remains limited. 
Imports remain subject to bilateral contracts, as do many prices to large industrial 
consumers. This will affect the structure of bargaining. Limited data availability on costs 
and pipeline networks also constrains the potential for modelling the industry. 
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The remainder of this part of the report comprises eight chapters: 
Chapters 11-14: review of the industry: 
(a) Demand: the competitive position of gas in the energy market and the future level of 
demand. 
(b) Supply: the sources of production available to meet demand. 
(c) Value chain: the costs and values in different parts of the supply chain, and the potential 
existence of economic rent. 
(d) Competition and industry structure: the commercial structure of the industry. 
Chapter 15: scenarios: 
(a) Present trends: a continuation of present industry structures and trends. 
(b) Negotiated TPA with independent pipelines: access to networks granted on a negotiated 
basis, with no monopoly rights over the construction of new transport capacity. 
(c) Full TPA: compulsory third party access to pipelines. 
Chapter 16: modelling structures: the modelling applies game theory (including bargaining 
theory) to the oligopolistic structure of the gas industry. 
Chapter 17: results of modelling: consequences for prices, consumption, costs and trade flows 
of each of the scenarios. 
Chapter 17: discussion of results. A qualitative and quantitative discussion of the results of 
the modelling. 
Chapter 18: the completion of the single market in energy and the completion of trans-
European energy networks. 
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10. Industry structure 
This chapter describes the structure of the gas industry and how this is likely to determine the 
outcome of the introduction of TPA. 
Figure 10.1 summarizes how the various aspects of industry structure detennine the context in 
which liberalization would operate. Most of these factors represent fundamental characteristics 
of the market, and would not directly be altered by the introduction of TPA. Each is then 
described more fully in subsequent sections. The factors are (the sequence (a), (b), (c) etc. 
conesponds to that on the diagram): 
(a) How the pattern of demand responds to changes in the price of gas and competing fuels 
(elasticity). There is a price ceiling for gas set by the cost of competing fuels, but 
demand is inelastic below this level (Section 11.3). 
(b) Steady underlying demand growth (Section 11.4). 
(c) The structure of oligopoly producers with incremental production concentrated in three 
main sources (Chapter 12). 
The factors above imply little gas to gas competition at present, with prices to consumers set 
by the cost of using competing fuels. 
(d) Supply costs. The total cost of supply tends to lie below the market price (Section 12.4). 
(e) The existence of rents in the value chain determined by the relationship between cost 
and price (Chapter 13). 
(f) Oligopsony buyers at present, with a larger number of buyers under TPA. However, 
unless TPA is extended to all consumers, which is beyond reforms presently envisaged, 
the total number of customers (large industrial consumers and distribution companies) 
will remain small (Section 14.1). 
(g) Vertical separation of the industry with production and transmission having different 
owners in most cases (Section 14.2). 
The factors above lead to a process of bargaining for available rents. 
(h) The possibility of committing to binding agreements in the form of long-term contracts 
(Section 14.3). 
(i) Imperfect information on costs and prices available to participants in the market (Section 
14.4). 
(j) Perceived risk of intenuption varying between suppliers (Section 14.5). 
(k) Extensive regulation (Section 14.6). 
These factors influence the bargaining process which will allocate rents between producers, 
consumers and transmission and distribution companies. 
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Figure 10.1. Influence of industry structure on the outcome of reform 
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Table 10.1. Key factors affecting the emergence of competition in gas markets 
Factor 
Number of incremental sources supplying each 
market 
Multiple independent offshore terminals/pipeline 
systems, or open access to these 
Number of independent producers serving each 
market 
Third party open access to transmission 
infrastructure 
Third party open access to distribution 
infrastructure 
Competitive supply to power sector 
Competitive supply to large industry 
Competitive supply to small consumers 
Spot market 
Scale of individual geographical markets 
Rate of market growth 
Linkage between individual markets 
Export potential 
Europe' 
3 
Few 
3 major incremental 
No2 
No 
No2 
No2 
No 
No 
Large 
Rapid in power 
sector, slow in 
others 
Integrated 
No 
UK 
40 
Yes 
20+ 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Pending 
Developing 
Large 
Rapid in power 
sector, slow (1%) in 
others 
Integrated 
From 1998 to 
continental Europe 
(and Ireland) 
US 
Hundreds 
Yes 
Hundreds 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Large 
Slow to moderate 
Interstate pipelines 
Not outside NAFTA 
1 Excluding the UK. 
2 Under discussion. 
10.1. Experience in other markets 
There is limited experience to date of the effects of liberalizing natural gas industries. The 
most extensive experience is from the UK and USA, both of which have competitive supply 
and extensive TPA. In both cases, substantial competition in the gas market has emerged. 
However, circumstances in these markets are very different from those in the EU as a whole. 
In particular, production in both markets is highly competitive, with numerous diverse sources 
of gas under independent ownership and control. These producers all have access to markets 
via infrastructure that allows buyers access to multiple sources of supply with no 'bottlenecks' 
under the control of a single authority that would create monopoly power over supply. 
Table 10.1 compares the situation in the UK, USA and EU as a whole. The differences in the 
market structures imply that the lessons from the UK and USA are unlikely to be directly 
transferable to the EU as a whole. For this reason, we have relied on analysis and modelling, 
rather than direct analogy with other markets, to assess the likely effect of reforms. The 
framework used here takes explicit account of the relative lack of competition among 
producers serving the EU. 
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11. Demand 
This chapter reviews the demand for gas. The characteristics of gas demand, in particular the 
need to remain competitive with alternative energy sources, have a strong influence on prices, 
consumption, and trade. In addition, the underlying rate of growth of gas demand affects the 
balance of influence within the market between producers, transporters and consumers. This 
chapter examines the characteristics of gas demand and the forecast level of demand over the 
next 25 years. 
11.1. Sectoral composition of demand 
Demand is determined by the competitive position of gas in the market, which is different in 
each market sector. Consequently, the sectoral composition of gas demand is important. We 
have adopted the standard classification of demand, which depends on the type of energy 
service provided and the competing fuels that can supply the same service: 
(a) residential (competing fuels: electricity and gasoil); 
(b) commercial (competing fuel: mainly gasoil); 
(c) industrial (competing fuel: low sulphur fuel oil, and sometimes gasoil); 
(d) feedstock (gas price set independently by world chemical markets); 
(e) power generation (competing fuel: mainly coal, also oil and nuclear). 
The demand for gas in each sector at present, and its market share, is shown in Figures 11.1 
and 11.2. Table 11.1 defines the major competing fuels in each sector and summarizes the 
effect they have on the relationship between the potential price of gas and demand. There is 
considerable variation in the sectoral composition of demand between Member States, and this 
is shown in the Appendices. 
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Figure 11.1 Market share of gas in each sector 
Commercial & Other Industrial 
Total 133 mtoe p.a. Total 298 mtoe p.a. 
Residential Feedstock 
Total 220 mtoe p.a. Total 53 mtoe p.a. 
Power Generation (incl. CHP) 
Total 492 mtoe p.a. 
Β other energy 
Π gas 
Source: IEA data for 1993 (EU-12). 
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Figure 11.2. Sectoral composition of gas demand 
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Table 11.1. Competing fuels and their effect on gas demand characteristics 
Residential 
Commercial 
Industrial 
Power 
generation 
Typical uses 
Space heating, 
hot water, 
cooking 
Space heating, 
hot water 
Process heat, 
steam raising, 
hot water for 
processes(very 
large quantities) 
Motive power 
for turbines 
Principal 
competing fuels 
Gasoil, 
electricity 
Gasoil, 
electricity 
Low sulphur 
fuel oil. gasoil, 
some coal 
Coal, oil 
nuclear 
Effect on price/quantity of competition with other fuels 
• Large installed base implies significant inertia 
• Gas has some convenience premium 
• Very high value against electricity 
• Large installed base implies significant inertia 
• Quality of energy service (cleanliness, security) generally 
more important than price 
• Low sulphur fuels compete with gas (environmental 
regulation) 
• High gas value where gasoil competes 
• Gas has premium value in some industrial applications, little 
or no premium in others, especially steam raising and hot 
water applications 
• Larger users often dual fired, and able to switch readily 
between gas and oil 
• Higher efficiency and low capital costs of combined cycle 
leads to high gas value 
• Low gas value in conventional steam turbine plant (similar 
efficiency for different fuel types) 
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11.2. The market value of gas as an influence on demand 
The availability of substitute fuels imposes a ceiling on the gas price. Jf the gas price rises 
above the total cost of using the alternative fuel, then gas will be uncompetitive, and consumer 
demand for gas will fall. This is the basis for the 'market value' or opportunity cost pricing of 
gas prevalent in much of Europe, where gas is priced in relation to oil products or other fuels 
such that the total costs of using two fuels are equivalent (see Figure 11.3). It is sometimes 
argued that this provides sufficient competition for gas, and prevents abuses of monopoly 
power. This argument is discussed further below, and calculations of gas value are presented 
in Chapter 13. 
Figure 11.3. The market value of gas (illustrative) 
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11.3. Demand functions and price elasticity 
The price elasticity of demand for gas is a key influence on the outcome of the scenarios for 
the completion of the single energy market, because it determines the way in which 
monopolistic or oligopolistic power will be exercised. If demand is price inelastic below the 
price of competing fuels, this may allow a monopolistic transmission company to increase 
profits by raising the price to just below that of parity with the competing fuel. The 
consequences of this are discussed further in the following sections. 
We have estimated the demand functions for gas in the various sectors based on the 
competitive situation in each market segment. In each sector, demand decreases rapidly as the 
price approaches that of the competing fuels but is price inelastic below this point as no 
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substitutes are readily available.0 This is because in almost all cases consumers require 
energy services (space heating, steam raising, turbine power to generate electricity) rather than 
a particular fuel. Consequently, the demand for gas is derived from the overall demand for 
energy services, with the amount of gas required dependent mainly on whether it is 
competitive with the alternative fuels in providing the required service at lowest total cost. 
This implies that demand for gas will become highly elastic when its price is such that the 
total cost of providing the service approaches that of the competing fuel. 
Schematic demand curves for each sector are shown in the Figure 11.4. They illustrate the 
following patterns: 
(a) In the residential sector demand, the installed appliance base (and consequently high 
switching costs for existing consumers) leads to demand which is highly price inelastic 
except in the very long term or when the network is growing and consumers are making 
a choice of heating systems. For this reason, gas pricing is controlled by public policy in 
much of Europe (there is only indirect oversight in Germany). 
(b) In the industrial sector demand is highly price elastic at or a little above a price of 
thermal parity with oil, and inelastic below this. Many consumers have dual fuel 
equipment and can switch between fuels readily. 
(c) In the commercial sector, most consumers could use gasoil, but with much less 
propensity to switch in response to a small price incentive. 
(d) In a competitive power sector, gas demand would be highly elastic at the price at which 
it reaches parity with the fully built up cost of new generation, and inelastic at lower 
prices. Demand becomes elastic again when the price falls to thermal parity with coal 
and oil, because it becomes economic to burn gas in steam turbines. A discount to the 
price of coal may be required to stimulate large-scale demand in the more conservative 
utility environment that applies in much of Europe at present. 
Other drivers of gas demand are described in the Appendices. Empirical evidence on the price 
elasticity of gas demand is limited because pricing regimes have tended to be stable. That 
which is available supports the picture presented here. For example, residential gas demand in 
the UK has shown almost no increase in response to a 20% real terms price decrease in the last 
few years, and gas is typically priced at only a modest premium to oil in industry (see 
Appendix B). There may be some asymmetry in the elasticities in that demand may rise less in 
response to a price fall than it would decrease in response to a price increase. 
25 
It should be noted that this is different from the kinked demand curve sometimes discussed in the literature on oligopoly. 
which makes assumptions about the production response of competing oligopolists. In this case the 'kink" is imposed by 
the price of competing fuels, which is set by world markets and is exogenous to the gas market. 
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Figure 11.4. Schematic sectoral demand curves for gas 
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11.4. Demand forecasts 
The effects of the completion of the single energy market will depend in part on the underlying 
demand for gas. The central demand forecast included here is shown in Figure 11.5. It is taken 
from the conventional wisdom scenario in the Energy Futures to 2020 study produced for the 
European Commission. It is in line with forecasts by others (see comparison of forecasts in 
Appendices). Provided gas demand continues to grow, the conclusions in this report are not 
sensitive to small variations in demand levels and are reinforced if demand growth is 
significantly greater than shown. By far the largest uncertainty in the demand forecast is the 
scale of growth in the power sector, which has the potential to be much greater than shown in 
the base case. An alternative scenario (the Hypermarket scenario) from the Energy Futures to 
2020 study is shown in Figure 11.6 to illustrate the possibility of increased gas demand, 
especially in the power sector, in a more competitive market. This is discussed more fully in 
the section on electricity and in the scenarios presented here. 
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Figure 11.5. Base case gas demand forecast (conventional wisdom scenario) 
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Figure 11.6. Alternative gas demand forecast (hypermarket scenario) 
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11.5. Investment in storage 
Demand growth over the next 25 years is likely to require some 30 bcm of additional storage 
capacity for load balancing and security of supply if present ratios of demand to storage 
capacity are maintained. The increase in long-distance supplies could increase the requirement 
for storage. However, a greater proportion of baseload demand from the power sector and 
increased use of interruptible contracts and dual fixing could greatly reduce this. Such a large 
amount of additional storage clearly poses a major challenge to the industry. Storage costs are 
very site specific, so generic costs are difficult to estimate, but at least ECU 10 billion or more 
of investment in additional storage facilities may be required. 
Supply 
12. Supply 
This chapter describes the structure of the supply available to meet demand, and the 
implications of this for the single energy market. Unlike electricity, which is a manufactured 
good produced throughout the Community, gas is a natural resource found in only a limited 
number of locations. Furthermore, transport costs are high, leading to markets being regional 
in character. This is likely to continue to be the case, despite continuing reductions in the cost 
of transporting gas by sea as liquefied natural gas (LNG). This regional character of the gas 
market, which contrasts strongly with the global character of oil markets, has profound 
implications for the evolution of competition. 
We consider supplies as being grouped into four categories: 
(a) indigenous production to serve local markets, 
(b) exports by countries within the EU, 
(c) exports by countries outside the EU able to supply large quantities of gas, 
(d) sources likely to provide small volumes of imports, mainly of LNG. 
The potential role of each group of suppliers within the European gas market is now 
considered. 
Figure 12.1 shows the conventional wisdom projection of demand presented in the previous 
section, matched with contracted imports from now to 2010. Existing import contracts are 
assumed to be extended, including maintenance of Dutch exports at present levels. They 
show some 100 mtoe of demand uncontracted by 2010. Additionally, many existing import 
contracts will need to be renewed during this period, extending the proportion of the market 
for which the supply source is not yet committed. 
The reserves in each of the main producers are very large (see Appendix B.3). For example, 
Norwegian reserves are 2,000 bcm, and Russian reserves are 48,100 bcm compared with 
present consumption in the EU of some 280 bcm p.a. (1 mtoe is equal to approximately 1.15 
bcm). There is a tendency for new discoveries and reserve upgrades to replenish resources, and 
actual production is likely to be available for significantly longer than suggested by present 
reserve to production (r/p) ratios. Development of the market is therefore unlikely to be 
constrained by the availability of reserves within this period. 
Availability of Dutch gas is assumed to be somewhat greater than in the Energy Futures to 2020 study, reflecting 
consistent previous upgrading of reserve estimates. If the lower assumption were adopted, that would reinforce the 
conclusions reached here. 
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Figure 12.1. Comparison of demand and contracted supply for the EU 
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12.1. Indigenous production 
Production within the EU will be unable to meet significant incremental demand. Little 
increase in production is possible from Italy and Germany, the two largest producers after the 
UK and the Netherlands, and there is little production elsewhere. Large new discoveries are 
not expected. It is assumed for modelling purposes that indigenous gas will be produced first 
to ensure security of supply and facilitate load balancing. Production is assumed to decline 
very slowly from present levels. 
12.2. EU exporters 
The Netherlands has the potential to export large additional quantities of low cost gas in the 
short to medium tenn. Modelling of European supply based on cost minimization would 
suggest that such additional quantities would be produced. Increases in production from the 
Netherlands are technically feasible, but the Netherlands has a policy of not increasing exports 
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significantly beyond their present levels to preserve long-term security of supply. Large-scale 
increases in exports from the large Groningen field would require significant long-term 
commitment as the gas is of a different composition ('L-Gas') from that burnt elsewhere in 
Europe ('Η-Gas') and cannot mix in the same network. There are presently few signs of this 
policy changing to make large amounts of new gas available, although additional demand 
within the Netherlands is likely to be accommodated. 
The United Kingdom will be able to provide some exports to Europe via the interconnector or 
other lines, but much of the available reserves will be required for indigenous UK use, in 
particular to meet the rapid demand growth from the power sector. In the longer term the UK 
is expected to resume net imports of gas because indigenous reserves will be insufficient to 
meet demand. The direction, magnitude and timing of flows along the interconnector are 
highly uncertain and treated as an exogenous variable for modelling purposes. They mainly 
affect the timing of additional imports from outside the EU rather than their necessity. The 
UK's present policy of favouring indigenous resources over imports is expected to continue. 
12.3. Imports 
Examination of cost data and reserve data (see Appendix B.3) implies that large incremental 
quantities of gas are available from three main sources: the former Soviet Union (FSU) 
(mainly Russia), Norway, and Algeria. Other sources outside the EU, such as Nigeria and 
Venezuela, are more distant, and will mainly deliver LNG. Consequently, these are only likely 
to provide small increments of supply (e.g. 5 bcm p.a. from each of two to three schemes by 
2010) due to financing and logistical constraints, although in principle reserves are available to 
provide imports on a larger scale. A pipeline from Iran is viewed as a very long-term prospect 
in view of the political instability along the route, although the results of recent discussions 
with Turkey appear promising. A pipeline from Turkmenistan not under the control of 
Gazprom is also likely to take many years to realize. If independent supply from Turkmenistan 
or Iran were to be realized, these would form very useful additional sources of supply. 
Each of the three main incremental suppliers is state controlled: 
(a) Algeria has a single state-owned producer (Sonatrach). Two large developments have 
recently been signed involving foreign participants (BP and Total), which include some 
joint marketing, but overall control is expected to remain with Sonatrach. There is some 
political instability, but the effect on gas exports has so far been limited. 
(b) Norway has a consortium of producers and marketers (the GFU) which is subject to 
significant government influence. For example, Saga's recent attempts to contract with 
Wintershall were refused permission. The main producer (Statoil) is state-owned. 
(c) Exports from the FSU remain under the effective control of Gazprom. Those republics 
other than Russia which have significant gas reserves must, at present, largely use the 
Gazprom system. 
All three of these suppliers will probably be required for diversity of supply reasons. 
The main possibilities for further diversity appear to lie with exports from other FSU republics 
that are not dependent on Gazprom and lowering the cost of long-distance LNG imports and 
perhaps imports from Iran. The Nigerian LNG project may be a first indication of this. 
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For modelling purposes we have assumed small quantities of gas from other producers and 
other FSU republics being imported for diversity of supply reasons. These are treated as an 
exogenous variable. The three major exporters are then assumed to compete for the remaining 
market. The possibilities for encouraging more disparate sources of supply are considered 
further in the chapter on policy implications. 
12.4. Costs of supply 
There are wide variations in estimates of the costs of supply to the EU border. These estimates 
reflect differences in production cost estimates, the use of new versus existing capacity, 
financial parameters, and assumptions about the proportion and cost of local input." 
Table 12.1 summarizes the best available estimates for production and transport costs. They 
exclude transit fees, for crossing intermediate countries (e.g. Poland and Belarus), which are in 
effect a form of tax to extract economic rent. These are considered to be part of upstream 
rents. Upstream taxes are also excluded as these are also a means of extracting upstream 
rents.28 Costs are tending to reduce in real terms as technology improves, especially for LNG. 
A comprehensive list of cost estimates is given in Appendix B.3. Costs are compared with 
market values for gas in the following chapter. 
Table 12.1. Representative costs of incremental supply 
Russia (Debottlenecks + expansion from 
existing production) 
Algeria New 
Russia New (Yamal) 
Norway New (Haltenbanken) 
Qatar LNG 
Cost to European border (USS/MMBtu) 
0.5-2.38 
1.25-2.00 
2.73 
3.25 
3.51 
Source: 1EA. 
Assumptions: Resource costs (i.e. excluding transport tariffs and upstream taxes but including costs of production and 
transport to the EU border): 10% discount rate. Breakdown shown in Appendices. 
12.4.1. Load factor 
The supply cost estimates shown assume baseload delivery. Delivery of gas at lower load 
factor becomes prohibitively expensive and additional storage close to low load factor demand 
(such as that from the residential sector) will be required as the proportion of demand met by 
imports increases. However, demand from the power sector and from large industrial 
consumers is likely to be baseload, and this assumption is adopted for the remainder of this 
chapter. 
27 
28 
Estimates such as those shown are often combined to form a supply curve. However, this is potentially misleading if not 
interpreted with care, as volumes are in practice often potentially larger, especially from Russia. 
The term 'upstream' in the oil and gas industry refers to exploration and production. 'Downstream' refers to the 
delivery of gas to the consumer. 
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12.5. The pipeline network 
Figure 12.2 shows schematically the main sources of gas on the European gas pipelines grid. 
Each of the main demand centres is supplied by main transmission lines of large diameter, 
large capacity pipelines. There are pipelines running from the Netherlands to Germany, 
Belgium and Italy. Russian gas exports are delivered at the border of the Czech Republic with 
Germany, and are delivered from there to demand centres within Germany and France. 
Russian exports to Italy are routed via Austria. Norwegian gas lands at both Emden and 
Zeebrugge. Algerian gas flows by pipeline to Italy, and as LNG to various terminals on the 
European coast. A new pipeline will take gas from Algeria to Spain. A small capacity line 
links France and Spain. 
Figure 12.2. Schematic representation of gas flows 
Key: 
• main gas entry points major flows 
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12.5.1. Interconnection and completion of the single market 
Until now, Portugal and Greece have lacked gas infrastructure and the UK system has been 
isolated from the continental European system. Links are now being established (see below). 
By far the most significant of these both in terms of volume and its effect on the market is the 
UK/Zeebrugge interconnector. This is also likely to require reinforcement of the transmission 
links from Zeebrugge to demand centres to which the gas will be delivered, especially 
Germany. 
The demand figures shown in Chapter 11 assume the interconnection of those markets that 
have in the past been without gas (Greece and Portugal) proceeds, although demand from 
these markets is not large. The investments required to complete the integration, totalling 
some ECU 2.1 billion, are shown in Table 12.2. These projects are important in any 
circumstances, and are not dependent on liberalization of the market to proceed. 
Table 12.2. New pipelines to complete trans-European networks 
Project 
Spain-Portugal (spur from GME 
Algeria-Spain) 
Bulgaria to Greece 
UK to continental Europe 
Total 
Status 
Planned (GME due for completion this 
year) 
Under construction 
Financing complete, due to commence 
operation late 1998 
Required investment 
(million ECU) 
390 
1.280 
550 
2,220 
Source: European Commission. 
In addition, there are several projects that increase the interconnectivity of the European 
network. For example, a new line from the Irish Republic to Northern Ireland would increase 
interconnectivity, but would not represent a fundamental change in the access of regions to the 
grid (because Northern Ireland is already linked to the main UK grid). 
Other major new pipelines are likely to be mainly from the major importing countries to the 
EU border, with appropriate additional capacity within the EU. In particular, there will be 
large new pipelines from Russia, and maybe reinforcement of existing links from Algeria and 
Norway. 
12.5.2. Effect of liberalization 
The projects described are driven by fundamental supply and demand forces within the 
market, or by policy goals to increase integration. With the completion of the projects shown 
in Table 12.2, the main remaining isolated markets will have been connected. Additional links 
to increase interconnection may be judged to be desirable on policy grounds. For example, an 
increase in the capacity of the links from Spain to France may increase security of Spanish 
supply in the event of disruption of supply from Algeria. However, such policy judgements are 
outside the scope of this work, which refers specifically to completion of the single market. 
Changes arising from the completion of the single market, i.e. those that arise from changes to 
the fundamental supply and demand forces within the market, are expected to be much less 
than for electricity, because the effect of liberalization on trade flows will be less. As 
described later in this report, the effect on demand is not likely to be large. The main effect on 
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demand is likely to be if power projects are permitted by the removal of exclusivity rights. In 
addition, there may be some increase in interconnection to allow trades within the system, to 
increase the overall efficiency of the network, and perhaps to allow the producers to access the 
market more directly, as in the case of the Wintershall line. Supply changes will mainly be in 
the form of additional imports, with conesponding reinforcement of the grid within the EU. 
Changes in production within the EU are likely to be small, with the exception of short- to 
medium-term changes resulting from changes to flows along the UK/Zeebrugge 
interconnector. 
From these considerations it seems likely that the effect of liberalization on integration will be 
small but positive, with the removal of exclusive rights to build pipelines the most important 
measure. 
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13. The value chain 
This chapter describes how large monopoly rents can be present if there is not full gas-to-gas 
competition. The likelihood of such monopoly power being present and the nature of 
competition are discussed in the following sections. 
13.1. Potential for monopoly rents 
In Chapter 11. estimates showed demand for gas to be highly elastic above the price of 
competing fuels, and inelastic below this level. This creates the potential for monopoly rents. 
For example, a transmission company acting as a profit maximizing monopolist would choose 
to raise prices to just below parity with competing fuels because this would increase margins 
more than it would reduce volumes, so increasing total profits. A limited number of upstream 
suppliers able to exercise monopoly power would be expected to do the same. Conversely, in a 
fully competitive gas market with numerous suppliers, the suppliers would compete, and 
prices would fall to the marginal cost of the incremental supplier, as in a normal competitive 
market. 
The magnitude of any potential monopoly rents can only be derived from a comparison of 
costs and values. If the price set by competition with other fuels is low compared with the cost 
of delivering the gas, then there will be no economic rent, because the ceiling imposed on the 
gas price by the ability to substitute other energy sources will ensure the absence of profits 
from monopoly control of the market. If the ceiling imposed by the oil price is above costs, 
then rents will be present. In the absence of effective gas-to-gas competition, rents may be 
appropriated by the parties in the production chain. 
We have examined the value chain for gas. Figure 13.1 shows the value of gas in power 
generation29 which is high. The clearest and best known example of a high price being paid for 
gas on this basis is the contract between the Dutch power producers association (SEP) and the 
Norwegian export consortium (GFU). for supply of the Eemshalven plant. This sector is the 
most likely to be affected by TPA because amounts consumed at each site are large. The 
assumption is that the price is set by the cost of the competing fuel (i.e. there is market value 
pricing and no gas-to-gas competition). This is equivalent to pricing just below the horizontal 
(highly elastic) section of the demand curves shown in Chapter 10 above. The price of 
competing fuel includes any taxes, and all taxes on gas are deducted from the calculated value. 
The calculations of the value of gas include the cost of FGD in power generation, and assume 
low sulphur oil products, and so include the environmental premium for gas as a low sulphur 
fuel. However, no premium for lower CO2 emissions is included. If this were present (e.g. 
because of a carbon tax), the value of gas, and consequently the rents, would increase. 
Table 13.1 compares these values with the cost of production and transmission to show 
available rents. They show the existence of substantial rents in the value chain, especially in 
the power sector. Rents in the industrial sector may be low or negative in some scenarios (in 
particular those in which the environment premium for gas was much lower, and gas is in 
29 
The comparison is with coal, which is the major competing fuel in most of Europe. Assumptions for coal (e.g. on 
thermal efficiency) are favourable. Comparison with fuel oil produces similar values. Comparison with nuclear plant 
produces higher values (sec Appendices). 
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competition with high sulphur fuel oil, in which case demand would be likely to be restricted). 
However, competition with high sulphur fuel oil seems unlikely to be widespread in industry 
in the long term in view of emerging environmental regulation. In practice, rents in the power 
sector may be limited by competition from long-distance delivery of LNG, the cost of which 
may place an effective ceiling on the gas price. 
Figure 13.1. Comparison of costs of generation 
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Table 13.1. Rents available in the gas supply chain (USS/MMBtu)1 
Value of gas to consumer 
Transmission (typical value) 
Production + delivery to European border (new 
Russian gas) 
Available rent 
Power generation 
4.20 
0.30 
2.73 
1.17 
Industry2 
3.50 
0.30 
2.73 
0.47 
Source: LE estimates from IEA data. 
' Costs and values both assume baseload supply. 
" Thermal parity with low sulphur fuel oil is assumed with no premium and no allowance for industrial applications in which 
gas competes with gasoil, or where gas is the only realistic choice of fuel. 
13.2. Gas prices 
At present, there is a wide variation of gas prices in Europe. This reflects different pricing 
principles ('cost plus' versus 'market value'), and differences in the price of competing fuels. 
There are also some variations in costs, especially for the residential sector, due to differences 
in the density of the network and average load factor and levels of consumption. 
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14. Competition and industry structure 
This chapter reviews the aspects of industry structure which determine the competitiveness of 
the gas market, and so will affect the consequences of measures designed to complete the 
single energy market. The degree of competitiveness largely reflects the degree of monopoly 
power in the market, and the scope for reducing the potential for monopolistic pricing by 
introducing TPA and related measures. 
Large economies of scale lead to natural monopolies or oligopolies in transmission and 
distribution. These are often supported by legal monopoly rights. In the present industry 
structure it is therefore possible for transmission companies to act as monopolists, setting price 
at above the competitive level to gain additional profits, unless they are prevented from doing 
so by other means, e.g. regulation. 
Creating the right of TPA to the system is designed to break this monopoly power. By granting 
consumers access to independent suppliers, each consumer has a choice of sources for gas, and 
price competition would be expected to emerge. The cost of transmission would become like 
any other of the supplier's costs, and may be either fixed (in a full TPA scenario), or subject to 
negotiation (in an nTPA scenario). This is the situation which has emerged for large 
consumers in the UK gas market, with numerous North Sea producers and independent supply 
companies competing to provide consumers with gas via British Gas's pipeline system. 
The key issue is whether a similar situation is likely to emerge in continental Europe. The 
monopoly price setting power of the transmission company is likely to be partly or wholly 
removed by TPA. However, with a limited number of suppliers able to provide sufficient 
volumes to meet incremental demand, it may be that the monopoly power of the transmission 
company is replaced by an oligopoly of producers who do not engage in price competition. 
Assessment of this possibility is a major focus of the modelling work. 
The strong elements of monopoly present until now in both the upstream (production) and 
downstream (transmission and distribution) has led to a prevalence of long-term contracts 
between parties to allocate risks and reduce exposure to future actions by the other party. This 
is likely to affect the form of evolution to competition. In addition, the structure of the 
commercial relationships in the industry has led to a lack of transparency, which may further 
hinder the evolution of a fully functioning market. 
The natural monopoly nature of transmission, the commercial structure of the industry, the 
existence of long-term contracts, and the lack of transparency are now each reviewed in more 
detail. 
14.1. Economies of scale in transmission 
The economies of scale in gas transmission are very large. The cost of moving a cubic metre 
(m ) of gas via a large diameter line is a small fraction of the cost of transmission via a small 
diameter line, because capacity increases with diameter vary much more rapidly than cost. A 
large diameter pipeline giving the greatest economies of scale will typically have a capacity of 
15 to 20 bcm or more, commensurate with the entire consumption of a small market (e.g. 
Belgium at 9 bcm p.a.), or a significant proportion of a large market ( e.g. 25% of the German 
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market of 65 bcm). Consequently, gas transmission is a classic natural monopoly or oligopoly, 
with the size of a single producing unit commensurate with the size of the market. 
The existence of these large economies of scale is the major driver behind the introduction of 
TPA. A market may be served by only a small number of large import lines, and will therefore 
tend to be naturally oligopolistic in character, because the construction of a large number of 
competing pipelines (unhindered market entry) is not a realistic option. TPA therefore forms 
the only practical way of introducing widespread competition in gas supply, and the provision 
of transmission services will remain monopolistic or oligopolistic. 
The scale of pipelines also has important implications for imports. A very large line is required 
if long-distance transmission is to be economic. Individual import schemes are therefore 
typically a large proportion of markets. For example, the new pipeline from Algeria to Spain 
will provide sufficient gas for the entire Spanish market for the foreseeable future. This 
furthers the tendency towards oligopoly. 
In some cases competing lines will be built. The most significant example to date is the 
Wintershall line in Germany, which has led to competition and reductions in price close to the 
line. The behaviour of a market in such situations of effective duopoly is likely to be specific 
to the circumstances of the particular market. In many cases there is little or no effective 
competition, and the presence of natural monopoly has led to the need for widespread 
government regulation of gas utilities, and frequently state or municipal ownership has been 
the means chosen to attempt to ensure that the interests of the consumer are protected. 
14.2. Separation of production and networks 
The industry is not traditionally vertically integrated. Producers and transmission companies 
are usually separate entities with distinct ownership. Imports from outside the EU have been 
governed by long-term contracts between transmission companies and the producers. There 
has also been a separation in the UK between the transmission company (BG) and the 
producers. The major exceptions to this pattern of separation are in the Netherlands, where 
production (NAM) and transmission (Gasunie) have a degree of common ownership, some 
common ownership in Germany, and the state ownership of both upstream (Agip) and 
transmission (SNAM) in Italy. 
This existing vertical separation avoids the need for enforcement of separation by regulation. 
In some respects, this may ease the transition to alternative market structures. However, at 
each vertical stage of the chain there is a limited number of players. Each major European 
market has a single dominant transmission company. Germany is a partial exception to this but 
Ruhrgas retain significant influence over the market, and other transmission companies 
(Thyssengas. BEB, etc.) usually dominate their particular regional markets. This implies that 
there will be a large element of monopoly power in this section of the chain, conesponding to 
the natural monopoly character of the physical assets. As noted above, it is this problem that 
TPA is designed to address. In addition, the large amount of state control and influence over 
the upstream, noted in Chapter 12 above, means that there tend to be a few dominant players 
in this sector. Consequently, although the chain is not vertically integrated neither the 
upstream nor transmission has the multiplicity of competitors necessaiy for a classically 
competitive market to emerge. 
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14.3. Existence of long-term contracts 
Unlike other commodities, such as oil or wheat, gas transport facilities (long distance 
pipelines) cannot be moved to serve other markets. A large investment is therefore tied to a 
particular market. In such circumstances, long-term contracts are often desired and are likely 
to persist as long as large capital assets must be dedicated to serving only one buyer, or taking 
gas from only one seller. This reflects legitimate economic considerations connected with risk 
reduction, and is traditional industry practice. The existence of such contracts can substantially 
slow the transition to alternative market structures as they will persist, locking in a substantial 
proportion of the market, even after TPA has been introduced. Further measures may be 
considered to address this. For example, in the UK a programme of forced release of gas was 
instituted by the regulator when the existence of long-term gas contracts slowed the 
introduction of competition. 
14.4. Imperfect information and price discrimination 
The gas industry is characterized by a lack of transparency of prices and costs. This affects the 
negotiating position of each party and therefore the prices at each point in the chain. Much 
data is uncertain to other players in the market: 
(a) the precise value of gas to an individual consumer versus the alternative fuel, 
(b) the transmission company's costs, 
(c) the producer's costs, 
(d) available capacities. 
The degree of uncertainty on these will affect the negotiating position of each party. For 
example, compulsory rather than negotiated TPA will remove uncertainty on grid access 
charges. Regulatory oversight of charges should also, over time, lead prices to become more 
closely related to costs. 
In addition to uncertainties in production and pipeline pricing and costs, there may exist 
opportunities for sellers to discriminate in setting prices to different consumers even if the 
costs of serving them are similar. For example: 
(a) a transmission company may negotiate individually with large consumers and charge 
different prices. This is presently the case in Germany; 
(b) a producer may do the same under a TPA regime in the absence of full upstream 
competition; 
(c) a transmission company may negotiate separate access prices in an nTPA regime. 
The greater the transparency of prices to consumers and for grid access, the smaller will be the 
opportunities for such discrimination. 
Producers may price discriminate indirectly by charging a price to transmission companies 
which reflects the mix of consumers the transmission company serves. Such reasoning is 
reflected in the mixed fuel oil/gasoil indexation found in some import contracts at present. 
However, such discrimination is likely to be less effective than if the producer is able to sell 
directly to different classes of consumer under a TPA regime. For the purposes of modelling 
we have assumed that producers tend to treat each sector (residential, industrial etc.) as a 
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separate market, seeking to maximize profit in each. Their bargaining power in this respect 
varies between scenarios. 
14.5. Perceived risk of supply interruption 
Risk of a major supply intenuption is a major concern for all gas systems. The usual concerns 
about loss of revenue that apply to any commercial operation are compounded by concerns 
about safety, by the social importance of gas supply, and by the broader economic 
consequences of any intenuption. Furthermore, the nature of gas infrastructure means that it is 
not possible to substitute one supply source for another rapidly. 
These considerations mean that providers of gas to consumers will be unwilling to rely on a 
single supply source, and will seek diversity of supply. This strengthens the tendency for each 
major supplier to find some place in the market, and in particular limits the ability of Russia to 
compete market share away from other producers on price alone. It has also led to a desire to 
see LNG schemes which, although small relative to the market as a whole, are perceived as 
providing useful supply diversity. 
There are also differences in perceived risk of intenuptions by producers. In particular. 
Norway's political stability gives Norwegian producers a unique position among major 
imports to the EU. 
14.6. Need for regulation 
Under any structure for the gas industry, there will be a continuous need for regulation beyond 
matters of health, safety and environmental protection. This need arises from the natural 
monopoly characteristics of gas networks, which require either monitoring of access prices, or 
monitoring of gas prices to consumers. The monitoring of prices may range from direct control 
to general oversight to ensure that monopoly powers are not being abused (as in Germany). In 
any case, the wider importance of gas supply refened to above is likely to ensure that some 
continuing regulatory attention to the gas industry will continue. 
Scenarios 95 
15. Scenarios 
In line with the terms of reference, we have examined three scenarios for the completion of the 
single energy market. The scenarios are chosen to be broadly consistent with those for 
electricity. The general nature of the reform envisaged is the same as for electricity, although 
details clearly differ because of the differences between the industries. As with electricity, 
factors not relating to market reform are kept constant between the three scenarios so that the 
effects of market reform can be described separately. The three scenarios are: 
(a) Business as usual: a continuation of the present situation. This represents a continuation 
of the situation described in the preceding sections. This may include some increase in 
competition if competing pipelines are built and producers integrate downstream. 
However, there is assumed to be little effective competition, with transmission 
companies able to pass through all costs to customers, including their own gas purchase 
costs. 
(b) Negotiated TPA: this includes the removal of restrictions on third party pipelines. Under 
this scenario the ability to build competing pipelines puts a fundamental limit on the 
amount which transmission companies can charge for access, because above a certain 
price it will be cheaper to build an alternative pipeline. This price will be high for small 
volumes because of the large economies of scale in transmission. However, short 
pipelines to consumers close to borders, or new lines able to transport large volumes 
(e.g. serving a group of power plants) may be economic. Negotiated TPA is also likely 
to impose direct limits on the price of access to the grid. The potential for arbitration 
appears likely to lead to broad pricing principles and to limits on access charges 
emerging. However, some price discrimination by the transmission company between 
parties seeking access to the grid is likely to remain in the absence of full price 
transparency. There is unlikely to be significant pressure on transmission companies' 
costs. 
(c) Compulsory TPA: this is likely to have similar effects to negotiated TPA. In addition, 
price transparency is likely to remove the potential for access price discrimination by the 
transmission company and external regulation of access prices is likely to put long-term 
pressure on the transmission company to reduce costs. This is likely to lead to: 
(i) a weakening of the bargaining power of transmission companies compared with 
negotiated TPA; 
(ii) a loss of implicit rents presently appropriated by the transmission companies. 
For modelling purposes we have sought to capture both of these effects as a loss of implicit 
rents presently appropriated by the transmission company in the form of a higher cost base and 
lack of pressure on returns (Figure 15.1). 
15.1. Roles of market participants 
The business as usual scenario with a continuation of the cunent industry structure is 
characterized as follows: 
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(a) gas producers outside the EU sell gas to transmission companies at the borders of the 
EU; 
(b) transmission companies act as gas merchants between producers and consumers, and 
provide gas transportation services. 
Under the TPA or nTPA scenarios, the structure of the market would be changed so that: 
(a) gas producers would have the ability to sell gas to a proportion of the final market within 
the EU; 
(b) transmission companies would provide transportation of gas from EU border to final 
market, and continue to provide their merchant function for those consumers who do not 
buy directly from producers. 
Consequently, in the cunent structure, gas transmission companies fulfil two roles: that of 
merchant of gas for the final market, and that of a transporter of gas. Under TPA, transmission 
companies are only transporters of gas for the portion of the market that buys gas directly from 
producers, but retain their merchant function for the remainder of the market. 
15.2. Effect of scenarios 
Figure 15.1 illustrates the effect of introducing TPA. At present the consumer price, fixed by 
the price of competing fuels, allows revenues that comprise the following: 
(a) costs of production including delivery to the European border, 
(b) costs of transmission, 
(c) implicit rents earned by the transmission company as inflated costs etc., 
(d) rents accruing to the producer, 
(e) rents accruing to the transmission company. 
Under nTPA, the transmission company is assumed to maintain its implicit rents. The other 
rents it presently earns are assumed to be divided between the producer and the consumer. The 
reallocation of rents to the consumer is manifest as a price reduction. The case illustrated here 
supposes that the consumer is able to gain less rent than the transmission company. The 
opposite case, which would show larger price reductions, is discussed in the next chapter. 
Under TPA, price transparency and pressure on costs also removes transmission companies" 
implicit rents. These are again allocated between consumers and producers, as are the other 
rents. Consumers and producers therefore gain more than under nTPA. 
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Figure 15.1. Negotiated TPA (illustrative) 
Negotiated TPA: Access price at or above present costs, implicit rents 
(inflated costs) remain with transmission company 
Transmission 
company rents 
Producer rents 
Implicit rents 
Transmission 
Company costs 
Producer's 
costs 
(including 
delivery 
to European 
border) 
Consumer price 
I Consumer rents 
Producer rents 
Implicit rents 
Transmission 
Company costs 
Producer's 
costs 
(including 
delivery 
to European 
border) 
Present situation nTPA 
Note: For illustration it is assumed that transmission companies are able to appropriate more rents than consumers. 
This issue is discussed fully in the modelling work. 
Notes: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
producers costs unchanged. 
transmission company costs unchanged. 
implicit rents unchanged (stay with transmission company). 
market value of gas (total height of bar) remains unchanged, 
transmission company rents allocated between consumers and producers. 
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Figure 15.2. Compulsory TPA (illustrative) 
Compulsory TPA: Access price below present costs, transmission 
company loses implicit rents 
Consumer price 
Transmission 
company rents 
Producer rents 
Implicit rents 
Transmission 
company costs 
Producer's 
costs 
H ν g y,"'~-·ν.\ > - · 
Consumer rents 
Producer rents 
Transmission 
company costs 
Producer's 
costs 
Present situation TPA 
Notes: 
(a) producer's costs unchanged. 
(b) transmission company costs unchanged. 
(c) market value of gas (total height of bar) remains unchanged. 
(d) transmission company rents (explicit and implicit) are allocated between consumers and producers. 
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16. Modelling structure 
16.1. Modelling framework 
The European gas industry has a number of distinctive characteristics which make the 
application of conventional equilibrium economics problematic. In particular, the persistence 
of oligopoly for the foreseeable future implies that models based on perfectly competitive 
markets will have limited applicability. In addition, rents are likely to be present among the 
oligopolists. 
To address the problem we have adopted a two-stage conceptual approach (Figure 16.1). The 
first stage seeks to determine if producers compete. We have analysed this as a repeated 
bidding game in which each producer makes an offer to a buyer (transmission company, large 
industrial consumer, etc.) who has a well defined demand. One consequence of this may be 
that producers tend not to compete on price, but seek to price at full market value, with each 
getting a share of the market because of requirements for diversity of supply, etc. 
We then examine the consequences of this for an individual deal. If producers are "not 
competing with each other on price, the problem becomes one of bargaining between a 
producer and the buyer. If the buyer is a customer under a negotiated TPA scenario, then the 
transmission company will also be a party to the bargaining. The bargaining is over the 
division of rents between the parties. 
Clearly, the representation of pricing as a two-stage process is a simplification, as each stage 
will influence the other. For example, the producers' bargaining position may be influenced by 
any desire to maintain co-operation on price and so may, from the consumers' view, be in 
effect simultaneous bargains with implicitly co-operating producers. Similarly, the outcome of 
bargaining processes will affect other producers' position on sustainable prices: concessions to 
customers must be small enough to avoid destroying co-operation. However the model 
remains consistent provided that bargaining by customers is not sufficiently strong to induce a 
breakdown of co-operation on price. The consequences for increased price competition are 
reviewed below. 
The assumptions, qualifications, and complications of the argument are described more fully 
in the Appendices. However, we do not consider the assumptions here to be any more 
restrictive than those necessary for other modelling approaches, and in many cases they are 
considerably closer to reality.31 The main purpose is not to derive a fully realistic model 
(which is in any case an impossibility) but to use the modelling framework to inform the 
analysis of market dynamics. 
30 
31 
In this sense the model is dynamic, in that it recognizes the importance of the evolution of behaviour through time. 
However, it remains distinct from more traditional approaches which treat aggregated quantities and continuous 
variables that change through time according to a set of differential equations. For the reasons stated we believe the 
approach adopted here yields more insight. 
We have considered, among other frameworks. Hotelling pricing (see Appendices), but do not consider this yields 
especially useful results in the context of the European gas industry. 
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Figure 16.1. Two-stage conceptual modelling approach 
Question: 
Do producers compete? 
Modelling structure: 
Repeated bidding game 
Question: How are 
prices agreed on 
each deal? 
Result: Producers 
implicitly cooperate 
to obtain maximum 
prices 
i 
Modelling structure: 
Bargaining between 
producers, transmission 
companies and consumers 
i 
Result: Division 
of rents 
16.1.1. A repeated game and the emergence of spontaneous co-operation among producers 
We have modelled the interaction of the three major incremental suppliers as a series of 
discrete bids where each producer attempts to secure the business of a particular buyer by 
making an offer of gas at a certain price. The quantity the buyer requires is assumed not to 
vary significantly with the price offered, because of the price inelastic nature of demand. The 
buyers are transmission companies acting in their merchant role in the business as usual 
scenario, and also power plants, large industrial consumers and distribution companies under a 
TPA environment. The producers make offers to each buyer for the first period, contracts are 
signed (which may extend beyond a year). The process is then repeated in subsequent years. 
This is illustrated schematically in Figure 16.2. 
Each producer will develop a bidding strategy. The extremes will be to price at the full market 
value of the gas (set by the cost of using the competing fuel) and to price at the marginal cost 
of supply. There will be an almost infinite range of strategies in between. 
This process has the 'Prisoners' Dilemma' reward structure common to price wars." The 
optimal outcome for the producers is that they each bid in at the monopoly price with each 
getting a share of the market. However, on any individual set of bids there will be an incentive 
for a producer to offer a low price to undercut the competition. If this happens it may lead to a 
price war with all parties worse off. 
32 See Appendix B6.3 for a description of the Prisoners' Dilemma. 
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Figure 16.2. Modelling of the market 
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If there were a single set of bids, this would be likely to lead to competition with prices 
competed down to marginal cost. However, the existence of a number of customers and the 
fact that the contracts with customers would be renewed regularly, probably annually, 
produces a repeated process. 
There has been a good deal of academic work on repeated games with a Prisoners' Dilemma 
structure (see Appendices). There are usually no methods for deriving an optimal bidding 
strategy in such circumstances, and computer based experiments have tended to be the 
preferred method of study. The studies each adopt somewhat different assumptions, but all 
show a strong tendency for co­operation to emerge spontaneously, and suggest that in a 
repeated game co­operation is likely to be the dominant strategy. 
Most of the work in this area refers to repeated two­player games. As the number of players 
increases, the pressure to make price cuts will be stronger. With a sufficiently large number of 
players bidding in, as is the case in the US and the UK, full competition would be likely. 
However, implicit co­operation is likely to persist with only three players, especially as they 
have somewhat different positions in the market. 
The presumption is that producers are able to avoid a mutually destructive price war by 
implicit co­operation, even if explicit co­operation is not possible. This appears to be entirely 
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consistent with the present situation, with gas priced close with parity to competing fuels in 
most of Europe, and border prices reflecting a netback from this. This analysis suggests that it 
is a fundamental property of the existence of an upstream oligopoly, rather than a feature of 
the existence of local monopolies in gas transport. It may be expected to persist under TPA. 
16.1.2. Likelihood of a collusive outcome being realized in practice 
The likelihood of a collusive outcome will depend on the incentives to collude and defect. 
There are strong incentives to collude if the product is homogeneous, and if the market would 
be competitive enough in the absence of collusion for prices to be forced down significantly. 
Incentives towards a non-collusive outcome include the possibility of gaining market share, 
and the likelihood of escaping retaliation. The main conditions for maintaining implicit price 
co-operation in a market are: 
(a) repeated game with no clear termination point, 
(b) few firms involved, 
(c) prices visible, 
(d) the potential for retaliation for price cuts must exist, 
(e) possibilities for entry must be limited, 
(f) limited gains from cutting prices in terms of increased market share. 
All of these apply very strongly to the European gas industry. The only partial exception is the 
visibility of prices (which affects the ability of other players to determine if a competitor is 
undercutting their prices). However, prices are now more transparent than they were as a result 
of the Commission's Directive on transparency (OJ L 185, 17.7.1990). In addition, the nature 
of the gas industry is such that, even though prices are not published, general price levels are 
widely known amongst interested parties. We therefore conclude that the European gas 
industry may show tendencies towards collusive behaviour. This appears to be supported by 
the present level of border prices which is quite uniform (typically US$ 2.70-2.80/ MMBtu) 
and apparently above marginal costs of production. 
It should be noted that the collusion referred to here does not refer to explicit agreements or 
any formal cartel. No European gas equivalent of OPEC is envisaged. The collusion is 
assumed to be entirely tacit, with the players remaining independent. The political and 
economic diversity of the exporters makes formal collusion highly unlikely. It may also reduce 
the potential for implicit collusion (see below). 
16.1.3. Soundness of this conclusion from comparison with other industries 
Comparisons can be made with other industries, such as telecommunications and airlines 
which have elements of natural monopoly or oligopoly, but where formal collusion may be 
excluded. Such comparisons show that when there are two or three players competing in a 
homogeneous market the characteristics of the market tend to be consistent with implicit 
collusion (although clearly implicit collusion is of its nature very difficult to prove). In these 
33 The issue of the finite nature of the resource base is also important. However, as noted in the discussion in the 
Appendix on Hotelling pricing the reserve base is sufficiently large (and robust due to new discoveries and reserve-
reappraisals) that it is unlikely to form a practical element of decision making for the major exporters. In any case, if the 
resource is finite, it serves to increase the incentives for producers to extract maximum rents, rather than engage in price 
competition to increase production of a (declining) resource. 
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markets there is little price competition, little difference between the product on offer, and 
comfortable margins. When a larger number of players is introduced (for example six) and the 
product is less homogeneous (e.g. different areas of coverage for portable telephones), the 
apparent level of competition in the market is higher. 
One of the closest analogies to the repeated bidding process described here is the electricity 
pool in England and Wales, where two companies (National Power and PowerGen) dominate 
price setting.34 Generating plant is bid into the system for each half hour during the day. This 
produces a market in which bids can vary each day, in which prices are highly visible, there is 
the possibility of retaliation, limited potential for entry into the relevant portion of the market 
(new plant goes into baseload) and limited potential to increase market share. On the criteria 
described above implicit collusion would therefore be expected. Market power is indeed now 
widely acknowledged to exist. Over the last two years prices have been held steady or forced 
down in the competitive (baseload) section of the market but have risen in the midload section 
of the pool, dominated by National Power and PowerGen. 
Perceived market power by the main generators led the regulator to impose a price cap in 1994 
and to require the two main generators to dispose of 6 GW of generating plant, with the 
objective of increasing competition (such regulatory intervention against the main incremental 
gas suppliers to Europe is, of course, much more difficult, as they are outside EU jurisdiction). 
This 6 GW is now to be sold to Eastern Group, increasing the number of major players from 
two to three. It is too early to determine the effect of the sale, but the price Eastern have paid 
for the assets implies they do not expect prices to be reduced significantly from their previous 
levels. This suggests a continuation of implicit price collusion with three main participants in 
the market. 
16.2. Bargaining theory 
Having defined the price that the producer will seek to offer in each bidding round, the 
question then becomes how price is actually agreed with the customer in each bidding round. 
The analysis above shows a strong tendency for the market price to lie just below the price of 
competing fuels, as at present. Demand would correspond to this. If price, volume and costs 
are largely fixed by the characteristics of the market, then there will be a fixed amount of rent 
to be bargained for and divided among the players. 
This is a well defined problem in game theory.33 Under certain assumptions, which are not 
restrictive, there is a unique solution determined by: 
(a) The number of players: the greater the number of players, the more there are among 
which to divide the available rent, and so the less each receives. 
(b) Bargaining power: the greater the bargaining power of a player, the greater the 
proportion of the rent they receive. 
(c) Risk averseness: the greater a participant's risk averseness, the less their utility may be 
increased by providing extra funds, and the less they will receive. Their wish not to see 
34 
35 
A third player, pumped storage facilities owned by Mission Energy, also sets price some of the time. 
The treatment here is the Nash bargaining solution for the problem in which two or more players must agree on how to 
divide a fixed sum of money between them. This is described more fully in Appendix A.7, together with alternative 
approaches based on backward induction. 
104 Single energy market 
negotiation break down exceeds their additional utility at a lower level of monetary gain 
than if they are risk neutral. 
The possibility of implicit collusion between producers occurs irrespective of whether 
consumers have access to pipeline capacity. It may be present either in the present industry 
circumstances, or under various forms of TPA. The key issue is the extent to which the 
alternative downstream market structures allow producers to benefit from potential collusion. 
16.2.1. Modelling of bargaining power and risk averseness 
Bargaining powers are relative, being expressed as a ratio of the bargaining power of two 
market participants (for convenience). The bargaining power and the risk averseness of the 
production companies are considered fixed between the scenarios and form a reference point 
against which the relative bargaining power of the transmission companies and customers is 
assessed. 
The behaviour of transmission companies may be interpreted by assuming that they are 
'satisficing', i.e. that they will seek to satisfy each of their constituencies, but will not 
maximize their performance against a single criteria. Under this model a transmission 
company would seek to: 
(a) give adequate returns to shareholders, 
(b) reward employees adequately and avoid redundancies, 
(c) avoid attracting undue regulatory or government interference. 
This set of objectives would suggest a bargaining position which would be satisfied by gaining 
modest rents. This view is broadly consistent with that taken by observers of the European gas 
business that transmission companies only seek and obtain modest rents, with the majority 
accruing to the producer. Such preferences would be manifest in rapidly declining marginal 
utilities for additional rents, which would result in lower risk tolerance. 
Prima facie it seems reasonable to suppose that customers will be even more risk averse than 
transmission companies to a breakdown of negotiation. Energy costs are usually often only a 
small part of an industry's costs and residential consumers put a high premium on reliable 
supply. However, energy intensive industries may be relatively non-risk-averse: energy is a 
large proportion of costs, so any reduction in price increases their profits significantly, and 
may be necessary to ensure their survival in some instances. In contrast, the transmission 
company may gain limited benefits from increased rent. The risk averseness of power 
companies will depend on their circumstances. If they have guaranteed markets, they may 
react like distribution companies, with a high degree of risk averseness, but in a competitive 
market they may act more like a transmission company or energy intensive consumer, and so 
be more risk neutral. 
It seems reasonable to suppose that the bargaining power of transmission companies would be 
greater than that of customers. They have the buying power that comes from being a large 
customer. However, it is also possible that customers will be more aggressive in negotiations 
as they directly bear the cost, rather than having de facto cost pass through and a guaranteed 
market position. This amplifies the effect of different risk averseness. The factors influencing 
bargaining positions are described in Table 16.1. 
Table 16.1. Factors affecting negotiating strength of types of bargainer 
o c 
Bargainer 
Producers 
Transmission costs 
Power plants 
Distribution companies 
Large consumers 
Small consumers 
Factors leading to strong negotiating power 
Factors favouring risk neutrality 
• Rents go to government (owner) 
for general use 
• None 
• Need to remain competitive if 
power market competitive 
• None 
• Need to remain competitive in 
world markets 
• None 
Factors favouring high bargaining 
strength 
• Few producers, each with large 
volume 
• Large buyers 
• Large buyers (especially if several 
plants) 
• Attractive load pattern if baseload 
• Public attention to residential 
prices 
• Can be large buyers, or part of 
group of large buyers 
• None 
Factors leading to weak negotiating power 
Factors favouring risk aversion 
• None 
• Large rents risk attracting 
regulatory attention 
• Low rents sufficient to ensure 
organizational 'comfort" 
• Gas plant economic at wide range 
of prices if competitive with coal 
• Public supply obligation 
• None 
• Energy costs small proportion of 
budget 
Factors favouring low bargaining 
strength 
• Hard currency exports key to 
economic welfare 
• Legally required only to cover costs 
(cost plus prices) in some countries 
• Smaller demand than transmission 
companies 
• Unattractive load pattern 
• Smaller than transmission company 
• Small relative to transmission 
company 
• Small 
Source: modelling assumptions 
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16.2.2. Possibility of a more competitive outcome 
The possibility remains that implicit collusion may not be maintained under TPA. or that it 
will be incomplete. We have therefore addressed the possibility that collusion will be only 
partial with some competition between producers. For simplicity this is addressed within the 
same modelling framework, but assuming that customers have greater bargaining power, and 
are thus able to secure a greater proportion of the rents. In a fully competitive market the 
marginal producer would secure no rents, with other producers gaining only the difference 
between their costs and those of the marginal supplier. 
The main factors which would tend to favour a more competitive outcome are as follows: 
(a) A sustained increase in the availability of UKCS gas. If significantly larger volumes 
were to become available through the interconnector with continental Europe on a 
sustained basis, this would encourage competition. We have not adopted this assumption 
because the existing reserve position in the UK and the very strong demand growth from 
the power sector suggest that this is unlikely. However, major new discoveries could 
change this position somewhat. In the absence of major UK discoveries, a UK market 
'reference price' may figure in negotiations, but the ability of buyers to obtain such a 
price from other producers seems limited if the buyers do not have the alternative of UK 
gas available to them in practice. 
(b) A sustained major increase in Dutch exports. This is considered unlikely for the reasons 
noted above. However, a major policy change from the Dutch government could 
stimulate competition, although at the expense of increasing import dependency in the 
long term. 
(c) Revenue requirements of the major exporters leading to pressure to cut prices and gain 
market share. Russia and Algeria both require hard currency from energy exports. This 
may increase the pressure to offer price cuts to increase market share. However, they 
would be expected to recognize the dangers to revenues of a price war. and the 
limitations on their ability to grow market share imposed by diversity of supply 
requirements. For this reason, we have adopted the view that such behaviour will be 
marginal. However, if it were to become a significant feature of the market, this could 
significantly reduce prices. 
The main incentive to increase volumes may come if large amounts of very low cost 
Russian gas become available. However, their share of new supply will, in any case, be 
large and it remains unclear that gaining market share will be preferred to maintaining 
high prices as a means of maximizing revenue. The possibility of major new Russian 
sales to the power sector is acknowledged and the desirability of ensuring the right to 
build independent pipelines (such as the Wintershall line) in order to allow for this 
possibility is among our main conclusions. 
(d) A reduction of state control. If each of the major exporters were to be represented by 
several producers freely competing to sell gas (as in the UKCS), the prospects for 
competition would be greatly enhanced. For example, if numerous independent 
producers were to emerge in Russia with open access to the Gazprom system, this would 
tend to lead to the emergence of true gas-to-gas competition. However, it is not in the 
interests of the countries concerned to allow this as it would entail losing control of 
natural resource rents. Consequently, although we expect foreign investment in Russia 
and Algeria (such as the BP venture referred to in the section on supply), this seems 
unlikely to lead to a loss of state control. A reduction in state control among existing 
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exporters would represent the most powerful route to increasing competition in the gas 
sector. 
(e) Other significant exporters to Europe emerging. If Iran or Turkmenistan were able to 
secure independent exports of gas, or very large quantities of LNG were to be sold into 
the European market, this would make the market much more competitive. 
(f) Differences in objectives between main producers. The main exporters may have 
different objectives: for example, Russia may, as noted, wish to increase export 
volumes, and Norway may attach priority to maintaining cordial relations with the EU. 
However, it appears unlikely that this will override the desire to maintain high prices. In 
particular, Gazprom's various marketing ventures, such as Wintershall, appear to be 
more an indication of a desire to circumvent the existing transmission companies than a 
sign of increased competition. 
16.3. Modelling assumptions 
We have summarized these in two cases of bargaining effectiveness, each of which may apply 
separately to various sectors (e.g. distribution companies may be risk averse, large industrial 
customers may not): 
(a) transmission companies are less effective negotiators than customers (more risk averse 
and/or lower bargaining power); 
(b) transmission companies are more effective negotiators than customers (less risk 
averse/higher bargaining power). 
These scenarios are quantified using the assumptions in Table 16.3. The quantification of 
parameters for bargaining strength and risk aversion is inevitably rather arbitrary when 
comparing the outcome of the present situation with that of TPA, because: 
(a) the bargaining strength of players not presently participants in the bargaining process 
(namely customers) must be estimated for a TPA environment. This is inevitably 
speculative; 
(b) the parameters cannot be measured directly, but must be inferred from the outcome of 
previous negotiations, and other data. Existing rent allocations are difficult to measure 
with any confidence. 
For these reasons we have relied on consideration of fundamental drivers to quantify 
parameters, rather than attempting to use an explicit methodology. The key aspect of the 
modelling is the ranking of the various parties under each parameter, rather than the absolute 
values of each parameter. 
The producer's bargaining effectiveness is taken as 1 to provide a reference point. 
Transmission companies are assumed to be less effective negotiators than producers, capturing 
only a small proportion of the rent at present. Customers are shown to be less effective 
negotiators than transmission companies are at present in Case 1 (see Table 16.3), and more 
effective negotiators than transmission companies in Case 2. 
The transmission company is shown as excluded from the negotiations under TPA. This 
appears realistic under full TPA, where an access price is externally determined. Under nTPA, 
the transmission company will clearly retain a place in negotiations. However, for modelling 
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purposes we have (as described in the previous section) treated this by assuming they retain 
implicit rents, but are not able to gain access to other rents so: 
(a) under nTPA, implicit rents are assumed to stay with the transmission company, other 
rents to be split between producers and customers; 
(b) under TPA, implicit rents are also allocated between producers and customers. 
The results of these assumptions are described in the next chapter. 
Table 16.2 summarizes the numerical assumptions on market value and production costs 
drawn from previous sections, which defines the amount of rent to be bargained for. New 
Russian gas is chosen to illustrate marginal supply options. Transmission costs from the 
European border to the customer are assumed to be US$ 0.2/MMBtu, with implicit rents of 
US$ 0.1/MMBtu due to additional costs. The assumption on the magnitude of implicit rents 
due to additional costs is inevitably judgemental, as there is no reliable way of measuring 
additional costs from data in the public domain. The rent assumed presently to accrue to 
transmission companies is very large relative to their costs, but small as a proportion of the 
overall price, because transmission within the borders of the EU is a small proportion of total 
costs. It appears unlikely that rents could be much larger as a proportion of costs without 
attracting evident attention (although additional rents may well be present in the distribution 
companies). Assumptions are also shown for price elasticities and volumes affected by TPA. 
The results are not sensitive to assumptions about price elasticities provided that they remain 
low. The volumes affected are based on the likely sizes of the markets. This will clearly 
change through time. 
Costs are assumed not to vary between the scenarios, as they reflect the resources necessary to 
deliver the gas. It may be argued that the cost of capital would increase under a TPA regime 
because of the increased market risk. Under the present regime, long-term contracts reduce 
financing risk and so may reduce the cost of capital for a pipeline project. However, to the 
extent that they were economic risk reduction measures, they would occur in a liberalized 
market through contracts, including forward contracts etc. In other cases, existing structures 
may include a hidden appropriation of value by existing market participants. For example, the 
existing merchant may restrict demand growth rather than contract for extra supplies, reducing 
market risk by depriving customers of value, or may effectively cross subsidize from the 
transport business by providing contracts with recourse to physical transmission and 
distribution assets. It is, therefore, unclear that there is any true increase in risk or cost of 
capital. In any case, the presumption in introducing competition, supported by experience 
elsewhere, is that the benefits from competition outweigh any costs. The key issue in this 
report is whether the potential for significant competition exists. 
16.4. Sensitivity of results to assumptions 
The general magnitude and direction of results is not sensitive to the parameters specified 
(although clearly quantifications change somewhat). The results depend on the relative 
magnitude of the variables, rather than their numerical values. Specifically the direction and 
broad magnitude of the changes remain valid provided the following remain: 
(a) pricing of gas at close to market value, 
(b) relative bargaining strengths of participants. 
(c) relative magnitudes of costs. 
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Base case results are shown in the next section, and sensitivities described. Numerical 
sensitivities are shown in the Appendices to illustrate the variation in outcomes. 
Table 16.2. Summary of value chain and other assumptions (US$/MMBtu) 
Value of gas 
Cost of production and 
deliver)' to border 
Cost of transmission 
Implicit rent in transmission 
(inflated costs) 
Other rents 
Other assumptions: 
Elasticities of demand 
Volume affected (bcm p.a.) 
PG 
4.20 
2.73 
0.20 
0.10 
1.17 
PG 
0.5 
50' 
Industry 
3.50 
2.73 
0.20 
0.10 
0.47 
Industry 
0.6 
252 
Notes 
See Chapter 5 
Both baseload. see Chapter 4 
Assumption 
Assumption 
Value-costs 
Assumption 
Assumption 
Source: modelling assumptions 
1 The majority of incremental gas in the power sector outside the UK. post 2000. 
" Equivalent to approximately 30% of industrial gas demand. 
Table 16.3. Rent allocation from bargaining effectiveness 
Scenario 
Present situation 
nTPA or TPA 
Producer 
Transmission 
company 
Customer 
Producer 
Transmission 
company 
Customer 
Case 1: weak customer 
bargaining 
Bargaining 
effectiveness 
1 
0.2 
n/a 
1 
0 
0.1 
Share of rent 
(%) 
83 
17 
0 
91 
0 
9 
Case 2: strong customer 
bargaining 
Bargaining 
effectiveness 
1 
0.2 
n/a 
1 
0 
0.4 
Share of rent 
(%) 
83 
17 
0 
71 
0 
29 
Source: LE estimates. 
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16.5. Modelling of different consumer classes 
Consideration of the factors shown in Table 16.1 suggest that: 
(a) power plants and large industrial customers are likely to be more effective negotiators 
than transmission companies; 
(b) small consumers and distribution companies may be less effective negotiators than 
transmission companies. 
For the scenarios including implicit collusion (see next chapter) the results of the modelling 
work for effective negotiators are taken to apply to power plants and large industry, the results 
for less effective negotiators are taken to apply to small consumer and distribution companies. 
It is possible that small consumers could form consortia to increase their negotiating strength. 
However, although this may mitigate some of the factors leading to weak negotiating power, 
others will remain unaffected and so it seems likely to reduce the magnitude of their 
disadvantage but not to eliminate it. In the scenario showing gas-to-gas competition, all 
consumers are assumed to be effective negotiators. 
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17. Results of the modelling work 
This chapter describes the results of the modelling work. Scenarios are described that include 
implicit collusion on price among producers, and gas-to-gas competition. The base case, with 
implicit price collusion among producers, is first described (Section 17.1). Sensitivities to this 
are then examined (Section 17.2 and Section 17.3). Finally, an alternative scenario showing 
the consequences of greater gas-to-gas competition is examined (Section 17.4). The numerical 
results are taken as from the bargaining model. Qualitative support for the results comes from 
the oligopoly models which are described in the Appendices. All quantitative results must be 
regarded as indicative in view of the uncertainties attached to parameters. 
17.1. General outcomes 
The models show that prices to customers are fixed just below the level at which it would be 
more economic to use another fuel. This is consistent with observed behaviour in the market. 
The model shows modest rents flowing to transmission companies, which is consistent with 
the observed rates of return and lack of marked cost pressure. Rents consist of explicit rents 
and disguised rents (higher than necessary costs). Rents to producers are large, consistent with 
a comparison of production costs and present border prices. Indexation of long-term gas 
imports to oil is designed to ensure that producers get a substantial share of any rent due to oil 
price rises, while transmission companies are able to keep prices competitive if the oil prices 
fall. Such a model is also likely be valid in the power sector based on consideration of 
fundamental drivers and limited evidence from the few contracts agreed to date. This is in 
marked contrast to the more competitive UK gas and power market which shows true gas-to-
gas competition and cost based prices. 
The results of the scenarios for the central case data assumptions are now summarized. 
Sensitivities and the alternative gas-to-gas competition scenarios are described below. As 
noted in Section 16.2. the possibility of implicit collusion between producers exists in any 
case. The difference between scenarios is the effect of downstream industry structure on the 
revenues they are able to obtain. 
17.1.1. Scenario 1 : The present situation 
Under this scenario the price is fixed at the revenue maximizing level. Rent accrues to the 
transmission companies and the producers. The major part of the rent accrues to the producers, 
because they have greater bargaining power. However, the transmission companies gain some 
rent, which is increased by uncertainty about their true costs. 
17.1.2. Scenario 2: Negotiated TPA 
This is intermediate between the full TPA scenario and the present situation. The removal of 
exclusivity rights may also limit the amount of rent transmission companies are able to extract, 
especially in the case of the power sector. Results are shown in Tables 17.1 and 17.2. 
Prices for access lack transparency, allowing transmission companies to keep implicit rents. 
Other rents are divided between producers and customers. The extent of the benefit to 
customers varies from some ECU 250 million to ECU 800 million, depending on their 
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bargaining power, due to price reductions in industry and in the power sector. However, the 
net benefit to the EU as a whole is markedly different depending on whether the customers 
have greater or lesser negotiating power than the transmission companies. In the latter case, 
some ECU 400 million of rent flows out of the Community to the producers. In the former 
case, producers also gain rent, due to a slightly expanded market, but not at the expense of 
parties within the EU. 
Increases in volumes are modest (1 to 3 bcm. less than 1% of the market in 2005), reflecting 
inelastic demand modest price charges and the opening of only a small proportion of the 
market to TPA. These volumes are less than a single year's market growth. Trade increases by 
a similar amount as indigenous production is little affected (a small increase in indigenous 
production to meet local demand in the Netherlands being a minor potential exception). 
Volume growth would be greater in circumstances where transmissions companies were 
presently restricting volumes because of low present profits, accompanied by inability to 
capture full value by price discrimination. 
17.1.3. Scenario 3: TPA 
The rent presently earned by transmission companies (both implicit and explicit) is lost 
provided the price of access is set at true cost. The rent will be divided between producers and 
customers. It is expected that consumers will be unable to secure all of this. In particular, 
consumers' bargaining power will be weakened by producers' improved ability to price 
discriminate, by the transparency of access prices and, to a large extent, by increased 
transparency of transmission company costs. Some buyers will also be more risk averse than 
the transmission companies. However, some customers, mainly in energy intensive industries, 
will be more risk tolerant and may seek to negotiate more aggressively. This should allow 
them to gain a larger proportion of the rents. A caveat to this is that the producers may expect 
to gain something from the deal, and they will still have the option of selling to the 
transmission company. 
The financial consequences of TPA are broadly similar to those of negotiated TPA. The main 
difference is that implicit rents due to inflated transmission company costs are removed. These 
are allocated among customers and producers according to their degree of bargaining power. 
We have assumed that such disguised rents are not large in absolute terms, as transmission 
costs within a country are not a large proportion of total costs. More rents may exist in the 
distribution parts of the business, but this is to remain a monopoly and so these are expected to 
be retained by the present distribution companies. 
Consumption will increase only slightly as the elasticity of demand is low. Cross-border trade 
will increase by an amount similar to the rise in demand as under TPA. If rents are not present 
in the industrial sector, market volumes may be further increased by price reduction due to 
loss of implicit rents. 
17.2. Sensitivities 
We have modelled the following sensitivities, which are shown in Tables 17.1 and 17.2. 
(a) Lower gas value: a reduction in the value of gas reduces the amount of rent to be 
bargained for. The effect is similar to that of an increase in costs. Gas values are 
assumed to be reduced to US$ 3.50/MMBtu in the power sector (perhaps because of the 
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threat of competition from long-distance LNG), and to US$ 3.10/MMBtu in industry 
(reflecting lower oil prices), 
(b) Higher transmission company rents: this assumes that a larger proportion of rents are 
currently being gained by the transmission company. US$ 0.30/MMBtu of rent 
(including inflated costs) are included in this case. This is a very large sum in proportion 
to costs, and may be considered an upper bound figure. 
The results of these sensitivities are shown in the tables below. The following results are 
common to all scenarios: 
(a) Prices to consumers fall in all scenarios as they accrue rents presently accruing to the 
transmission company. The fall is greater in a TPA environment than in an nTPA 
environment. There is consequently a net gain to consumers which, in the case of 
'Scenario·2, strong negotiating power' (considered more realistic for large consumers), 
varies between some ECU 300 and 1,400 million p.a. 
(b) The border price rises if consumer negotiating power is weak, but tends to fall if it is 
strong. However, the effect of consumer negotiating power in reducing border price is 
offset to a greater extent in the TPA case as the producer is able to gain implicit rents 
previously retained by the transmission company. The border price therefore rises 
slightly in some cases under a TPA environment, even if consumers are stronger 
negotiators than the transmission company (because costs are now more transparent). In 
all cases except that of strong consumer negotiating power, producers experience a 
modest net revenue gain as any small price falls are offset by an increase in the volume 
of sales. 
The results for individual cases are: 
(a) Lower gas value: price falls are reduced as there is less rent to bargain for. The border 
price is somewhat higher in scenario 2 as there is less opportunity to offset the effect of 
the producer gaining transmission company rents. Gains to both producers and 
consumers are smaller as there is less rent, and volume increases are consequently 
smaller. 
(b) Higher transmission company rents: here the main effect is to increase the difference 
between the nTPA and the TPA scenarios. The greater amount of transmission company 
implicit rent (inflated costs) that the producers have access to in the TPA case causes 
border prices to be higher than in the nTPA case, where the transmission company 
retains these. 
17.3. Effect of other changes 
17.3.1. Carbon tax 
A carbon tax would raise the value of gas against other fuels. For example, a tax levied 
entirely on CO2 content at the level of US$ 10/bbl of oil would raise the value of gas in 
industry by US$ 0.65/MMBtu and in power generation by US$ 2.25/MMBtu. This would 
directly increase the amount of rent in the chain by an equivalent amount, unless other 
measures were also taken which had a counterbalancing effect. In practice, rents in the power 
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sector would be so large that some other factor, such as the cost of alternative supply, would 
limit them. 
Table 17.1. Comparison of sensitivities (scenario 1 - weak customer negotiation) 
Scenario 
Base case 
Lower gas 
value 
Higher 
transmission 
company rents 
Change in price 
to industry 
(US$/MMBtu) 
nTPA 
-0.04 
-0.01 
-0.02 
TPA 
-0.05 
-0.02 
-0.05 
Change in price 
to power 
generators 
(US$/MMBtu) 
nTPA 
-0.11 
-0.04 
-0.09 
TPA 
-0.12 
-0.05 
-0.12 
Change in 
border price' 
(USS/MMBtu) 
nTPA 
0.07 
0.3 
0.05 
TPA 
0.15 
0.12 
0.32 
Total gain for 
consumers 
(million ECU) 
nTPA 
256 
91 
201 
TPA 
283 
119 
283 
Net change in 
producer 
revenue 
(million ECU) 
nTPA 
332 
118 
256 
TPA 
621 
406 
1,121 
Source: model results 
1 Average of industry and power generation. 
Table 17.2. Comparison of sensitivities (scenario 2 - strong customer negotiation) 
Scenario 
Base case 
Lower gas value 
Higher 
transmission 
company rents 
Change in price 
to industry 
(USS/MMBtu) 
nTPA 
-0.13 
-0.02 
-0.08 
TPA 
-0.16 
-0.05 
-0.16 
Change in price 
to power 
generators 
(USS/MMBtu) 
nTPA 
-0.33 
-0.13 
-0.28 
TPA 
-0.36 
-0.16 
-0.36 
Change in 
border price' 
(USS/MMBtu) 
nTPA 
-0.10 
-0.04 
-0.08 
TPA 
-0.04 
0.04 
0.16 
Total gain for 
consumers 
(million ECU) 
nTPA 
803 
289 
631 
TPA 
889 
375 
889 
Net change in 
producer 
revenue 
(million ECU) 
nTPA 
20 
8 
1 
TPA 
282 
267 
782 
Source: model results 
1 Average of industry and power generation. 
17.3.2. Other cost and price changes 
If production costs are higher or lower than shown then the amount of rent will be 
correspondingly changed. For example, new Algerian supplies may have an additional 
US$ 0.75/MMBtu of available rent. Norwegian producers may have US$ 0.5/MMBtu less rent 
available. 
A rise in oil prices would increase rents in the industrial sector. Continuing improvements in 
thermal efficiencies of CCGT plant will also tend to raise rents in the power sector, subject to 
the cap imposed by the costs of LNG imports. Changes in the amount of rent will not change 
the conclusions reached here, but will change the size of the costs and benefits of reform. 
17.3.3. Bargaining strengths 
As noted, the assignment of bargaining strengths has an inevitable degree of arbitrariness. 
However, the ordering of these (i.e. which is greater than another) is the key to determining 
the outcome. The higher the present bargaining strength of the transmission company, the less 
plausible is the hypothesis that some customers would have greater bargaining power than the 
transmission companies. However, as noted, the border price of gas and the comfortable but 
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not spectacular profitability of the existing transmission companies make it seem unlikely that 
they are at present gaining the majority of the rents. 
17.3.4. Cost of alternative pipelines 
If TPA is not introduced, the amount of rent that transmission companies may extract is, in 
principle, limited by the possibility of building independent pipelines. For small volumes this 
will be prohibitively expensive, because the necessary economies of scale will not be 
achievable. However, in the power sector volumes consumed are large. 1 GW of CCGT 
consumes some 1.3 bcm p.a. of gas in baseload. A small group of power stations could 
therefore support a pipeline of moderate size. For example, a 5 bcm pipeline running 200 km 
from a border need only incur costs of US$ 0.14/MMBtu. 
If exclusivity rights for pipelines are removed, this should allow groups of power plants to 
negotiate their*own deals using relatively short pipelines from the border to the plants, and 
incur only modest cost in doing so. This will allow many of the gains from increased 
bargaining power from TPA to be realized even in the absence of TPA to existing networks. 
As such it constitutes an important limitation on the oligopoly power of transmission 
companies, but emphasizes the importance of bargaining between customers and producers. 
17.4. Alternative scenario with greater price competition between producers 
We have examined an alternative scenario which assumes increased competition among 
producers. In this scenario producers do not collude, but compete actively to win customers by 
offering price reductions. This is one of the classic 'textbook' forms of behaviour postulated 
for oligopolists competing in a market on price.36 The presumed consequence is that each 
producer reduces his prices in the hope of gaining market share. This is followed by a price 
response from other producers, and so on until prices reach the floor imposed by the costs of 
production. As in any competitive market, consumers appropriate much of the rent, with prices 
potentially being driven down to marginal cost. 
In terms of the framework used in this work, this implies that producers' ability to bargain for 
rents by raising prices will be reduced by pressures to gain market share. This increases the 
power of consumers who are able to secure a better deal. TPA may facilitate this by providing 
easier access by consumers to producers, encouraging producers to compete for market share 
by pricing keenly. The ability of producers to maintain prices that exists under the present 
industry structure (foregoing only a limited amount to the transmission companies) is assumed 
to be greatly reduced under TPA by granting consumers direct access to producers, stimulating 
true competition. 
We have modelled the effect of such gas-to-gas competition within the same framework used 
for the base scenario for ease of comparison, expressing the effects of competition in terms of 
increased negotiating power for consumers. This is shown in Table 17.4. The negotiating 
power of consumers is assumed to increase to 40% of that of the producer in scenario 1, and 
80% ofthat of the producer in scenario 2 (totalling over ECU 1 billion p.a.). This creates large 
gains for consumers at the expense of producers. These are larger in the TPA case than in the 
nTPA case. In practice the gains may be even greater than shown, as they may apply to a larger 
It is referred to as Bertrand competition. 
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segment of the market; and because the effective negotiating power of consumers may 
increase beyond that shown. 
This scenario clearly suggests that liberalization would produce major benefits if there were a 
large degree of price competition among producers. 
Table 17.3. Results of increased competition scenario 
Scenario 
Weak consumer 
negotiation 
Strong 
consumer 
negotiation 
Change in price 
to industry 
(USS/MMBtu) 
nTPA 
-0.13 
-0.21 
TPA 
-0.16 
-0.25 
Change in price 
to power 
generators 
(USS/MMBtu) 
nTPA 
-0.33 
-0.52 
TPA 
-0.36 
-0.56 
Change in 
border price' 
(USS/MMBtu) 
nTPA 
-0.10 
-0.23 
TPA 
-0.04 
-0.18 
Total gain for 
consumers 
(million ECU) 
nTPA 
803 
1,249 
TPA 
889 
1.382 
Net change in 
producer 
revenue 
(million ECU) 
nTPA 
20 
-255 
TPA 
282 
-20 
Source: model results 
1 Average of industry and power generation. 
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18. Conclusions and policy implications 
18.1. Conclusions 
This chapter summarizes the conclusions of the analysis presented here, then assesses the 
implications of these for policy. 
Given the structure of the industry that we have described, we conclude from our analysis that: 
(a) There are likely to be advantages for TPA to gas transmission networks for large 
industrial consumers and power generators, because they will have the incentive and 
ability to negotiate more effectively than the present transmission companies. 
(b) This should increase the competitiveness of energy intensive industry in the EU by 
securing lower energy prices. The total saving to consumers could be some hundreds of 
millions of ECU. TPA will also give greater commercial freedom for IPPs to buy gas 
even when it does not significantly further the interests of the transmission company, 
and is also likely to be a necessary condition for increasing integration of gas and 
electricity markets. This should aid economic efficiency by allowing resources to be 
properly allocated across the two sectors. 
(c) The advantages of TPA for distribution companies are less clear, because distribution 
companies may be less effective negotiators than transmission companies, and so one 
effect may be a transfer of additional economic rent outside the EU. There may be some 
reductions in city gate prices, but it is unclear whether these will be transferred to the 
consumer rather than appropriated by the distribution company unless there is TPA to all 
consumers, which seems a distant prospect. If distribution companies cannot obtain 
reduced prices under TPA, they may seek to continue obtaining gas as at present. There 
may also be increased direct marketing by producers. 
(d) If TPA were to lead to vigorous price competition among producers (full gas-to-gas 
competition), there would be likely to be much greater benefits to consumers, although 
in the absence of full competition in supply to individual consumers, the risk of 
distribution companies appropriating many of the benefits would remain. 
(e) There are no compelling reasons for exclusive rights to build pipelines. It should be 
possible to assure adequate standards of health and safety during construction and 
operation by means of legislation on these matters. 
(f) Ensuring the right of independent parties to build pipelines may be a key element in 
allowing the gains from the increased use of gas in the power sector to be realized. Many 
of the savings for consumers from TPA in the power sector could be achieved by 
allowing independent pipelines (even without TPA), provided that the ability of 
independent generators to build and operate power plants exists. If there is no right to 
build independent pipelines, independent power producers may not be able to contract 
for gas successfully, and this would significantly impair the growth of competition in 
electricity generation. 
(g) TPA seems unlikely to lead to major additional costs. Any increase in risk is mainly a 
transfer of risk from the consumer to the industry. If long-term contracts for supply are 
required, for example because assets are locked in, then these will follow from the 
market in any case. 
(h) Liberalization of the electricity sector is likely to have a major effect on the gas industry. 
This is because liberalization of electricity will assist in realizing the huge potential 
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market for gas in the power sector. Similarly, liberalization in the gas market is likely to 
be beneficial to the liberalization of the electricity sector and may in some respects (such 
as allowing the construction of independent pipelines) be a condition for realizing the 
full potential of liberalization in the power sector, 
(i) As with electricity, the natural monopoly characteristics of the network will lead to the 
continuing need for regulatory oversight. 
18.2. Policy issues for gas 
This section of the report summarizes our conclusions on the main points of interest 
highlighted in the terms of reference. The structure of this section is the same as the 
corresponding section for electricity, for ease of comparison. 
In many cases, the effects of completing the single market for gas are smaller than those for 
electricity, because of the problems with introducing competition described in this report. The 
main effect of introducing TPA is likely to be to redistribute economic rent between the 
parties in the value chain. Without more extensive liberalization, including the upstream, there 
is little true increase in competition in production or network construction and operation, the 
major sources of costs, so there is only a limited effect on productive and dynamic efficiency. 
Prices and availability of supply also change little, so there is also likely to be little effect on 
allocative efficiency. The main caveat to this is that there may be some increase in productive 
efficiency in transmission as the construction of independent pipelines and storage and greater 
cost transparency increase pressure on the transmission companies to bring their costs down 
and result in a more efficient and integrated grid. The effects of increased efficiency have been 
treated in the modelling as a loss of rents presently disguised as inflated costs ('implicit 
rents'). 
The effect of completing the single market is considered under the following headings. 
18.2.1. Energy consumption patterns 
There is expected to be an increase of gas consumption of 2 bcm p.a. as a result of nTPA and 
3 bcm p.a. as a result of full TPA. The rise is small because the demand for gas is inelastic, 
price falls that result from TPA are small, and only part of the market (large industrial 
consumers and power generators) is assumed to be affected. This increase excludes the 
potential additional volumes from increased use of gas in power generation which may follow 
from the liberalization of electricity markets and the construction of independent pipelines. 
18.2.2. Energy production patterns 
Production within the EU tends to be driven by availability of reserves, security of supply and 
load balancing requirements, and national policy on extraction of natural resources. There is 
little potential for increased production outside the Netherlands and the UK. Policy in the 
Netherlands seems unlikely to change, so the effect of TPA will be small. There may be some 
increase in UK exports down the interconnector in the short term, with a correspondingly 
earlier reversal of flow to import gas. The capacity of the interconnector is 15 to 20 bcm p.a.. 
and significant quantities are expected to flow in all scenarios. The maximum change in 
annual production therefore seems likely to be 5-10 bcm. With negligible changes in 
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production elsewhere, production changes seem likely to amount to only 2^1% of total EU gas 
consumption. 
18.2.3. Price and cost effects for certain categories of consumer 
As noted, prices to large industrial consumers and power plants are likely to fall slightly, 
perhaps by some US$ 0.1/MMBtu to industry (approximately 3%) and US$ 0.2-0.3/MMBtu 
to the power sector (5-8%). Prices to residential consumers are unlikely to fall. There is a 
theoretical possibility that they might rise due to weakening of the bargaining power of 
distribution companies, but this seems unlikely to occur in practice as they will have the 
option of continuing to buy from the transmission companies. 
It should be noted that there is no double counting of gains in the power sector if these are 
added to the benefits shown in the electricity section. The base case analysis for electricity 
assumes a high* gas price, comparable with that shown here. The 'high gas' case for electricity 
does assume a lower gas price (US$ 3.50/MMBtu), and in this case gains may be as shown in 
the 'reduced rent' sensitivity for gas. 
Greater gas-to-gas competition is shown to lead to savings of ECU 0.9-1.4 billion p.a. These 
savings would be much greater if TPA were extended more widely, as would be appropriate in 
such a case. 
TPA may reduce the potential for price discrimination by permitting ready on-selling of gas. It 
is assumed by some that price differences are removed by consumers or traders with access to 
lower priced gas buying additional volumes at the low price, and selling them for a very small 
margin. However, in practice this may be limited by the power of the producers who may seek 
to price discriminate to extract maximum value from the market. 
18.2.4. Levels of investment in capacity and network links 
As consumption is unchanged, investment levels are also likely to be little changed. Increased 
demand of 3 bcm p.a. would require increased investment of ECU 190 million, but in 
practice this may be met from existing capacity and more efficient use of the network. 
There may be some efficiency gains in transmission capacity construction due to the removal 
of exclusivity rights and increased transparency of transmission costs. Savings would be 
expected to come from two main sources. The first would be competition leading to more 
efficient construction of new capacity. The second would be the construction of additional 
links and new storage facilities that would remove inefficiencies and bottlenecks in the 
system. It is also possible that a TPA regime would reduce inefficiencies by increasing 
transparency of costs for existing networks. This is modelled in the present study as the loss of 
transmission company implicit rents but is difficult to quantify without detailed technical 
modelling of the network, which is outside the scope of this study. 
If costs for new transmission capacity were reduced by 10%, as is assumed for electricity, this 
would lead to a reduction of some 1% or less on total gas costs, as transmission remains a 
37 
Based on the assumption that the gas would flow on average 500 km through a line with capacity of 10 bcm p.a.. the 
remaining capacity in the line being occupied by other gas. 
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small proportion of the overall cost of providing bulk gas. and the savings would only apply to 
new capacity. This is equivalent to approximately ECU 220 million p.a. However, it is 
unlikely that all of this would be realized as competition would probably be less fierce than in 
electricity generation. A figure below this therefore seems more realistic. 
There is the possibility of significant additional investment if independent pipelines are built 
to serve power sector demand that would not otherwise be served, due to the existing 
transmission companies restricting the market. The potential additional investment in this case 
would be large. For example, if there were an extra 20 GW of plant, consuming 26 bcm p.a. of 
gas transported an average distance of 400 km. this would require an additional 
ECU 1.3 billion of investment.38 
18.2.5. Capacity utilization 
Again this would be expected to be largely unchanged. It could be that some part of the 
additional volume consumed would increase utilization, especially off peak. There is also the 
possibility that further competing capacity would be built following the removal of exclusivity 
rights leading to a fall in capacity utilization. However, detailed modelling of the network is 
outside the scope of this project. 
18.2.6. Level and pattern of cross-border trade and sourcing by independent parties 
Again, as consumption is likely to increase little, and most gas must come from sources 
outside the EU, there would be little change in cross-border trade within the EU. The main 
potential changes are the increase in the flows from the UK referred to above, and the 
possibility of gas moving to power plants via independent pipelines. 
18.2.7. Level of import dependency and sources of imports 
The level of import dependency will increase under all scenarios. It is not likely to be very 
different under the TPA scenarios, as there will be a continued requirement to source from 
each of the major suppliers. The small increase in total volumes will lead to a corresponding 
small increase in overall import dependency for the Community. The issue of import 
dependency is discussed further below. 
If the ability to build independent pipelines leads to additional demand, then this will 
correspondingly increase import dependency. 
18.2.8. Requirements for investment in interconnection 
The Commission identifies several projects that are required to complete the single market 
(see Chapter 12). They are all likely to proceed under each of the three scenarios, and so will 
be little affected by the introduction of liberalization. However, each is a valuable step towards 
increasing coherence of the Community's energy systems. The UK interconnector is especially 
valuable in this respect. The total investment is likely to be of the order of ECU 2.2 billion. 
1 Q 
Gas is assumed to move via a 10 bcm p.a. capacity line. 
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18.2.9. Security of supply and balance of energy sources 
Security of supply will reflect import dependency, as described above. Measures to improve 
security of supply are described below. 
18.2.10. Contribution to the competitiveness of Community industry 
There is likely to be a modest contribution to the competitiveness of Community industry, 
from the reduction in price to large industrial consumers. 
18.2.11. Impact of difference in indirect taxation or subsidization of energy consumption 
Taxation of oil products will continue to have an effect on the price of gas. To the extent that 
this is harmonized, there would be expected to be some convergence of gas prices in the EU. 
The extent of present differences in taxation are shown in Appendix B.5. 
18.2.12. Environmental consequences 
The modest increase in gas consumption will produce some environmental benefits by 
reducing CO2 emissions, presuming gas displaces other fuels. However, there is a danger of an 
increase in methane emissions if imports from Russia increase. This is discussed further 
below. Our base case results show an additional 0.7 bcm p.a. of consumption in industry, and 
an extra 2.2 bcm p.a. of consumption in the power sector. This would result in emissions 
reduction of some 8 million tonnes of CO2 p.a.39 assuming gas displaced fuel oil in industry 
and coal in power generation. In practice, some of these savings may not occur as some 
consumption growth will be from a general increase in energy use, rather than the substitution 
of one fuel for another. 
18.2.13. Possibility of increased rivalry between producers 
The above conclusions correspond to the limited competition scenario. The scenario showing 
greater price competition between producers would result in the following principal 
differences: 
(a) Price falls to consumers would be greater, especially for power plants, where rents are 
presently greatest. Industrial consumers may also experience price falls. Residential 
consumers may also experience some reduction in prices, but some may be appropriated 
by the distribution companies. 
(b) Sales volumes would increase somewhat. 
(c) There may be some pipeline over-capacity as competing pipelines are built. 
(d) Import dependency would rise as volumes increased. 
(e) The contribution to the competitiveness of Community industry would be greater, 
corresponding to the increased price falls. 
(f) Patterns of production would not be significantly affected, although some of the increase 
in UK volumes may be displaced by other sources, most likely Russia. 
(g) Increased consumption would also lead to greater environmental benefits. 
39 See Appendices for details of C02 emissions by fuel type. 
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18.3. Policy issues for gas 
Policy measures need to seek to address the key drivers of the outcomes identified in this 
report. These are: 
(a) The form of demand. This is set by fundamental economic considerations, and is likely 
to be difficult to influence by policy. 
(b) The price of competing fuels. These are set by world markets. However. EU tax rates 
have an influence on consumer prices. 
(c) Concern on security of supply. The EU may be able to take measures, such as assisting 
strategic storage, which ease concerns in this area. 
(d) The number of producers. Increasing the number of producers able to supply the market 
is likely to be a key policy objective. 
(e) The bargaining power of customers. This may be affected, e.g. by permitting TPA only 
for certain classes of customers. 
(f) The bargainers for rents in the chain. By becoming a de facto participant in bargaining 
(e.g. by imposing taxes), the EU may change rent allocations. 
The last four of these issues, and other policy matters, are now discussed. 
18.3.1. Security of supply 
The potential growth of demand in the power sector poses clear challenges for policy. A 
laissez faire approach would lead to very great reliance on imports, especially from Russia, 
which would expose the European Union to the possibility of supply interruptions disrupting 
the gas and electricity industries simultaneously. The policy implications of this mainly relate 
to security of supply in electricity, and are discussed in the corresponding chapter on 
electricity. It is possible that the greater reliance on Russian gas due to demand growth in the 
power sector could have a deleterious effect on the security of gas supply in other sectors. 
However, if there is a major supply interruption from Russia, and there are adequate 
arrangements, such as dual firing of power plants, this need not be so. Indeed, if there is a 
large proportion of interruptible contracts for power plants, demand growth from the power 
sector may serve to enhance security of gas supply for other sectors. 
Security of supply may be further enhanced by conservation of energy. These benefits should 
form part of the equation when considering the desirability of such measures, along with the 
well recognized environmental and other benefits. 
Extra strategic storage may be required as import dependency increases. This may best be 
realized by the gas companies engaging in competitive tender. 
The completion of trans-European gas networks will also have an important role to play here. 
The projects identified in the Commission's recent document on trans-European energy 
networks (Trans-European Energy Network, Community Guidelines for Projects of Common 
Interest [1995], European Commission DG XVII) will all assist in this respect, particularly in 
reducing the vulnerability of individual Member States to interruptions from a supplier on 
which they are especially dependent. However, the main contribution to increased security of 
supply would come from increasing the diversity of import sources, and this is discussed 
further below. 
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18.3.2. Environmental policy implications 
TPA would have few direct effects on consumption, and so few environmental effects. 
However, the effects of increased gas consumption in the power sector must be considered. In 
many ways, increased gas consumption will provide benefits, with negligible emissions of 
sulphur and reduced emissions of CO2. However, the issue of methane emission from the gas 
system, especially outside the EU will need to be addressed, because methane is such a 
powerful greenhouse gas. The Russian system is likely to be especially problematic in this 
respect, because of the high level of losses from the system. 
18.3.3. Addressing the problem of the upstream oligopoly 
The most significant contribution to addressing the problem of diversity of supply would be to 
increase the number of gas importers. The best prospects for increased large-scale imports by 
the EU are*from the republics of the former Soviet Union, especially Turkmenistan, exporting 
via routes other than through Russia. Supplies from the Middle East could also make a 
significant contribution. The main problems with securing these supplies are the political 
difficulties along the route which they must traverse, and the corresponding difficulty in 
financing projects. Assistance from the EU to alleviate these difficulties may have substantial 
benefits. 
LNG imports will also have a contribution to make. Facilitating planning permission etc. for 
LNG terminals may be helpful in increasing the diversity of suppliers, but direct subsidies may 
be ineffective as they may simply weaken the incentive on LNG providers to keep reducing 
their costs, on which good progress is being made. Instead, assuring readier access to markets 
by removing barriers may stimulate efforts by producers to reduce the costs of long-distance 
deliveries, especially of LNG, and so increase diversity of supply. 
18.3.4. Rent flows 
The potential for rents in the value chain to be appropriated by producers could be addressed 
directly by fiscal measures, perhaps, for example, a licence fee for transmission pipelines 
calculated at the point of entry. This would be equivalent to transit tariffs common among the 
countries through which major gas lines pass. Licence fees would in effect raise transmission 
costs and so reduce the amount of rent in the chain for which the industry could bargain. 
A final possibility would be to tax gas as it is consumed. There is now a tax in Germany, but 
in most countries there is no equivalent for gas of the excise tax on oil products. However, 
such a tax would risk restricting demand growth among marginal consumers. The most 
effective measure might be to place a tax on the use of gas in the power sector, where rents are 
very large; and there may be a desire that potential demand, which is enormous, be 
constrained. 
18.3.5. Maintenance of buyer concentration as a policy mechanism 
The problem of upstream oligopoly does not imply that it is desirable to balance this with an 
oligopoly of buyers (the transmission companies), as happens at present. This produces no 
benefits for the consumer, as it simply leads to rent capture by the transmission companies. 
Rather, the preferred solution is to implement policies that increase competition in production, 
and to seek to appropriate rent for consumers, whether directly or via official institutions, in 
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the form of licence fees or taxes. Maintenance of the existing structure simply compounds one 
problem (upstream oligopoly) with another (downstream oligopoly), whereas an appropriate 
policy solution is likely to involve addressing directly the problems caused to consumers by 
the presence of an upstream oligopoly. 
18.4. Summary of main policy conclusions 
The main conclusions of this work may be summarized as follows: 
(a) The removal of restrictions on building independent pipelines and storage facilities is 
likely to have significant benefits, especially if the electricity sector is liberalized. It is 
also likely to increase the efficiency of operation of the European pipeline network. 
Continuing such restrictions has few, if any, benefits. 
(b) TPA for power plants and large industrial consumers is likely to have significant 
benefits. The introduction of TPA is also likely to have some benefits in improving the 
operating efficiency of the network. 
(c) There are problems with a potential flow of economic rent outside the Community under 
TPA because of the uncompetitive nature of the upstream, and there is a risk that some 
efficiency gains will flow upstream rather than to the consumer. This needs to be 
addressed by additional policy measures to capture the major benefits of liberalization 
for all consumers. For example, this could be achieved by fiscal measures. However, 
retention of the existing market structure, in the belief that concentration of buyer power 
will balance that of the producers, is unlikely to be a satisfactory policy, as it is very 
unlikely to produce benefits for consumers. 
(d) Increasing the number of gas suppliers to the EU would be extremely beneficial, but will 
be difficult to achieve. 
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APPENDIX A 
Electricity 
Al. Other issues related to the single market in electricity 
There is a range of issues related to the completion of the single market in energy which have 
been treated only briefly in the main body of the report, in order to keep the analysis focused 
and concise. These issues are discussed further here. 
Al.l . Need to avoid cross-subsidization 
In the publicly owned electricity supply industry in England and Wales prior to privatization, 
the prices offered to large customers were subsidized. The large customers avoided paying a 
capacity charge, contributed neither to the subsidy for British Coal nor to the cost of the 
expensive nuclear power stations, and some paid little or nothing for transmission. The largest 
customers effectively paid little more than the energy cost of running on imported coal. In 
April 1991 the subsidy was removed and 10 MW+ customers complained as their prices 
increased by an average of about 12% in real terms and converged on prices offered to 
medium size customers.40 Pool prices have also risen over the period as they have begun to 
converge to contract prices. 
Non-cost-reflective pricing is believed to exist in several countries at present. Discriminatory 
pricing places generators attempting to enter new markets, who do not have the support of a 
captive market to bear the costs of cross-subsidization, at a competitive disadvantage. As well 
as preventing competition, such price distortions may result in a 'subsidy competition' among 
those who have a franchise market upon which the costs of the subsidy can be borne. 
As noted in the main body of this report the removal of a cross-subsidy represents only an 
initial effect. If competition acts to increase efficiency, the long-term gains from competition 
should eventually outweigh the removal of the initial cross-subsidy (provided that this subsidy 
is not too large). 
The main purpose of unbundling accounting is to help identify costs so that they can be 
adequately reflected in tariffs. In a truly unbundled and competitive system in which there is 
no cross-subsidy from a franchise market, generators have no incentive to price discriminate. 
It is assumed that price discrimination at the generation and transmission level is much 
reduced in any nTPA scenario, and eliminated in a TPA scenario. However, some 
discrimination at the distribution level remains. 
In its report on the 'Consequences of Electricity Privatization" (Volume 1. Energy Committee Second Report. Session 
1991-92. 26 February 1992. UMSO) the Energy Committee of the House of Commons stated'we would not support 
subsidies to very large users at the expense of smaller users'. The Committee furthermore stated that 'it is certainly 
unacceptable for intensive electricity users in the UK to be disadvantaged by overseas competitors paying unjustifiably 
low prices. The remedy clearly lies with the European Commission". 
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The issue of distribution companies having the right of third party access is relevant here. If 
the incumbent generator retains exclusive rights to sell to the distribution companies, this 
gives the potential to exclude competitors from the industrial sector by cross-subsidizing these 
from the monopoly part of their market. In contrast, if distribution companies also have the 
right to buy freely, opportunities for this are reduced, because distribution companies will be 
able to go elsewhere to secure better deals if undue costs are being charged to them. It will be 
the task of the regulatory authorities to ensure that they have the appropriate incentives to do 
so, rather than simply passing excess costs through to their customers. Experience in the UK 
has shown that such incentives are difficult to create, and the solution adopted in the UK, and 
more rapidly in Sweden, has been to allow all consumers to buy electricity from independent 
suppliers. This creates competition in all market segments, greatly reducing the potential for 
cross-subsidy. 
Al.2. Issues of property rights associated with TPA 
As noted in the report, access on fair terms to the transmission system is a prerequisite for the 
successful operation of the single market both within a Member State, and even more so 
between parties in different Member States. Ensuring that access is provided may alter the 
property rights of the owner of the transmission system: 
(a) In some countries (e.g. Germany) owners built lines on the understanding that they 
would defacto be entitled to their sole use, and that the terms on which others used the 
lines were at the discretion of the owner. 
(b) In other countries, however, lines were built as a joint venture between parties (e.g. 
Sweden), and the parties became used to sharing and accommodating changing 
requirements to use lines. 
(c) There is now a trend in some countries (e.g. UK) that a condition for building or indeed 
owning a line (provided there is available capacity) is that it has to be a common carrier. 
The consequence that some companies fear from a change of property rights is not that the 
change will affect the value of the line per se, because if other parties use it they should pay a 
reasonable charge for its use. Rather they are concerned that allowing others access on 
economic terms will affect the competitive positioning - and hence value - of their generating 
plant. As noted in the main body of this report, control of transmission has in most countries 
to date provided the means of controlling the generation market. 
Al.3. Requirements for effective establishment of TPA 
Once the basic property right issues are resolved, achieving the aim of access requires: 
(a) prompt and fair terms for connection where there is capacity; 
(b) a reasonable price for the use of the wires; 
(c) appropriate payments for transmission system operation costs; 
(d) a developed settlement system; 
(e) effective arbitration. 
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Al.4. Prompt and fair terms for connection 
Transmission system operators should be required to offer terms within a defined and 
reasonable period where there is capacity, and should be entitled to earn a reasonable return on 
the assets needed to make a connection into their system. In situations where connections are 
dedicated for a particular user and do not impact on the system as a whole, the pricing should 
not be difficult. But there are obvious difficulties in the frequent cases when there are shared 
assets for which one party may have already paid, or when general system reinforcement is 
required to enable a generator or customer to connect in a particular location. In such cases the 
'depth in the system' to which interactions will be determined and costed has to be defined (in 
England and Wales the National Grid Company adopts a 'shallow' approach and treats as 
much of the system as possible as a common service and shared cost). 
Al.5. Pricing for use of a transmission system 
Economical transport is important to the operation of trading markets. It is important in 
electricity, but it has unusual complexities, namely: 
(a) The system can be highly interactive, with a change in one part affecting operation 
elsewhere. Costs can vary both over time and on a regional basis due to changes in 
losses and requirements for reactive power, and to transmission constraints. 
(b) Constraints are more binding than in most - if not all - other transport systems, and the 
consequential cost implications of requiring plants to operate out of merit can be 
significant. 
(c) Electricity transport requires the real time support of ancillary services. 
The theory of spot pricing41 solved the conceptual problem - in principle it is possible to 
devise continually varying prices at the nodes of a network based on the short run marginal 
costs of generation and transmission (including a reliability component representing capacity), 
and the price of 'transmission' between the two points is then the difference between the spot 
prices at the nodes. Although short run marginal cost based pricing presents many practical 
problems, in principle transmission pricing should vary on a zonal basis where the zones are 
delimited by transmission constraints. 
Although transmission pricing is important, the conceptual complexity of the issue should not 
disguise the fact that it is a minor cost component in the total system. Thus, in the first 
instance access on reasonably fair and prompt terms will be of more importance than 
sophisticated transmission pricing. In those systems that have been opened for use by third 
parties tractable pricing methodologies have been found. The UK system, the largest 
integrated grid presently open to third parties in Europe, adopted a simple revenue cap 
approach with RPI-x price control. There is regional differentiation of connection charges to 
encourage capacity to connect in the south of England where it is in short supply. 
41 
F.C. Schweppe. M.C. Camanis. R.D. Tabors. R.E. Bohn (1988). Spot pricing of electricity. Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
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Al.6. Firm power and difference pricing 
Short term security of supply is a critical issue in developing TPA. A generator with a large 
portfolio of plant has the inherent advantage over a competitor with only one or two plants, of 
being able to provide firm power, and also the ability to accommodate differences between a 
contracted take and the amount actually taken. Co-generation, in particular, can be 
discouraged by charging a high price for standby and top-up power. 
Creation of a power pool avoids this problem, and also matches the integrated nature of an 
electricity system. Alternatively, the main generator can be given the responsibility of 
balancing the system. 
Al.7. Economic despatch 
The benefits of the economic despatch of new entrant generators within a system are self-
evident. This objective can be achieved either by generators (infeeds from other systems), 
being 'despatched' by the dominant utility (subject to procedures to ensure fairness), or by 
some form of pool. TPA does not necessarily require a pool even for trading within a Member 
State, particularly where there is a dominant monopoly. Still less does TPA require overall EC 
despatch - provided the interfaces between systems are economically sound, then separate 
intertrading 'areas' should (in theory) adjust to each other through price signals to provide an 
overall optimal despatch. 
Al.8. Settlement system 
In an efficient single market, arrangements will have to be made for an appropriate settlement 
mechanism to sort out who pays who for what. A settlement system for relatively few parties 
trading within a Member State should not present significant difficulties. But trading across 
Member State control areas and transmission constraints will heighten awareness of the issue 
of transmission system operation costs, and proper arrangements will be crucial for the success 
of the single market. In practice, bilateral arrangements are likely to be the main mechanism 
for this. 
A 1.9. Effective arbitration 
The Commission carefully applies the principle of subsidiarity in defining how disputes under 
the proposed directive (COM(91) 548 final) should be resolved. It states in the General 
Explanatory Memorandum that Member States will be free to choose how they implement the 
directive, e.g. whether to set up a regulatory authority or to rely on competition legislation. 
This approach avoids the charge that the Commission wishes to be seen as a super-regulator, 
and also avoids suggesting that Member States should appoint special purpose regulators. 
However, some form of specialized regulation is likely to be necessary, as noted in the main 
report. 
ALIO. Risk and financing new generation plant 
Traditionally, companies in continental Europe have an obligation to supply, which implies an 
obligation to invest. Customers have no choice of supplier, and have to pay for what the 
undertakings (or their regulator) determines it costs to provide the supply. 
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Thus the financing of plant is no problem because in Europe (unlike in the USA) the 
undertakings building plant know they can generally pass their costs through to the customers. 
Subsequently, plant 'value' to the utilities equals the plant depreciated cost upon which they 
earn a return. The utility shareholders face little or no financial risk from the possibility of 
demand not materializing, nor from relative fuel prices altering and rendering facilities less 
economic and consequently reducing their economic value. 
Competitive generation organized in the form of bidding to electric companies for long-term 
contracts of 15-30 years does not fundamentally alter the deal since, in the absence of retail 
'by-pass', there is still cost pass through to final consumers. 
The developer bears the construction cost risk and most - if not all - of the performance risk 
of availability and operations and maintenance costs. Poor operational performance apart, the 
developer is then paid for the plant's capital cost, and this provision is the basis for financing 
the project. The developer is also paid for the fuel (but may have an incentive at the margin to 
buy keenly). 
The utility bears the substantial risks of whether demand will be there that requires the output, 
and of fuel price increases, including the possibility that if the plant's fuel price increases 
relative to other generators' fuels, then it may run less than planned and so the plant will 
reduce in value. In turn, the utility is generally able to pass these risks through to its customers 
in its electricity tariffs via some form of regulatory agreement. 
Competitive generation plus competition to supply customers directly breaks the deal and 
raises questions concerning how new generation facilities will be financed without a captive 
customer base. 
If there is no cost pass through mechanism, a critical issue is whether investors will be 
prepared to invest in a market environment where competition shifts some of the risks 
identified above from customers to owners, and consequently raises the investor's financing 
rate.42 We have taken the view that because it is simply a risk transfer, it does not raise overall 
costs (in a market the risk can be passed to those able to bear it most cheaply). 
42 
The total risks should remain the same, but the burden of risk shifts from customer to shareholder which increases the 
shareholders* required cost of capital. 
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A2. Electricity prices and taxes 
Table A2.1. Electricity prices for EU countries, UK pence on the first day of..., 1990 
prices (excluding VAT) 
Country and load type 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 Ocl-88 Oct-87 Oct-86 Aug-85 
Belgium 
3,300 IcWh/year 
: I00kW@40%LF 
10,000 kW @ 80% LF 
Denmark 
3.300 kWh/year 
100kW@40%LF 
10,000 kW @ 80% LF! 
France 
3,300 kWh/year 
100kW@40%LF 
10,000 kW@ 80% LF; 
Germany 
3,300 kWh/year 
f 100kW@40%LF 
10.000 kW @ 80% LF, 
Greece 
3,300 kWh/year 
100kW@40%LF 
10,000 kW @ 80% LF 
Ireland 
3,300 kWh/year 
10ÖkW@40%LF 
10,000 kW @ 80% LF 
Italy 
3,300 kWh/year 
: : 10pkW<§40%LF 
10,000 kW @ 80% LF: 
Luxembourg 
3.300 kWh/year 
i00kW@4O%LF 
10,000 kW @ 80% LF 
Netherlands 
3,300 kWh/year 
"'■','.; ; ì ò o k w @ 4 b % L F 
10,000 kW @ 80% LF 
Portugal 
3,300 kWh/year 
100kW@40%LF*: 
10,000 kW % 80% LF« 
Spain 
3,300 kWh/year 
."' lOÖkWlgW/iLF 
10,000kW@80%LF ; 
UK 
3,300 kWh/year 
100kW@40%LF : 
10,000 kW @ 80% LF! 3 12 331 341 3 46 3 45 
Industrial pfièês 
Domestic prices 
* deflated using CPI 
9.68 
530 
2.91 
7.94 
2.91 
2.63 
8.72 
4,45 
285 
983 
7.31 
474 
3.06 
2.19 
1 49 
651 
4 68 
3.00 
770 
NA 
NA 
8.58 
NA 
NA 
6.21 
341 
274 
7.53 
431 
331 
7.56 
4.31 
3.06 
7.26 
4 10 
8.94 
489 
2 68 
7.54 
292 
2.53 
8.48 
4.53 
2.89 
9 19 
7.03 
455 
3.16 
2.34 
1 64 
645 
447 
2.87 
8.14 
NA 
NA 
8.09 
576 
3.44 
5.99 
3 56 
248 
7.45 
4.51 
348 
12 49 
7,69 
5.47 
7.81 
435 
9.64 
537 
2 97 
853 
3.33 
2 80 
884 
4.76 
3.05 
9.56 
7.35 
4.77 
3.98 
2.89 
2.03 
7 43 
507 
3.25 
7 35 
5.99 
3.16 
860 
6 11 
3.67 
6.25 
365 
2.60 
8 92 
5.65 
436 
9 24 
587 
4 18 
806 
4.52 
8 40 
461 
2.56 
7 11 
2 85 
2 17 
7 66 
3.87 
250 
853 
638 
4.14 
4.51 
3 20 
225 
6.39 
4 63 
297 
804 
659 
3 34 
748 
5 10 
3.22 
5.36 
301 
2.16 
7.35 
4.90 
379 
8.93 
587 
4.18 
799 
4.60 
8.36 
450 
2.54 
746 
3 04 
2.33 
7.48 
3.65 
2.37 
8.52 
6 15 
4.14 
4.50 
3 24 
248 
6 69 
471 
3.02 
7.61 
6.53 
295 
7.45 
484 
3 02 
5.52 
3 22 
232 
695 
465 
363 
8 99 
599 
4.19 
7.41 
452 
9 02 
4 70 
270 
8,31 
330 
2,78 
8 00 
3.72 
2.42 
921 
687 
4.62 
574 
4 12 
3 15 
741 
525 
3 37 
782 
6 56 
3.34 
8.24 
520 
3.29 
6.46 
359 
2.62 
7 26 
486 
3 88 
8.73 
5.69 
4 13 
7.36 
4.97 
792 
NA 
2 25 
7 08 
NA 
1.73 
6 07 
NA 
2 02 
7 86 
NA 
3.70 
5 84 
NA 
3 09 
6.66 
NA 
2.86 
895 
NA 
249 
720 
NA 
2 57 
4.97 
NA 
1.88 
6 92 
NA 
3.75 
7.75 
NA 
3.51 
7 38 
NA 
8 39 
NA 
2 41 
6 77 
NA 
1 38 
639 
NA 
2 16 
8 36 
NA 
7 64 
6.89 
NA 
3.64 
7.05 
NA 
3 07 
9 52 
NA 
265 
7 54 
NA 
2 80 
5 10 
NA 
1 94 
7 87 
NA 
4 26 
8 10 
NA 
3 57 
795 
NA 
9 11 
4.65 
265 
7 04 
2 57 
1 52 
6 96 
380 
241 
901 
631 
4 20 
821 
5 35 
4.10 
8 06 
5 83 
3 75 
11.15 
6 48 
3 12 
8 10 
524 
3 46 
5 74 
3.45 
2 46 
8 95 
6 42 
5 02 
8 42 
4.94 
370 
7 77 
5.19 
9 59 
4 72 
2 86 
7 05 
2 30 
1 72 
7 33 
4.05 
255 
8 70 
653 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
9 12 
6 58 
4 62 
12 16 
672 
2 81 
828 
501 
3 31 
5 70 
3 40 
2 17 
9 70 
7.13 
5 56 
8 42 
5 10 
3 87 
7 92 
5 31 
7 6" 
3 38 
2 32 
5 46 
2 05 
1 90 
6 21 
2 97 
2 29 
6 68 
4 80 
3 31 
NA 
NA 
NA 
8 13 
5 73 
4 45 
11 52 
6 68 
3 56 
7 19 
3 78 
2 67 
5.77 
3 65 
3 07 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
8 08 
5 58 
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Table A2.2. Electricity prices for EU countries, local currencies on the first day of.. 
1990 prices 
Country and load type 
Belgium 
3,300 kWh/year 
I 0 0 k W @ 4 0 % L F 
10.000 kW @ 80% LF 
Denmark 
3,300 kWh'year 
IOOkW@40%LF 
10,000 kW @ 80% LF 
France 
3,300 kWh'year 
100kW@40%LF 
10.000 kW @ 80% LF 
Germany 
3.300 kWh/year 
100kW'@4Ô%LF; 
10,000 kW @ 80% LF, 
Greece 
3,300 kWh/year 
100kW@40%LF 
10.000 kW @ 80% LF 
Ireland 
3.300 kWh/year 
IOOkW@40%LF 
10,000 kW ® 80% LF 
Italy 
3,300 kWh/year 
IO0kW@40%LF 
10,000 kW @ 80% LF 
Luxembourg 
3.300 kWh/year 
1 0 0 k W @ 4 0 % L F 
10,000 kW @ 80% LF 
Netherlands 
3.300 kWh/year 
1 0 0 k W @ 4 0 % L F 
10.000 kW @ 80% LF 
Portugal 
3,300 kWh/year 
IOOkW@40%LF» 
t0 ,000kW@80%LF· 
Spain 
3.300 kWli/year 
1 0 0 k W @ 4 0 % L F 
10,000 kW @ 80% LF 
UK 
3,300 kWh/year 
100kW@40%LF 
tO,OOOkW@80%LF 
Industriai prices 
Domestic prices 
Oct­88 Ocl­87 Oct­86 Aug­85 
6 06 
3 32 
1 82 
100 79 
3697 
33 44 
8943 
45 64 
29 22 
2804 
2086 
13 53 
1405 
10.05 
6 85 
754 
5 42 
3 47 
214 64 
NA 
NA 
4 55 
NA 
NA 
2042 
11 23 
901 
1973 
11 30 
869 
18 52 
10.56 
751 
7.89 
4 98 
3 78 
601 
3 29 
1.80 
101 02 
39 08 
33 92 
91 01 
48 56 
31 04 
27 78 
21 24 
13 76 
1421 
10 52 
7 39 
774 
536 
344 
226 52 
NA 
NA 
460 
3 28 
1 96 
20 86 
1241 
8 65 
2049 
1241 
9.58 
18 65 
11.48 
8 17 
7.81 
5 27 
4.02 
6 02 
3 35 
1 86 
108 08 
4223 
35 48 
90 85 
48 91 
31 37 
27 58 
21 22 
13.76 
15.76 
11.44 
804 
791 
540 
3 46 
180.25 
14682 
77 38 
4 60 
327 
1.97 
20.88 
12 19 
870 
2087 
13.21 
10.21 
1888 
12.00 
8 54 
806 
548 
4.13 
5 92 
3.25 
1 81 
104 78 
42 02 
32 03 
91 16 
46 11 
29 77 
28.12 
21 04 
1364 
18 04 
12 80 
8 99 
7 80 
5 65 
3 62 
190.15 
155.87 
78.96 
465 
3 18 
2.00 
21.05 
11.81 
8 48 
20 05 
13 38 
1034 
18 57 
1221 
8 70 
7.99 
5.58 
4.19 
6 03 
3 25 
1 83 
106 93 
43 55 
3340 
90 50 
44 22 
2868 
28.70 
2071 
13.95 
1659 
11.96 
9 16 
809 
5 70 
3.66 
18241 
156 46 
70.63 
474 
3.08 
1 92 
22.11 
12.90 
9.29 
:950 
-.3.03 
.0 19 
'885 
!2.54 
879 
7.41 
531 
4.06 
631 
3 29 
I 89 
113 90 
45 17 
38 13 
9240 
4291 
27.91 
2951 
2201 
1479 
1739 
1246 
954 
8.14 
5 77 
370 
177 40 
148.90 
7580 
5 09 
321 
2.03 
24 65 
1370 
10 00 
1921 
12.86 
1026 
17 64 
11 49 
834 
736 
497 
368 
6 43 
NA 
1 83 
112 68 
NA 
27 58 
81 78 
N A 
27.14 
29.34 
NA 
13.81 
18.52 
NA 
9 79 
8 41 
NA 
3 62 
232.37 
NA 
64.55 
5 17 
NA 
1.84 
22 51 
NA 
8 49 
19.91 
NA 
1078 
18 03 
NA 
8.16 
738 
NA 
3 59 
6 73 
NA 
1 94 
105 60 
Ν A 
21 51 
84 58 
NA 
28 64 
30 80 
NA 
28.16 
21.08 
NA 
11.12 
8 75 
NA 
3 82 
246.83 
NA 
6869 
534 
NA 
1 98 
22 74 
NA 
8 64 
2243 
NA 
12 15 
19 26 
NA 
8.50 
7.95 
NA 
3 76 
6 80 
3 47 
1 98 
103 60 
37 82 
2238 
84 94 
46 42 
29 43 
31.31 
21.94 
14.59 
22.96 
14 95 
11.46 
894 
6 47 
4 17 
263.98 
153 41 
73.91 
5 34 
345 
2 28 
24 11 
14 49 
1031 
2275 
1632 
1276 
18.95 
11.12 
8.33 
7.77 
5 19 
3.73 
7 00 
3 45 
2 09 
99 66 
3252 
24 24 
86 20 
47 67 
29 94 
29.54 
22.18 
NA 
23.89 
1651 
1266 
976 
7 04 
4 95 
270.06 
14921 
6234 
534 
323 
2 13 
23 52 
14 03 
8 94 
22 50 
1653 
1291 
18 40 
11 15 
8.45 
7.92 
531 
390 
7 29 
3 20 
220 
98.12 
36 92 
34 10 
90 55 
4322 
33.30 
3029 
21.78 
1501 
21.39 
1530 
11 71 
10.16 
7 16 
5 56 
330 14 
18546 
98 72 
602 
3 17 
2 24 
31.14 
1967 
1659 
2202 
1621 
13 94 
18 54 
11.07 
8.76 
8.08 
5.58 
436 
* deflated using CP1 
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Table A2.3. Electricity prices for EU countries: local currencies on the first day of, 
current prices 
Local currencies on the first day of the year, current prices 
Country and load type 
Belgium 
3,300 kWh/year 
100kW@40%LF 
10,000 kW @80%LF 
Denmark 
3,300 kWh/year 
100kW@40%LF 
10,000 kW @ 80% LF 
France 
3,300 kWh/year 
IOOkW@40%LF 
10.000 kW @ 80% LF 
Germany 
3,300 kWh/year 
, 100kW@40%LF 
to.ooo kW @ Soy, LF; 
Greece 
3,300 kWh/year 
100kW@40%LF. 
(0,000 kW @ 80% LF: 
Ireland 
3,300 kWh/year 
I00kW@40%LF 
10,000 kW @ 80% LF 
Italy 
3,300 kWh/year 
100kW@40%LF 
10,000 kW @ 80% LF 
Luxembourg 
3.300 kWh/year 
100kW@40%LF 
10,000 kW @ 80% LF 
Netherlands 
3,300 kWh/year 
I00kW@40%LF : 
10,000 kW @ 80% LF 
Portugal 
3,300 kWh/year 
100kW@40%LF 
10,000kW@80%LF 
Spain 
3,300 kWh/year 
100kW@40%LF 
10,000 kW @ 80% LF 
Oct-86 Aug-85 
UK 
3,300 kWh/year 
100kW@40%LF 
10,000 kW @ 80% LF 
6 84 
3 37 
1 85 
III 
3824 
3459 
99 84 
46.18 
29 56 
3287 
22 15 
14.36 
27 02 
17.14 
11.69 
8 54 
577 
3 7 
275 
182 12 
98.04 
522 
3 11 
1.95 
233 
12 1 
97 
27 86 
15 95 
12 27 
23 82 
1241 
882 
933 
6 
456 
6 68 
3 27 
1 79 
109.1 
3937 
34 17 
99 84 
46.33 
29 61 
32 06 
22.17 
14.37 
2497 
16 64 
11.69 
854 
5 77 
37 
275 
17601 
93.19 
5.18 
3.II 
1 86 
234 
13 2 
9.2 
27 86 
16 88 
13 03 
-}1 CO 
12 63 
8 99 
8 93 
6.1 
465 
6.54 
3.29 
1 82 
114 46 
42 27 
3552 
9803 
46 17 
29.61 
3089 
22 01 
1427 
2497 
16 64 
11.69 
854 
5 77 
3 7 
210 35 
16561 
87.29 
5.07 
306 
1 84 
22 8 
129 
92 
27 05 
17 12 
13 23 
22 15 
12 66 
9.01 
8 99 
6.192 
4.672 
626 
3 22 
1 79 
109 5 
42 27 
32 22 
9636 
4477 
2891 
30 26 
21 84 
14.16 
24 97 
16 64 
11 69 
83 
5.77 
3 7 
2124 
167 4 
848 
4 95 
3 01 
1.9 
22 4 
124 
89 
24.32 
16.23 
12.54 
20 83 
1256 
895 
8 772 
6066 
4556 
6 22 
321 
181 
109 5 
44 12 
33 83 
93 4 
43 65 
28 31 
29 7 
21 21 
14 28 
1982 
13.96 
10 69 
835 
577 
3.7 
193 9 
164 6 
74 3 
489 
3 
1 87 
22 8 
132 
95 
21 72 
14 52 
11 35 
19 96 
1273 
892 
7.85 
5.6 
4 284 
6 31 
3 29 
1.89 
1139 
45 17 
38 13 
92 4 
4291 
2791 
29.51 
22 01 
1479 
17 39 
12 46 
9.54 
8.14 
5 77 
3 7 
177 4 
148 9 
75 8 
5 09 
3.21 
2 03 
24 65 
13 7 
10 
1921 
12 86 
1026 
17 64 
II 49 
8 34 
736 
4 07 
368 
6 16 
NA 
1 82 
109 75 
NA 
27 22 
79 08 
NA 
27 49 
2858 
NA 
13 58 
15 39 
NA 
8 45 
8 14 
NA 
3 72 
2182 
NA 
60 1 
4 98 
NA 
1.88 
21 97 
NA 
841 
17 56 
NA 
Q51 
16 89 
NA 
7.00 
6735 
NA 
3.377 
6 1 
NA 
1 82 
9821 
NA 
20 13 
79 08 
NA 
27 49 
29 2 
NA 
26 84 
1539 
NA 
8 45 
8 14 
NA 
3 72 
2182 
NA 
60 1 
4 98 
NA 
1 88 
21.07 
NA 
8 26 
17 56 
Ν A 
051 
16 89 
NA 
7 00 
6 735 
NA 
3 38 
6 1 
3 21 
1 83 
92 16 
34 01 
20 13 
77 3 
4234 
26 85 
29 3 
2065 
13.73 
1477 
104 
7 97 
8 14 
6 06 
3 9 
222 14 
128 10 
61 76 
49| 
3 10 
2 11 
23 13 
13 77 
98 
16 26 
II 66 
0 12 
15 86 
10 15 
7.61 
627 
4 46 
3 21 
6 18 
3 35 
2 03 
85 28 
28 05 
21.58 
75 01 
43 4 
27 26 
27 59 
21 4 
NA 
13 2 
10 52 
807 
8 615 
6 55 
46 
21702 
121 49 
5076 
491 
3 19 
2 II 
22 72 
13 5 
8595 
147 
108 
8 43 
14 63 
10 09 
7 65 
6 138 
4 394 
3 224 
6 35 
3 52 
2 42 
80 07 
33 88 
31 20 
77 82 
40 48 
31 19 
28 32 
21 55 
14 85 
0 61 
8 27 
6 33 
8 64 
6 81 
5 29 
250 51 
152 315 
81 08 
5 52 
3 21 
2 27 
30 05 
1045 
164 
12 88 
0 4S 
8 15 
13 55 
093 
7 86 
6 056 
4 424 
3 458 
Industrialprices 
Domestic prices 
Including all taxes except VAT 
Including all taxes and VAT 
Table A2.4. Domestic electricity prices and taxes 
> 
-a 
3 
a. 
Pi' 
Electricity taxes in the E l ! 
Tariffs for 100 kWh (1994-1) 
Category 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
UK 
Region 
National territory * 
National territory 
Hamburg 
Hanover 
Dusseldorf 
Frankfurt am Main 
Stuttgart 
Munich 
Western zone 
Southern zone 
Erfurt 
Leipzig 
Rostock 
Athens * 
Madrid * 
Lille 
Paris 
Marseille 
Lyon 
Toulouse 
Strasbourg 
Dublin 
North and centre 
South and Islands 
National territory 
Grand Duchy 
Rotterdam 
North Holland 
North Brabant 
Lisbon * 
S. Miguel Acores 
London 
Glasgow 
Leeds 
Birmingham 
Prices (ECU 
Households 
D A (annual cons. kWh 600) 
VAT 
3.69 
4.56 
3,63 
2.81 
3.09 
2.68 
4.04 
2.94 
3,30 
4.51 
3.24 
3.03 
2.97 
1.37 
2.03 
2.35 
2.37 
2.35 
2.35 
2.35 
2.18 
1.60 
0.57 
0.57 
0.56 
1.24 
2.51 
2.14 
2.20 
0.64 
-
-
-
-
-
Other taxes 
0.15 
5,32 
2.20 
1.54 
1.72 
1.35 
1.96 
1.49 
1.83 
2.28 
-
-
-
-
-
1.33 
1.46 
1.33 
1.33 
1.33 
0.44 
-
-
-
1,15 
-
-
-
-
0.10 
-
-
-
-
-
Total taxes 
3.84 
9.88 
5.83 
4,35 
4.81 
4.03 
6.00 
4.43 
5.13 
6.79 
3.24 
3.03 
2.97 
1.37 
2.03 
3.68 
3.83 
3.68 
3.68 
3.68 
2.62 
1.60 
0.57 
0.57 
1.71 
1.24 
2.51 
2.14 
2,20 
0.74 
-
-
-
-
-
Prices (ECU) 
Households 
D Β (annual cons. kWh 1200) 
VAT 
3.34 
3.56 
2.89 
2.38 
2.55 
2.39 
2.96 
2.73 
2.44 
3.27 
2.50 
2.25 
2.41 
1.31 
2.03 
2.21 
2.24 
2.21 
2.21 
2.21 
2.07 
1.35 
0.65 
0.65 
0.63 
0.93 
2.08 
1.75 
1.73 
0.73 
-
-
-
-
-
Other taxes 
0.15 
5,32 
1.62 
1.32 
1.41 
1.20 
1.44 
1.38 
1.37 
1.65 
-
-
-
-
-
1.16 
1.27 
1.16 
1.16 
1.16 
0.39 
-
-
-
0.95 
-
-
-
-
0.05 
-
-
-
-
-
Total taxes 
3.49 
8.88 
4.51 
3,70 
3.96 
3.59 
4.40 
4.11 
3.81 
4.92 
2.50 
2.25 
2.41 
1.31 
2.03 
3.37 
3.51 
3.37 
3.37 
3.37 
2.46 
1.35 
0.65 
0.65 
1.58 
0.93 
2.08 
1.75 
1.73 
0.78 
-
-
-
-
-
Prices (ECU) 
Households 
D C (annual cons. kWh 3500) 
VAT 
2.38 
2.89 
2.16 
1.98 
2.15 
1.96 
2.05 
2.32 
1.83 
2.28 
1.85 
1.68 
1.96 
1.15 
1.59 
1.72 
1.74 
1.72 
1.72 
1.72 
1.59 
0.94 
1.75 
1.75 
1.74 
0.62 
1.63 
1.45 
1.32 
0.63 
-
-
-
-
-
Other taxes 
0.15 
5.32 
1.21 
1.08 
1.20 
1.00 
1.00 
1.17 
1.02 
1.15 
-
-
-
-
-
1.00 
1.10 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.34 
-
2.21 
2.09 
3.34 
-
-
-
-
0.02 
-
_ 
-
-
-
Total taxes 
2.53 
8.21 
3.37 
3.06 
3.35 
2.96 
3,05 
3.49 
2.85 
3.43 
1.85 
1.68 
1.96 
1.15 
1.59 
2.72 
2.84 
2.72 
2.72 
2.72 
1.93 
0.94 
3.96 
3.84 
5.08 
0.62 
1.63 
1.45 
1.32 
0.65 
-
_ 
-
-
-
Prices (ECU) 
Households 
D D (annual cons. kWh 7500) 
VAT 
2.16 
2,70 
1.96 
1.88 
1.99 
1.88 
1.84 
2.26 
1.63 
2.04 
1.73 
1.50 
1.86 
1.19 
1.46 
1.70 
1.72 
1.70 
1.70 
1.70 
1.58 
0.91 
1.62 
1.61 
1.60 
0.60 
1.51 
1.37 
1.20 
0.56 
-
_ 
-
-
-
Other taxes 
0.15 
5.32 
1.10 
1.03 
1.10 
0.95 
0.89 
1,14 
0.91 
1.03 
-
-
-
-
-
0.95 
1.05 
0.95 
0.95 
0.95 
0.32 
-
2.21 
2.10 
3.34 
-
-
-
-
0.01 
. 
_ 
-
-
-
Total taxes 
2.31 
8.02 
3.06 
2.91 
3.09 
2.83 
2.73 
3.40 
2.54 
3.07 
1.73 
1.50 
1.86 
1.19 
1.46 
2.65 
2.77 
2.65 
2.65 
2.65 
1.90 
0.91 
3.83 
3.71 
4.94 
0.60 
1.51 
1.37 
1.20 
0.57 
. 
. 
. 
-
-
Prices (ECU 
Households 
D E (annual cons. kWh 2000) 
VAT 
1.37 
2.40 
1.18 
1.12 
1.12 
1.02 
1.05 
1.25 
1.04 
1.19 
1.04 
0.93 
1.06 
0,87 
1.04 
1.35 
1.38 
1.35 
1.35 
1.35 
1.27 
0.62 
_ 
_ 
. 
0.41 
1.06 
0.99 
0.90 
0.41 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
-
Other taxes 
0.14 
4,94 
0.66 
0,61 
0.62 
0,51 
0.51 
0,63 
0.57 
0.60 
_ 
. 
. 
. 
_ 
0.77 
0.84 
0.77 
0.77 
0.77 
0.25 
_ 
, 
_ 
. 
_ 
. 
. 
. 
_ 
_ 
. 
_ 
_ 
-
Total taxes 
1.51 
7.34 
1 84 
1.73 
1.74 
1.53 
1.56 
1.88 
1.61 
1.79 
1.04 
0 9 3 
1.06 
0 87 
1.04 
2.12 
-> -n 
2.12 
2.12 
2.12 
1.52 
0.62 
. 
. 
. 
0.41 
1.06 
0 9 9 
0.90 
0.41 
. 
. 
. 
-
Source: Electricity pnces 0)90-94 , Eurostat, 1994. 
* Standard National Tariff. 
Table A2.5. Industrial electricity prices and taxes 
t ' lrctrktrv raie* ia ík» Kl ' 
Tanl l t lur 100 kWhi 1994-1) 
Cuttory 
B i r e i i m 
D r i m a r k 
O r r n a a v 
C r u r c 
.Spaia 
t r a n c e 
I r r b a d 
1 U N 
l . a i r m b o a r s 
N t l a r r l a a d s 
P o r r a e a l 
U K 
K r e i i i a 
N a l . i m a l 1 e m t i . r v · 
NalmnaJ l e m t o r s 
H a m b u r g 
H a n o v e r 
D u s s e l d o r t 
F r a n k f u r t am M a i n 
S tu t tga r t 
M u n i c h 
W e s t e r n A m e 
S o u t h e r n / o n e 
E r f u r t 
L e i p z i g 
R u s t o c l : 
A then» ' 
M u d n d " 
L i l l e 
P a n , 
M a r s e i l l e 
U v i n 
s l r a s b n u r g 
D u H m 
N<w1h and Cent re 
S o u t h and b l a n d i 
N a t i o n a l T e r r i t o r y 
( ¡ r a n d IJuchv " * 
R o l l c t d a m 
N o r t h H o l l a n d 
N o r t h ¡ i r a b a n l 
L i sbon * 
S M i g u e l A ç o r e i 
L o n d o n 
U e d s 
H i t m i n e t u m 
I 'nees ι l -CU 
I n d m l r v 
I A (annua l c o r L s l W h 3 » . » 0 0 ) 
V A T 
2.87 
2 57 
J I H 
2 8 4 
4 61 
.V.W 
V 1 3 
Λ 2 7 
2 .60 
2 9 0 
2 8 0 
2 2 9 
2 8 7 
1 56 
1.76 
2 IO 
2 11 
2 10 
] 9 7 
I 6.1 
I 47 
I 2 2 
1 44 
t l f O 
1 83 
I 57 
1 ..VJ 
0 6 5 
0 64 
1 81 
2 l ' i 
I 81 
1 81 
ι « l i e r tax 
» 6 7 
1.71 
1.57 
2 56 
ι ω 
1.52 
1 65 
I 4 5 
1 4 6 
» 9 8 
1 0 8 
0 9 8 
l l 1.1 
1 61 
1 4 9 
2 80 
O U I 
l o t a i (ax 
2.87 
3 24 
4 75 
4 4 1 
7.17 
5 0 3 
4 6 5 
4 9 2 
4 0 5 
4 36 
2 80 
2 2 9 
2 87 
1.56 
1.76 
3 0 8 
V 19 
l o l l 
2 3 » 
1 6 3 
H I S 
2 7 1 
4 24 
» 8 3 
1 8.1 
1 57 
I 3 9 
» 6 6 
0 64 
1 81 
2.19 
1 8 ] 
1 81 
I ' n c c s t l X U 
Indus t r y 
[ 11 ( a n n u a l e m u . L W r 
V A T 
2 » 5 
2 4 9 
3 I M 
2 .81 
2 9 7 
3 .12 
3 O S 
3 2 3 
2 5 2 
2 8 6 
2 .77 
2 24 
2 .87 
1 55 
1 7 6 
1 9 8 
1.99 
1 9 8 
1 9 3 
1 61 
1 2 8 
1 2 7 
1 2 5 
» 8 4 
1 8 4 
1 57 
1.43 
» 6 7 
1 77 
2.12 
2 2 0 
1.78 
1 l l h c r l a r 
» 6 6 
1 71 
1 54 
1 65 
1 67 
1 4 9 
1 64 
1 4 » 
1 4 5 
» 3 7 
0 .4» 
0 37 
0 12 
I. TO 
1 6 8 
2 4 9 
T o t a l l a * 
2 8 5 
3 15 
4 75 
4 . 3 5 
4 6 2 
4 . 9 9 
4 54 
4 . 8 7 
3 9 2 
4 . 3 1 
2 .77 
2 24 
2 .87 
1.55 
1 76 
2.35 
2 3 9 
2 15 
2 .05 
1.61 
1 0 7 
2 9 5 
1 7 4 
» 8 4 
1.84 
1 57 
1 4 3 
1)67 
0 6 4 
1.77 
2 21) 
I 7 8 
P n c e s ( t L U 
I n d m l r v 
1 C (annua l L O M . k W h 160.01X1) 
V A I 
2 3 6 
2 50 
2 5 7 
2 2 » 
2 2 8 
2 2 9 
2 3 4 
2 11 
2 15 
2 4 9 
2 15 
2 0 9 
2 6 0 
I 43 
1 41 
1 83 
1.83 
1 83 
1 7 8 
1 2 9 
1 03 
1.01 
Ι Ο Ι 
0 64 
1 9 9 
1.54 
I 64 
» 5 5 
0 58 
1 9 8 
2 0 5 
1 72 
1 58 
( )1hcr t a t 
0.66 
1 4 5 
1 21 
I 2 6 
I 16 
1 1 5 
1.06 
1.19 
1.25 
0.14 
0 .18 
0 34 
0 .12 
1 80 
1 6 8 
2 4 9 
! o w l l ax 
2.36 
3.16 
4 02 
3 41 
3 54 
3 4 5 
3 4 9 
3 17 
3 14 
3 74 
3 15 
2 0 9 
2 6 0 
1 4 3 
1.41 
2 17 
2.21 
2 17 
1 9 0 
1 29 
2 83 
2.71 
3.50 
1)64 
1 9 9 
1 54 
1 64 
0 55 
1)58 
1.98 
2 05 
1 72 
1 58 
P n c c s d i C U 
I n d u s t r y 
1 O l a n m i a K o n s M W h 1.250) 
V A I ' 
1.76 
2.45 
2 07 
1.83 
1 81 
1.77 
1 8 9 
! 6 8 
1 73 
1 6 2 
1 6 0 
1.70 
1 6 9 
1.14 
1 2 9 
1.46 
1 4 6 
1.46 
1.46 
0 9 9 
0.98 
0 9 6 
0 95 
0.5.1 
1 55 
1.10 
1.08 
» 4 8 
0 52 
1.40 
1 63 
1.29 
< ) lhc r ΙΛ\ 
0 6 6 
1.17 
1.01 
1 ol 
» ' X ) 
» 9 2 
» 8 6 
» 9 6 
» 8 2 
1 79 
1 6 8 
2 4 9 
l o i a ) Ιπκ 
1 76 
3 11 
3.24 
2 .84 
2 82 
2 6 7 
2 8 1 
2 54 
2 6 9 
2.44 
1.60 
1 70 
1 6 9 
1 14 
1.29 
1 4 6 
1.46 
1.46 
1.46 
» 9 9 
2 .77 
2 6 4 
3 4 4 
» 5 3 
1.55 
1 10 
1.08 
0 4 8 
0 52 
1 6 3 
1.29 
1 29 
P n c M l K C U 
Indus t r y 
Ι Π annual cons M W h 2.0" XII 
V A I 
1 4 9 
2 4 3 
1 6 6 
1 54 
1 61 
1.45 
1 56 
1 18 
1 53 
1.16 
1.16 
1 4 3 
1 3 8 
1 0 5 
I 15 
1 21 
1 21 
1 21 
1 2 1 
0 81 
1)84 
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(1.82 
0 45 
1 28 
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1 3 8 
1 18 
( J t h e l l a x 
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0.85 
0 89 
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0 .70 
0 84 
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2 .49 
[ ' o l d tax 
1 49 
1.09 
2.59 
2 39 
2 5 0 
2 19 
2 32 
2 0 8 
2 3 7 
2 0 5 
1 36 
1 4 3 
1 38 
1 0 5 
1.15 
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1 21 
1.21 
1.21 
0 81 
2 6 4 
2 5 2 
1 31 
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1 28 
0 9 4 
0.91 
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1)48 
1.22 
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V A T 
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0 7 5 
0 35 
1 08 
0.92 
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0 4 2 
1)47 
0 9 8 
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0 7 ! 
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» 6 8 
» 7 8 
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A3. Fuel mix 
Figure A3.1. Electricity generation by fuel for the EU­15,1960­93 
2,500,000 
2,000,000 
1,500,000 
1,000,000 
500,000 
.c 
s 
o o CD σ> 
CM 
CD 
σ) 
•fl­
eo σι 
co 
co σι 
co 
co σι 
o 
r~ σι 
CN 
c~ σι 
·<* 
t^ O l 
CD 
t^ O i 
CO 
t^ O l 
o 
00 
CT) 
CN 
CO 
O l 
■ * 
CO 
CT) 
CO 
CO 
O l 
CO 
CO 
O l 
o 
O l 
O l 
CN 
O l 
O l 
I Coal M Other solid fuels Β Oil DGas D Nuclear ■ Hydro ØGeothermal/solar etc. 
136 Sinale enerav market 
Table A3.1. 
GWh 
Coal 
Other solid fuels 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Hydro 
Geothermal/solar 
Electricity 
I960 
284480 
1774 
43002 
7691 
2370 
169945 
etc. 2104 
generation by fuel for the EU-15 (1995 membership), 
1961 
306149 
1794 
54116 
9219 
2862 
173055 
2292 
1962 
337672 
1726 
70500 
10394 
4297 
171694 
2346 
1963 
350468 
2336 
80897 
10102 
7210 
188757 
2427 
1964 
379042 
2610 
108831 
10220 
11374 
179601 
2527 
1965 
378504 
2824 
125178 
9945 
19833 
205234 
2576 
1966 
377022 
3982 
140370 
13593 
26002 
224157 
2633 
1967 
400659 
4594 
149716 
16837 
30719 
216675 
2818 
, 1960-93 
1968 
429714 
5362 
170430 
25421 
34266 
221386 
3113 
1969 
455264 
5920 
211625 
36708 
41924 
217150 
3229 
Total 511366 549487 598629 642197 694205 744094 787759 822018 889692 971820 
GWh 
Coal 
Other solid fuels 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Hydro 
Geothermal/solar etc. 
1970 
436739 
9335 
265043 
53345 
42333 
226637 
3219 
1971 
441344 
9369 
298998 
69564 
49079 
223678 
3165 
1972 
419272 
9469 
350841 
91556 
63286 
232479 
3133 
1973 
453707 
10237 
380178 
109711 
67475 
231499 
3039 
1974 
439531 
10755 
381165 
140810 
76700 
247814 
3097 
1975 
436885 
10860 
325659 
148120 
96815 
249230 
3000 
1976 
511776 
12264 
366826 
149950 
117458 
216713 
2961 
1977 
508187 
12211 
314078 
144446 
142188 
290345 
2956 
1978 
539839 
14184 
342660 
140352 
159344 
271226 
2964 
1979 
581142 
15135 
347814 
141285 
172564 
293664 
2996 
1036651 1095197 1170036 1255846 1299872 1270569 1377948 1414411 1470569 1554600 
GWh 
Coal 
Other solid fuels 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Hydro 
Geothermal/solar etc. 
1980 
616212 
16967 
340757 
121451 
199627 
265476 
3168 
1981 
612668 
15923 
290490 
103178 
278062 
272231 
3226 
1982 
630608 
15341 
250314 
99302 
307425 
269910 
3336 
1983 
640635 
14966 
208463 
109878 
362885 
277253 
3341 
1984 
577101 
18054 
226841 
120535 
469010 
283324 
3495 
1985 
629202 
19184 
179902 
112108 
562285 
282205 
3358 
1986 
649343 
18882 
166959 
112336 
611650 
268342 
3492 
1987 
664819 
19133 
169215 
119582 
625272 
293894 
3757 
1988 
652463 
20961 
166858 
118137 
670280 
308761 
3993 
1989 
671346 
22162 
194515 
135163 
711391 
249809 
4189 
1563658 1575778 1576236 1617421 1698360 1788244 1831004 1895672 1941453 1988575 
GWh 
Coal 
Other solid fuels 
Oii 
Gas 
Nuclear 
Hydro 
Geothermal/solar etc. 
1990 
790890 
25479 
191780 
146380 
720189 
248928 
4500 
1991 
801046 
24019 
207782 
144987 
747352 
266787 
5381 
1992 
766897 
18540 
224412 
145951 
759898 
284174 
4947 
1993 
719191 
21806 
196365 
184475 
794238 
288366 
6260 
2128146 2197354 2204819 2210701 
Source: IEA statistics: energy balances of OECD countries. 
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Table A3.2. 
Country 
Austria 
Belgium * 
Denmark 
Finland * 
France 
Germany 
Greece * 
Ireland^ 
Italy * 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands * 
Portugal * 
Spain * 
Sweden * 
United Kingdom 
Percentage composition ι »f the inputs used for the 
in the 15 EU Member States (1993) 
Coal 
15.5 
24.7 
77.4 
48.9 
5.2 
59.0 
75.6 
55.7 
10.3 
71.4 
32.6 
43.9 
42.5 
3.6 
48.9 
Crude 
oil 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Petroleum 
products 
2.5 
1.1 
8.3 
2.4 
0.4 
1.8 
21.7 
15.6 
54.9 
9.5 
4.4 
40.5 
6.9 
2.5 
7.6 
Gas Nuclear 
25.5 
9.3 
2.4 
3.8 
0.5 
5.4 
0.2 
26.7 
18.8 
4.8 
54.3 
0.0 
0.5 
1.1 
10.9 
0.0 
63.0 
0.0 
34.3 
88.6 
31.4 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
6.4 
0.0 
43.5 
64.3 
31.3 
Hydro 
53.3 
0.1 
0.0 
7.7 
5.1 
1.2 
2.2 
1.9 
8.3 
4.8 
0.1 
12.9 
6.3 
25.8 
0.5 
production of electricity 
Geotherm. 
solar etc. 
0.0 
0.0 
10.7 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
7.4 
0.0 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Combust. 
renew 
and waste 
3.2 
1.8 
1.2 
2.8 
0.2 
1.1 
0.3 
0.0 
0.3 
9.5 
2.0 
2.7 
0.3 
2.7 
0.7 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Source: IEA, 'Energy Balances of OECD Countries 1992-1993'. 
* Electricity production includes both electricity and CHP plants 
, Paris, 1995. 
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A4. Input data 
Table A4.1. Austria 
Macro-economic variables 
Gross Domestic Product ($90m) 
GDP deflator (1985=100) 
Interest rate (%) 
Exchange rate (curr./$) 
Discount rate (%, real) 
Technicoeconomics of new power plants 
Nuclear Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/k\V) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Fuel oil Investment cost (S90/lcW) 
Fixed cost (S90/k\V) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Coal Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Brown coal Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (rnillsS'90/kWli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Polyvalent Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kVV) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Gas comb, cycle Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/kW) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Peak devices Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cosi ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Advanced coal Investment cost (590/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Imports of electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
Peak reserve from imports (GW) 
Price of Imports ($m/kWh) 
Exports of electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
LOLP constraint (hours) 
1992 
144072 
122.73 
9.71 
10.99 
9.00 
1907 
36 
1.58 
33% 
1065 
40 
0.81 
40% 
1115 
42 
1.41 
39% 
1197 
72 
1.41 
38% 
1176 
44 
1.41 
39% 
727 
21 
1.41 
52% 
307 
12 
0.00 
32% 
1503 
54 
1.67 
44% 
6881 
2294 
0 
10 
94 
6466 
2155 
0 
4.38 
1995 
152239 
135.71 
7.48 
11.82 
8.00 
1907 
36 
1.58 
33% 
1065 
40 
0.81 
38% 
1115 
42 
1.41 
38% 
1197 
72 
1.41 
38% 
1176 
44 
1.41 
38% 
727 
21 
1.41 
52% 
307 
12 
0.00 
32% 
1503 
54 
1.67 
44% 
3900 
1300 
0 
10 
104 
2700 
900 
0 
4.38 
2000 
176965 
158.45 
7.51 
11.19 
8.00 
1907 
36 
1.58 
33% 
1065 
40 
0.81 
39% 
1115 
42 
1.41 
38% 
1197 
72 
1.41 
38% 
1176 
44 
1.41 
38% 
727 
21 
1.41 
54% 
307 
12 
0.00 
33% 
1503 
54 
1.67 
46% 
4800 
1600 
0 
10 
119 
2400 
800 
0 
4.38 
2005 
198887 
183.81 
7.39 
10.43 
8.00 
1907 
36 
1.58 
33% 
1051 
39 
0.81 
39% 
1101 
41 
1.41 
39% 
1197 
72 
1.41 
39% 
1150 
43 
1.41 
38% 
718 
21 
1.41 
56% 
307 
12 
0.00 
34% 
1393 
50 
1.67 
48% 
4200 
1400 
0 
10 
141 
1650 
550 
0 
4.38 
2010 
218820 
213.40 
7.40 
9.69 
8.00 
1907 
36 
1.58 
33% 
1038 
39 
0.81 
40% 
1087 
41 
1.41 
39% 
1197 
72 
1.41 
39% 
1124 
42 
1.41 
39% 
708 
21 
1.41 
58% 
307 
12 
0.00 
35% 
1292 
46 
1.67 
50% 
3225 
1075 
0 
10 
178 
1650 
550 
0 
4.38 
2015 
239797 
248.04 
7.40 
9.08 
8.00 
1907 
36 
1.58 
33% 
1025 
38 
0.81 
4 1 % 
1073 
40 
1.41 
40% 
1197 
72 
1.41 
40% 
1098 
41 
1.41 
39% 
699 
20 
1.41 
6 1 % 
307 
12 
0.00 
36% 
1229 
44 
1.67 
52% 
3225 
1075 
0 
10 
223 
1650 
550 
0 
4.38 
2020 
263709 
288.36 
7.40 
8.60 
8,00 
1907 
36 
1.58 
33% 
1012 
38 
081 
4 1 % 
1059 
40 
1.41 
40% 
1197 
72 
1.41 
40% 
1072 
40 
1.41 
40% 
690 
20 
1.41 
63% 
307 
12 
0,00 
37% 
1198 
43 
1.67 
54% 
3225 
1075 
0 
10 
277 
1650 
550 
0 
438 
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Table A4.2. Belgium 
¡Macro-economic variables 
Gross Domestic Product ($90m) 
GDP deflator (1985=100) 
Interest rate (%) 
Exchange rate (curr./$) 
Discount rate (%, real) 
Technicoeconomics of new power plants 
Nuclear Investment cost (S90/k\V) 
Fixed cost (S90/k\V) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWb) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Fuel oil Investment cost (S90/k\V) 
Fixed cost (S9û7kW) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Coal Investment cost ($90/k\V) 
Fixed cost (S90/k\V) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/k\Vh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Brown coal Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/k\Vh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Polyvalent Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/k\V) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Gas comb, cycle Investment cost ($90/k\V) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Peak devices Investment cost (S90/k\V) 
Fixed cost (S90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/k\Vh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Advanced coal Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Imports of electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
Peak reserve from imports (GW) 
Price of imports ($m/kWh) 
Exports of electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
LOLP constraint (hours) 
1992 
170667 
121.80 
13.00 
32.15 
9.00 
2406 
43 
0.54 
33% 
1343 
50 
1.02 
38% 
1407 
52 
1.78 
37% 
1509 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1483 
55 
1.65 
38% 
917 
27 
1.78 
52% 
451 
17 
0.00 
32% 
1890 
68 
2.10 
44% 
5848 
0 
0 
10 
159 
5720 
0 
0 
4.38 
1995 
176079 
132.77 
10.32 
34.66 
8.00 
2406 
43 
0.54 
33% 
1343 
50 
1.02 
38% 
1407 
52 
1.78 
38% 
1509 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1483 
55 
1.65 
38% 
917 
27 
1.78 
52% 
451 
Π 
0.00 
32% 
1890 
68 
2.10 
44% 
7000 
0 
0 
10 
80 
6000 
0 
0 
4.38 
2000 
200873 
151.57 
9.76 
32.83 
8.00 
2406 
43 
0.54 
33% 
1343 
50 
1.02 
39% 
1407 
52 
1.78 
38% 
1509 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1483 
55 
1.65 
38% 
917 
27 
1.78 
54% 
451 
17 
0.00 
33% 
1890 
68 
2.10 
46% 
9700 
0 
0 
10 
90 
6000 
0 
0 
4.38 
2005 
220419 
174.20 
961 
30.60 
8,00 
2406 
43 
0.54 
33% 
1326 
50 
1.02 
39% 
1389 
52 
1.78 
39% 
1509 
91 
1.78 
39% 
1450 
54 
1.65 
38% 
905 
26 
1.78 
56% 
451 
17 
0.00 
34% 
1753 
63 
2.10 
48% 
9700 
0 
0 
10 
104 
6000 
0 
0 
4.38 
2010 
241575 
202.29 
9.61 
28.42 
8.00 
2406 
43 
0.54 
33% 
1309 
49 
1.02 
40% 
1371 
51 
1.78 
39% 
1509 
91 
1.78 
39% 
1418 
53 
1.65 
39% 
894 
26 
1.78 
58% 
451 
17 
0.00 
35% 
1625 
58 
2.10 
50% 
9700 
0 
0 
10 
129 
6000 
0 
0 
4.38 
2015 
261415 
234.40 
9.61 
26.63 
8.00 
2406 
43 
0.54 
33% 
1293 
49 
1.02 
4 1 % 
1354 
50 
1.78 
40% 
1509 
91 
1.78 
40% 
1385 
51 
1.65 
39% 
882 
26 
1.78 
6 1 % 
451 
17 
0.00 
36% 
1546 
56 
2.10 
52% 
9700 
0 
0 
10 
158 
3000 
0 
0 
4.38 
2020 
280157 
272.72 
9.61 
25.23 
8.00 
2406 
43 
0.54 
33% 
1276 
48 
1.02 
4 1 % 
1336 
50 
1.78 
40% 
1509 
91 
1.78 
40% 
1352 
50 
1.65 
40% 
871 
25 
1.78 
63% 
451 
17 
0.00 
37% 
1507 
54 
2.10 
54% 
9700 
0 
0 
10 
191 
3000 
0 
0 
4.38 
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Table A4.3. Denmark 
Macro-economic variables 
Gross Domestic Product ($90m) 
GDP deflator) 1985= 100) 
Interest rate (%) 
Exchange rate (curr./$) 
Discount rate (%, real) 
Technicoeconomics of new power plants 
Nuclear Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Fuel oil Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Coal Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Brown coal Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Polyvalent Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Gas comb, cycle Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate(%) 
Peak devices Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Advanced coal Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Imports of electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
Peak reserve from imports (GW) 
Price of imports ($m/kWh) 
Exports of electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
LOLP constraint (hours) 
1992 
109901 
126.40 
10.80 
6.04 
9.00 
2405 
45 
2.91 
33% 
1342 
50 
1.02 
38% 
1406 
52 
1.78 
38% 
1509 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1479 
55 
1.78 
37% 
914 
27 
1.78 
52% 
387 
15 
0.00 
32% 
1890 
68 
2.10 
44% 
7349 
0 
1297 
10 
76 
4138 
762 
0 
4.38 
1995 
120526 
133,52 
7.79 
6.47 
8.00 
2405 
45 
2.91 
33% 
1342 
50 
1.02 
38% 
1406 
52 
1.78 
38% 
1509 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1479 
55 
1.78 
38% 
914 
27 
1.78 
52% 
387 
15 
0.00 
32% 
1890 
68 
2.10 
44% 
2000 
300 
0 
10 
84 
2500 
500 
0 
4.38 
2000 
138704 
154.50 
8.00 
6.12 
8.00 
2405 
45 
2.91 
33% 
1342 
50 
1.02 
39% 
1406 
52 
1.78 
38% 
1509 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1479 
55 
1.78 
38% 
914 
27 
1.78 
54% 
387 
15 
0.00 
33% 
1890 
68 
2.10 
46% 
2000 
300 
0 
10 
96 
5000 
500 
0 
4.38 
2005 
153995 
180.07 
7.88 
5.70 
8.00 
2405 
45 
2.91 
33% 
1326 
50 
1.02 
39% 
1388 
52 
1.78 
39% 
1509 
91 
1.78 
39% 
1446 
54 
1.78 
38% 
902 
26 
1.78 
56% 
387 
15 
0.00 
34% 
1752 
63 
2.10 
48% 
1900 
200 
0 
10 
114 
5000 
500 
0 
4.38 
2010 
169190 
209.85 
7.88 
5.30 
8.00 
2405 
45 
2.91 
33% 
1309 
49 
1.02 
40% 
1371 
51 
1.78 
39% 
1509 
91 
1.78 
39% 
1413 
52 
1.78 
39% 
891 
26 
1.78 
58% 
387 
15 
0.00 
35% 
1624 
58 
2.10 
50% 
1500 
100 
0 
10 
144 
2500 
500 
0 
4.38 
2015 
184265 
242.09 
7.88 
4.96 
8.00 
2405 
45 
2.91 
33% 
1292 
48 
1.02 
4 1 % 
1353 
50 
1.78 
40% 
1509 
91 
1.78 
40% 
1381 
51 
1.78 
39% 
879 
26 
1.78 
6 1 % 
387 
15 
0.00 
36% 
1545 
56 
2.10 
52% 
1500 
100 
0 
10 
181 
1000 
250 
0 
4.38 
2020 
199344 
27735 
7.88 
4.70 
8.00 
2405 
45 
2.91 
33% 
1275 
48 
1.02 
4 1 % 
1336 
50 
1.78 
40% 
1509 
91 
1.78 
40% 
1348 
50 
1.78 
40% 
868 
25 
1.78 
63% 
387 
15 
0.00 
37% 
1507 
54 
2.10 
54% 
1500 
100 
0 
10 
224 
1000 
250 
0 
4.38 
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Table A4.4. Finland 
Macro-economic variables 
Gross Domestic Product ($90m) 
GDPdeflator(1985=100) 
Interest rate (%) 
Exchange rate (curr./$) 
Discount rate (%, real) 
Technicoeconomics of new power plants 
Nuclear Investment cost ($90/k\V) 
Fixed cost (S90/kW) 
Variable cost (miIlsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Fuel oil Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/k\V) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Coal Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/lc\V) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Brown coal Investment cost (S90/1(\V) 
Fixed cost (S90/kW) 
Variable cost (millsSWkWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Polyvalent Investment cost ($90/l<W) 
Fixed cost (S90/k\V) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Gas comb, cycle Investment cost (S90/UV) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mil!sS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Peak devices Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/k\V) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Advanced coal Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/kW) 
Variable cost (inillsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Imports of electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
Peak reserve from imports (GW) 
Price of Imports ($m/kWh) 
Exports of Electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
LOLP constraint (hours) 
1992 
93636 
138.87 
11.98 
4.48 
9.00 
2410 
45 
4.71 
33% 
1345 
50 
1.02 
38% 
1409 
53 
1.83 
39% 
1512 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1485 
55 
1.83 
39% 
918 
27 
1.78 
52% 
387 
15 
0.00 
32% 
1898 
68 
2.11 
44% 
6800 
2267 
0 
10 
48 
505 
168 
0 
4,38 
1995 
99305 
149.12 
8.18 
5.55 
8.00 
2410 
45 
4.71 
33% 
1345 
50 
1.02 
38% 
1409 
53 
1.83 
38% 
1512 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1485 
55 
1.83 
38% 
918 
27 
1.78 
52% 
387 
15 
0.00 
32% 
1898 
68 
2.11 
44% 
3863 
1288 
0 
10 
39 
375 
125 
0 
4.38 
2000 
116777 
176.42 
7.70 
5.45 
8.00 
2410 
45 
4.71 
33% 
1345 
50 
1.02 
39% 
1409 
53 
1.83 
38% 
1512 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1485 
55 
1.83 
38% 
918 
27 
1.78 
54% 
387 
15 
0.00 
33% 
1898 
68 
2.11 
46% 
2250 
750 
0 
10 
39 
375 
125 
0 
4.38 
2005 
134091 
208.12 
7.22 
5.33 
8.00 
2410 
45 
4.71 
33% 
1328 
50 
1.02 
39% 
1391 
52 
1.83 
39% 
1512 
91 
1.78 
39% 
1453 
54 
1.83 
38% 
906 
26 
1.78 
56% 
387 
15 
0.00 
34% 
1760 
63 
2.11 
48% 
2250 
750 
0 
10 
40 
375 
125 
0 
4.38 
2010 
151637 
245.97 
6.96 
5.21 
8.00 
2410 
45 
4.71 
33% 
1311 
49 
1.02 
40% 
1373 
51 
1.83 
39% 
1512 
91 
1.78 
39% 
1420 
53 
1.83 
39% 
895 
26 
1.78 
58% 
387 
15 
0.00 
35% 
1632 
59 
2.11 
50% 
2250 
750 
0 
10 
41 
375 
125 
0 
4.38 
2015 
168998 
292.58 
7.05 
5.12 
8.00 
2410 
45 
4,71 
33% 
1295 
49 
1.02 
4 1 % 
1356 
51 
1.83 
40% 
1512 
91 
1.78 
40% 
1387 
51 
1.83 
39% 
883 
26 
1.78 
6 1 % 
387 
15 
0.00 
36% 
1552 
56 
2.11 
52% 
2250 
750 
0 
10 
42 
375 
125 
0 
4.38 
2020 
186154 
348.56 
7.05 
5.09 
8.00 
2410 
45 
4.71 
33% 
1278 
48 
1.02 
4 1 % 
1338 
50 
1.83 
40% 
1512 
91 
1.78 
40% 
1355 
50 
1.83 
40% 
872 
25 
1.78 
63% 
387 
15 
0.00 
37% 
1514 
54 
2.11 
54% 
2250 
750 
0 
10 
42 
375 
125 
0 
4.38 
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Table A4.5. France 
Macro-economic variables 
Gross Domestic Product ($90m) 
GDP deflator (1985=100) 
Interest rate (%) 
Exchange rate (curr./$) 
Discount rate (%, real) 
Technicoeconomics of new power plants 
Nuclear Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/k\Vli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Fuel oil Investment cost (S90/k\V) 
Fixed cost (S90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Coal Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (milIsS'90/kWli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Brown coal Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (millsS'9û7kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Polyvalent Investment cost ($90/k\V) 
Fixed cost ($90/lcW) 
Variable cost (millsí'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Gas comb, cycle Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Peak devices Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWIi) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Advanced coal Invesmient cost (S90/k\V) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Imports of electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
Peak reserve from imports (GW) 
Price of Imports ($m/kWh) 
Exports of electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
LOLP constraint (hours) 
1992 
1032264 
125.70 
16.16 
5.29 
9.00 
1744 
35 
3.30 
33% 
1338 
50 
1.10 
38% 
1402 
52 
1.83 
38% 
1508 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1478 
55 
1.83 
38% 
916 
27 
1.83 
52% 
386 
15 
0.00 
32% 
1889 
68 
2.10 
44% 
3789 
852 
95 
10 
179 
43892 
14631 
0 
4.38 
1995 
1065073 
131.75 
12.05 
5.66 
8.00 
1744 
35 
3.30 
33% 
1338 
50 
1.10 
38% 
1402 
52 
1.83 
38% 
1508 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1478 
55 
1.83 
38% 
916 
27 
1.83 
52% 
386 
15 
0.00 
32% 
1889 
68 
2.10 
44% 
2310 
540 
150 
10 
192 
49050 
16350 
0 
4.38 
2000 
1219206 
153.36 
11.71 
5.33 
8.00 
1744 
35 
3.30 
33% 
1338 
50 
1.10 
39% 
1402 
52 
1.83 
38% 
1508 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1478 
55 
1.83 
38% 
916 
27 
1.83 
54% 
386 
15 
0.00 
33% 
1889 
68 
2.10 
46% 
3000 
720 
280 
10 
234 
56850 
18950 
0 
4.38 
2005 
1382492 
176.54 
11.52 
4.97 
8.00 
1744 
35 
3.30 
33% 
1322 
50 
1.10 
39% 
1384 
52 
1.83 
39% 
1508 
91 
1.78 
39% 
1445 
54 
1.83 
38% 
904 
26 
1.83 
56% 
386 
15 
0.00 
34% 
1752 
63 
2.10 
48% 
3000 
720 
280 
10 
289 
37500 
12500 
0 
4.38 
2010 
1556930 
203.41 
11.52 
4.62 
8.00 
1744 
35 
3.30 
33% 
1305 
49 
1.10 
40% 
1367 
51 
1.83 
39% 
1508 
91 
1.78 
39% 
1413 
52 
1.83 
39% 
893 
26 
1.83 
58% 
386 
15 
0.00 
35% 
1624 
58 
2.10 
50% 
3000 
720 
280 
10 
361 
33000 
11000 
0 
4.38 
2015 
1721300 
234.67 
11.52 
4.33 
8.00 
1744 
35 
3.30 
33% 
1288 
48 
1.10 
4 1 % 
1349 
50 
1.83 
40% 
1508 
91 
1.78 
40% 
1380 
51 
1.83 
39% 
882 
26 
1.83 
6 1 % 
386 
15 
0.00 
36% 
1544 
56 
2.10 
52% 
3000 
720 
280 
10 
447 
30000 
10000 
0 
4.38 
2020 
1879986 
271.17 
11.52 
4.10 
8.00 
1744 
35 
3.30 
33% 
1271 
48 
1.10 
4 1 % 
1332 
50 
1.83 
40% 
1508 
91 
1.78 
40% 
1348 
50 
1.83 
40% 
870 
25 
1.83 
63% 
386 
15 
0 0 0 
37% 
1506 
54 
2.10 
54% 
3000 
720 
280 
10 
547 
30000 
10000 
0 
438 
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Table A4.6. Germany 
Macro-economic variables 
Gross Domestic Product ($90m) 
GDP deflator (1985=100) 
Interest rate (%) 
Exchange rate (curr./$) 
Discount rate (%, real) 
Technicoeconomics of new power plants 
Nuclear Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/k\Vh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Fuel oil Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/k\V) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWli) 
* Efficiency rate (%) 
Coal Investment cost (S90/KW) 
Fixed cost (S90/k\V) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Brown coal Invesnnent cost ($90/lc\V) 
Fixed cost (S90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/lcWli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Polyvalent Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S907kW) 
Variable cost (mitlsS'90/k\Vh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Gas comb.cycle Investment cost ($90/k\V) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (inillsS'90/k\Vli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Peak devices Investment cost ($90/k\V) 
Fixed cost (S90/kW) 
Variable cost (miIlsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Advanced coal Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/k\Vh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Imports of electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
Peak reserve from imports (GW) 
Price of Imports ($m/kWh) 
Exports of electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
LOLP constraint (hours) 
1992 
1481163 
123.50 
13.59 
1.56 
9.00 
2620 
49 
11.11 
33% 
1336 
50 
0.99 
38% 
1400 
52 
1.79 
38% 
1564 
58 
1.79 
38% 
1476 
55 
1.79 
38% 
914 
27 
1.79 
52% 
385 
15 
0.00 
32% 
1886 
68 
2.10 
44% 
21310 
7103 
0 
10 
235 
25299 
8433 
0 
4.38 
1995 
1544973 
134.70 
10.90 
1.67 
8.00 
2620 
49 
11.11 
33% 
1336 
50 
0.99 
38% 
1400 
52 
1.79 
38% 
1564 
58 
1.79 
38% 
1476 
55 
1,79 
38% 
914 
27 
1.79 
52% 
385 
15 
0.00 
32% 
1886 
68 
2.10 
44%. 
24375 
8125 
0 
10 
211 
2400C 
8000 
0 
4.38 
2000 
1839409 
154.93 
10.94 
1.58 
8.00 
2620 
49 
11.11 
33% 
1336 
50 
0.99 
39% 
1400 
52 
1.79 
38% 
1564 
58 
1.79 
38% 
1476 
55 
1.79 
38% 
914 
27 
1.79 
54% 
385 
15 
0.00 
33% 
1886 
68 
2.10 
47% 
22500 
7500 
0 
10 
219 
15750 
5250 
0 
4.38 
2005 
2097206 
177.90 
10.77 
1.47 
8.00 
2620 
49 
11.11 
33% 
1320 
50 
0.99 
39% 
1382 
52 
1.79 
39% 
1564 
58 
1.79 
39% 
1443 
53 
1.79 
38% 
903 
26 
1.79 
56% 
385 
15 
0.00 
34% 
1749 
63 
2.10 
49% 
22500 
7500 
0 
10 
231 
13500 
4500 
0 
4.38 
2010 
2316011 
204.75 
10.77 
1.37 
8.00 
2620 
49 
11.11 
33% 
1303 
49 
0.99 
40% 
1365 
51 
1.79 
39% 
1564 
58 
1.79 
39% 
1411 
52 
1.79 
39% 
891 
26 
1.79 
58% 
385 
15 
0.00 
35% 
1621 
58 
2.10 
52% 
22500 
7500 
0 
10 
246 
13500 
4500 
0 
4.38 
2015 
2511244 
235.35 
10.77 
1.28 
8.00 
2620 
49 
11.11 
33% 
1286 
48 
0.99 
4 1 % 
1347 
50 
1.79 
40% 
1564 
58 
1.79 
40% 
1378 
51 
1.79 
39% 
880 
26 
1.79 
6 1 % 
385 
15 
0.00 
36% 
1542 
55 
2.10 
55% 
20625 
6875 
0 
10 
259 
12000 
4000 
0 
4.38 
2020 
2707010 
270,13 
10.77 
1.22 
8.00 
2620 
49 
11,11 
33% 
1270 
48 
0.99 
4 1 % 
1330 
50 
1.79 
40% 
1564 
58 
1.79 
40% 
1346 
50 
1.79 
40% 
869 
25 
1.79 
63% 
385 
15 
0.00 
37% 
1504 
54 
2.10 
58% 
18375 
6125 
0 
10 
270 
12000 
4000 
0 
4.38 
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Table A4.7. Greece 
Macro-economic variables 
Gross Domestic Product ($90m) 
GDP deflator (1985= 100) 
Interest rate (%) 
Exchange rate (curr./$) 
Discount rate (%, real) 
Technicoeconomics of new power plants 
Nuclear Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (inillsS'90/kWli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Fuel oil Invesnnent cost ($90/k\V) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Coal Inveshnent cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/k\V) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Brown coal Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/k\V) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Polyvalent Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/kW) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Gas comb, cycle Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Peak devices Investment cost ($907kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/k\V) 
Variable cost (miIlsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Advanced coal Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Imports of electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
Peak reserve from imports (GW) 
Price of imports ($m/kWh) 
Exports of electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
LOLP constraint (hours) 
1992 
32523 
284.40 
28.83 
190.71 
9.00 
2405 
45 
0.11 
33% 
927 
39 
0.81 
38% 
1406 
52 
1.78 
38% 
1509 
46 
1.19 
38% 
1482 
55 
1.78 
38% 
916 
27 
1.78 
52% 
387 
15 
0.00 
32% 
1889 
68 
2.10 
44% 
0 
580 
387 
10 
30 
0 
253 
109 
4.38 
1995 
32847 
392.41 
22.80 
283.73 
8.00 
2405 
45 
0.11 
33% 
927 
39 
0.81 
38% 
1406 
52 
1.78 
38% 
1509 
46 
1.19 
38% 
1482 
55 
1.78 
38% 
916 
27 
1.78 
52% 
387 
15 
0.00 
32% 
1889 
68 
2.10 
44% 
0 
736 
491 
10 
39 
0 
237 
102 
4.38 
2000 
37534 
578.53 
16.21 
343.44 
8.00 
2405 
45 
0.11 
33% 
927 
39 
0.81 
39% 
1406 
52 
1.78 
38% 
1509 
46 
1.19 
38% 
1482 
55 
1.78 
38% 
916 
27 
1.78 
54% 
387 
15 
0.00 
33% 
1889 
68 
2.10 
46% 
0 
543 
362 
10 
64 
0 
380 
163 
4.38 
2005 
42641 
802.89 
16.21 
388.37 
8.00 
2405 
45 
0.11 
33% 
915 
38 
0,81 
39% 
1388 
52 
1.78 
39% 
1509 
46 
1.19 
39% 
1450 
54 
1.78 
38% 
905 
26 
1.78 
56% 
387 
15 
0.00 
34% 
1752 
63 
2.10 
48% 
0 
632 
421 
10 
90 
0 
475 
203 
4.38 
2010 
48882 
1098.46 
16.21 
428.16 
8.00 
2405 
45 
0.11 
33% 
903 
38 
0.81 
40% 
1371 
51 
1.78 
39% 
1509 
46 
1.19 
39% 
1417 
53 
1.78 
39% 
893 
26 
1.78 
58% 
387 
15 
0.00 
35% 
1624 
58 
2.10 
50% 
0 
640 
440 
10 
119 
0 
480 
200 
4.38 
2015 
55490 
1463.80 
16,21 
465.90 
8.00 
2405 
45 
0.11 
33% 
892 
37 
0.81 
4 1 % 
1353 
50 
1.78 
40% 
1509 
46 
1.19 
40% 
1384 
51 
1.78 
39% 
882 
26 
1.78 
6 1 % 
387 
15 
0.00 
36% 
1545 
56 
2,10 
52% 
0 
640 
440 
10 
157 
0 
480 
200 
4.38 
2020 
63179 
1952.53 
16.21 
511.64 
8.00 
2405 
45 
0.11 
33% 
880 
37 
0.81 
4 1 % 
1336 
50 
1.78 
40% 
1509 
46 
1.19 
40% 
1352 
50 
1.78 
40% 
870 
25 
1.78 
63% 
387 
15 
0.00 
37% 
1 506 
54 
2.10 
54% 
0 
640 
440 
10 
200 
0 
480 
200 
4.38 
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Table A4.8. Ireland 
Macro-economic variables 
Gross Domestic Product ($90m) 
GDP deflator (1985=100) 
Interest rate (%) 
Exchange rate (curr./$) 
Discount rate (%, real) 
Technicoeconomics of new power plants 
Nuclear Investment cosi ($90/l<W) 
Fixed cost (S90/kW) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Fuel oil Investment cost (S90/k\V) 
Fixed cost (S90/kW) 
Variable cost (miIlsS'90/kWh) 
* Efficiency rate (%) 
Coal Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/k\V) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Broun coal Inveshnent cost ($90/k\V) 
Fixed cost (S90/k\V) 
Variable cost (milIsS'90/k\Vh) 
Efficiency rate {%) 
Polyvalent Investment cost ($90/k\V) 
Fixed cost (S90/kW) 
\'ariable cost (millsS'90/k\Vli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Gas comb, cycle Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/k\V) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate {%) 
Peak devices Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/kW) 
Variable cost (milIsS'90/kWli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Advanced coal Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/k\V) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Imports of electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
Peak reserve from imports (GW) 
Price of imports ($m/kWh) 
Exports of electricity (GWh) 
Comracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
LOLP constraint (hours) 
1992 
40218 
120.70 
15.31 
0.59 
9.00 
2417 
45 
29.90 
33% 
1349 
51 
1.02 
38% 
1413 
53 
1.79 
38% 
1516 
92 
1.79 
38% 
1490 
55 
1.79 
38% 
921 
27 
1.76 
52% 
453 
18 
0.00 
32% 
1899 
68 
2.11 
44% 
0 
0 
0 
10 
65 
0 
0 
0 
4.38 
1995 
46819 
131.82 
11.97 
0.68 
8.00 
2417 
45 
29.90 
33% 
1349 
51 
1.02 
38% 
1413 
53 
1.79 
38% 
1516 
92 
1,79 
38% 
1490 
55 
1.79 
38% 
921 
27 
1.76 
52% 
453 
18 
0.00 
32% 
1899 
68 
2.11 
44% 
0 
0 
0 
10 
62 
0 
0 
0 
4.38 
2000 
56046 
151.59 
11.51 
0.65 
8.00 
2417 
45 
29.90 
33% 
1349 
51 
1.02 
39% 
1413 
53 
1.79 
38% 
1516 
92 
1.79 
38% 
1490 
55 
1.79 
38% 
921 
27 
1.76 
54% 
453 
18 
0.00 
33% 
1899 
68 
2.11 
46% 
0 
0 
0 
10 
76 
0 
0 
0 
4.38 
2005 
65576 
174.14 
11.33 
0.60 
8.00 
2417 
45 
29.90 
33% 
1332 
50 
1.02 
39% 
1395 
52 
1.79 
39% 
1516 
92 
1.79 
39% 
1457 
54 
1.79 
38% 
909 
27 
1.76 
56% 
453 
18 
0.00 
34% 
1761 
63 
2.11 
48% 
0 
0 
0 
10 
95 
0 
0 
0 
4.38 
2010 
76099 
199.36 
11.32 
0.56 
8.00 
2417 
45 
29.90 
33% 
1315 
49 
1.02 
40% 
1378 
51 
1.79 
39% 
1516 
92 
1.79 
39% 
1424 
53 
1.79 
39% 
898 
26 
1.76 
58% 
453 
18 
0.00 
35% 
1633 
59 
2.11 
50% 
0 
0 
0 
10 
103 
0 
0 
0 
4.38 
2015 
85279 
230.90 
11.29 
0.52 
8.00 
2417 
45 
29.90 
33% 
1298 
49 
1.02 
4 1 % 
1360 
51 
1.79 
40% 
1516 
92 
1.79 
40% 
1391 
52 
1.79 
39% 
886 
26 
1.76 
6 1 % 
453 
18 
0.00 
36% 
1553 
56 
2.11 
52% 
0 
0 
0 
10 
109 
0 
0 
0 
4.38 
2020 
95239 
266.44 
11.22 
0.50 
8.00 
2417 
45 
29.90 
33% 
1282 
48 
1.02 
4 1 % 
1342 
50 
1.79 
40% 
1516 
92 
1.79 
40% 
1359 
50 
1.79 
40% 
875 
26 
1.76 
63% 
453 
18 
0.00 
37% 
1514 
54 
2.11 
54% 
0 
0 
0 
10 
115 
0 
0 
0 
4.38 
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Table A4.9. Italy 
Macro-economic variables 
Gross Domestic Product ($90m) 
GDP deflator (1985=100) 
Interest rate (%) 
Exchange rate (curr./$) 
Discount rate (%, real) 
Technicoeconomics of new power plants 
Nuclear Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'907kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Fuel oil Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (millsS^O/kWb) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Coal Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/lcWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Brown coal Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/k\V) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/l(Wli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Polyvalent Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Gas comb, cycle Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Peak devices Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost (590/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/l<Wli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Advanced coal Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Imports of electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
Peak reserve from imports (GW) 
Price of imports ($m/kWh) 
Exports of electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
LOLP constraint (hours) 
1992 
805442 
156.70 
15.77 
1232.40 
9.00 
2401 
45 
0.02 
33% 
1340 
50 
1.02 
39% 
1407 
52 
1.78 
38% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1480 
55 
1.78 
38% 
917 
27 
1.78 
52% 
386 
15 
0.00 
32% 
1891 
68 
2.10 
44% 
26955 
8985 
0 
10 
164 
517 
129 
0 
4.38 
1995 
829238 
165.13 
10.05 
1592.02 
8.00 
2401 
45 
0.02 
33% 
1340 
50 
1.02 
38% 
1407 
52 
1.78 
38% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1480 
55 
1.78 
38% 
917 
27 
1.78 
52% 
386 
15 
0.00 
32% 
1891 
68 
2.10 
44% 
26250 
8750 
0 
10 
174 
802 
201 
0 
4.38 
2000 
944379 
197.50 
10.44 
1615.65 
8.00 
2401 
45 
0.02 
33% 
1340 
50 
1.02 
39% 
1407 
52 
1.78 
38% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1480 
55 
1.78 
38% 
917 
27 
1.78 
54% 
386 
15 
0.00 
33% 
1891 
68 
2.10 
46% 
16500 
5500 
0 
10 
198 
806 
202 
0 
4.38 
2005 
1046446 
239.94 
9.72 
1581.13 
8.00 
2401 
45 
0.02 
33% 
1323 
50 
1.02 
39% 
1389 
52 
1.78 
39% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
39% 
1447 
54 
1.78 
38% 
905 
26 
1.78 
56% 
386 
15 
0.00 
34% 
1753 
63 
2.10 
48% 
11250 
3750 
0 
10 
223 
810 
203 
0 
4.38 
2010 
1148597 
291.14 
9.73 
1541.93 
8.00 
2401 
45 
0.02 
33% 
1307 
49 
1.02 
40% 
1372 
51 
1.78 
39% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
39% 
1415 
52 
1.78 
39% 
894 
26 
1.78 
58% 
386 
15 
0.00 
35% 
1625 
58 
2.10 
50% 
8000 
2000 
0 
10 
261 
800 
160 
160 
4.38 
2015 
1260391 
352.40 
9.73 
1517.22 
8.00 
2401 
45 
0 0 2 
33% 
1290 
48 
1.02 
4 1 % 
1354 
50 
1.78 
40% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
40% 
1382 
51 
1.78 
39% 
882 
26 
1.78 
6 1 % 
386 
15 
0.00 
36% 
1546 
56 
2.10 
52% 
8000 
2000 
0 
10 
303 
800 
160 
160 
4.38 
2020 
1369423 
426.28 
9.73 
1509.13 
8.00 
2401 
45 
0.02 
33% 
1273 
48 
1.02 
4 1 % 
1336 
50 
1.78 
40% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
40% 
1350 
50 
1.78 
40% 
871 
25 
1.78 
63% 
386 
15 
0.00 
37% 
1507 
54 
2.10 
54% 
8000 
2000 
0 
10 
348 
800 
160 
160 
4.38 
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Table A4.10. The Netherlands 
Macro-economic variables 
Gross Domestic Product ($90m) 
GDP deflator (1985=100) 
Interest rate (%) 
Exchange rate (curr./$) 
Discount rate (%, real) 
Technicoeconomics of new power plants 
Nuclear Investment cost (S90/k\V) 
Fixed cost (S90/kW) 
Variable cost (iniIls$'90/kWli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Fuel oil Invesnnent cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/kW) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Coal Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (milIsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Brown coal Investment cost (S90/k\V) 
Fixed cost ($90/k\V) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Polyvalent Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (milIsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Gas comb, cycle Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/l<Wh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Peak devices Investment cost ($90/k\V) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Advanced coal Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/ltWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Imports of electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
Peak reserve from imports (GW) 
Price of imports ($m/kWh) 
Exports of electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
LOLP constraint (hours) 
1992 
281251 
110.30 
12.75 
1.76 
9.00 
1747 
35 
9.89 
33% 
1344 
50 
1.02 
38% 
1407 
52 
1.78 
38% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1480 
55 
1.65 
38% 
917 
27 
1.65 
52% 
387 
15 
0.00 
32% 
1891 
68 
2.10 
44% 
7568 
1336 
0 
10 
157 
227 
0 
0 
4.38 
1995 
292522 
113.46 
9.99 
1.88 
8.0C 
1747 
35 
9.89 
33% 
1344 
50 
1.02 
38% 
1407 
52 
1.78 
38% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1480 
55 
1.65 
38% 
917 
27 
1.65 
52% 
387 
15 
0.00 
32% 
1891 
68 
2.10 
44% 
9775 
1725 
0 
10 
167 
0 
0 
0 
4.38 
2000 
333663 
128.01 
9.84 
1.78 
8.00 
1747 
35 
9.89 
33% 
1344 
50 
1.02 
39% 
1407 
52 
1.78 
38% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1480 
55 
1.65 
38% 
917 
27 
1.65 
54% 
387 
15 
0.00 
33% 
1891 
68 
2.10 
46% 
13600 
2400 
0 
10 
186 
0 
0 
0 
4.38 
2005 
372472 
146.13 
9.68 
1.66 
8.00 
1747 
35 
9.89 
33% 
1327 
50 
1.02 
39% 
1390 
52 
1.78 
39% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
39% 
1447 
54 
1.65 
38% 
906 
26 
1.65 
56% 
387 
15 
0.00 
34% 
1754 
63 
2.10 
48% 
11900 
2100 
0 
10 
209 
0 
0 
0 
4.38 
2010 
414113 
166.97 
9.69 
1.54 
8.00 
1747 
35 
9.89 
33% 
1310 
49 
1.02 
40% 
1372 
51 
1.78 
39% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
39% 
1415 
53 
1.65 
39% 
894 
26 
1.65 
58% 
387 
15 
0.00 
35% 
1626 
58 
2.10 
50% 
6000 
1440 
560 
10 
252 
0 
0 
0 
4.38 
2015 
451958 
190.81 
9.69 
1.44 
8.00 
1747 
35 
9.89 
33% 
1293 
49 
1.02 
4 1 % 
1355 
51 
1.78 
40% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
40% 
1382 
51 
1.65 
39% 
883 
26 
1.65 
6 1 % 
387 
15 
0.00 
36% 
1546 
56 
2.10 
52% 
6000 
1440 
560 
10 
301 
0 
0 
0 
4.38 
2020 
490403 
219.42 
9.69 
1.37 
8.00 
1747 
35 
9.89 
33% 
1277 
48 
1.02 
4 1 % 
1337 
50 
1.78 
40% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
40% 
1349 
50 
1.65 
40% 
871 
25 
1.65 
63% 
387 
15 
0.00 
37% 
1508 
54 
2.10 
54% 
6000 
1440 
560 
10 
356 
0 
0 
0 
4.38 
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Table A4.11. Portugal 
Macro-economic variables 
Gross Domestic Product ($90m) 
GDP Deflator (1985=100) 
Interest rate (%) 
Exchange rate (curr./$) 
Discount rate (%, real) 
Technicoeconomics of new power plants 
Nuclear Investment cost ($90/k\V) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Fuel oil Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kVVli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Coal Invesnnent cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWb) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Brown coal Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/k\V) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Polyvalent Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/k\V) 
Variable cost (millsï'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Gas comb, cycle Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/k\V) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Peak devices Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/k\Vh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Advanced coal Invesnnent cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/k\V) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Imports of electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
Peak reserve from imports (GW) 
Price of imports ($m/kWh) 
Exports of Electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
LOLP constraint (hours) 
1992 
31909 
249.60 
22.35 
135.00 
9.00 
2407 
45 
0.13 
33% 
1344 
50 
1.02 
38% 
1407 
52 
1.78 
38% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1484 
55 
1.78 
38% 
915 
27 
1.78 
48% 
387 
15 
0,00 
32% 
1891 
68 
2.10 
44% 
2537 
0 
0 
10 
128 
1197 
0 
0 
4.38 
1995 
32829 
288.12 
16.72 
176,27 
8.00 
2407 
45 
0.13 
33% 
1344 
50 
1.02 
38% 
1407 
52 
1.78 
38% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1484 
55 
1.78 
38% 
915 
27 
1.78 
52% 
387 
15 
0.00 
32% 
1891 
68 
2.10 
44% 
4200 
0 
0 
10 
128 
1250 
0 
0 
4.38 
2000 
38498 
366.39 
16.80 
189.82 
8.00 
2407 
45 
0.13 
33% 
1344 
50 
1.02 
39% 
1407 
52 
1.78 
38% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1484 
55 
1.78 
38% 
915 
27 
1.78 
54% 
387 
15 
0.00 
33% 
1891 
68 
2.10 
46% 
2400 
0 
0 
10 
149 
1250 
0 
0 
4.38 
2005 
44978 
465.38 
16.44 
200.18 
8.00 
2407 
45 
0.13 
33% 
1327 
50 
1.02 
39% 
1390 
52 
1.78 
39% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
39% 
1451 
54 
1.78 
38% 
903 
26 
1.78 
56% 
387 
15 
0.00 
34% 
1754 
63 
2.10 
48% 
2400 
0 
0 
10 
172 
1250 
0 
0 
4.38 
2010 
52499 
589.37 
16.10 
210.36 
8.00 
2407 
45 
0.13 
33% 
1310 
49 
1.02 
40% 
1372 
51 
1.78 
39% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
39% 
1419 
53 
1.78 
39% 
892 
26 
1,78 
58% 
387 
15 
0.00 
35% 
1626 
58 
2.10 
50% 
2400 
0 
0 
10 
200 
1250 
0 
0 
4.38 
2015 
60759 
745.61 
15.54 
223.04 
8.00 
2407 
45 
0.13 
33% 
1293 
49 
1.02 
4 1 % 
1355 
51 
1.78 
40% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
40% 
1386 
51 
1.78 
39% 
880 
26 
1.78 
6 1 % 
387 
15 
0.00 
36% 
1546 
56 
2.10 
52% 
2400 
0 
0 
10 
229 
1250 
0 
0 
4.38 
2020 
70258 
942.35 
15.54 
239,05 
8.00 
2407 
45 
0.13 
33% 
1277 
48 
1.02 
4 1 % 
1337 
50 
1.78 
40% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
40% 
1353 
50 
1.78 
40% 
869 
25 
1.78 
63% 
387 
15 
0.00 
37% 
1508 
54 
2.10 
54% 
2400 
0 
0 
10 
260 
1250 
0 
0 
438 
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Table A4.12. Spain 
Macro-economic variables 
Gross Domestic Product ($90m) 
GDP deflator (1985= 100) 
Interest rate (%) 
Exchange rate (curr./$) 
Discount rate (%, real) 
Technicoeconomics of new power plants 
Nuclear Invesnnent cost (S90/1<W) 
Fixed cost ($90/k\V) 
Variable cost (inillsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Fue; oil Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/UV) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Coal Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/k\V) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/k\Vh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Brown coal Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/k\V) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Polv valent Investment cost (S90/k\V) 
Fixed cost (S90/kW) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Gas comb, cycle Investment cost (S90/k\V) 
Fixed cost (S90/k\V) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Peak devices Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/kW) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/k\Vh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Advanced coal Investment cost (S90/k\V) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/k\Vh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Imports of electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
Peak reserve from imports (GW) 
Price of imports ($m/kWh) 
Exports of electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
LOLP constraint (hours) 
1992 
355222 
162.80 
14.23 
102.38 
9.00 
2398 
45 
0.18 
33% 
1343 
50 
1.14 
39% 
1407 
52 
1.78 
38% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1483 
55 
1.78 
38% 
917 
27 
1.78 
52% 
450 
18 
0.00 
30% 
1891 
68 
2.10 
44% 
4210 
140 
0 
10 
61 
3509 
201 
0 
4.38 
1995 
369097 
183.41 
12.28 
138.99 
8.00 
2398 
45 
0.18 
33% 
1343 
50 
1.14 
38% 
1407 
52 
1.78 
38% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1483 
55 
1.78 
38% 
917 
27 
1.78 
52% 
450 
18 
0.00 
32% 
1891 
68 
2.10 
44% 
7000 
100 
0 
10 
62 
2900 
400 
0 
4.38 
2000 
424177 
230.76 
10.67 
147.52 
8.00 
2398 
45 
0.18 
33% 
1343 
50 
1.14 
39% 
1407 
52 
1.78 
38% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1483 
55 
1.78 
38% 
917 
27 
1.78 
54% 
450 
18 
0.00 
33% 
1891 
68 
2.10 
46% 
11000 
100 
0 
10 
69 
2700 
600 
0 
4.38 
2005 
483838 
287.89 
10.17 
149.31 
8.00 
2398 
45 
0.18 
33% 
1326 
50 
1.14 
39% 
1389 
52 
1.78 
39% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
39% 
1451 
54 
1.78 
38% 
905 
26 
1.78 
56% 
450 
18 
0.00 
34% 
1753 
63 
2.10 
48% 
7000 
100 
0 
10 
75 
2900 
400 
0 
4.38 
2010 
552607 
355.98 
9.89 
149.86 
8.00 
2398 
45 
0.18 
33% 
1310 
49 
1.14 
40% 
1372 
51 
1.78 
39% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
39% 
1418 
53 
1.78 
39% 
894 
26 
1.78 
58% 
450 
18 
0.00 
35% 
1626 
58 
2.10 
50% 
3000 
100 
0 
10 
86 
3100 
200 
0 
4.38 
2015 
622820 
436.74 
9.89 
151.01 
8.00 
2398 
45 
0.18 
33% 
1293 
49 
1.14 
4 1 % 
1354 
50 
1.78 
40% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
40% 
1385 
51 
1.78 
39% 
882 
26 
1.78 
6 1 % 
450 
18 
0.00 
36% 
1546 
56 
2.10 
52% 
3000 
100 
0 
10 
98 
3100 
200 
0 
4.38 
2020 
703664 
535.94 
9.90 
153.77 
8.00 
2398 
45 
0.18 
33% 
1276 
48 
1,14 
4 1 % 
1337 
50 
1.78 
40% 
1510 
91 
1.78 
40% 
1353 
50 
1.78 
40% 
871 
25 
1.78 
63% 
450 
18 
0.00 
37% 
1508 
54 
2.10 
54% 
3000 
100 
0 
10 
111 
3100 
200 
0 
4.38 
150 Single energy market 
Table A4.13. Sweden 
Macro-economic variables 
Gross Domestic Product ($90m) 
GDP deflator (1985=100) 
Interest rate (%) 
Exchange rate (curr./$) 
Discount rate (%, real) 
Technicoeconomics of new power plants 
Nuclear Invesnnent cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Fuel oil Invesnnent cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Coal Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Brown coal Invesnnent cost ($90/kW| 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Polyvalent Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Gas comb, cycle Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90VkW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Peak devices Investment cost ($907kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/k\V) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Advanced coal Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/k\V) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Imports of electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
Peak reserve from imports (GW) 
Price of imports ($m/kWh) 
Exports of electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
LOLP constraint (hours) 
1992 
156515 
164.66 
15.43 
5.82 
9.00 
2406 
45 
3.04 
33% 
1343 
50 
1.02 
40% 
1407 
52 
1.78 
39% 
1509 
91 
1.78 
35% 
1483 
55 
1.78 
39% 
916 
27 
1.78 
52% 
387 
15 
0.00 
32% 
1895 
68 
2.11 
44% 
6634 
2211 
0 
10 
63 
8246 
2749 
0 
4.38 
1995 
159126 
175.63 
10.59 
7.72 
8.00 
2406 
45 
3.04 
33% 
1343 
50 
1.02 
38% 
1407 
52 
1.78 
38% 
1509 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1483 
55 
1.78 
38% 
916 
27 
1.78 
52% 
387 
15 
0.00 
32% 
1895 
68 
2.11 
44% 
6000 
2000 
0 
10 
57 
6000 
2000 
0 
4.38 
2000 
178132 
200.62 
10.62 
7.29 
8.00 
2406 
45 
3.04 
33% 
1343 
50 
1.02 
39% 
1407 
52 
1.78 
38% 
1509 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1483 
55 
1.78 
38% 
916 
27 
1.78 
54% 
387 
15 
0.00 
33% 
1895 
68 
2.11 
46% 
6000 
2000 
0 
10 
65 
6000 
2000 
0 
4.38 
2005 
199522 
232.19 
10.47 
6.90 
8.00 
2406 
45 
3.04 
33% 
1326 
50 
1.02 
39% 
1389 
52 
1.78 
39% 
1509 
91 
1.78 
39% 
1450 
54 
1.78 
38% 
905 
26 
1.78 
56% 
387 
15 
0.00 
34% 
1757 
63 
2.11 
48% 
6000 
2000 
0 
10 
76 
6000 
2000 
0 
4.38 
2010 
223095 
270.82 
10.48 
6.50 
8.00 
2406 
45 
3.04 
33% 
1309 
49 
1.02 
40% 
1371 
51 
1.78 
39% 
1509 
91 
1.78 
39% 
1418 
53 
1.78 
39% 
894 
26 
1.78 
58% 
387 
15 
0.00 
35% 
1629 
59 
2.11 
50% 
6003 
2001 
0 
10 
94 
6000 
2000 
0 
4.38 
2015 
243228 
317.73 
10.47 
6.13 
8.00 
2406 
45 
3.04 
33% 
1293 
49 
1.02 
4 1 % 
1354 
50 
1.78 
40% 
1509 
91 
1.78 
40% 
1385 
51 
1.78 
39% 
882 
26 
1.78 
6 1 % 
387 
15 
0.00 
36% 
1550 
56 
2.11 
52% 
6007 
2002 
0 
10 
118 
6000 
2000 
0 
4.38 
2020 
264767 
372.85 
10.48 
5.84 
8.00 
2406 
45 
3.04 
33% 
1276 
48 
1.02 
4 1 % 
1336 
50 
1.78 
40% 
1509 
91 
1.78 
40?Ό 
1352 
50 
1.78 
40% 
871 
25 
1.78 
63% 
387 
15 
0.00 
37% 
1511 
54 
2.11 
54% 
6011 
2004 
0 
10 
145 
6000 
2000 
0 
4.38 
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Table A4.14. United Kingdom 
Macro-economic variables 
Gross Domestic Product ($90m) 
GDP deflator (1985= 100) 
Interest rate (%) 
Exchange rate (curr./$) 
Discount rate (%, real) 
Technicoeconomics of new power plants 
Nuclear Investment cost ($90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/UV) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/k\Vb) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Fuel oil Investment cost (S907kW) 
Fixed cost (S907kW) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate {%) 
Coal Investment cost (S90/k\V) 
Fixed cost (S90/kW) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/k\Vh) 
Efficiency rate {%) 
Brown coal Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/UV) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (°/o) 
Pol> valent Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/k\V) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/k\Vli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Gas comb, cycle Investment cost ($90/k\V) 
Fixed cost ($90/kW) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Peak devices Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost (S90/kW) 
Variable cost (millsS'90/kWli) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Advanced coal Investment cost (S90/kW) 
Fixed cost ($90/k\V) 
Variable cost (mills$'90/kWh) 
Efficiency rate (%) 
Imports of electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
Peak reserve from imports (GW) 
Price of imports ($m/kWh) 
Exports of electricity (GWh) 
Contracted for base load 
Contracted for intermediate load 
Contracted for peak load 
LOLP constraint (hours) 
1992 
720528 
146.90 
9.41 
0.57 
9.00 
2401 
45 
32.03 
33% 
1340 
50 
1.02 
38% 
1404 
52 
1.78 
38% 
1512 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1480 
55 
1.78 
38% 
918 
27 
1.78 
52% 
386 
15 
0.00 
32% 
1894 
68 
2.10 
44% 
16722 
0 
0 
10 
66 
32 
0 
0 
4.38 
1995 
783464 
159.24 
7.77 
0.67 
8.00 
2401 
45 
32.03 
33% 
1340 
50 
1.02 
38% 
1404 
52 
1.78 
38% 
1512 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1480 
55 
1.78 
38% 
918 
27 
1.78 
52% 
386 
15 
0.00 
32% 
1894 
68 
2.10 
44% 
12000 
0 
0 
10 
76 
47 
0 
0 
4.38 
2000 
890808 
191.02 
8.04 
0.68 
8.00 
2401 
45 
32.03 
33% 
1340 
50 
1.02 
39% 
1404 
52 
1.78 
38% 
1512 
91 
1.78 
38% 
1480 
55 
1.78 
38% 
918 
27 
1.78 
54% 
386 
15 
0.00 
33% 
1894 
68 
2.10 
46% 
12000 
0 
0 
10 
92 
47 
0 
0 
4.38 
2005 
994660 
228.81 
7.77 
0.67 
8.00 
2401 
45 
32.03 
33% 
1323 
50 
1.02 
39% 
1386 
52 
1.78 
39% 
1512 
91 
1.78 
39% 
1447 
54 
1.78 
38% 
907 
26 
1.78 
56% 
386 
15 
0.00 
34% 
1756 
63 
2.10 
48% 
12000 
0 
0 
10 
104 
47 
0 
0 
4.38 
2010 
1101743 
275.99 
7.78 
0.65 
8.00 
2401 
45 
32.03 
33% 
1307 
49 
1.02 
40% 
1369 
51 
1.78 
39% 
1512 
91 
1.78 
39% 
1415 
52 
1.78 
39% 
895 
26 
1.78 
58% 
386 
15 
0.00 
35% 
1628 
59 
2.10 
50% 
12000 
0 
0 
10 
122 
47 
0 
0 
4.38 
2015 
1211430 
332.77 
7,78 
0.65 
8.00 
2401 
45 
32.03 
33% 
1290 
48 
1.02 
4 1 % 
1351 
50 
1.78 
40% 
1512 
91 
1.78 
40% 
1382 
51 
1.78 
39% 
884 
26 
1.78 
6 1 % 
386 
15 
0.00 
36% 
1548 
56 
2.10 
52% 
12000 
0 
0 
10 
142 
47 
0 
0 
4.38 
2020 
1327092 
401.12 
7.78 
0.65 
8.00 
2401 
45 
32.03 
33% 
1273 
48 
1.02 
4 1 % 
1334 
50 
1.78 
40% 
1512 
91 
1.78 
40% 
1350 
50 
1.78 
40% 
872 
25 
1.78 
63% 
386 
15 
0.00 
37% 
1510 
54 
2.10 
54% 
12000 
0 
0 
10 
163 
47 
0 
0 
4.38 
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A5. UK liberalization 
A5.1. Productivity in UK electricity distribution 
Figure A5.1 reports productivity growth in the industry since 1971. It shows that for most of 
the period productivity growth has averaged about 2.5% per year and that less efficient firms 
have neither caught up with the frontier nor moved further away from it. However, by 1993 
the frontier started to move out quite sharply, by 13% in 1992/93 and 8% in 1993/94. The less 
efficient firms could not keep up with this frontier shift and the catching­up index (a measure 
of the extent to which firms on average catch up with best practice) fell significantly. This 
analysis implies that if prices and costs are transparent and there are appropriate incentives on 
management (in this case, a desire to create rewards for shareholders), then significant 
efficiency gains can be made. Furthermore, the scope for incremental efficiency improvement 
is large. The analysis here shows a gain of more than 10% above trend in just two years. 
Figure A5.1. Productivity growth in electricity distribution in England and Wales, 
1971-94 
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A5.2. Estimates of future changes in UK residential electricity prices 
Figure A5.2 shows an estimate of the likely change in the bill for a typical residential 
consumer in the UK between now and 2000. In line with the price data shown elsewhere in 
this Appendix, the price of electricity to residential consumers is shown to have fallen only 
slightly in real terms between 1990 and 1995. However, as the favourable terms given to the 
companies at privatization are removed, price falls are expected to be much larger. The 
projected fall includes a reduction in distribution prices of over 30% imposed by the regulator 
and continuing falls in the price of bulk electricity. 
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Figure A5.3. Productivity growth for National Power, PowerGen and Nuclear Electric 
7.7 
¡¿¿ruftktrø: 
NATIONAL POWER 
1991 
i?«ÖSE 
1992 
10,9 
13.6 
lui 
16.9 
ìSSms 
1993 1994 1995 
Manpower productivity (GWh) + 24% 
8.6 
S4# m 
Κψτ' •mW. 
90/91 
9.7 
91/92 
12.9 
¡Uli 
mr ι 
92/93 
POWERGEN 
14.7 
» H 
SPBs 
Sa» 
BfSS 
93/94 
17 
Jk 
»π Kv*» 
«Ρ 
SST 
ft fi 
TOI 
94/95 
Productivity 
GWh of electricity 
produced per employee 
Improved 98% since 1990/91 
Productivity up 27% 
GWh/employee 
NUCLEAR ELECTRIC 
3.2 
iii 
''"•lüjSrtJÏ 
4.5 
Sgasai 
J « mm m 
ίϋίϋϋί 
5.7 
1 må 
■■I 
'/•i 
Egal 
S 
Sft ...... 
89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 
Appendix Λ6: Base case 155 
A6. Base case 
Table A6.1. Base case power generation forecasts for Europe 
EWI-NH : BASE CASE CAPACITIES 
Power Generation by fuel in TWh 
Germany 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
.HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
99 
117 
3 
15 
144 
19 
397 
2000 
149 
134 
0 
83 
145 
20 
531 
2005 
129 
138 
0 
136 
145 
21 
569 
2010 
143 
140 
0 
152 
145 
21 
602 
2015 
151 
128 
0 
183 
145 
22 
629 
2020 
188 
87 
0 
213 
145 
23 
656 
Power Generation by fuel in per cent (sum of figures may not total 100 due to rounding) 
Germany 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
25 
30 
1 
4 
36 
5 
100 
2000 
28 
25 
0 
16 
27 
4 
100 
2005 
23 
24 
0 
24 
25 
4 
100 
2010 
24 
23 
0 
25 
24 
4 
100 
2015 
24 
20 
0 
29 
23 
4 
100 
2020 
29 
13 
0 
32 
22 
4 
100 
Power Generation by fuel in T W h 
France 
HC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
20 
4 
7 
350 
72 
453 
2000 
18 
0 
3 
327 
89 
436 
2005 
13 
0 
3 
348 
96 
460 
2010 
9 
0 
3 
385 
94 
491 
2015 
20 
0 
2 
399 
92 
514 
2020 
24 
0 
11 
413 
91 
538 
Power Generation by fuel in per cent (sum of figures may not total 100 due to rounding) 
France 
HC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
4 
1 
2 
77 
16 
100 
2000 
4 
0 
1 
75 
20 
100 
2005 
3 
0 
1 
76 
21 
100 
2010 
2 
0 
1 
78 
19 
100 
2015 
4 
0 
0 
78 
18 
100 
2020 
4 
0 
2 
77 
17 
100 
Power Generation by fuel in T W h 
Benelux 
HC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
37 
1 
57 
43 
2 
140 
2000 
68 
0 
37 
44 
2 
150 
2005 
59 
0 
56 
44 
2 
160 
2010 
59 
0 
64 
44 
2 
169 
2015 
49 
0 
81 
43 
2 
175 
2020 
24 
0 
109 
43 
2 
179 
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Table A6.1. Base case power generation forecasts for Europe (continued) 
EWI-NH : BASE CASE CAPACITIES 
Power Generation by fuel in per cent (sum of figures may not total 100 due to rounding) 
Benelux 
HC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
27 
1 
40 
31 
1 
100 
2000 
45 
0 
25 
29 
1 
100 
2005 
37 
0 
35 
27 
1 
100 
2010 
35 
0 
38 
26 
1 
100 
2015 
28 
0 
46 
25 
1 
100 
2020 
13 
0 
61 
24 
1 
100 
Power Generation by fuel in TWh 
Austria / Switzerland 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
4 
1 
2 
7 
22 
74 
110 
2000 
11 
1 
0 
1 
22 
71 
106 
2005 
7 
1 
0 
1 
22 
72 
103 
2010 
3 
1 
0 
5 
22 
77 
107 
2015 
2 
1 
0 
3 
22 
81 
109 
2020 
2 
0 
0 
4 
22 
86 
113 
Power Generation by fuel in per cent (sum of figures may not total 100 due to rounding) 
Austria / Switzerland 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
4 
1 
2 
6 
20 
67 
100 
2000 
11 
1 
0 
1 
20 
67 
100 
2005 
7 
1 
0 
1 
21 
70 
100 
2010 
2 
1 
0 
4 
20 
72 
100 
2015 
2 
1 
0 
3 
20 
75 
100 
2020 
2 
0 
0 
4 
19 
76 
100 
Power Generation by fuel in T W h 
Portugal / Spain 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
56 
12 
10 
0 
53 
31 
162 
2000 
63 
13 
3 
0 
56 
42 
177 
2005 
70 
13 
4 
9 
56 
42 
193 
2010 
71 
13 
0 
31 
56 
43 
214 
2015 
74 
1 
0 
58 
56 
45 
234 
2020 
42 
1 
0 
106 
56 
46 
250 
Power Generation by fuel in per cent (sum of figures may not total 100 due to rounding) 
Portugal / Spain 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
35 
7 
6 
0 
33 
19 
100 
2000 
35 
8 
2 
0 
32 
24 
100 
2005 
36 
7 
2 
4 
29 
22 
100 
2010 
33 
6 
0 
14 
26 
20 
100 
2015 
32 
0 
0 
25 
24 
19 
100 
2020 
17 
0 
0 
42 
22 
18 
100 
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Table A6.2. Base case power capacity forecasts for Europe 
EWI-NH : BASE CASE CAPACITIES 
German capacity development |MW| 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
23328 
20139 
5435 
10448 
22507 
8250 
90106 
2000 
22455 
20858 
2174 
16665 
20866 
8607 
91624 
2005 
20351 
22538 
1441 
22925 
20866 
8817 
96938 
2010 
19747 
22538 
544 
29667 
20866 
9171 
102532 
2015 
20733 
17182 
310 
39643 
20866 
9524 
108257 
2020 
25274 
11681 
285 
47499 
20866 
9878 
115483 
French capaci 
'HC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
ty development [MW] 
1992 (act.) 
11840 
6262 
1699 
57675 
24996 
102472 
2000 
9973 
3323 
3785 
64795 
24636 
106512 
2005 
8081 
2796 
4697 
64795 
24636 
105005 
2010 
5113 
841 
12990 
64795 
25343 
109082 
2015 
5113 
685 
13369 
64022 
26050 
109239 
2020 
4003 
685 
13538 
66157 
26757 
111140 
Austria/Switzerland capacity development |MW] 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1992 (act.) 
1517 
460 
3649 
570 
2950 
22826 
31972 
2000 
2226 
742 
692 
2492 
2868 
24116 
33136 
2005 
2226 
742 
692 
2967 
2868 
24629 
34124 
2010 
1420 
742 
650 
5617 
2868 
26004 
37301 
2015 
994 
605 
619 
6431 
2868 
27378 
38895 
2020 
994 
275 
574 
7376 
2868 
28753 
40840 
Benelux capacity development [MW| 
HC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1992 (act.) 
7536 
1112 
11587 
5990 
2562 
28787 
2000 
9826 
574 
10810 
5785 
2393 
29388 
2005 
8467 
574 
13486 
5785 
2393 
30705 
2010 
8275 
574 
16352 
5785 
2393 
33379 
2015 
7408 
574 
21204 
5785 
2393 
37364 
2020 
6161 
414 
23130 
5785 
2393 
37883 
Portugal/Spaii 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
ι capacity deve 
1994 (act.) 
9152 
3400 
7886 
3902 
7400 
20324 
52064 
lopment | M W 
2000 
10414 
1867 
6858 
2775 
7400 
20937 
50251 
2005 
10860 
1867 
5083 
4376 
7400 
20937 
50523 
2010 
10380 
1830 
1680 
10522 
7400 
21832 
53644 
2015 
10321 
134 
100 
16828 
7400 
22729 
57512 
2020 
5783 
134 
0 
23831 
7400 
23624 
60772 
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Table A6.3. Base case forecasts for European net imports 
EWI-NH : BASE CASE CAPACITIES 
Net-power imports 1993 (Net Imports+, Net Exports-); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Ost-E. 
UK 
I 
Import 
D 
0 
-13.362 
3.554 
13.841 
0 
-2.88 
-0.826 
0 
0 
F 
13.362 
0 
8.912 
2.768 
1.570 
0 
0 
16.759 
17.279 
A / CH 
-3.554 
-8.912 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-2.495 
0 
21.201 
Benelux 
-13.841 
-2.768 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
IB 
0 
-1.570 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Scand. 
2.88 
0 
0 
0 
Ost-E. 
0.826 
0 
2.495 
0 
UK 
0 
-16.759 
0 
0 
I 
0 
-17.279 
-21.201 
0 
Net-power imports 1995 (Net Imports*, Net Exports-); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Ost-E. 
UK 
I 
Import 
D 
0 
-13.368 
1.372 
3.697 
0 
-6.5 
-0.451 
0 
0 
F 
13.368 
0 
9.141 
3.799 
2.354 
0 
0 
14.736 
13.124 
A/CH 
-1.372 
-9.141 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-2.3 
0 
15.137 
Benelux 
-3.697 
-3.799 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
IB 
0 
-2.354 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Scand. 
6.5 
0 
0 
0 
Ost-E. 
0.451 
0 
2.3 
0 
UK 
0 
-14.736 
0 
0 
1 
0 
-13.124 
-15.137 
0 
Net-power imports 2000 (Net Imports+, Net Exports-); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Osl-E. 
UK 
1 
Import 
D 
0 
-15.369 
3.762 
4.185 
0 
-3.487 
-1.152 
0 
0 
F 
15.369 
0 
10.267 
4.124 
2.541 
0 
0 
14.463 
10.252 
A/CH 
-3.762 
-10.267 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-3.18 
0 
11.515 
Benelux 
-4.185 
-4.124 
0 
0 
0 
1.793 
0 
0 
0 
IB 
0 
-2.541 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Scand. 
3.487 
0 
0 
-1.793 
Ost-E. 
1.152 
0 
3.18 
0 
UK 
0 
-14.463 
0 
0 
I 
0 
-10.252 
-11.515 
0 
Net-power imports 2005 (Net Imports+, Net Exports-); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Ost-E. 
UK 
I 
Import 
D 
0 
-16.533 
3.972 
4.49 
0 
-4.513 
-2.848 
0 
0 
F 
16.533 
0 
10.988 
4.389 
2.175 
0 
0 
13.863 
3.112 
A/CH 
-3.972 
-10.988 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-4.208 
0 
3.008 
Benelux 
-4,49 
-4.389 
0 
0 
0 
1.724 
0 
0 
0 
IB 
0 
-2.175 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Scand. 
4.513 
0 
0 
-1.724 
Ost-E. 
2.848 
0 
4.208 
0 
UK 
0 
-13.863 
0 
0 
I 
0 
-3.112 
-3.008 
0 
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Table A6.3. Base case forecasts for European net imports (continued) 
EWI-NH : BASE CASE CAPACITIES 
Net-power imports 2010 (Net Imports+, Net Exports-); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
ΓΒ 
Scand. 
Ost-E. 
UK 
I 
Import 
D 
0 
-17.525 
3.221 
4.755 
0 
-3,833 
-4.387 
0 
0 
F 
17.525 
0 
11.447 
4.631 
3.094 
0 
0 
13.863 
1.532 
A/CH 
-3,221 
-11.447 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-4.07 
0 
0.980 
Benelux 
-4.755 
-4.631 
0 
0 
0 
1.643 
0 
0 
0 
IB 
0 
-3.094 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Scand. 
3.833 
0 
0 
-1.643 
Osl-E. 
4.387 
0 
4.07 
0 
UK 
0 
-13.863 
0 
0 
I 
0 
-1.532 
-0.980 
0 
Net-power imports 2015 (Net Imports+, Net Exports-); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Ost-E. 
UK 
1 
Import 
D 
0 
-18.236 
4.897 
4.937 
0 
-3.879 
-3.446 
0 
0 
F 
18.236 
0 
11.866 
3.409 
2.511 
0 
0 
13.582 
1.124 
A/CH 
-4.897 
-11.866 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-4.871 
0 
1.388 
Benelux 
-4.937 
-3.409 
0 
0 
0 
1.549 
0 
0 
0 
IB 
0 
-2.511 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Scand. 
3.879 
0 
0 
-1.549 
Osl-E. 
3.446 
0 
4.871 
0 
UK 
0 
-13.582 
0 
0 
I 
0 
-1.124 
-1.388 
0 
Net-power imports 2020 (Net Imports+, Net Exports-); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Osl-E. 
UK 
I 
Import 
D 
0 
-13.841 
4.023 
5.088 
0 
-3.922 
-3.765 
0 
0 
F 
13.841 
0 
11.838 
2.692 
2.530 
0 
0 
13.582 
0.717 
A/CH 
-4.023 
-11.838 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-4.64 
0 
1.795 
Benelux 
-5.088 
-2.692 
0 
0 
0 
1.444 
0 
0 
0 
IB 
0 
-2.530 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Scand. 
3.922 
0 
0 
-1.444 
Osl-E. 
3.765 
0 
4.64 
0 
UK 
0 
-13.582 
0 
0 
I 
0 
-0.717 
-1.795 
0 
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Table A6.4. EWI-NH: Base case capacities 
Transmission capacity additions 
Germany 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
1995 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1200 
0 
0 
0 
2000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
294.11 
0 
0 
2005 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1326.17 
24.69 
0 
0 
2010 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
28.81 
0 
0 
2015 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
37.04 
0 
0 
2020 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
6.17 
0 
0 
France 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
1995 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
42.01 
0 
2000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2005 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
7.17 
0 
2010 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2015 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
118.33 
0 
2020 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Austria and Switzerland 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
1995 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
600 
0 
78.66 
2000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2005 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
667.43 
0 
145.23 
2010 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2015 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2020 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Benelux 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
1995 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
855.61 
0 
0 
0 
2005 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2010 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2015 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2020 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Iberia 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
1995 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2005 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2010 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2015 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2020 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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Table A6.5. EWI-NH: Base case data 
EWI-NH : Base case data 
Germany 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
3 (1st) 
0 
6375 
18935 
10104 
0 
2235 
5100 
0 
0 
1995 
0 
6375 
18935 
10104 
0 
3435 
5100 
0 
0 
2000 
0 
6375 
18935 
10104 
0 
3435 
5394 
0 
0 
2005 
0 
6375 
18935 
10104 
0 
4761 
5419 
0 
0 
2010 
0 
6375 
18935 
10104 
0 
4761 
5448 
0 
0 
2015 
0 
6375 
18935 
10104 
0 
4761 
5485 
0 
0 
2020 
0 
6375 
18935 
10104 
0 
4761 
5491 
0 
0 
France 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
0 
UK 
IT 
1993 (1st) 
6375 
0 
5335 
3335 
3429 
0 
0 
2000 
4290 
1995 
6375 
0 
5335 
3335 
3429 
0 
0 
2042 
4290 
2000 
6375 
0 
5335 
3335 
3429 
0 
0 
2042 
4290 
2005 
6375 
0 
5335 
3335 
3429 
0 
0 
2049 
4290 
2010 
6375 
0 
5335 
3335 
3429 
0 
0 
2049 
4290 
2015 
6375 
0 
5335 
3335 
3429 
0 
0 
2168 
4290 
2020 
6375 
0 
5335 
3335 
3429 
0 
0 
2168 
4290 
Austria and Switzerland 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
3 (1st) 
18935 
5335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2104 
0 
3982 
1995 
18935 
5335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2704 
0 
4361 
2000 
18935 
5335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2704 
0 
4361 
2005 
18935 
5335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3371 
0 
4506 
2010 
18935 
5335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3371 
0 
4506 
2015 
18935 
5335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3371 
0 
4506 
2020 
18935 
5335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3371 
0 
4506 
Benelux 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
ι (1st) 
0104 
3335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1995 
10104 
3335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2000 
10104 
3335 
0 
0 
0 
856 
0 
0 
0 
2005 
10104 
3335 
0 
0 
0 
856 
0 
0 
0 
2010 
10104 
3335 
0 
0 
0 
856 
0 
0 
0 
2015 
10104 
3335 
0 
0 
0 
856 
0 
0 
0 
2020 
10104 
3335 
0 
0 
0 
856 
0 
0 
0 
Iberia 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
0 
UK 
IT 
1993 (1st) 
0 
3429 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1995 
0 
3429 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2000 
0 
3429 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2005 
0 
3429 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2010 
0 
3429 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2015 
0 
3429 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2020 
0 
3429 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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Table A6.6. Capacity utilization of generation plant per hour by year 
EWI-NH : BASE CASE CAPACITIES 
Base case 
Germany 
HC 
HCGUD 
HCGAS 
BC 
OIL 
GASGUD 
GASTUR 
NUC 
1995 
6273 
0 
0 
6304 
0 
0 
351 
6950 
2000 
6656 
0 
0 
6429 
0 
7530 
339 
6950 
2005 
6310 
0 
7442 
6122 
0 
7530 
254 
6949 
2010 
7173 
7617 
7442 
6233 
0 
6040 
226 
6946 
2015 
7159 
7617 
7442 
7426 
0 
5226 
211 
6937 
2020 
7148 
7617 
6762 
7437 
0 
4992 
0 
6933 
France 
HC 
HCGUD 
HCGAS 
OIL 
GASGUD 
GASTUR 
1995 
1863 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4975 
2000 
1830 
0 
0 
0 
2288 
5041 
2005 
1680 
0 
0 
0 
1802 
5366 
2010 
1818 
0 
0 
0 
268 
5944 
2015 
3995 
0 
0 
0 
237 
6235 
2020 
6015 
0 
0 
0 
1058 
6245 
Austria/Switzerland 
HC 
HCGUD 
HCGAS 
BC 
OIL 
GASGUD 
GASTUR 
1995 
1965 
0 
0 
5060 
0 
0 
7530 
2000 
5085 
0 
0 
1892 
0 
0 
7530 
2005 
3242 
0 
0 
1485 
0 
0 
7524 
2010 
1771 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1744 
7518 
2015 
1775 
0 
0 
0 
0 
991 
7513 
2020 
1503 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1099 
7513 
Benelux 
HC 
HCGUD 
HCGAS 
OIL 
GASGUD 
GASTUR 
1995 
6849 
0 
7442 
0 
7880 
7530 
2000 
6877 
0 
7442 
0 
7672 
7530 
2005 
6909 
0 
7442 
0 
6870 
7530 
2010 
7174 
0 
7442 
0 
5805 
7522 
2015 
6583 
0 
7442 
0 
5289 
7519 
2020 
3995 
0 
0 
0 
6580 
7515 
Iberia 
HC 
HCGUD 
HCGAS 
BC 
OIL 
GASGUD 
GASTUR 
1995 
5042 
0 
0 
6749 
0 
0 
7530 
2000 
6007 
0 
0 
7201 
396 
0 
7530 
2005 
6408 
0 
0 
6795 
876 
5334 
7529 
2010 
6824 
7617 
0 
7113 
0 
4459 
7527 
2015 
7158 
7617 
0 
0 
0 
4541 
7530 
2020 
7157 
7617 
0 
0 
0 
5473 
7504 
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Table A6.7. Base case share of new technologies 
EWI-NH : BASE CASE CAPACITIES 
New. Tech: GTCC & IGCC 
German capacity development of new technologies |MW| 
New Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
6497 
80971 
87468 
2000 
13216 
78409 
91624 
2005 
19542 
77396 
96938 
2010 
29011 
73521 
102532 
2015 
41682 
66575 
108257 
2020 
59741 
55742 
115483 
German capacity development of new technologies \%\ 
New Tech. 
Cony.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
7.43 
92.57 
100 
2000 
14.42 
85.58 
100 
2005 
20.16 
79.84 
100 
2010 
28.29 
71.71 
100 
2015 
38.50 
61.50 
100 
2020 
51.73 
48.27 
100 
French capacity development of new technologies [MW] 
New Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
657 
105844 
106501 
2000 
2000 
104512 
106512 
2005 
1820 
103185 
105005 
2010 
9959 
99123 
109082 
2015 
10176 
99063 
109239 
2020 
10176 
100964 
111140 
French capacity development of new technologies [%| 
New Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
0.62 
99.38 
100 
2000 
1.88 
98.12 
100 
2005 
1.73 
98.27 
100 
2010 
9.13 
90.87 
100 
2015 
9.32 
90.68 
100 
2020 
9.16 
90.84 
100 
Austrian/Swiss capacity development of new technologies [MW] 
New Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
0 
32404 
32404 
2000 
152 
32984 
33136 
2005 
152 
33972 
34124 
2010 
2520 
34781 
37301 
2015 
3082 
35813 
38895 
2020 
3687 
37153 
40840 
Austrian/Swiss capacity development of new technologies [%] 
New Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
0.00 
100.00 
100 
2000 
0.46 
99.54 
100 
2005 
0.45 
99.55 
100 
2010 
6.76 
93.24 
100 
2015 
7.92 
92.08 
100 
2020 
9.03 
90.97 
100 
Benelux capacity development of new technologies [MW] 
New Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
9327 
20608 
29935 
2000 
7512 
21876 
29388 
2005 
8708 
21997 
30705 
2010 
11072 
22307 
33379 
2015 
15371 
21993 
37364 
2020 
16688 
21195 
37883 
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Table A6.7. Base case share of new technologies (continued) 
EWI-NH : BASE CASE CAPACITIES 
Benelux capacity development of new technologies |%] 
New Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
31.16 
68.84 
100 
2000 
25.56 
74.44 
100 
2005 
28.36 
71.64 
100 
2010 
33.17 
66.83 
100 
2015 
41.14 
58.86 
100 
2020 
44.05 
55.95 
100 
Iberian capacity development of new technologies [MW] 
New Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
0 
50975 
50975 
2000 
0 
50251 
50251 
2005 
1579 
48943 
50523 
2010 
7137 
46507 
53644 
2015 
13077 
44435 
57512 
2020 
19677 
41095 
60772 
Iberian capacity development of new technologies [%] 
New Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
0.00 
100.00 
100 
2000 
0.00 
100.00 
100 
2005 
3.13 
96.87 
100 
2010 
13.30 
86.70 
100 
2015 
22.74 
77.26 
100 
2020 
32.38 
67.62 
100 
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Table A6.8. Base case grid utilization 
EWI-NH : BASE CASE CAPACITIES 
Grid-utilization: Actual flows [TWh]/Maximum flow capacity [TWh] 
C.\PR-nh = BaseCase 
1994 (act.) 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
G 
0.00 
0.54 
0.13 
0.03 
0.00 
0.20 
0.02 
0,00 
0.00 
F 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.10 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.01 
A 
0.13 
0.33 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.34 
0,00 
0.00 
L 
0.38 
0.32 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IB 
0.00 
025 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
N 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0 
002 
0.00 
0.34 
0.00 
0.00 
UK 
0.00 
0 00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IT 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1995 
e 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
G 
0.00 
0.48 
0.11 
0.01 
0.00 
0.29 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
F 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
A 
0.12 
0.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.28 
0.00 
0.03 
L 
0.10 
0.29 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IB 
0.00 
0.18 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
N 
0.29 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0 
0.04 
0.00 
0.28 
0.00 
0.00 
UK 
0.00 
003 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IT 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
G 
0.00 
0.55 
0.12 
0.02 
0.00 
0.29 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
F 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
A 
0.17 
0.44 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.36 
0.00 
0.04 
L 
0.11 
0.31 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.29 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IB 
0.00 
0.19 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
N 
0.29 
0.00 
0.00 
0.29 
0.00 
0 
0.07 
0.00 
0.36 
0.00 
0.00 
UK 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IT 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
G 
0.00 
0.59 
0.13 
0.02 
0.00 
0.29 
0.15 
0,00 
0.00 
F 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.08 
0.00 
A 
0.18 
0.48 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.36 
0.00 
0.04 
L 
0.12 
0.34 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.30 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IB 
0.00 
0.21 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
N 
0.29 
0.00 
0.00 
0.30 
0.00 
0 
0.15 
0.00 
0.36 
0.00 
0.00 
UK 
0.00 
0.08 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IT 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
2010 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
G 
0.00 
0.63 
0.14 
0.02 
0.00 
0.32 
0.22 
0.00 
0.00 
F 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.04 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.08 
0.00 
A 
0.18 
0.50 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.36 
0.00 
0.05 
L 
0.13 
0.35 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.31 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IB 
0.00 
0.23 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
N 
0.32 
0.00 
0,00 
0.31 
0.00 
0 
0.22 
0.00 
0.36 
0.00 
0.00 
UK 
0.00 
0.08 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
IT 
0,00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
G 
0.00 
0.65 
0.13 
0.02 
0.00 
0.32 
0.18 
0.00 
0.00 
F 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.13 
0.09 
0.00 
0.00 
0.09 
0.03 
A 
0.19 
0.51 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.42 
0.00 
0.03 
L 
0.13 
0,37 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.32 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IB 
0.00 
0.25 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
N 
0.32 
0.00 
0.00 
0.32 
0.00 
0 
0.18 
0.00 
0.42 
0.00 
0.00 
UK 
0.00 
0.09 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IT 
0.00 
0.03 
0,03 
0.00 
0.00 
166 Single energy market 
Table A6.8. Base case grid utilization (continued) 
EWI-NH : BASE CASE CAPACITIES 
2020 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
G 
0.00 
0.50 
0.15 
0.02 
0.00 
0.32 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
F 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.14 
0.10 
0.00 
0.00 
0.09 
0.05 
A 
0.20 
0.53 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.41 
0.00 
0.01 
L 
0.14 
0.33 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.33 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IB 
0.00 
0.27 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
N 
0.32 
0.00 
0,00 
0.33 
0.00 
0 
0.20 
0.00 
0.41 
0.00 
0.00 
UK 
0,00 
0.09 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IT 
0,00 
0.05 
0,01 
0.00 
0.00 
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A7. nTPA 
Table Α7.1. nTPA power generation forecasts for Europe 
Power generation by fuel in TWh 
Germany 
IIC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
99 
117 
3 
15 
144 
19 
397 
2000 
147 
134 
0 
45 
145 
20 
491 
2005 
136 
138 
0 
95 
145 
21 
534 
2010 
154 
141 
0 
112 
145 
21 
573 
2015 
158 
128 
0 
151 
145 
22 
604 
2020 
215 
87 
0 
175 
145 
23 
644 
Power generation by fuel in per cent (sum of figures may not total 100 due to rounding) 
Germanv 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
25 
30 
1 
4 
36 
5 
100 
2000 
30 
27 
0 
9 
30 
4 
100 
2005 
25 
26 
0 
18 
27 
4 
100 
2010 
27 
25 
0 
20 
25 
4 
100 
2015 
26 
21 
0 
25 
24 
4 
100 
2020 
33 
13 
0 
27 
22 
4 
100 
Power generation by fuel in TWh 
France 
HC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
20 
4 
7 
350 
72 
453 
2000 
18 
0 
3 
369 
95 
485 
2005 
13 
0 
3 
386 
96 
499 
2010 
19 
0 
3 
405 
94 
521 
2015 
30 
0 
6 
402 
93 
532 
2020 
26 
0 
15 
416 
91 
548 
Power generation by fuel in per cent (sum of figures may not total 100 due to rounding) 
France 
HC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
4 
1 
2 
77 
16 
100 
2000 
4 
0 
1 
76 
20 
100 
2005 
3 
0 
1 
77 
19 
100 
2010 
4 
0 
1 
78 
18 
100 
2015 
6 
0 
1 
76 
17 
100 
2020 
5 
0 
3 
76 
17 
100 
Power generation by fuel in Ρ 
Benelux 
HC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
37 
1 
57 
43 
2 
140 
tVh 
2000 
70 
0 
36 
44 
2 
152 
2005 
60 
0 
49 
44 
2 
155 
2010 
59 
0 
59 
44 
2 
165 
2015 
53 
0 
80 
43 
2 
178 
2020 
44 
0 
87 
43 
2 
177 
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Table A7.1. NTPA power generation forecasts for Europe (continued) 
Power generation by fuel in per cent (sum of figures may not total 100 due to rounding) 
Benelux 
HC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
27 
1 
40 
31 
1 
100 
2000 
46 
0 
24 
29 
1 
100 
2005 
39 
0 
32 
28 
1 
100 
2010 
36 
0 
36 
26 
1 
100 
2015 
30 
0 
45 
24 
1 
100 
2020 
25 
0 
49 
25 
1 
100 
Power generation by fuel in TWh 
Austria/Switzerland 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
4 
1 
2 
7 
22 
74 
110 
2000 
6 
1 
0 
1 
22 
71 
101 
2005 
7 
1 
0 
7 
22 
72 
109 
2010 
8 
2 
0 
5 
22 
77 
113 
2015 
6 
1 
0 
5 
22 
82 
115 
2020 
6 
0 
0 
3 
22 
87 
117 
Power generation by fuel in per cent (sum of figures may not total 100 due to rounding) 
Austria/Switzerland 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
4 
1 
2 
6 
20 
67 
100 
2000 
6 
1 
0 
1 
21 
70 
100 
2005 
7 
1 
0 
6 
20 
66 
100 
2010 
7 
1 
0 
4 
19 
68 
100 
2015 
5 
1 
0 
5 
19 
71 
100 
2020 
5 
0 
0 
2 
18 
74 
100 
Power generati 
Portugal/Spaii 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
on by fuel in T\ 
1 
1993 (act.) 
56 
12 
10 
0 
53 
31 
162 
2000 
60 
13 
2 
0 
56 
42 
173 
2005 
68 
13 
4 
6 
56 
42 
189 
2010 
69 
13 
0 
31 
56 
43 
211 
2015 
73 
1 
0 
59 
56 
45 
233 
2020 
40 
1 
0 
108 
56 
46 
250 
Power generation by fuel in per cent (sum of figures may not total 100 due to rounding) 
Portugal/Spain 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
35 
7 
6 
0 
33 
19 
100 
2000 
35 
8 
1 
0 
32 
24 
100 
2005 
36 
7 
2 
3 
29 
22 
100 
2010 
32 
6 
0 
15 
26 
20 
100 
2015 
31 
0 
0 
25 
24 
19 
100 
2020 
16 
0 
0 
43 
22 
18 
100 
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Table A7.2. nTPA power capacity forecasts for Europe 
German capacity development [MW] 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
23328 
20139 
5435 
10448 
22507 
8250 
90106 
2000 
21668 
20858 
2174 
12544 
20866 
8607 
86717 
2005 
20351 
22538 
1441 
18804 
20866 
8817 
92817 
2010 
21435 
22538 
544 
25546 
20866 
9171 
100100 
2015 
21746 
17182 
310 
35522 
20866 
9524 
105150 
2020 
28799 
11681 
285 
44025 
20866 
9878 
115534 
French capacity development [MW| 
- HC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1992 (act.) 
11840 
6262 
1699 
57675 
24996 
102472 
2000 
9973 
3323 
3785 
64795 
24636 
106512 
2005 
8081 
2796 
5859 
64795 
24636 
106167 
2010 
5113 
841 
14134 
64795 
25343 
110226 
2015 
5113 
685 
14296 
64022 
26050 
110166 
2020 
4003 
685 
14465 
66157 
26757 
112067 
Austrian/Swiss capacity development [MW| 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1992 (act.) 
1517 
460 
3649 
570 
2950 
22826 
31972 
2000 
2226 
742 
692 
2492 
2868 
24116 
33136 
2005 
2226 
742 
692 
4927 
2868 
24629 
36084 
2010 
1420 
742 
650 
5617 
2868 
26004 
37301 
2015 
994 
605 
619 
6228 
2868 
27378 
38692 
2020 
994 
275 
574 
6568 
2868 
28753 
40032 
Benelux capacity development [MW| 
HC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1992 (act.) 
7536 
1112 
11587 
5990 
2562 
28787 
2000 
10255 
574 
11357 
5785 
2393 
30364 
2005 
8467 
574 
14321 
5785 
2393 
31540 
2010 
8275 
574 
18070 
5785 
2393 
35097 
2015 
7408 
574 
24038 
5785 
2393 
40198 
2020 
6161 
414 
24205 
5785 
2393 
38958 
Iberian capacity development [MW] 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1994 (act.) 
9152 
1800 
7886 
3902 
7400 
20324 
52064 
2000 
9955 
1836 
6858 
2775 
7400 
20937 
49761 
2005 
10860 
1836 
5083 
4663 
7400 
20937 
50778 
2010 
10216 
1830 
1680 
10276 
7400 
21832 
53234 
2015 
10157 
134 
100 
16582 
7400 
22729 
57102 
2020 
5619 
134 
0 
22730 
7400 
23624 
59507 
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Table A7.3. nTPA forecasts for European net imports 
Net-power imports 1993 (net imports + nel exports); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Ost-E. 
UK 
I 
Import 
D 
0 
-1.3.362 
3.554 
13.841 
0 
-2.88 
-0.826 
0 
0 
F 
13.362 
0 
8.912 
2.768 
1.570 
0 
0 
16.759 
17.279 
A/CH 
-3.554 
-8.912 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-2.495 
0 
21.201 
Benelux 
-13.841 
-2.768 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
IB 
0 
-1.570 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Scand. 
2.88 
0 
0 
0 
Ost-E. 
0.826 
0 
2.495 
0 
UK 
0 
-16.759 
0 
0 
I 
0 
-17.279 
-21.201 
0 
Net-power imports 1995 (net imports + net exports); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Ost-E. 
UK 
I 
Import 
D 
0 
-29.164 
-6.676 
2.555 
0 
-6.5 
-0.451 
0 
0 
F 
29.164 
0 
17.883 
13.066 
10.272 
0 
0 
14.736 
13.124 
A/CH 
6.676 
-17.88.3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-2.3 
0 
15.137 
Benelux 
-2.555 
-13.066 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
IB 
0 
-10.272 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Scand. 
6.5 
0 
0 
0 
Ost-E. 
0.451 
0 
2.3 
0 
UK 
0 
-14.736 
0 
0 
I 
0 
-13.124 
-15.137 
0 
Net-power imports 2000 (net imports + net exports); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Ost-E. 
UK 
I 
Import 
D 
0 
-32.071 
-5.786 
-10.035 
0 
-.3.487 
-0.69 
0 
0 
F 
32.071 
0 
24.489 
17.220 
6.185 
0 
0 
14.048 
10.252 
A/CH 
5.786 
-24.489 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-3.642 
0 
11.515 
Benelux 
10.035 
-17.220 
0 
0 
0 
1.79.3 
0 
0 
0 
IB 
0 
-6.185 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Scand. 
3.487 
0 
0 
-1.793 
Ost-E. 
0.69 
0 
3.642 
0 
UK 
0 
-14.048 
0 
0 
1 
0 
-10.252 
-11.515 
0 
Net-power imports 2005 (net imports + net exports); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Ost-E. 
UK 
I 
Import 
D 
0 
-31.218 
-11.134 
-0.487 
0 
-4.513 
-3.299 
0 
0 
F 
31.218 
0 
20.751 
13.989 
5.982 
0 
0 
13.863 
3.078 
A/CH 
11.134 
-20.751 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-3.757 
0 
3.042 
Benelux 
0.487 
-13.989 
0 
0 
0 
1.724 
0 
0 
0 
IB 
0 
-5.982 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Scand. 
4.513 
0 
0 
-1.724 
Ost-E. 
3.299 
0 
3.757 
0 
UK 
0 
-1.3.863 
0 
0 
I 
0 
-3.078 
-3.042 
0 
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Table A7.3. nTPA forecasts for European net imports (continued) 
Net-power imports 2010 (net imports + net exports); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
Λ/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Ost-E. 
UK 
I 
Import 
D 
0 
-30.904 
-9.247 
1.571 
0 
-3.833 
-4.024 
0 
0 
F 
30.904 
0 
17.006 
12.175 
5.908 
0 
0 
13,682 
1.498 
A/CH 
9.247 
-17.006 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-4.433 
0 
1.014 
Benelux 
-1.571 
-12.175 
0 
0 
0 
1.643 
0 
0 
0 
IB 
0 
-5.908 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Scand. 
3.833 
0 
0 
-1.643 
Osl-E. 
4.024 
0 
4.433 
0 
UK 
0 
-13.682 
0 
0 
I 
0 
-1.498 
-1.014 
0 
Net-power imports 2015 (nel imports + net exports); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Ost-E. 
UK 
I 
Import 
D 
0 
-27.174 
-4.644 
-0.813 
0 
-3.879 
-4.406 
0 
0 
F 
27.174 
0 
16.751 
6.540 
3.282 
0 
0 
13.582 
0.718 
A/CH 
4.644 
-16.751 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-3.911 
0 
1.794 
Benelux 
0,813 
-6.540 
0 
0 
0 
1.549 
0 
0 
0 
IB 
0 
-3.282 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Scand. 
3.879 
0 
0 
-1.549 
Ost-E. 
4.406 
0 
3.911 
0 
UK 
0 
-13.582 
0 
0 
1 
0 
-0.718 
-1.794 
0 
Net-power imports 2020 (net imports + net exports); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Ost-E. 
UK 
I 
Import 
D 
0 
-20.146 
0,857 
2.749 
0 
-3.858 
-3.409 
0 
0 
F 
20.146 
0 
11.214 
6.615 
2.587 
0 
0 
13.582 
0.718 
A/CH 
-0.857 
-11.214 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-4.996 
0 
1.794 
Benelux 
-2.749 
-6.615 
0 
0 
0 
1.38 
0 
0 
0 
IB 
0 
-2.587 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Scand. 
3.858 
0 
0 
-1.38 
Ost-E. 
3.409 
0 
4.996 
0 
UK 
0 
-13.582 
0 
0 
1 
0 
-0.718 
-1.794 
0 
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Table A7.4. EWI-01 : increased competition DATA NEG-TPA 
Transmission capacity additions 
Germany 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
France 
1995 
0.00 
807 
0 
0 
0 
1200 
0 
0 
0 
2000 
0 
2593 
0 
0 
0 
0 
294 
0 
0 
2005 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1326 
25 
0 
0 
2010 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
29 
0 
0 
2015 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
37 
0 
0 
2020 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
6 
0 
0 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
0 
UK 
IT 
Austria 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
1995 
0 
0 
281.19 
1387.56 
0 
0 
0 
42.01 
0 
and Switzerland 
1995 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
600 
0 
378.66 
2000 
0 
0 
1718.81 
612.44 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2005 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
7.17 
0 
2005 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
667.43 
0 
0 
2010 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
73.67 
0 
2010 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2015 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
44.66 
0 
2015 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2020 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2020 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Benelux 
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
G 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IB 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N 0 855.61 0 0 0 0 
O 0 0 0 0 0 0 
UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IT 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Iberia 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
1995 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2005 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2010 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2015 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 · 
0 
0 
0 
2020 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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Table A7.4. EWI-01 : increased competition DATA NEG-TPA (continued) 
EWI-01 : increased competition DATA NEG-TPA 
Germany 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
Ν 
0 
UK 
IT 
1993 (1st) 
0 
6375 
18935 
10104 
0 
2235 
5100 
0 
0 
1995 
0 
7182 
18935 
10104 
0 
3435 
5100 
0 
0 
2000 
0 
9775 
18935 
10104 
0 
3435 
5394 
0 
0 
2005 
0 
9775 
18935 
10104 
0 
4761 
5419 
0 
0 
2010 
0 
9775 
18935 
10104 
0 
4761 
5448 
0 
0 
2015 
0 
9775 
18935 
10104 
0 
4761 
5485 
0 
0 
2020 
0 
9775 
18935 
10104 
0 
4761 
5491 
0 
0 
France 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
Ν 
O 
UK 
IT 
1993 (1st) 
6375 
0 
5335 
3335 
3429 
0 
0 
2000 
4290 
1995 
6375 
0 
5616 
4723 
3429 
0 
0 
2042 
4290 
2000 
6375 
0 
7335 
5335 
3429 
0 
0 
2042 
4290 
2005 
6375 
0 
7335 
5335 
3429 
0 
0 
2049 
4290 
2010 
6375 
0 
7335 
5335 
3429 
0 
0 
2123 
4290 
2015 
6375 
0 
7335 
5335 
3429 
0 
0 
2168 
4290 
2020 
6375 
0 
7335 
5335 
3429 
0 
0 
2168 
4290 
Austria and Switzerland 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
Ν 
0 
UK 
IT 
1993 (1st) 
18935 
5335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2104 
0 
3982 
1995 
18935 
5335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2704 
0 
4361 
2000 
18935 
5335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2704 
0 
4361 
2005 
18935 
5335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3371 
0 
4361 
2010 
18935 
5335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3371 
0 
4361 
2015 
18935 
5335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3371 
0 
4361 
2020 
18935 
5335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3371 
0 
4361 
Benelux 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
Ν 
0 
UK 
IT 
1993 (1st) 
10104 
3335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1995 
10104 
3335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2000 
10104 
3335 
0 
0 
0 
856 
0 
0 
0 
2005 
10104 
3335 
0 
0 
0 
856 
0 
0 
0 
2010 
10104 
3335 
0 
0 
0 
856 
0 
0 
0 
2015 
10104 
3335 
0 
0 
0 
856 
0 
0 
0 
2020 
10104 
3335 
0 
0 
0 
856 
0 
0 
0 
Iberia 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
Ν 
0 
UK 
IT 
1993 (1st) 
0 
3429 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1995 
0 
3429 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2000 
0 
3429 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2005 
0 
3429 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2010 
0 
3429 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2015 
0 
3429 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2020 
0 
3429 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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Table A7.5. Capacity utilization of generation plant per hour by year 
nTPA 
Germany 
HC 
HCGUD 
HCGAS 
BC 
OIL 
GASGUD 
GASTUR 
NUC 
1995 
5214 
0 
0 
6310 
0 
0 
351 
6950 
2000 
6805 
0 
0 
6429 
0 
7530 
339 
6950 
2005 
6621 
0 
7442 
6124 
0 
7157 
254 
6949 
2010 
7104 
7617 
6292 
6235 
0 
5338 
226 
6946 
2015 
7117 
7617 
6762 
7426 
0 
4887 
211 
6937 
2020 
7148 
7617 
6762 
7437 
0 
4453 
0 
6933 
France 
HC 
HCGUD 
HCGAS 
OIL 
GASGUD 
GASTUR 
1995 
1892 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5685 
2000 
1889 
0 
0 
0 
2288 
5688 
2005 
1681 
0 
0 
0 
1050 
5963 
2010 
3831 
0 
0 
0 
240 
6249 
2015 
6125 
0 
0 
0 
571 
6285 
2020 
6519 
0 
0 
0 
1367 
6293 
Austria/Switzerland 
HC 
HCGUD 
HCGAS 
BC 
OIL 
GASGUD 
GASTUR 
1995 
1950 
0 
0 
5062 
0 
0 
7530 
2000 
2879 
0 
0 
1892 
0 
0 
7530 
2005 
3338 
0 
0 
1485 
0 
3229 
7524 
2010 
5803 
0 
0 
2113 
0 
1856 
7518 
2015 
5541 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1838 
7513 
2020 
5785 
0 
0 
0 
0 
984 
7513 
Benelux 
HC 
HCGUD 
HCGAS 
OIL 
GASGUD 
GASTUR 
1995 
6681 
0 
7442 
0 
7880 
7530 
2000 
6799 
0 
7442 
0 
7518 
7530 
2005 
7178 
0 
5272 
0 
5845 
7530 
2010 
7174 
0 
7442 
0 
4665 
7522 
2015 
7171 
0 
6028 
0 
4393 
7519 
2020 
7166 
0 
6027 
0 
4955 
7515 
Iberia 
HC 
HCGUD 
HCGAS 
BC 
OIL 
GASGUD 
GASTUR 
1995 
4281 
0 
0 
6752 
0 
0 
7530 
2000 
6003 
0 
0 
7324 
275 
0 
7530 
2005 
6288 
0 
0 
7090 
843 
4322 
7529 
2010 
6705 
0 
0 
7113 
0 
4600 
7527 
2015 
7158 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4665 
7530 
2020 
7157 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5868 
7504 
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Table A7.6. NTPA share of new technologies 
New. Tech: GTCC & IGCC 
German capacity development of new technologies [MW] 
New Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
6497 
80971 
87468 
2000 
9095 
77622 
86717 
2005 
15421 
77396 
92817 
2010 
26579 
73521 
100100 
2015 
38575 
66575 
105150 
2020 
59792 
55742 
115534 
German capacity development of new technologies |%| 
New Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
7.43 
92.57 
100 
2000 
10.49 
89.51 
100 
2005 
16.61 
83.39 
100 
2010 
26.55 
73.45 
100 
2015 
36.69 
63.31 
100 
2020 
51.75 
48.25 
100 
French capacity development of new technologies |MW) 
New Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
657 
105844 
106501 
2000 
2000 
104512 
106512 
2005 
2982 
103185 
106167 
2010 
11103 
99123 
110226 
2015 
11103 
99063 
110166 
2020 
11103 
100964 
112067 
French capacity development of new technologies [%] 
New Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
0.62 
99.38 
100 
2000 
1.88 
98.12 
100 
2005 
2.81 
97.19 
100 
2010 
10.07 
89.93 
100 
2015 
10.08 
89.92 
100 
2020 
9.91 
90.09 
100 
Austrian/Swiss capacity development of new technologies [MW] 
New Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
0 
32404 
32404 
2000 
152 
32984 
33136 
2005 
2112 
33972 
36084 
2010 
2520 
34781 
37301 
2015 
2879 
35813 
38692 
2020 
2879 
37153 
40032 
Austrian/Swiss capacity development of new technologies [%] 
New Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
0.00 
100.00 
100 
2000 
0.46 
99.54 
100 
2005 
5.85 
94.15 
100 
2010 
6.76 
93.24 
100 
2015 
7.44 
92.56 
100 
2020 
7.19 
92.81 
100 
Benelux capacity development of new technologies |MW| 
New Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
9327 
20608 
29935 
2000 
7512 
22852 
30364 
2005 
9543 
21997 
31540 
2010 
12790 
22307 
35097 
2015 
18205 
21993 
40198 
2020 
17763 
21195 
38958 
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Table A7.6. NTPA share of new technologies (continued) 
Benelux capacity development of new technologies [%] 
New Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
31.16 
68.84 
100 
2000 
24.74 
75.26 
100 
2005 
30.26 
69.74 
100 
2010 
36.44 
63.56 
100 
2015 
45.29 
54.71 
100 
2020 
45.60 
54.40 
100 
Iberian capacity development of new technologies [MW] 
New Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
0 
50975 
50975 
2000 
0 
49761 
49761 
2005 
1333 
49446 
50778 
2010 
6727 
46507 
53234 
2015 
12667 
44435 
57102 
2020 
18412 
41095 
59507 
Iberian capacity development of new technologies [%] 
New Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
0.00 
100.00 
100 
2000 
0.00 
100.00 
100 
2005 
2.62 
97.38 
100 
2010 
12.64 
87.36 
100 
2015 
22.18 
77.82 
100 
2020 
30.94 
69.06 
100 
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Table A7.7. Grid utilization 
Capacity utilization of networks [real/theoretical] 
Grid-utilization: Actual flows [TWh]/Maximum flow capacity [TWIi 
CAPR-01 = nTPA 
1994 (act.) 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
G 
0.00 
0.54 
0.13 
0.03 
0.00 
0.20 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
F 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.10 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
Λ 
0.13 
0.33 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.34 
0.00 
0.00 
L 
0.38 
0.32 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
000 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IB 
0.00 
0,25 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Ν 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
o 
0.02 
000 
0.34 
0.00 
0.00 
UK 
000 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IT 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
G 
0.00 
0.93 
0.14 
0.04 
0.00 
0.29 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
F 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
A 
0.06 
0.73 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.28 
0.00 
0.03 
L 
0.10 
0.65 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IB 
0.00 
0.71 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
N 
0.29 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0 
0.04 
0.00 
0.28 
0.00 
0.00 
UK 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IT 
0.00 
0.00 
0,03 
0 0 0 
0.00 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
G 
0.00 
0.75 
0.19 
0.34 
0.00 
0.29 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
F 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.07 
0.00 
A 
0.12 
0.77 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.39 
0.00 
0.04 
L 
0.11 
0.76 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,29 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IB 
0.00 
0.44 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
N 
0.29 
0.00 
0.00 
0.29 
0.00 
0 
0.05 
0.00 
0.39 
0.00 
0.00 
UK 
0.00 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
IT 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
G 
0.00 
0.73 
0.21 
0.13 
0.00 
0.29 
0.17 
0.00 
0.00 
F 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.08 
0.01 
A 
0.07 
0.65 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.33 
0.00 
0.04 
L 
0.12 
0.62 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.30 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IB 
0.00 
0.47 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
N 
0.21 
0.00 
0.00 
0.30 
0.00 
0 
0,17 
0.00 
0.33 
0.00 
0.00 
UK 
0 0 0 
0.08 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
IT 
0.00 
0.01 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
G 
0.00 
0.72 
0.19 
0.10 
0.00 
0.32 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
F 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.09 
0.01 
A 
0.08 
0.53 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.38 
0.00 
0.05 
L 
0.13 
0,54 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.31 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IB 
0.00 
0.42 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
N 
0.32 
0.00 
0.00 
0.31 
0.00 
0 
0.20 
0.00 
0.38 
0.00 
0.00 
UK 
0.00 
0.09 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IT 
0.00 
0.01 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
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Table A7.7. Grid utilization (continued) 
2015 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
G 
0.00 
0.63 
0.17 
0.16 
0.00 
0.32 
0.22 
0.00 
0.00 
F 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.08 
0.12 
0.00 
0.00 
0.09 
0.05 
A 
0.11 
0.53 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.35 
0.00 
0.01 
L 
0.14 
0.36 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.32 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IB 
0.00 
034 
0.00 
0 0 0 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
N 
0.32 
0.00 
0.00 
0.32 
0.00 
0 
022 
0 0 0 
0.35 
0.00 
0.00 
UK 
0 0 0 
0.09 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IT 
0 0 0 
005 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
2020 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
G 
0.00 
0.47 
0.15 
0.10 
0.00 
0.32 
0.18 
0.00 
0.00 
F 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.09 
0.15 
0.00 
0.00 
0.09 
0.05 
A 
0.16 
0.38 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.43 
0.00 
0.01 
L 
0.16 
0.37 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.34 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IB 
0.00 
0.32 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
N 
0.32 
0.00 
0.00 
0.34 
0.00 
0 
0.18 
0.00 
0.43 
0.00 
0.00 
UK 
0.00 
0.09 
0.00 
0 0 0 
0.00 
IT 
0.00 
005 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
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A8. TPA 
Table A8.1. TPA power generation forecasts for Europe 
Power generation by fuel in TWh 
Germany 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
99 
117 
3 
15 
144 
19 
397 
2000 
111 
134 
0 
39 
145 
20 
450 
2005 
133 
138 
0 
70 
145 
21 
507 
2010 
149 
140 
0 
93 
145 
21 
549 
2015 
152 
122 
0 
141 
145 
22 
581 
2020 
224 
87 
0 
158 
145 
23 
637 
Power generation by fuel in per cent (sum off gures may not total 100 due to rounding) 
Germany 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
25 
30 
1 
4 
36 
5 
100 
2000 
25 
30 
0 
9 
32 
4 
100 
2005 
26 
27 
0 
14 
29 
4 
100 
2010 
27 
26 
0 
17 
26 
4 
100 
2015 
26 
21 
0 
24 
25 
4 
100 
2020 
35 
14 
0 
25 
23 
4 
100 
Power generation by fuel in TWh 
France 
HC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
20 
4 
7 
350 
72 
453 
2000 
27 
0 
5 
405 
96 
533 
2005 
32 
0 
3 
406 
97 
537 
2010 
32 
0 
16 
409 
95 
551 
2015 
34 
0 
17 
404 
93 
548 
2020 
27 
0 
18 
416 
92 
553 
Power generation by fuel in per cent (sum of figures may not total 100 due to rounding) 
France 
HC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
4 
1 
2 
77 
16 
100 
2000 
5 
0 
1 
76 
18 
100 
2005 
6 
0 
1 
76 
18 
100 
2010 
6 
0 
3 
74 
17 
100 
2015 
6 
0 
3 
74 
17 
100 
2020 
5 
0 
3 
75 
17 
100 
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Table A8.1. TPA power generation forecasts for Europe (continued) 
Power generation by fuel in TWh 
Benelux 
HC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
37 
1 
57 
43 
2 
140 
2000 
71 
0 
36 
44 
2 
153 
2005 
60 
0 
45 
44 
2 
151 
2010 
59 
0 
55 
44 
2 
160 
2015 
53 
0 
82 
43 
2 
181 
2020 
44 
0 
86 
43 
2 
175 
Power generation by fuel in per cent (sum of figures may not total 100 due to rounding) 
Benelux 
HC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
27 
1 
40 
31 
I 
100 
2000 
46 
0 
24 
28 
1 
100 
2005 
40 
0 
30 
29 
1 
100 
2010 
37 
0 
35 
27 
1 
100 
2015 
29 
0 
45 
24 
1 
100 
2020 
25 
0 
49 
25 
1 
100 
Power generation by fuel in TWh 
Austria/Switzerland 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
4 
1 
2 
7 
22 
74 
110 
2000 
4 
1 
0 
0 
22 
71 
98 
2005 
8 
2 
0 
5 
22 
71 
107 
2010 
9 
2 
0 
5 
22 
78 
115 
2015 
7 
2 
0 
5 
22 
82 
117 
2020 
7 
1 
0 
5 
22 
88 
122 
Power generation by fuel in per cent (sum of figures may not total 100 due to rounding) 
Austria/Switzerland 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
4 
1 
2 
6 
20 
67 
100 
2000 
4 
1 
0 
0 
22 
72 
100 
2005 
7 
1 
0 
4 
20 
67 
100 
2010 
8 
2 
0 
4 
19 
67 
100 
2015 
6 
1 
0 
4 
18 
70 
100 
2020 
5 
1 
0 
4 
18 
72 
100 
Power generation by fuel in TWh 
Portugal/Spain 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
56 
12 
10 
0 
53 
31 
162 
2000 
56 
13 
2 
0 
56 
42 
170 
2005 
64 
13 
3 
8 
56 
42 
186 
2010 
66 
13 
0 
31 
56 
43 
208 
2015 
72 
1 
0 
61 
56 
45 
234 
2020 
39 
1 
0 
108 
56 
46 
250 
Power generation by fuel in per cent (sum of figures may not total 100 due to 
Portugal/Spain 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
35 
7 
6 
0 
33 
19 
100 
2000 
33 
8 
1 
0 
33 
25 
100 
2005 
34 
7 
1 
5 
30 
23 
100 
2010 
32 
6 
0 
15 
27 
21 
100 
rounding) 
2015 
31 
0 
0 
26 
24 
19 
100 
2020 
16 
0 
0 
43 
22 
18 
100 
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Table A8.2. TPA power capacity forecasts for Europe 
German capacity development |MW| 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
23328 
20139 
5435 
10448 
22507 
8250 
90106 
2000 
19401 
20858 
2174 
12544 
20866 
8607 
84450 
2005 
20351 
22538 
1441 
18804 
20866 
8817 
92817 
2010 
20752 
22538 
544 
25546 
20866 
9171 
99417 
2015 
20861 
17182 
310 
35522 
20866 
9524 
104265 
2020 
29976 
11681 
285 
42604 
20866 
9878 
115290 
French capacity developmenl 
. HC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1992 (act.) 
11840 
6262 
1699 
57675 
24996 
102472 
[MW| 
2000 
9973 
3323 
3915 
64795 
24636 
106642 
2005 
8081 
2796 
4972 
64795 
24636 
105280 
2010 
5113 
841 
14366 
64795 
25343 
110458 
2015 
5113 
685 
14528 
64022 
26050 
110398 
2020 
4003 
685 
14697 
66157 
26757 
112299 
Austrian/Swiss capacity development [MW] 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1992 (act.) 
1517 
460 
3649 
570 
2950 
22826 
31972 
2000 
2226 
742 
692 
2492 
2868 
24116 
33136 
2005 
2226 
742 
692 
4927 
2868 
24629 
36084 
2010 
1420 
742 
650 
5617 
2868 
26004 
37301 
2015 
994 
605 
619 
5927 
2868 
27378 
38391 
2020 
994 
275 
574 
6267 
2868 
28753 
39731 
Benelux capac 
HC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
ity development [MW] 
1992 (act.) 
7536 
1112 
11587 
5990 
2562 
28787 
2000 
10255 
574 
11112 
5785 
2393 
30119 
2005 
8467 
574 
14321 
5785 
2393 
31540 
2010 
8275 
574 
18070 
5785 
2393 
35097 
2015 
7408 
574 
24563 
5785 
2393 
40723 
2020 
6161 
414 
24730 
5785 
2393 
39483 
Iberian capaci 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
ty developmen 
1994 (act.) 
9152 
1800 
7886 
3902 
7400 
20324 
52064 
t [MW] 
2000 
9955 
2150 
6858 
2775 
7400 
20937 
50075 
2005 
10860 
2150 
5083 
5235 
7400 
20937 
51665 
2010 
10102 
1830 
1680 
10848 
7400 
21832 
53692 
2015 
10043 
134 
100 
17154 
7400 
22729 
57560 
2020 
5505 
134 
0 
22628 
7400 
23624 
59291 
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Table A8.3. TPA forecasts for European net imports 
Net-power imports 199.3 (net imports + net exports); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Ost-E. 
UK 
I 
Import 
D 
0 
-13.362 
3.554 
1.3.841 
0 
-2.88 
-0.826 
0 
0 
F 
13.362 
0 
8.912 
2.768 
1.570 
0 
0 
16.759 
17.279 
A/CH 
-3.554 
-8.912 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-2.495 
0 
21.201 
Benelux 
-13.841 
-2.768 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
IB 
0 
-1.570 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Scand. 
2.88 
0 
0 
0 
Ost-E. 
0.826 
0 
2.495 
0 
UK 
0 
-16.759 
0 
0 
I 
0 
-17.279 
-21.201 
0 
Net-power imports 1995 (nel imports + net exports); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Ost-E. 
UK 
I 
Import 
D 
0 
-44.958 
-14.297 
-3.822 
0 
-6.5 
-0.559 
0 
0 
F 
44.958 
0 
26.624 
22.331 
18.189 
0 
0 
14.282 
12.624 
A/CH 
14.297 
-26.624 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-2.192 
0 
15.637 
Benelux 
3.822 
-22.331 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
IB 
0 
-18.189 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Scand. 
6.5 
0 
0 
0 
Ost-E. 
0.559 
0 
2.192 
0 
UK 
0 
-14.282 
0 
0 
I 
0 
-12.624 
-15.637 
0 
Net-power imports 2000 (net imports + net exports): TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Ost-E. 
UK 
I 
Import 
D 
0 
-48.772 
-15.325 
-24.253 
0 
-3.425 
-1.64 
0 
0 
F 
48.772 
0 
38.709 
30.314 
9.183 
0 
0 
13.882 
9.800 
A/CH 
15.325 
-38.709 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-2.692 
0 
11.967 
Benelux 
24.253 
-30.314 
0 
0 
0 
1.7.31 
0 
0 
0 
IB 
0 
-9,183 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Scand. 
3.425 
0 
0 
-1.731 
Ost-E. 
1.64 
0 
2.692 
0 
UK 
0 
-13.882 
0 
0 
1 
0 
-9.800 
-11.967 
0 
Net-power imports 2005 (net imports + net exports-); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Ost-E. 
UK 
I 
Import 
D 
0 
-45.901 
-18.452 
-5.463 
0 
-4.451 
-3.359 
0 
0 
F 
45.901 
0 
30.512 
23.587 
9.520 
0 
0 
13.782 
3.078 
A/CH 
18.452 
-30.512 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-3.697 
0 
3.042 
Benelux 
5.463 
-23.587 
0 
0 
0 
1.662 
0 
0 
0 
IB 
0 
-9.520 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Scand. 
4.451 
0 
0 
-1.662 
Ost-E. 
3.359 
0 
3.697 
0 
UK 
0 
-13.782 
0 
0 
I 
0 
-3.078 
-3.042 
0 
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Table A8.3. TPA forecasts for European net imports (continued) 
Net-power imports 2010 (net imports + net exports-); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Osl-E. 
UK 
I 
Import 
D 
0 
-44.282 
-16.973 
-1.65 
0 
-3.771 
-3.781 
0 
0 
F 
44.282 
0 
22.564 
19.717 
8.701 
0 
0 
13.682 
1.498 
A/CH 
16.973 
-22.564 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-4.676 
0 
1.014 
Benelux 
1.65 
-19.717 
0 
0 
0 
1.581 
0 
0 
0 
IB 
0 
-8.701 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Scand. 
3.771 
0 
0 
-1.581 
Ost-E. 
3.781 
0 
4.676 
0 
UK 
0 
-13.682 
0 
0 
I 
0 
-1.498 
-1.014 
0 
Net-power imports 2015 (net imports + nel exports); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Ost-E. 
UK 
I 
Import 
D 
0 
-36.111 
-12.159 
-6.564 
0 
-3.817 
-4.406 
0 
0 
F 
36.111 
0 
21.618 
9.712 
1.986 
0 
0 
13.582 
0.718 
A/CH 
12.159 
-21.618 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-3.911 
0 
1.794 
Benelux 
6.564 
-9.712 
0 
0 
0 
1.487 
0 
0 
0 
IB 
0 
-1.986 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Scand. 
3.817 
0 
0 
-1.487 
Ost-E. 
4.406 
0 
3.911 
0 
UK 
0 
-13.582 
0 
0 
I 
0 
-0.718 
-1.794 
0 
Net-power imports 2020 (net imports + net exports); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Ost-E. 
UK 
I 
Import 
D 
0 
-21.418 
-2.655 
0.107 
0 
-3.86 
-3.409 
0 
0 
F 
21.418 
0 
9.905 
11.182 
2.644 
0 
0 
13.582 
0.718 
A/CH 
2.655 
-9.905 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-4.996 
0 
1.794 
Benelux 
-0.107 
-11.182 
0 
0 
0 
1.382 
0 
0 
0 
IB 
0 
-2.644 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Scand. 
3.86 
0 
0 
-1.382 
Ost-E. 
3.409 
0 
4.996 
0 
UK 
0 
-13.582 
0 
0 
I 
0 
-0.718 
-1.794 
0 
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Table A8.4. EWI: full competition DATA TPA 
Transmission capacity additions 
Germany 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
1995 
0 
5000 
0 
0 
0 
1200 
0 
0 
0 
2000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2005 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1326.17 
318.8 
0 
0 
2010 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
28.81 
0 
0 
2015 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
37.04 
0 
0 
2020 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
6.17 
0 
0 
France 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
1995 
0 
0 
4214.25 
5000 
1479.34 
0 
0 
42.01 
0 
Austria and Switzerland 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
0 
UK. 
IT 
Benelux 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
Iberia 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
1995 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
600 
0 
378.66 
1995 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1995 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
855.61 
0 
0 
0 
2000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2005 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
25.5 
0 
2005 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
667.43 
0 
0 
2005 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2005 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2010 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
55.34 
0 
2010 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2010 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2010 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2015 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
10.41 
0 
2015 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2015 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2015 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2020 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2020 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2020 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2020 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Appendix A8: TPA 185 
Table A8.4. 
EWI-VH 
Germany 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
EWI: full competition DATA TPA (continued) 
: full competition DATA TPA 
1993 (1st) 
0 
6375 
18935 
10104 
0 
2235 
5100 
0 
0 
1995 
0 
11375 
18935 
10104 
0 
3435 
5100 
0 
0 
2000 
0 
11375 
18935 
10104 
0 
3435 
5100 
0 
0 
2005 
0 
11375 
18935 
10104 
0 
4761 
5419 
0 
0 
2010 
0 
11375 
18935 
10104 
0 
4761 
5448 
0 
0 
2015 
0 
11375 
18935 
10104 
0 
4761 
5485 
0 
0 
2020 
0 
11375 
18935 
10104 
0 
4761 
5491 
0 
0 
France 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
1993 (1st) 
6375 
0 
5335 
3335 
3429 
0 
0 
2000 
4290 
1995 
6375 
0 
9549 
8335 
4908 
0 
0 
2042 
4290 
2000 
6375 
0 
9549 
8335 
4908 
0 
0 
2042 
4290 
2005 
6375 
0 
9549 
8335 
4908 
0 
0 
2068 
4290 
2010 
6375 
0 
9549 
8335 
4908 
0 
0 
2123 
4290 
2015 
6375 
0 
9549 
8335 
4908 
0 
0 
2133 
4290 
2020 
6375 
0 
9549 
8335 
4908 
0 
0 
2133 
4290 
Austria and Switzerland 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
1993 (1st) 
18935 
5335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2104 
0 
3982 
1995 
18935 
5335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2704 
0 
4361 
2000 
18935 
5335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2704 
0 
4361 
2005 
18935 
5335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3371 
0 
4361 
2010 
18935 
5335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3371 
0 
4361 
2015 
18935 
5335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3371 
0 
4361 
2020 
18935 
5335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3371 
0 
4361 
Benelux 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
1993 (1st) 
10104 
3335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1995 
10104 
3335 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2000 
10104 
3335 
0 
0 
0 
856 
0 
0 
0 
2005 
10104 
3335 
0 
0 
0 
856 
0 
0 
0 
2010 
10104 
3335 
0 
0 
0 
856 
0 
0 
0 
2015 
10104 
3335 
0 
0 
0 
856 
0 
0 
0 
2020 
10104 
3335 
0 
0 
0 
856 
0 
0 
0 
Iberia 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
0 
UK 
IT 
1993 (1st) 
0 
3429 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1995 
0 
3429 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2000 
0 
3429 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2005 
0 
3429 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2010 
0 
3429 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2015 
0 
3429 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2020 
0 
3429 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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Table A8.5. Capacity utilization of generation plant per hour by year 
TPA 
Germany 
HC 
HCGUD 
HCGAS 
BC 
OIL 
GASGUD 
GASTUR 
NUC 
1995 
4489 
0 
0 
5847 
0 
0 
351 
6950 
2000 
5745 
0 
0 
6427 
0 
7530 
339 
6950 
2005 
6523 
0 
6762 
6120 
0 
5899 
254 
6949 
2010 
7103 
7617 
6762 
6232 
0 
4411 
226 
6946 
2015 
7159 
7617 
6762 
7092 
0 
4548 
211 
6937 
2020 
7148 
7617 
6762 
7437 
0 
4183 
0 
6933 
France 
HC 
HCGUD 
HCGAS 
OIL 
GASGUD 
GASTUR 
1995 
1884 
0 
6028 
0 
0 
6270 
2000 
2656 
0 
0 
0 
3568 
6246 
2005 
3915 
0 
0 
0 
1541 
6269 
2010 
6365 
0 
0 
0 
1383 
6305 
2015 
6796 
0 
0 
0 
1483 
6306 
2020 
6984 
0 
0 
0 
1569 
6294 
Austrian/Swiss 
HC 
HCGUD 
HCGAS 
BC 
OIL 
GASGUD 
GASTUR 
1995 
1946 
0 
0 
5027 
0 
0 
7530 
2000 
1697 
0 
0 
1892 
0 
0 
7530 
2005 
3529 
0 
0 
2113 
0 
2147 
7524 
2010 
6510 
0 
0 
2991 
0 
1858 
7518 
2015 
7179 
0 
0 
2583 
0 
1856 
7513 
2020 
6490 
0 
0 
5089 
0 
1856 
7513 
Benelux 
HC 
HCGUD 
HCGAS 
OIL 
GASGUD 
GASTUR 
1995 
6517 
0 
7442 
0 
7756 
7530 
2000 
6929 
0 
7442 
0 
7530 
7530 
2005 
7147 
0 
5272 
0 
5567 
7530 
2010 
7171 
0 
6028 
0 
4349 
7522 
2015 
7171 
0 
6028 
0 
4411 
7519 
2020 
7166 
0 
6027 
0 
4707 
7515 
Iberian 
HC 
HCGUD 
HCGAS 
BC 
OIL 
GASGUD 
GASTUR 
1995 
3519 
0 
0 
6752 
0 
0 
7530 
2000 
5662 
0 
0 
6243 
337 
0 
7530 
2005 
5890 
0 
0 
6048 
535 
4251 
7529 
2010 
6517 
0 
0 
7113 
0 
4231 
7527 
2015 
7158 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4633 
7530 
2020 
7157 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5947 
7504 
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Table A8.6. TPA share of new technologies 
New technologies: GTCC and IGCC 
German capacity development of new technologies [MW| 
N e w Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
6497 
80971 
87468 
2000 
9095 
75355 
84450 
2005 
15421 
77396 
92817 
2010 
25896 
73521 
99417 
2015 
37690 
66575 
104265 
2020 
59548 
55742 
115290 
German capacity development of new technologies [%] 
N e w Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Surrj 
1995 
7.43 
92.57 
100 
2000 
10.77 
89.23 
100 
2005 
16.61 
83.39 
100 
2010 
26.05 
73.95 
100 
2015 
36.15 
63.85 
100 
2020 
51.65 
48.35 
100 
French capacity development of new technologies [MW] 
N e w Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
657 
105844 
106501 
2000 
2000 
104642 
106642 
2005 
2095 
103185 
105280 
2010 
11335 
99123 
110458 
2015 
11335 
99063 
110398 
2020 
11335 
100964 
112299 
French capacity development of new technologies [%] 
N e w Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
0.62 
99.38 
100 
2000 
1.88 
98.12 
100 
2005 
1.99 
98.01 
100 
2010 
10.26 
89.74 
100 
2015 
10.27 
89.73 
100 
2020 
10.09 
89.91 
100 
Austrian/Swiss capacity development of new technologies [MW| 
N e w Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
0 
32404 
32404 
2000 
152 
32984 
33136 
2005 
2112 
33972 
36084 
2010 
2520 
34781 
37301 
2015 
2578 
35813 
38391 
2020 
2578 
37153 
39731 
Austrian/Swiss capacity development of new technologies [%| 
N e w Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
0.00 
100.00 
100 
2000 
0.46 
99.54 
100 
2005 
5.85 
94.15 
100 
2010 
6.76 
93.24 
100 
2015 
6.72 
93.28 
100 
2020 
6.49 
93.51 
100 
Single energy market 
Table A8.6. TPA share of new technologies (continued) 
Benelux capacity development of new technologies [MW] 
New Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
9327 
20608 
29935 
2000 
7512 
22607 
30119 
2005 
9543 
21997 
31540 
2010 
12790 
22307 
35097 
2015 
18730 
21993 
40723 
2020 
18288 
21195 
39483 
Benelux capacity development of new technologies |%] 
New Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
31.16 
68.84 
100 
2000 
24.94 
75.06 
100 
2005 
30.26 
69.74 
100 
2010 
36.44 
63.56 
100 
2015 
45.99 
54.01 
100 
2020 
46.32 
53.68 
100 
Iberian capacity development of new technologies [MW| 
New Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
0 
50975 
50975 
2000 
0 
50075 
50075 
2005 
1905 
49760 
51665 
2010 
7185 
46507 
53692 
2015 
13125 
44435 
57560 
2020 
18196 
41095 
59291 
Iberian capacity development of new technologies [%] 
New Tech. 
Conv.Tech. 
Sum 
1995 
0.00 
100.00 
100 
2000 
0.00 
100.00 
100 
2005 
3.69 
96.31 
100 
2010 
13.38 
86.62 
100 
2015 
22.80 
77.20 
100 
2020 
30.69 
69.31 
100 
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Table A8.7. TPA grid utilization 
Grid-utilization: actual flows [TWh]/maximum flow capacity [TWh] 
CAPR-vh = TPA 
1994 (act.) 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
G 
0.00 
0.54 
0,13 
0.03 
0.00 
0.20 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
F 
0.00 
0.00 
0,03 
0.10 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
Λ 
0,13 
0.33 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.34 
0.00 
0.00 
L 
0.38 
0.32 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IB 
0.00 
0.25 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Ν 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
o 
0.02 
0.00 
0.34 
0.00 
0.00 
UK 
0.00 
0 0 0 
0.00 
000 
0.00 
IT 
0,00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
G . 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
G 
0.00 
0.90 
0.22 
0.18 
0.00 
0.29 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
F 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.06 
0.03 
A 
0.04 
0.64 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.27 
0.00 
0.00 
L 
0.10 
0.62 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IB 
0.00 
0.86 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
N 
0.29 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0 
0.05 
0.00 
0.27 
0.00 
0.00 
UK 
0.00 
0.06 
0.00 
0 00 
0.00 
IT 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
G 
0.00 
0.98 
0.26 
0.66 
0.00 
0.29 
0.10 
0.00 
0.00 
F 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
0.08 
0.02 
A 
0.08 
0.93 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.31 
0.00 
0.01 
L 
0.11 
0.84 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.30 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IB 
0.00 
0.47 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
N 
0.29 
0.00 
0.00 
0.30 
0.00 
0 
0.10 
0.00 
0.31 
0.00 
0.00 
υ κ 
0.00 
0.08 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IT 
0.00 
0.02 
0,01 
0.00 
0.00 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
G 
0.00 
0.92 
0.28 
0.24 
0.00 
0.29 
0.17 
0.00 
0.00 
F 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.08 
0.01 
A 
0.06 
0.73 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.33 
0.00 
0.04 
L 
0.12 
0.66 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.31 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
IB 
0.00 
0.51 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
N 
0.29 
0.00 
0.00 
0,31 
0.00 
0 
0.17 
0.00 
0.33 
0.00 
0.00 
UK 
0.00 
008 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IT 
0.00 
0.01 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
G 
0.00 
0.89 
0.26 
0.17 
0.00 
0.32 
0.19 
0.00 
0.00 
F 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.09 
0.01 
A 
0.06 
0.54 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.40 
0.00 
0.05 
L 
0.13 
0.56 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.32 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IB 
0.00 
0.43 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
N 
0.32 
0.00 
0.00 
0.32 
0.00 
0 
0.19 
0.00 
0.40 
0.00 
0.00 
UK 
0.00 
0.09 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IT 
0.00 
0.01 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
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Table A8.7. TPA grid utilization (continued) 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
G 
0.00 
0.72 
0.22 
0.30 
0.00 
0.32 
0.22 
0.00 
0.00 
F 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0,09 
0.05 
A 
0.07 
0.52 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.35 
0.00 
0.01 
L 
0.15 
0.32 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.33 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IB 
0.00 
0.29 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
N 
0.32 
0.00 
0,00 
0.33 
0.00 
0 
0.22 
0.00 
0.35 
0.00 
0.00 
UK 
0.00 
0.09 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IT 
0.00 
0.05 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
G 
F 
A 
L 
IB 
N 
O 
UK 
IT 
G 
0.00 
0.43 
0.16 
0.18 
0.00 
0.32 
0.18 
0.00 
0.00 
F 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.05 
0.14 
0.00 
0.00 
0.09 
0.05 
A 
0.13 
0.28 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.43 
0.00 
0.01 
L 
0.18 
0.35 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.34 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IB 
0.00 
0,26 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
N 
0.32 
0.00 
0.00 
0.34 
0.00 
0 
0.18 
0.00 
0.43 
0.00 
0.00 
UK 
0.00 
0.09 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
IT 
0.00 
0,05 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
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A9. High gas demand 
Table A9.1. Power generation forecasts under high gas demand 
Power generation by fuel in TWh: high gas case 
Germany 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
99 
117 
3 
15 
144 
19 
397 
2000 
103 
134 
0 
42 
145 
20 
444 
2005 
105 
131 
0 
95 
145 
21 
497 
2010 
132 
78 
0 
133 
145 
21 
510 
2015 
119 
35 
0 
200 
145 
22 
521 
2020 
93 
5 
0 
269 
145 
23 
535 
Power generation by fuel in per cent (sum of figures may not total 100 due to rounding) 
Germany 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
25 
30 
1 
4 
36 
5 
100 
2000 
23 
30 
0 
10 
33 
4 
100 
2005 
21 
26 
0 
19 
29 
4 
100 
2010 
26 
15 
0 
26 
28 
4 
100 
2015 
23 
7 
0 
38 
28 
4 
100 
2020 
17 
1 
0 
50 
27 
4 
100 
Power generation by fuel in T W h 
France 
HC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
20 
4 
7 
350 
72 
453 
2000 
23 
0 
10 
405 
96 
535 
2005 
18 
0 
26 
407 
96 
548 
2010 
24 
0 
54 
409 
95 
582 
2015 
25 
0 
76 
404 
93 
598 
2020 
21 
0 
77 
416 
92 
606 
Power generation by fuel in per cent (sum of figures may not total 100 due to rounding) 
France 
HC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
4 
1 
2 
77 
16 
100 
2000 
4 
0 
2 
76 
18 
100 
2005 
3 
0 
5 
74 
18 
100 
2010 
4 
0 
9 
70 
16 
100 
2015 
4 
0 
13 
68 
16 
100 
2020 
3 
0 
13 
69 
15 
100 
Power generation by fuel in TWh 
Benelux 
HC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
37 
1 
57 
43 
2 
140 
2000 
59 
0 
56 
44 
2 
161 
2005 
50 
0 
66 
44 
2 
161 
2010 
56 
0 
84 
44 
2 
185 
2015 
49 
0 
119 
43 
2 
214 
2020 
37 
0 
160 
43 
2 
243 
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Table A9.1. Power generation forecasts under high gas demand (continued) 
Power generation by fuel in per cent (sum of figures may not total 100 due to rounding) 
Benelux 
HC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
27 
1 
40 
31 
1 
100 
2000 
37 
0 
35 
27 
1 
100 
2005 
31 
0 
41 
27 
1 
100 
2010 
30 
0 
45 
24 
1 
100 
2015 
23 
0 
56 
20 
1 
100 
2020 
15 
0 
66 
18 
1 
100 
Power generation by fuel in TWh 
Austria/Switzerland 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
4 
1 
2 
7 
22 
74 
110 
2000 
2 
1 
0 
1 
22 
70 
96 
2005 
6 
1 
0 
0 
22 
71 
100 
2010 
7 
1 
0 
3 
22 
77 
109 
2015 
5 
1 
0 
1 
22 
82 
110 
2020 
5 
0 
0 
1 
22 
86 
114 
Power generation by fuel in per cent (sum of figures may not total 100 due to rounding) 
Austria/Switzerland 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
4 
1 
2 
6 
20 
67 
100 
2000 
2 
1 
0 
1 
23 
73 
100 
2005 
6 
1 
0 
0 
22 
71 
100 
2010 
6 
1 
0 
3 
20 
71 
100 
2015 
4 
1 
0 
I 
20 
74 
100 
2020 
4 
0 
0 
1 
19 
76 
100 
Power generation by fuel in TWh 
Portugal/Spain 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
56 
12 
10 
0 
53 
31 
162 
2000 
56 
14 
0 
1 
56 
42 
168 
2005 
61 
13 
1 
9 
56 
42 
182 
2010 
56 
7 
0 
38 
56 
43 
200 
2015 
50 
1 
0 
70 
56 
45 
221 
2020 
39 
0 
0 
100 
56 
46 
241 
Power generation by fuel in per cent (sum of figures may not total 100 due to rounding) 
Portugal/Spain 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
35 
7 
6 
0 
33 
19 
100 
2000 
33 
8 
0 
0 
33 
25 
100 
2005 
34 
7 
0 
5 
31 
23 
100 
2010 
28 
3 
0 
19 
28 
22 
100 
2015 
23 
0 
0 
32. 
25 
20 
100 
2020 
16 
0 
0 
41 
23 
19 
100 
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Table A9.2. Power capacity forecasts under high gas demand 
German capacity development [MW| 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1993 (act.) 
23328 
20139 
5435 
10448 
22507 
8250 
90106 
2000 
19401 
20858 
2174 
12544 
20866 
8607 
84450 
2005 
2035 t 
22538 
1441 
18804 
20866 
8817 
92817 
2010 
18871 
22538 
544 
25546 
20866 
9171 
97536 
2015 
16935 
17182 
310 
35522 
20866 
9524 
100339 
2020 
12830 
11681 
285 
46321 
20866 
9878 
101861 
French capacity developmenl 
-HC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1992 (act.) 
11840 
6262 
1699 
57675 
24996 
102472 
[MW] 
2000 
9973 
3323 
3915 
64795 
24636 
106642 
2005 
8081 
2796 
7079 
64795 
24636 
107387 
2010 
5113 
841 
16473 
64795 
25343 
112565 
2015 
5113 
685 
19225 
64022 
26050 
115095 
2020 
4003 
685 
21168 
66157 
26757 
118770 
Austrian/Swiss capacity development [MW| 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1992 (act.) 
1517 
460 
3649 
570 
2950 
22826 
31972 
2000 
2226 
742 
692 
2492 
2868 
24116 
33136 
2005 
2226 
742 
692 
2967 
2868 
24629 
34124 
2010 
1420 
742 
650 
5617 
2868 
26004 
37301 
2015 
994 
605 
619 
5927 
2868 
27378 
38391 
2020 
994 
275 
574 
6267 
2868 
28753 
39731 
Benelux capac 
HC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
ity developmer 
1992 (act.) 
7536 
1112 
11587 
5990 
2562 
28787 
t [MW] 
2000 
8467 
574 
12914 
5785 
2393 
30133 
2005 
8467 
574 
14321 
5785 
2393 
31540 
2010 
8275 
574 
18070 
5785 
2393 
35097 
2015 
7408 
574 
24563 
5785 
2393 
40723 
2020 
6161 
414 
31330 
5785 
2393 
46083 
Iberian capacity development [MW] 
HC 
BC 
OIL 
GAS 
NUC 
HYDRO 
Sum 
1994 (act.) 
9152 
1800 
7886 
3902 
7400 
20324 
52064 
2000 
10465 
2122 
6858 
2775 
7400 
20937 
50557 
2005 
11370 
2122 
5083 
4697 
7400 
20937 
51610 
2010 
10452 
1990 
1680 
10310 
7400 
21832 
53664 
2015 
10043 
590 
100 
16143 
7400 
22729 
57005 
2020 
5505 
590 
0 
23146 
7400 
23624 
60265 
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Table A9.3. Forecasts for European net imports under high gas demand 
Net-power imports 1994 (net imports+, net exports-); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Ost-E. 
UK 
I 
Import 
D 
0.0 
-14.9 
0.1 
15.6 
0.0 
-2.7 
-0.3 
0.0 
0.0 
F 
14.9 
0.0 
7.1 
3.3 
2.8 
0.0 
0.0 
16.9 
17.1 
A/CH 
-0.1 
-7.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
-2.5 
0.0 
20.6 
Benelux 
-15.6 
-3.3 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
IB 
0.0 
-2.8 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Scand. 
2.7 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Ost-E. 
0.3 
0.0 
2.5 
0.0 
UK 
0.0 
-16.9 
0.0 
0.0 
I 
0.0 
-17.1 
-20.6 
0.0 
Net-power imports 1995 (net imports+, net exports-); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Ost-E. 
UK 
I 
Import 
D 
0.0 
-44.2 
-14.9 
-3.4 
0.0 
-6.5 
-0.8 
0.0 
0.0 
F 
44.2 
0.0 
27.5 
21.7 
19.1 
0.0 
0.0 
14.3 
12.6 
A/CH 
14.9 
-27.5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
-1.9 
0.0 
15.6 
Benelux 
3.4 
-21.7 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
IB 
0.0 
-19.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Scand. 
6.5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Ost-E. 
0.8 
0.0 
1.9 
0.0 
UK 
0.0 
-14.3 
0.0 
0.0 
I 
0.0 
-12.6 
-15.6 
0.0 
Net-power imports 2000 (net imports+, net exports-); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Ost-E. 
UK 
I 
Import 
D 
0.0 
-48.8 
-14.9 
-29.9 
0.0 
-3.5 
-1.6 
0.0 
0.0 
F 
48.8 
0.0 
40.2 
28.4 
11.2 
0.0 
0.0 
13.9 
9.8 
A/CH 
14.9 
-40.2 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
-2.7 
0.0 
12.0 
Benelux 
29.9 
-28.4 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1.8 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
IB 
0.0 
-11.2 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Scand. 
3.5 
0.0 
0.0 
-1.8 
Osl-E. 
16 
0.0 
2.7 
0.0 
UK 
0.0 
-13.9 
0.0 
0.0 
I 
0.0 
-9.8 
-12.0 
0.0 
Net-power imports 2005 (net imports+, net exports-); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Ost-E. 
UK 
1 
Import 
D 
0.0 
-47.7 
-15.0 
-17.0 
0.0 
-4.5 
-3.4 
0.0 
0.0 
F 
47.7 
0.0 
34.3 
24.8 
13.4 
0.0 
0.0 
13.8 
2.4 
A/CH 
15.0 
-34.3 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
-3.7 
0.0 
3.7 
Benelux 
17.0 
-24.8 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1,7 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
IB 
0.0 
-13.4 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Scand. 
4.5 
0.0 
0.0 
-1.7 
Ost-E. 
3.4 
0.0 
3.7 
0.0 
UK 
0.0 
-13.8 
0.0 
0.0 
I 
0.0 
-2.4 
-3.7 
0.0 
Appendix A9: High gas demand 195 
Table A9.3. Forecasts for European net imports under high gas demand (continued) 
Net-power imports 2010 (net imports+, net exports-); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Ost-E. 
UK 
1 
Import 
D 
0.0 
-48.8 
-22.0 
-30.3 
0.0 
-3.8 
-4,7 
0.0 
0.0 
F 
48.8 
0.0 
35.7 
24.2 
175 
0.0 
0.0 
13.7 
0.7 
A/CH 
22.0 
-35.7 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
-3.8 
0.0 
1.8 
Benelux 
30.3 
-24.2 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1.6 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
IB 
0.0 
-17.5 
0.0 
0.0 
0,0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Scand. 
3.8 
0.0 
0.0 
-1.6 
Ost-E. 
4.7 
0.0 
3.8 
0.0 
UK 
0.0 
-13.7 
0.0 
0.0 
I 
0.0 
-0.7 
-1.8 
0.0 
Net-power imports 2015 (net imports*, net exports-); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Ost-E. 
UK 
I 
Import 
D 
0.0 
-48.8 
-22.5 
-43.4 
0.0 
-3.8 
-4.4 
0.0 
0.0 
F 
48.8 
0.0 
39.5 
14.3 
15.4 
0.0 
0.0 
13.6 
0.7 
A/CH 
22.5 
-39.5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
-3.9 
0.0 
1.8 
Benelux 
43.4 
-14.3 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1.5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
IB 
0.0 
-15.4 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Scand. 
3.8 
0.0 
0.0 
-1.5 
Ost-E. 
4.4 
0.0 
3.9 
0.0 
UK 
0.0 
-13.6 
0.0 
0.0 
I 
0.0 
-0.7 
-1.8 
0.0 
Net-power imports 2020 (net ¡mports+, net exports-); TWh 
Export 
D 
F 
A/CH 
Benelux 
IB 
Scand. 
Ost-E. 
UK 
I 
Import 
D 
0.0 
-48.8 
-18.0 
-57.3 
0.0 
-3.9 
-4.4 
0.0 
0.0 
F 
48.8 
0.0 
34.0 
2.2 
11.7 
0.0 
0.0 
13.6 
0.7 
A/CH 
18.0 
-34.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
-4.0 
0.0 
1.8 
Benelux 
57.3 
-2.2 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1.4 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
IB 
0.0 
-11.7 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Scand. 
3.9 
0.0 
0.0 
-1.4 
Osl-E. 
4.4 
0.0 
4.0 
0.0 
UK 
0.0 
-13.6 
0.0 
0.0 
I 
0.0 
-0.7 
-1.8 
0.0 
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AlO.Transmission capacities 
Figure AlO.l. Capacities of back-to-back stations between core and satellite regions 
in 1995 [MW] 
SCAN. 
EAST 
ITALY 
Core regions 
Satellite regions 
Initial capacity 1993 (actual value) 
Base case 
Increased competition 
Full competition 
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Figure Al 0.2. Capacities of back-to-back stations between core and satellite regions 
in 2000 [MW] 
SCAN. 
IBERIA 
EAST 
ITALY 
Core regions 
Satellite regions 
Initial capacity 1993 (actual value) 
Base case 
Increased competition 
Full competition 
198 Single energy market 
Figure A10.3. Capacities of back-to-back stations between core and satellite regions 
in 2010 [MW] 
SCAN. 
EAST 
ITALY 
Core regions 
Satellite regions 
Initial capacity 1993 (actual value) 
Base case 
Increased competition 
Full competition 
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Figure A10.4. Capacities of back-to-back stations between core and satellite regions 
in 2020 [MW] 
EAST 
ITALY 
Core regions 
Satellite regions 
Initial capacity 1993 (actual value) 
Base case 
Increased competition 
Full competition 
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All . Midas results 
Tahle Al 1.1. Scenarios 2020: Germany, new conventional wisdom 
Gross production (In GWh) 
Nuclear 
Total solids 
Total liquids 
Total gas 
Hard coal 
Lignite 
Other solids 
Fuel oil 
Diesel oil 
Other liquids 
Natural gas 
Hydrogen 
Derived gases 
Waste 
Biomass 
Biohiels 
Total thermal 
Hydro 
Rcncwables/geothermal 
Total primary production 
Total without pumping 
Pumping 
Fuel consumption (in ktoe) 
Nuclear 
Total solids 
Total liquids 
Total gas 
Hard coal 
Lignite 
Other solids 
Fuel oil 
Diesel oil 
Other liquids 
Natural gas 
Hydrogen 
Derived gases 
Waste 
Btomass 
Biofuels 
1992 1995 
Summary 
2000 
electricity balance 
2005 2010 2015 2020 
158775 
137914 
153152 
2835 
293901 
7817 
3563 
176 
11556 
32973 
0 
8413 
41387 
1042 
4256 
0 
352142 
17265 
88 
17353 
528270 
5200 
159779 
126950 
114236 
2085 
243270 
17473 
4312 
225 
22010 
88257 
0 
8751 
97008 
1478 
4187 
0 
367953 
17614 
348 
17963 
545695 
4701 
159779 
186508 
118016 
1888 
306413 
22660 
7308 
291 
30259 
79005 
0 
7960 
86966 
2677 
10847 
0 
437162 
17786 
812 
18598 
615539 
5421 
156691 
206275 
109340 
1856 
317471 
22119 
6235 
288 
28642 
112662 
0 
6817 
119479 
2933 
12424 
0 
480949 
18374 
1477 
19851 
657491 
5421 
139178 
225150 
103791 
2082 
331023 
21167 
4262 
276 
25705 
156684 
0 
5820 
162504 
2946 
14244 
0 
536422 
18670 
1851 
20521 
696121 
5421 
98221 
237698 
100586 
1729 
340012 
11750 
3528 
244 
15522 
227243 
207 
5466 
232917 
2889 
16134 
0 
607474 
18965 
2218 
21183 
726878 
5421 
44653 
247882 
IOI765 
1494 
351141 
6534 
3308 
133 
9975 
289154 
883 
4103 
294140 
5150 
30074 
1 
690481 
19261 
2585 
21846 
756980 
5421 
39000 
31949 
41099 
657 
73705 
2686 
1094 
60 
3841 
7718 
0 
1969 
9688 
241 
983 
0 
40111 
29577 
29009 
486 
59072 
5071 
1210 
65 
6346 
20699 
0 
2052 
22751 
348 
987 
0 
41639 
43480 
27471 
440 
71391 
5168 
1802 
66 
7037 
17306 
0 
1744 
19049 
586 
2374 
0 
40835 
45654 
25518 
411 
71583 
5093 
1542 
66 
6702 
25075 
0 
1517 
26592 
645 
2735 
0 
36271 
43896 
23801 
406 
68103 
4939 
1049 
65 
6052 
32797 
0 
1218 
34015 
650 
3144 
0 
25597 
45222 
22759 
329 
68310 
2761 
866 
57 
3684 
40546 
30 
975 
41552 
638 
3565 
0 
11637 
47618 
22949 
287 
70853 
1581 
768 
32 
2381 
48316 
127 
686 
49128 
1010 
5899 
0 
92/95 
\nnual average*"/. 
95/00 
change 
00/05 05/10 10/15 15/20 
0.21 
-2.72 
-931 
-9 74 
-6.11 
3075 
6 56 
862 
23.96 
38 84 
1 32 
32.84 
12.36 
-0.55 
1.47 
0 67 
58.41 
1.16 
1.09 
-330 
0.00 
8 00 
0 65 
•1 96 
4.72 
534 
1113 
5.28 
6.57 
-2 19 
000 
-1 88 
-2.16 
12.61 
20.97 
0.00 
3.51 
0.19 
18 44 
0.70 
2.44 
2 89 
-0.39 
2 04 
•1 52 
-0 34 
0.71 
-048 
•3 13 
-0 24 
-1.09 
7 36 
0.00 
-3 05 
6.56 
1.84 
2.75 
0.00 
1.93 
065 
1271 
1J1 
1J3 
000 
-2.34 
1 77 
-1 04 
-, -\-> 
0.84 
-0.88 
-733 
-0 82 
-2.14 
6.82 
000 
-3 11 
6.34 
0.09 
2.77 
0.00 
2.21 
032 
462 
0.67 
1.15 
0.00 
-6.73 
1 09 
-0 63 
-3 65 
0.54 
- I I I I 
-3 71 
-245 
-9.60 
7 72 
000 
-1 25 
7.47 
-0J9 
2.52 
0.00 
2.52 
0 31 
3 68 
0.64 
0.87 
000 
-14.59 
0 84 
0 23 
-287 
0.65 
-II 07 
-1 28 
-II 39 
-8.46 
4.94 
33 58 
-5 57 
4.78 
12.26 
13.26 
0.00 
2.59 
031 
3 11 
0.62 
0.81 
0.00 
0.94 
-2 54 
-1096 
-956 
-7.11 
23 60 
3 39 
2 68 
18.22 
38 93 
1 39 
32.92 
13.14 
0.14 
0.75 
801 
-1.08 
-1 95 
3.86 
0 38 
8 30 
0 33 
2.09 
-3 52 
0 00 
-3 21 
-3.49 
10.96 
19.19 
0.00 
-0.39 
0 98 
-1 46 
-1 37 
0.05 
-0 29 
-3 07 
-0 05 
-0.97 
7 70 
0 00 
-2 74 
6.90 
1.95 
2.87 
0.00 
-2.34 
-0 78 
-1 38 
-0 24 
-0.99 
-0 61 
-742 
-0 55 
-2.02 
5 52 
000 
-429 
5.05 
0.15 
2.83 
0.00 
-6.73 
060 
-0 89 
-4 12 
0.06 
-1098 
-3 76 
-2 32 
-9.45 
4 33 
0 00 
-4 35 
4.08 
-0.37 
2.54 
0.00 
-14.59 
1 04 
0.17 
-2 69 
0.73 
•1055 
-2 38 
• 10 88 
-8.36 
3 57 
33 22 
-6 81 
3.41 
9.62 
10.60 
0.00 
% Change 
1990/2020 
-69.65 
78 08 
23 24 
2452 
57.48 
-14 18 
63 57 
-91 34 
-10.74 
704 64 
-55 70 
550.77 
7.09 
143.00 
21 28 
9653 85 
37.33 
69.27 
120 55 
-67.82 
50 53 
1648 
5 26 
37.29 
-12.09 
23 56 
-91 13 
-14.46 
470 90 
-68 57 
361.54 
-6.53 
■α rv 3 D. 
> 
K) 
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Table ΛΙ1.2. Scenarios 2020: Germany, new conventional wisdom 
Demand (GWh) 
Industrial 
Domestic 
Transports 
Total final demand 
Energy branch consumption 
of which for hydrogen prod. 
Distribution losses 
Total demand 
Electricity exchanges (GWh) 
Imports 
Exports 
Net exports 
Electricity production (GWh) 
Conv. thermal power plants 
Nuclear power plants 
Hydro and other renewables 
Total 
Load (GW) 
Total gross peak demand 
System reserve margin 
LOLP (in hours) 
Demand and exchanges 
1992 
210252 
221588 
14892 
446732 
55985 
0 
20106 
522823 
28285 
33732 
5447 
352142 
158775 
17353 
528270 
81.28 
1.53 
4.03 
1995 
209071 
245575 
15787 
470434 
54203 
0 
21379 
546016 
32321 
32000 
-321 
367953 
159779 
17963 
545695 
85.26 
1.47 
4.28 
2000 
235272 
287610 
17948 
540831 
58708 
0 
24674 
624212 
29674 
21000 
-8674 
437162 
159779 
18598 
615539 
95.96 
1.39 
4.37 
2005 
250172 
309566 
22094 
581832 
60836 
0 
26539 
669207 
29716 
18000 
-11716 
480949 
156691 
19851 
657491 
102.38 
1.32 
4.30 
2010 
262846 
326817 
26997 
616660 
63041 
0 
28127 
707828 
29707 
18000 
-11707 
536422 
139178 
20521 
696121 
108.12 
1.34 
4.34 
2015 
275433 
333300 
32994 
641728 
67066 
4' 
29270 
738064 
27186 
16000 
-11186 
607474 
98221 
21183 
726878 
111 93 
1.27 
3.77 
2020 
290449 
334311 
39911 
664670 
70142 
HO 
30317 
765129 
24149 
16000 
-8149 
690481 
44653 
21846 
756980 
115.29 
1.27 
4.30 
92/95 
-0.19 
3.49 
1.96 
1.74 
-1.07 
2.07 
1.46 
4.55 
-1.74 
-138.93 
1.47 
0.21 
1.16 
1.09 
1.61 
-1.35 
2.07 
\nnual average 
95/00 
2.39 
3.21 
2.60 
2.83 
1.61 
2.91 
2.71 
-1.69 
-8.08 
93.29 
3.51 
0.00 
0.70 
2.44 
2.39 
-1.11 
0.42 
% change 
00/05 
1.24 
1.48 
4.24 
1.47 
0.71 
1.47 
1.40 
0.03 
-3.04 
6.20 
1.93 
-0.39 
1.31 
1.33 
1.30 
-1.06 
-0.31 
05/10 
0.99 
1.09 
4.09 
1.17 
0.71 
1.17 
1.13 
-0.01 
0.00 
-0.01 
2.21 
-2.34 
0.67 
1.15 
1.10 
0.35 
0.19 
10/15 
0.94 
0.39 
4.09 
0.80 
1.25 
0.80 
0.84 
-1.76 
-2.33 
-0.91 
2.52 
-6.73 
0.64 
0.87 
0.69 
-1.09 
-2.79 
15/20 
1.07 
0.06 
3.88 
0.71 
0.90 
11.53 
0.71 
0.72 
-2.34 
0.00 
-6.14 
2.59 
-14.59 
0.62 
0.81 
0.59 
-0.05 
2.63 
% Change 
1992/2020 
1.16 
1.48 
3.58 
1.43 
0.81 
1.48 
1.37 
-0.56 
-2.63 
2.43 
-4.43 
0.83 
1.29 
1.26 
-0.68 
0.23 
New heat from CHP (ktoe) 
Additional demand 
Potential production 
0 
0 
0 0 1011.26078 1819.16625 
0 165.845618 941.52545 1792.51669 
2372.35956 2748.30114 
2350.98576 7389.59127 41.52 
12.46 
13.74 
545 
5.57 
2.99 
25.74 
> 
•a 
Table Al 1.3. Scenarios 2020: Germany, new conventional wisdom 
Electricity generating capacities (GW) 
Nuclear 
Monovalents 
Coal 
Lignite 
Residual fuel Oi 
Natural gas conv 
Nat. Gas comb, cyclt 
Biomass 
Total 
Polyvalents 
With coal 
Without coa 
Small autoproducer: 
Total 
Peak Devices 
New Technologies 
New coa! 
New CHP 
Fuel cell: 
Biomass comb, cyclt 
Fuel oil comb, cycli 
Total 
Total thermal 
Hydro 
Geothermal 
Wind 
Solar 
Total without pumping 
Pumping 
Total 
1992 
22.518 
17.575 
21.218 
6.094 
8.466 
0.000 
0.723 
54.076 
9.478 
0.190 
14.400 
24.068 
6.094 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
106.756 
3.005 
0.000 
0.215 
0.000 
109.976 
6.924 
116.900 
1995 
22.518 
18.139 
20.967 
6.226 
9.553 
0.387 
0.773 
56.045 
9.478 
0.190 
13.154 
22.822 
6.094 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
107.478 
3.043 
0.000 
0.550 
0.000 
111.071 
6.924 
117.995 
2000 
22.518 
24.729 
18.487 
6.274 
10.135 
0.687 
0.898 
61.209 
10.178 
0.095 
11.344 
21.617 
8.374 
0.600 
1.500 
0.000 
0.900 
0.000 
3.000 
116.718 
3.068 
0.000 
0.800 
0.010 
120.596 
7.984 
128.580 
2005 
22.096 
28.079 
14.488 
5.499 
9.925 
0.687 
1.148 
59.826 
8.793 
0.000 
8.846 
17.639 
8.067 
6.200 
3.800 
0 .000 
0 .900 
O.COO 
10.900 
118.528 
3.194 
0.000 
1.050 
0.035 
122.807 
7.984 
130.791 
2010 
19.663 
26.236 
14.041 
4.438 
9.415 
5.187 
1.398 
60.714 
6.211 
0.000 
9.026 
15.237 
7.821 
19.400 
4.750 
0.000 
0.900 
0.000 
25.050 
128.485 
3.244 
0.000 
1.300 
0.060 
133.089 
7.984 
141.073 
2015 
13.906 
23.418 
13.187 
1.260 
4.764 
19.337 
1.648 
63.614 
3.638 
0.000 
9.206 
12.844 
6.379 
22.200 
6.000 
0.300 
0.900 
0.000 
29.400 
126.143 
3.294 
0.000 
1.550 
0.085 
131.072 
7.984 
139.056 
2020 
6.322 
21.167 
13.321 
0.180 
1.965 
28.012 
2.148 
66.793 
1.981 
0.000 
9.252 
11.233 
5.223 
22.200 
14.600 
1.725 
2.525 
0.000 
41.050 
130.621 
3.344 
0.000 
1.800 
0.110 
135.875 
7.984 
143.859 
93/95 
0.000 
0.943 
0.560 
0.132 
1.087 
0.387 
0.050 
3.159 
0.000 
0.000 
0.055 
0.055 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
3.214 
0.038 
0.000 
0.335 
0.000 
3.587 
0.000 
3.587 
96/00 
0.000 
7.085 
2.911 
0.048 
0.582 
0.300 
0.125 
11.051 
0.700 
0.000 
0.000 
0.700 
2.280 
0.600 
1.500 
0.000 
0.900 
0.000 
3.000 
17.031 
0.025 
0.000 
0.250 
0.010 
17.316 
1.060 
18.376 
Capacity expa 
2001/05 
0.000 
3.600 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.250 
3.850 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
5.600 
2.300 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
7.900 
11.750 
0.126 
0.000 
0.250 
0.025 
12.151 
0.000 
12.151 
usions (GW) 
2006/10 
0.000 
0.000 
3.600 
0.000 
0.000 
4.500 
0.250 
8.350 
0.000 
0.000 
2.250 
2.250 
0.000 
13.200 
0.950 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
14.150 
24.750 
0.050 
0.000 
0.250 
0.025 
25.075 
0.000 
25.075 
2011/15 
0.000 
0.000 
3.900 
0.000 
0.000 
14.150 
0.250 
18.300 
0.000 
0.000 
2.250 
2.250 
0.000 
2.800 
1.250 
0.300 
0.000 
0.000 
4.350 
24.900 
0.050 
0.000 
0.250 
0025 
25.225 
0.000 
25.225 
2016/20 
0.000 
0.000 
2.350 
0.000 
0.000 
8.675 
0.500 
11.525 
0.000 
0.000 
2.250 
2.250 
0.000 
0.000 
8.600 
1.425 
1.625 
0.000 
11.650 
25.425 
0,050 
0.000 
0.250 
0.025 
25.750 
0.000 
25.750 
% change 
1993/2020 
0.000 
11.628 
13.321 
0.180 
1.669 
28.012 
1.425 
56.235 
0,700 
0.000 
6.805 
7.505 
2.280 
22.200 
14,600 
1.725 
2.525 
0.000 
41.050 
107.070 
0.339 
0.000 
1.585 
0.110 
109.104 
1.060 
110.164 
Table Al 1.4. Scenarios 2020: Germany, negotiated TPA 
o -t-
Gross production tin GWh) 
Nuclear 
Total solids 
Total liquids 
Total gas 
Hard coal 
Lignite 
Other solids 
Fuel oil 
Diesel oil 
Other liquids 
Natural gas 
Hydrogen 
Derived gases 
Waste 
Biomass 
Biofueli 
Total thermal 
Hydro 
Renewables/geothermal 
Total primary production 
Total without pumping 
Pumping 
Fuel consumption (in ktoe) 
Nuclear 
Total solids 
Total liquids 
Total gas 
Hard coal 
Lignite 
Other solids 
Fuel oil 
Diesel oil 
Other liquids 
Natural gas 
Hydrogen 
Derived gases 
Waste 
Biomass 
Biotuels 
1992 1995 
Summary 
2000 
electricity balance 
2005 2010 2015 2020 
158775 
137914 
153152 
2835 
293901 
7817 
3563 
176 
11556 
32973 
0 
8413 
41387 
1042 
4256 
0 
352142 
17265 
88 
17353 
528270 
5200 
159779 
117098 
114236 
2079 
233413 
18918 
4080 
226 
23225 
80423 
0 
8649 
89072 
1478 
4187 
0 
351375 
17614 
348 
17963 
529116 
4701 
159779 
145591 
118016 
1867 
265475 
22000 
7175 
291 
29466 
78980 
0 
7909 
86889 
2213 
8997 
0 
393040 
17786 
812 
18598 
571417 
5421 
156691 
165872 
109340 
1847 
277059 
23332 
6625 
289 
30246 
113131 
0 
6813 
119945 
2586 
10842 
0 
440679 
18374 
1477 
19851 
617221 
5421 
139178 
196999 
103791 
2093 
302884 
21255 
2642 
281 
24178 
150499 
0 
5633 
156132 
2626 
12636 
0 
498455 
18670 
1851 
20521 
658154 
5421 
98221 
219343 
100586 
1886 
321815 
10581 
1918 
220 
12719 
219249 
123 
5002 
224374 
2628 
14467 
0 
576002 
18965 
2218 
21183 
695406 
5421 
44653 
234859 
101765 
1592 
338217 
12300 
1911 
251 
14462 
282792 
1276 
4046 
288114 
4782 
27550 
0 
673125 
19261 
2585 
21846 
739624 
5421 
39000 
31949 
41099 
657 
73705 
2686 
1094 
60 
3841 
7718 
0 
1969 
9688 
241 
983 
0 
40111 
27292 
29009 
485 
56785 
5490 
1142 
66 
6698 
18904 
0 
2033 
20937 
348 
987 
0 
41639 
34005 
27471 
436 
61912 
5018 
1769 
66 
6853 
17300 
0 
1732 
19032 
496 
2017 
0 
40835 
36558 
25518 
407 
62483 
5373 
1632 
67 
7071 
25140 
0 
1514 
26654 
578 
2424 
0 
36271 
37447 
23801 
398 
61647 
4936 
657 
65 
5659 
32775 
0 
1227 
34002 
588 
2829 
0 
25597 
41111 
22759 
354 
64224 
2482 
457 
52 
2991 
40568 
18 
925 
41511 
588 
3238 
0 
11637 
44171 
22949 
299 
67419 
2447 
444 
50 
2942 
48320 
184 
691 
49195 
944 
5440 
0 
Annual average % change 
92/95 95/00 00/05 05/10 10/15 15/20 
0.21 
-5.31 
-9.31 
-9.82 
-7.39 
34 26 
462 
8.79 
26.20 
34.61 
0.93 
29.11 
12.35 
-0.54 
-0.07 
0.67 
58.41 
1.16 
0.05 
-3.30 
0.00 
4.45 
0.65 
-2.13 
2.61 
3.06 
11.95 
5.16 
4.88 
-036 
0.00 
-1.77 
-0.50 
8.41 
16.53 
0.00 
2.27 
0 19 
1844 
0.70 
1.55 
289 
-0.39 
2.64 
-1.52 
-0 22 
0.86 
1.18 
-1.58 
-0.13 
0.52 
7.45 
0.00 
-2.94 
6.66 
3.17 
3.80 
0.00 
2.31 
065 
12.71 
1.31 
1.55 
0.00 
-2.34 
3 50 
-1.04 
2,53 
1.80 
-1 85 
-16.80 
-0,56 
-4.38 
5.87 
0.00 
-3.73 
5.41 
0.30 
3.11 
4.26 
2.49 
032 
4 62 
0.67 
1.29 
0.00 
-6.73 
2.17 
-0.63 
-206 
1.22 
-13.02 
-620 
-4.82 
-12.06 
7 82 
0 00 
-235 
7.52 
0.01 
2.74 
3.79 
2.93 
031 
3 68 
0.64 
1.11 
0.00 
-14.59 
1 38 
0.23 
-333 
1.00 
3.06 
-0 08 
2.69 
2.60 
5.22 
59.64 
-4,15 
5.13 
12.72 
13.75 
19.34 
3.17 
0 31 
3 II 
0.62 
1.24 
0.00 
0.94 
-5 12 
-10.96 
-9 64 
-8J3 
26 91 
1 44 
2.84 
20.37 
34 80 
1 07 
29.29 
13.13 
0.15 
0.75 
450 
-1 08 
-2 09 
1.74 
-1 78 
9 14 
0 22 
0.46 
•1.76 
0 00 
-3 15 
-1.89 
7.33 
15.37 
0.00 
-0.39 
1 46 
-1 46 
-1.37 
0.18 
1 38 
-1 60 
0 06 
0.63 
7 76 
000 
-2 66 
6.97 
3.11 
3.75 
0.00 
-2.34 
0 48 
-1 38 
-0 46 
-0.27 
-1 68 
-1662 
-0 39 
-4.36 
5 45 
0 00 
-4 12 
4.99 
0.33 
3.14 
4.26 
-6.73 
1 88 
-089 
-2 34 
0.82 
-1285 
-7 00 
•4 62 
-11.97 
4 36 
0 00 
-5 48 
4.07 
0.01 
2.73 
3.79 
-14.59 
1.45 
0.17 
-3.27 
0.98 
-0 28 
-0 57 
-0 64 
-0.33 
3 56 
59 24 
-5 67 
3.45 
9.93 
10.94 
16.51 
% Change 
1990/2020 
-69.65 
68 73 
23.24 
32.70 
51.69 
61.57 
-551 
-83.70 
29.41 
686 94 
-5632 
537.44 
-0.57 
136.89 
21 28 
9653 85 
37.33 
65.39 
12055 
-67.82 
3964 
16 48 
983 
30.64 
36 10 
-28 45 
-86 27 
5.70 
470 95 
•68 31 
362.16 
-12.63 
Table Al 1.5. Scenarios 2020: Germany, negotiated TPA 
> 
■a ■a 
Electricity generating capacities (GW) 
Nuclear 
Monovalents 
Coal 
Lignite 
Residual fuel oil 
Natural gas conv. 
Nat. gas comb, cycle 
Biomass 
Total 
Polyvalents 
With coal 
Without coal 
Small autoproducers 
Total 
Peak devices 
New technologies 
New coal 
New CHP 
Fuel cells 
Biomass comb, cycle 
Fuel oil comb, cycle 
Total 
Total thermal 
Hydro 
Geothennal 
Wind 
Solar 
Total without pumping 
Pumping 
Total 
1992 
22.518 
17.575 
21.218 
6.094 
8.466 
0.000 
0.723 
54.076 
9.478 
0.190 
14.400 
24.068 
6.094 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
106.756 
3.005 
0.000 
0.215 
0.000 
109.976 
6.924 
116.900 
1995 
22.518 
18.139 
20.967 
6.226 
9.553 
0.387 
0.773 
56.045 
9.478 
0.190 
13.154 
22.822 
6.094 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
107.478 
3.043 
0.000 
0.550 
0.000 
111.071 
6.924 
117.995 
2000 
22.518 
24.729 
18.487 
6.274 
10.135 
0.687 
0.898 
61.209 
10.178 
0.095 
11.344 
21.617 
7.234 
0.600 
0.000 
0.000 
0.600 
0.000 
1.200 
113.778 
3.068 
0.000 
0.800 
0.010 
117.656 
7.984 
125.640 
2005 
22.096 
24.479 
14.488 
5.499 
9.925 
0.687 
1.148 
S6.226 
8.793 
0.000 
9.746 
18.539 
6.927 
6.400 
4.176 
0.075 
0.650 
0.000 
11.301 
115.089 
3.194 
0.000 
1.050 
0.035 
119.368 
7.984 
127.352 
2010 
19.663 
22.636 
14,041 
4.438 
9.415 
2.937 
1.398 
54.864 
6.211 
0.000 
9.026 
15.237 
6.681 
19.400 
4.376 
0.075 
0.650 
0.000 
24.501 
120.946 
3.244 
0.000 
1.300 
0.060 
125.550 
7.984 
133.534 
2015 
13.906 
19.818 
13.187 
1.260 
4.764 
16.387 
1.648 
57.064 
3.638 
0.000 
9.206 
12.844 
5.239 
22.000 
6.476 
0.225 
0.650 
0.000 
29.351 
118.404 
3.294 
0.000 
1.550 
0.085 
123.333 
7.984 
131.317 
2020 
6.322 
17.567 
13.321 
0.180 
1.965 
26.387 
2.148 
61.568 
1.981 
0.000 
9.252 
11.233 
4.083 
22.800 
13.876 
1.200 
2.150 
1.200 
41.226 
124.432 
3.344 
0.000 
1.800 
0.110 
129.686 
7.984 
137.670 
Capacity expansions (GW) 
93/95 
0.000 
0.943 
0.560 
0.132 
1.087 
0.387 
0.050 
3.159 
0.000 
0.000 
0.055 
0.055 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
3.214 
0.038 
0.000 
0.335 
0.000 
3.587 
0.000 
3.587 
96/00 
0.000 
7.085 
2.911 
0.048 
0.582 
0.300 
0.125 
11.051 
0.700 
0.000 
0.000 
0.700 
1.140 
0.600 
0.000 
0.000 
0.600 
0.000 
1.200 
14.091 
0.025 
0.000 
0.250 
0.010 
14.376 
1.060 
15.436 
2001/05 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.250 
0.250 
0.000 
0.000 
0 900 
0.900 
0.000 
5.800 
4.176 
0.075 
0.050 
0.000 
10.101 
11.251 
0.126 
0.000 
0.250 
0.025 
11.652 
0.000 
11.652 
2006/10 
0.000 
0.000 
3.600 
0.000 
0.000 
2.250 
0.250 
6.100 
0.000 
0.000 
1.350 
1.350 
0.000 
13.000 
0.200 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
13.200 
20.650 
0.050 
0.000 
0.250 
0.025 
20.975 
0.000 
20.975 
2011/15 
0.000 
0.000 
3.900 
0.000 
0.000 
13.450 
0.250 
17.600 
0.000 
0.000 
2.250 
2.250 
0.000 
2.600 
2.100 
0.150 
0.000 
0.000 
4.850 
24.700 
0.050 
0.000 
0.250 
0.025 
25.025 
0.000 
25.025 
2016/20 
0.000 
0.000 
2.350 
0.000 
0.000 
10.000 
0.500 
12.850 
0.000 
0.000 
2.250 
2.250 
0.000 
0.800 
7.400 
0.975 
1.500 
1.200 
11.875 
26.975 
0.050 
0.000 
0.250 
0.025 
27.300 
0.000 
27.300 
% change 
1993/2020 
0.000 
8.028 
13.321 
0.180 
1.669 
26.387 
1.425 
51.010 
0.700 
0.000 
6.805 
7.505 
1.140 
22.800 
13.876 
1.200 
2.150 
1.200 
41.226 
100.881 
0.339 
0 000 
1.585 
0.110 
102.915 
1.060 
103.975 
o 
Table A 11.6. Scenarios 2020: Germany, negotiated TPA 
Demand and exchanges 
Demand (GWh) 
Total final demand 
Energy branch consumption 
oj'which for 
Distribution losses 
Total demand 
Electricity exchanges (GWh) 
Net exports 
Electricity production (GWh) 
Conv. thermal power plants 
Nuclear power plants 
Hydro and other renewables 
Total 
Load (GW) 
Total gToss peak demand 
Industrial 
Domestic 
Transports 
hydrogen prod. 
Imports 
Exports 
System reserve margin 
LOLP (in hours) 
1992 
210252 
221588 
14892 
446732 
55985 
0 
20106 
522823 
28285 
33732 
5447 
352142 
158775 
17353 
528270 
81.28 
1.53 
4.03 
1995 
209090 
245554 
15789 
470432 
53199 
0 
21379 
545010 
38537 
22643 
-15894 
351375 
159779 
17963 
529116 
83.86 
1.47 
5.98 
2000 
235920 
288787 
17951 
542659 
55784 
0 
24758 
623200 
70535 
18751 
-51784 
393040 
159779 
18598 
571417 
95.75 
1.36 
11.50 
2005 
250680 
310047 
22095 
582822 
58205 
0 
26584 
667610 
66888 
16498 
-50390 
440679 
156691 
19851 
617221 
102.21 
1.28 
24.91 
2010 
261987 
326629 
26999 
615615 
60620 
a 
28079 
704314 
65512 
19352 
-46160 
498455 
139178 
20521 
658154 
108.14 
1.27 
24.70 
2015 
275392 
333495 
33024 
641912 
64818 
4' 
29279 
736009 
63261 
22658 
-40603 
576002 
98221 
21183 
695406 
112.94 
1.20 
26.23 
2020 
290440 
333387 
39906 
663732 
69085 
K5 
30274 
763091 
50691 
27224 
-23467 
673125 
44653 
21846 
739624 
116.92 
1.21 
24.04 
Annual average % change 
92/95 
-0.18 
3.48 
1.97 
1.74 
-1.69 
2.07 
1.39 
10.86 
-12.44 
-242.90 
-0.07 
0.21 
1.16 
0.05 
1.05 
-1.30 
14.13 
95/00 
2.44 
3.30 
2.60 
2.90 
0.95 
2.98 
2.72 
12.85 
-3.70 
26.65 
2.27 
0.00 
0.70 
1.55 
2.69 
-1.58 
13.96 
00/05 
1.22 
1.43 
4.24 
1.44 
0.85 
1.43 
1.39 
-1.06 
-2.53 
-0.54 
2.31 
-0.39 
1.31 
1.55 
1.32 
-1.11 
16.72 
05/10 
0.89 
1.05 
4.09 
1.10 
0.82 
1.10 
1.08 
-0.41 
3.24 
-1.74 
2.49 
-2.34 
0.67 
1.29 
1.13 
-0.17 
-0.17 
10/15 
1.00 
0.42 
4.11 
0.84 
1.35 
0.84 
0.88 
-0.70 
3.20 
-2.53 
2.93 
-6.73 
0.64 
l . i i 
0.87 
-1.18 
1.21 
15/20 
1.07 
-0.01 
3.86 
0.67 
1.28 
12.86 
0.67 
0.73 
-4.33 
3.74 
-10.39 
3.17 
-14.59 
0.62 
1.24 
0.70 
0.22 
-1.73 
% change 
1992/2020 
1.16 
1.47 
3.58 
1.42 
0.75 
1.47 
1.36 
2.11 
-0.76 
2.34 
-4.43 
0.83 
1.21 
1.31 
-0.82 
6.59 
New heat from CHP (ktoe) 
Additional demand 
Potential production 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 1024.1914 
110.563745 960.338036 
1710.59525 2484.66062 2984.29042 
1508.17187 3336.13266 6644.05391 54.09 
10.80 
945 
7.75 
17.21 
3.73 
14.77 
(to 
3 
Table Al 1.7. Scenarios 2020: Germany, TPA 
> 
X3 
Gross production (in GWh) 
Nuclear 
Total solids 
Total liquids 
Total gas 
Hard coal 
Lignite 
Other solids 
Fuel oil 
Diesel oil 
Other liquids 
Natural gas 
Hydrogen 
Derived gases 
Waste 
Biomass 
Biouiels 
Total thermal 
Renevvab 
Hvdro 
es/geothcrmal 
Total primary production 
Total without pumping 
Pumping 
Fuel consumption (in Ktoe) 
Nuclear 
Total solids 
Total liquids 
Total gas 
Hard coal 
Lignite 
Other solids 
Fuel oil 
Diesel oil 
Other liquids 
Natural gas 
Hydrogen 
Derived gases 
Waste 
Biomass 
Biotuels 
1992 1995 
Summarv ί 
2O00 
lectricity balance 
2005 2010 2015 2020 
158775 
137914 
153152 
2835 
293901 
7817 
3563 
176 
11556 
32973 
0 
8413 
41387 
1042 
4256 
0 
352142 
17265 
88 
17353 
528270 
5200 
159779 
109936 
114236 
2073 
226246 
18343 
4033 
226 
22602 
75596 
0 
8583 
84179 
1478 
4187 
0 
338691 
1/614 
348 
17963 
516433 
4701 
159779 
102273 
118016 
1794 
222084 
22928 
6953 
291 
30173 
80462 
0 
7884 
88346 
1747 
7149 
0 
349498 
17786 
812 
18598 
527875 
5421 
156691 
140968 
109340 
1827 
252135 
22477 
6548 
289 
29314 
II25I1 
0 
6791 
119302 
2155 
8959 
0 
411866 
18374 
1477 
19851 
588408 
5421 
139178 
177718 
103791 
2076 
283586 
21265 
2503 
283 
24050 
145515 
0 
5481 
150996 
2238 
10710 
0 
471579 
18670 
1851 
20521 
631278 
5421 
98221 
207981 
100586 
1969 
310535 
10718 
2062 
223 
13004 
207205 
82 
4758 
212045 
2294 
12486 
0 
550364 
18965 
2218 
21183 
669768 
5421 
44653 
231116 
101765 
1650 
334531 
12141 
2263 
185 
14588 
278701 
841 
4027 
283569 
4470 
25547 
0 
662705 
19261 
2585 
21846 
729204 
5421 
39000 
31949 
41099 
657 
73705 
2686 
1094 
60 
3841 
7718 
0 
1969 
9688 
241 
983 
0 
40111 
25630 
29009 
483 
55122 
5324 
1129 
65 
6519 
17801 
0 
2021 
19822 
348 
987 
0 
41639 
24089 
27471 
423 
51983 
5235 
1713 
66 
7014 
17633 
0 
1728 
19361 
405 
1656 
0 
40835 
31170 
25518 
404 
57092 
5177 
1610 
67 
6854 
24996 
0 
1509 
26505 
495 
2056 
0 
36271 
33427 
23801 
391 
57619 
4943 
618 
66 
5627 
32774 
0 
1234 
34009 
512 
2453 
0 
25597 
38930 
22759 
369 
62058 
2516 
491 
52 
3059 
38923 
12 
894 
39829 
524 
2850 
0 
11637 
43254 
22949 
309 
66511 
2404 
525 
37 
2965 
48320 
121 
698 
49139 
884 
5049 
0 
92/95 
Vnnual average % 
95/00 
change 
00/05 05/10 10/15 15/20 
0.21 
-7 28 
-9 31 
-9 90 
-8.35 
32 88 
4 22 
8.65 
25.06 
31 86 
0 67 
26.70 
12.34 
-0.54 
-1.29 
0.07 
58 41 
1.16 
-0.75 
-3 30 
0.00 
-1 43 
0 65 
-285 
-0.37 
4 56 
II 51 
5 25 
5.95 
1 26 
000 
-1 68 
0.97 
3.40 
11.29 
0.00 
0.63 
0.19 
18 44 
0.70 
0.44 
2 89 
-0.39 
6 63 
-1 52 
0 36 
2.57 
-0 40 
-1 19 
-0 13 
-0.58 
6.94 
0 00 
-294 
6.19 
4.30 
4.62 
0.00 
3 J 4 
065 
1271 
1.31 
2.19 
000 
-2.34 
4 74 
-1 04 
2 60 
2.38 
-1 10 
-1750 
•0 47 
-3.88 
5 28 
0 00 
•4 19 
4.82 
0.75 
3.63 
4.36 
2.74 
032 
462 
0.67 
1.42 
000 
-6.73 
3 19 
-0 63 
-1 06 
1.83 
-12 80 
-3 80 
-4 65 
-11.57 
7 32 
0 00 
-2 79 
7.03 
0.50 
3.12 
3.79 
3.14 
031 
3 68 
0.64 
1.19 
0 00 
-14.59 
2 13 
0 23 
-3 47 
1.50 
2 52 
1 87 
-3 69 
2.33 
6 II 
59 27 
-3 28 
5.99 
14.27 
15.39 
3.39 
3.78 
031 
3 II 
0.62 
1.71 
0 00 
0.94 
-7.08 
-1096 
-9 71 
-9.23 
25 62 
1.05 
271 
19.29 
32 12 
087 
26.95 
13.12 
0.15 
0.75 
-1 23 
-1 08 
-265 
-1.17 
-034 
8 69 
0 32 
1.48 
-0 19 
0 00 
-3 09 
-0.47 
3.05 
10.91 
0.00 
-0J9 
5 29 
-1 46 
-0.90 
1.89 
-022 
-1 23 
0 05 
-0.46 
7 23 
0 00 
-267 
6.48 
4.10 
4.42 
0.00 
-2.34 
1 41 
-1 38 
-0 67 
0.18 
-0 92 
-17 44 
-0 29 
-3.87 
5 57 
0 00 
-3'>3 
5.11 
0.71 
3.59 
4.36 
-6.73 
3 10 
•0.89 
-1 15 
1.50 
•1263 
-4 51 
-4 46 
-11.47 
3 50 
0 00 
-6 25 
3.21 
0.43 
3.05 
3.79 
-14.59 
2.13 
0 17 
-3 48 
1.40 
-0 91 
1 37 
-6 92 
-0.62 
4 42 
58 90 
-4 82 
4.29 
11.03 
12.12 
3.39 
% change 
1990/2020 
-69.65 
66 04 
23 24 
37 49 
50.03 
59 47 
II 88 
-88 02 
30.54 
675 55 
-56 52 
527.38 
-7.04 
133.22 
21 28 
9653 85 
37.33 
63.06 
120 55 
-67.82 
36 74 
16 48 
13 23 
28.88 
33 67 
•15 50 
■ 89 95 
6.54 
470 95 
-67 99 
361.64 
-18.25 
Table Al 1.8. Scenarios 2020: Germany,TPA 
to 
o 
Demand (GWh) 
Industrial 
Domestic 
Transports 
Total final demand 
Energy branch consumption 
of which for hydrogen prod. 
Distribution losses 
Total demand 
Electricity exchanges (GWh) 
Imports 
Exports 
Net exports 
Electricity production (GWh) 
Conv, (hernial power plants 
Nuclear power plants 
Hydro and other renewables 
Total 
Load (GW) 
Total gross peak demand 
System reserve margin 
LOLP (in hours) 
1992 
210252 
221588 
14892 
446732 
55985 
0 
20106 
522823 
28285 
33732 
5447 
352142 
158775 
17353 
528270 
81.28 
1.53 
4.03 
1995 
209101 
245558 
15790 
470449 
52296 
0 
21380 
544125 
49307 
21615 
-27692 
338691 
159779 
17963 
516433 
83.62 
1.47 
7.11 
Demand 
2000 
236390 
289294 
17966 
543650 
52560 
0 
24803 
621013 
108291 
15153 
-93138 
349498 
159779 
18598 
527875 
95.04 
1.35 
17.73 
and exchanges 
2005 
250894 
309899 
22088 
582882 
56301 
0 
26586 
665769 
92815 
15454 
-77361 
411866 
156691 
19851 
588408 
101.85 
1.27 
24.59 
2010 
261076 
326413 
27002 
614491 
58924 
0 
28028 
701443 
87815 
17650 
-70165 
471579 
139178 
20521 
631278 
107.54 
1.25 
24.77 
2015 
275162 
331980 
33007 
640149 
63179 
4b 
29198 
732527 
82293 
19534 
-62759 
550364 
98221 
21183 
669768 
111.98 
1.17 
40.61 
2020 
289591 
331911 
39896 
661398 
68527 
80 
30168 
760093 
56867 
25978 
-30889 
662705 
44653 
21846 
729204 
116.29 
1.20 
24.99 
92/95 
-0.18 
3.48 
1.97 
1.74 
-2.25 
2.07 
1.34 
20.35 
-13.79 
-271.95 
-1.29 
0.21 
1.16 
-0.75 
0.95 
-1.26 
20.90 
Annual average 
95/00 
2.48 
3.33 
2.62 
2.93 
0.10 
3.02 
2.68 
17.04 
-6.86 
27.45 
0 6 3 
0.00 
0.70 
0.44 
2.59 
-1.75 
20.04 
% change 
00/05 
1.20 
1.39 
4.22 
1.40 
1.38 
1.40 
1.40 
-3.04 
0.39 
-3.64 
3.34 
-0.39 
1.31 
2.19 
1.39 
-1.20 
6.76 
05/10 
0.80 
1.04 
4.10 
1.06 
0.91 
1.06 
1.05 
-1.10 
2.69 
-1.93 
2.74 
-2.34 
0.67 
1.42 
1.09 
-0.30 
0.14 
10/15 
1.06 
0.34 
4.10 
0.82 
1.40 
0.82 
0.87 
-1.29 
2.05 
-2.21 
3.14 
-6,73 
0.64 
1.19 
0.81 
-1.24 
10.40 
15/20 
1.03 
0.00 
3.86 
0.66 
1.64 
11.71 
0.66 
0.74 
-7.12 
5.87 
-13.22 
3.78 
-14.59 
0.62 
1.71 
0 76 
0.39 
-9.26 
%Change 
1992/2020 
1.15 
1.45 
3,58 
1.41 
0.72 
1.46 
1.35 
2 53 
-0.93 
2.28 
-4.43 
0.83 
1.16 
1.29 
-0.87 
6.74 
New heat from ('HP (ktoe) 
Additional demand 
Potential production 
0 
0 
0 0 1017.68536 
0 55,2818726 936.523992 
1618.32728 
1565.7626 
2593.56115 
2915.6849 
297485159 
7117.26926 76.11 
9.72 
10,83 
9.89 
13.24 
2.78 
19.54 
J/1 
00 
Table Al 1.9. Scenarios 2020: Germany, TPA 
> 
Electricity generating capacities (GW) 
Nuclear 
Monovalents 
Coal 
Lignite 
Residual fuel Oi 
Natural gas conv 
Nat. gas comb, cyclt 
Biomass 
Total 
Polyvalents 
With coal 
Without coa 
Small autoproducer; 
Total 
Peak devices 
New technologies 
New coal 
New CHP 
Fuel cells 
Biomass comb, cyclt 
Fuel oil comb, cyclt 
Total 
Total thermal 
Hydro 
Geotherma 
Wind 
Solar 
Total without pumping 
Pumping 
Total 
1992 
22.518 
17.575 
21.218 
6.094 
8.466 
0.000 
0.723 
54.076 
9.478 
0.190 
14.400 
24.068 
6.094 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
106.756 
3.005 
0.000 
0.215 
0.000 
109.976 
6924 
116.900 
1995 
22.518 
18.139 
20.967 
6.226 
9.553 
0.387 
0.773 
56.045 
9.478 
0.190 
13.154 
22.822 
6.094 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
107.478 
3.043 
0.000 
0.550 
0.000 
111.071 
6.924 
117.995 
2000 
22.518 
24.729 
18.487 
6.274 
10.135 
0.687 
0.898 
61.209 
10.178 
0.095 
11.344 
21.617 
6.544 
0.400 
0.000 
0.000 
0.300 
0.000 
0.700 
112.588 
3.068 
0.000 
0.800 
0.010 
116.466 
7.984 
124.450 
2005 
22.096 
24.479 
14.488 
5.499 
9.925 
0.687 
1.148 
56.226 
8.793 
0.000 
9.746 
18.539 
6.237 
5.600 
4.219 
0.075 
0.350 
0.000 
10.244 
113.342 
3.194 
0.000 
1.050 
0.035 
117.621 
7.984 
125.605 
2010 
19.663 
22.636 
14.041 
4.438 
9.415 
1.137 
1.398 
53.064 
6.211 
0.000 
9.926 
16.137 
5.991 
18.200 
4.619 
0.075 
0.350 
0.000 
23.244 
118.099 
3.244 
0,000 
1.300 
0.060 
122.703 
7.984 
130.687 
2015 
13.906 
19.818 
13.187 
1.260 
4.764 
14.612 
1.648 
55.289 
3.638 
0.000 
10.106 
13.744 
4.549 
20.800 
6.169 
0.225 
0.350 
0.000 
27.544 
115.032 
3.294 
0.000 
1.550 
0.085 
119.961 
7.984 
127.945 
2020 
6.322 
17.567 
13.321 
0.180 
1.965 
24.912 
2.148 
60.093 
1.981 
0.000 
10.152 
12.133 
3.393 
22.400 
13.569 
1.125 
1.850 
1.200 
40.144 
122.085 
3.344 
0.000 
1.800 
0 110 
127.339 
7.984 
135.323 
93/95 
0.000 
0.943 
0.560 
0.132 
1.087 
0.387 
0.050 
3.159 
0.000 
0.000 
0.055 
0.055 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
3.214 
0.038 
0,000 
0.335 
0.000 
3.587 
0.000 
3.587 
96/00 
0.000 
7.085 
2.911 
0.048 
0.582 
0.300 
0.125 
11.051 
0.700 
0.000 
0.000 
0.700 
0.450 
0.400 
0.000 
0.000 
0.300 
0.000 
0.700 
12.901 
0.025 
0.000 
0.250 
0.010 
13.186 
1.060 
14.246 
Capacity expa 
2001/05 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.250 
0.250 
0.000 
0.000 
0.900 
0.900 
0.000 
5.200 
4.219 
0.075 
0.050 
0.000 
9.544 
10.694 
0.126 
0.000 
0.250 
0.025 
11.095 
0.000 
11.095 
lisions (GW) 
2006/10 
0.000 
0.000 
3.600 
0.000 
0.000 
0.450 
0.250 
4.300 
0.000 
0.000 
2.250 
2.250 
0.000 
12.600 
0.400 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
13.000 
19.550 
0.050 
0.000 
0 250 
0025 
19.875 
0000 
19.875 
2011/15 
0.000 
0.000 
3,900 
0.000 
0.000 
13.475 
0.250 
17.625 
0.000 
0.000 
2.250 
2.250 
0.000 
2.600 
1.550 
0.150 
0.000 
0.000 
4.300 
24.175 
0.050 
0.000 
0.250 
0.025 
24.500 
0.000 
24.500 
2016/20 
0.000 
0.000 
2.350 
0.000 
0.000 
10.300 
0500 
13.150 
0.000 
0.000 
2.250 
2.250 
0.000 
1.600 
7.400 
0.900 
1.500 
1,200 
12.600 
28.000 
0 050 
0000 
0 250 
0025 
28.325 
0 000 
28.325 
% change 
1993/2020 
0.000 
8.028 
13321 
0.180 
1.669 
24.912 
1.425 
49.535 
0.700 
0.000 
7705 
8.405 
0.450 
22.400 
13.569 
1.125 
1.850 
1.200 
40.144 
98.534 
0 339 
0.000 
1.585 
0.110 
100.568 
1 060 
101.628 
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APPENDIX Β 
Gas 
Bl. Survey of the literature 
Bl.l. The European gas industry 
This chapter reviews selected papers relating to the European gas industry: 
Golombek, R., Gjelsvik, E. and Rosendahl, K.E. [1995] 'Effects of Liberalizing the 
Natural Gas Markets in Western Europe'. The Energy Journal, Vol. 16, No 1. 
This paper models gas supply to Europe assuming that the major producers (Algeria, 
Netherlands, Norway, Russia, UK) are profit maximizing Cournot oligopolists able to sell to 
all markets under a TPA regime to large consumers and distribution companies. A static 
equilibrium approach is adopted. The paper identifies gains in economic welfare of 15-20% 
arising from trade and the removal of price discrimination. 
Gains from trade are described, with and without the interconnector between continental 
Europe and the UK. Without the interconnector imports from Norway replace much of UK 
production. Algerian production approximately doubles, and total market volumes increase by 
some 10% as prices fall (elasticities are assumed to be close to 1). With the interconnector 
between the UK and continental Europe, Algeria's production increases further, as does 
production from the CIS and the Netherlands. Production from Norway and the UK declines 
(Norwegian exports to the UK are displaced). Total production increases by just under 10%. 
In both cases, there are large gains due to production shining to lower cost sources. The 
presumption is that present policies restrict low cost purchase in favour of other resources. 
Gains from the removal of price discrimination follow from the assumption that price 
differentials between the household and industrial sectors are reduced to the cost distribution 
and load balancing. This appears to imply that there are no obstacles to this caused by the 
monopoly power of the distribution companies. 
The work is closely related to the modelling presented in this report. However, there are 
several differences in assumptions which lead to different conclusions: 
(a) we assume that exports from the Netherlands continue to be subject to policy 
restrictions, as are imports to the UK; 
(b) we believe that demand elasticities are below those shown by Golombek et al., who 
show elasticities greater than 1 for the residential sector; 
(c) we assume that TPA does not extend to small consumers, and that distribution 
companies are able to continue to price discriminate. This may be extended to the ability 
of producers to defacto control on-sale of gas; 
(d) the power sector, with its high rents, is explicitly included in our model; 
(e) we use different estimates for parameter values; 
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(f) supply security is explicitly included in our model and excluded from the model by 
Golombek et al. 
These different assumptions lead to the differing results obtained in this study. 
Odell, P.R. [1993] 'Prospects for Natural Gas in Western Europe'. The Energy Journal, 
Vol. 13, No 3. 
A review of the European gas industry arguing for major potential for expansion. Remaining 
gas reserves in Western Europe (including Norway) are reviewed and shown to have increased 
consistently over the last four decades. This is argued to be at odds with the conventional view 
that conserving resources by limiting production is the main policy objective. Further 
liberalization of the industry is seen as inevitable. 
Demand growth is forecast to be strong. Production in the UK is forecast to rise, and 
Netherlands productivity to remain constant. The likely need for external supplies is noted, 
with the FSU and Algeria identified as readily able to meet demand, other producers providing 
niche supplies. 
An increase in the netback value of gas is foreseen especially in view of a possible carbon tax. 
Radetzki, M. [1994] 'World Demand for Natural Gas: History and Prospects'. The 
Energy Journal, Vol. 15, Special Issue. 
A review of the world gas industry suggesting for the European market greater competition 
upstream and downstream, and growing consumption. 
Jensen, J.T. [1994] Gas supplies for the world market. 
A review of gas supply fundamentals, industry production cost estimates. 
Stern, J.P. [1995] The Russian Natural Gas 'Bubble' - Consequences for European Gas 
Markets. Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
An extensive analysis of supply, demand and transport capacity in Russia, suggesting that 
there is potential for large scale, low cost additional exports to Western Europe. 
Dienes, L., Dobozi, I. And Radetzki, M. [1994] Energy and Economic Reform in the 
Former Soviet Union. London: Macmillan. 
A general review of the consequences of reform in the energy sector in the FSU. 
Radetzki, M. [1992] 'Pricing of natural gas in the West European Market', 
Energy Studies Review, Vol. 4, No 2. 
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This paper argues that prices to the user are those of a price discriminating monopolist, with 
rents going largely to producers. Evidence of this is obtained by comparing the returns of 
transmission companies and producers. This is forecast to change as both production and 
transmission become more competitive. 
The paper suggests four reasons why transmission companies may not seek to profit 
maximize: 
(a) ownership by oil companies implying that the import price of gas is in effect a transfer 
price: 
(b) political interference in negotiations, such as countertrade, the 30% rule, and politically 
motivated high prices for Algerian gas; 
(c) cost plus pricing which seeks to limit prices to consumers to the border price plus cost of 
- transport, which allows the importer to bid up prices; 
(d) the ability of monopolies to ensure an adequate return. 
These are consistent with the satisfying model proposed in this work, except the first which 
does not appear valid in view of the limited control by shareholders of companies" behaviour, 
widespread state ownership, and the state ownership of many producers. 
Mittra, B., Lucas, N. and Fells, I. [1995] 'European Energy: Balancing markets and 
policy'. Energy Policy, Vol. 23, No 8, pp. 689-701. 
A review of general energy policy issues. Sources of market failure are identified as arising 
from monopoly, public goods, externalities (especially the environment, short termism and 
R&D). The first three are uncontentious while the last two are acknowledged by the author as 
contentious, and in this work we have rejected the short-termism argument as presented by the 
authors and considered fundamental R&D a case of a public good. Policy failures are also 
described. 
Objectives for energy policy are suggested to be security of supply, access and quality 
standards, pollution control, and least cost supply. The authors recommend measures to 
encourage security of supply (including efficiency measures, a tax on imports and completion 
of networks, TPA, and a CO2 tax). 
Bergmann, Β. [1988] Natural Gas in Western Europe: Facing the oil price uncertainties in 
the 1986 oil price crisis and policy responses. Mabro ed. 
A paper noting the relationship between gas and oil prices in consumer markets and import 
contracts. 
Percebois, J. and Valette, E. [1995] Modelling the European Gas Market, a comparison of 
several scenarios. 
A model of stocks and flows of gas is used to simulate the effect of supply disruption. 
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B1.2. Game theory 
The literature on game theory is extensive, often highly technical and much of it has limited 
relevance to the present study. The following review is therefore highly selective. 
The Nash bargaining solution is described in standard texts (e.g. Binmore. 1992). The game 
theoretical approach to Cournot oligopoly is also widely covered, but in almost all cases the 
assumption of a linear demand curve is adopted, and the treatment given here is particular to 
the gas industry. There are good semi-technical accounts on the basis and limitations of game 
theory (e.g. Kreps (1990); Hargreaves, Heap and Varoufakis (1995)). 
The specific application of game theory to oligopoly is reviewed in Phlips (1995). Explicit 
collusion is treated following the original work by Selten (1973) showing that 'four is few [i.e. 
collusive], six is many [i.e. competitive]'. The theory of tacit collusion is also reviewed, 
showing the tendency of the collusive outcome to be reached provided that oligopolists meet 
over and over again in the market (i.e. there is a repeated game). 
The original empirical work on repeated Prisoners' Dilemma is due to Axelrod (1984). A 
survey of recent work in this area is given by Nowak, May and Sigmund (1995). There has 
been some work on strategies in oligopoly markets that draws on the idea of computer 
experimentation to derive best strategies (e.g. Binmore and Samuelson, 1992). but the 
emphasis has tended to be on the standard Cournot model (e.g. Dixon, Wallis and Moss, 
1994). In all of this work a strong tendency towards co-operation emerging in repeated games 
is found. 
B 1.2.1. References: on game theory 
Axelrod, R. [1984] The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, New York. 
Binmore, K. [1992] Fun and Games. Heath. 
Binmore, K. and Samuelson, L. [1992] 'Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by 
finite automata', Journal of Economic Theory, 57, 278-305. 
Dixon, H.D., Wallis, S. and Moss, S. [1994] Axelrod Meets Cournot: Oligopoly and the 
Evolutionary Metaphor Part 1. Discussion Paper, Department of Economics, University of 
York. July. 
Hargreaves-Heap, S.P. and Varoufakis. Y. [1995] Game Theory, Routledge. 
Kreps, D.M. [1990] Game Theory and Economic Modelling. Oxford. 
Nowak, Μ.Α., May, R.M. and Sigmund, Κ. [1995] 'The Arithmetic of Mutual Help'. 
Scientijic American, June. 
Phlips, L. [1995] Competition Policy: A game-theoretic perspective. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Selten, R. [1973] International Journal of Game Theory. 2. 141-201. 
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B2. Demand 
B2.1. Drivers of gas demand 
The key drivers of demand are different in each sector. This discussion reviews and expands 
on the material in the main report. In the residential sector, number of connections, proportion 
of connections with space heating load, and long-term trends in consumer income and energy 
efficiency are the main drivers of demand. Demand is not very price sensitive. Substitution is 
also possible, as in other sectors, but tends to be less direct: for example, gasoil is a substitute 
in residential heating applications but new equipment may be required. 
In the commercial sector, the price relative to gasoil is of key importance, although there is a 
good deal of inertia, caused by the installed base of appliances. Gas may attract an increasing 
environmental premium due to tightening air quality standards in urban areas, and the 
consequent need to move to very low sulphur gasoil. In most commercial applications, the 
quality of energy service tends to predominate over cost considerations, because energy costs 
are a small proportion of total costs. This also tends to inertia due to a lack of attention to 
energy costs. 
In large industrial use, the relative price of gas and fuel oil is a key variable. Again, gas attracts 
a significant environmental premium and competes with low sulphur fuels. Oil can be used as 
a direct substitute for gas in many industrial applications, especially steam raising but also 
some process heat applications. Some industrial plant is dual fired, being able to switch readily 
between gas and oil. 
In the power sector, the full cost of generation is the key driver. The demand for gas is 
therefore driven by the relative cost of gas and competing fuels, and of different generating 
technologies. The use of gas in combined cycle plant (CCGT) is the largest single change in 
the prospects for gas demand in recent years. The trend towards CCGTs is likely to be 
furthered by the increasing trend towards IPPs, which favours low capital cost and short lead 
time technologies. In the power sector, the major competing fuel is coal, either in a steam 
cycle or gasified for use in combined cycle. 
Policy issues are potentially important influences on demand. In the past natural gas has been 
viewed as a premium fuel, not suitable for some applications. National policy is likely to 
influence the rate at which residential consumers are connected to the grid in the residential 
sector. Fuel choice in the power sector is also subject to the influence of national policy. For 
many years the EC Directive restricting the use of gas in the power sector (COM(93) 643 
final) prevented the growth of large scale demand from this sector. 
B2.2. Elasticities of demand 
Evidence of the elasticity of gas demand is difficult to obtain because the price regime for 
natural gas in Western Europe has been stable, so there has been little opportunity to observe 
the effect of changes. Further, a key sector of demand, the power sector, is new, with a well 
defined pricing regime only having emerged in the special circumstances of the UK. Estimates 
must therefore be based on an analysis of fundamentals. 
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Short run elasticities of demand for gas tend to be very high as equipment is dedicated, with 
the exception of those industrial users who have dual firing. Longer term elasticities must 
include the relative cost of capital equipment. Radetzki (1992) implies a demand curve for gas 
that is kinked, as present here, but suggests the possibility of high elasticities below the 
substitution price, giving two alternative revenue maximizing points (high price/low volume 
and low price/high volume). This seems inherently implausible because: 
(a) price elasticities below the substitution point would be expected to be low on economic 
principle. This is strongly supported by the experience of the UK. which has seen rapidly 
falling prices in the residential commercial and industrial sectors with no corresponding 
demand growth (see below). The demand growth is all in the power sector: 
(b) a low price strategy would suggest very low marginal costs, which seems unlikely in 
view of the resource costs. 
Each sector is now reviewed. 
B2.2.1. Power sector 
Above the price leading to cost parity with coal based technology, generation using gas has 
few advantages. Emissions from modern coal plant are within LCPD limits. USC steam 
technology is already proven and IGCC is likely to become so. Strategic positioning against a 
future carbon tax is the other main economic advantage of gas, but presently this appears to be 
a minor element in utilities' decision making. It would therefore be expected that gas demand 
would drop rapidly above the coal parity price. 
Below the coal parity price it rapidly becomes a question of what determines plant drive other 
than economics. The most influential factors would appear to be: 
(a) Utility conservatism. Many utilities remain profoundly conservative in their choice of 
fuel and technology. 
(b) Concern about security of supply. Coal is available from several geographically and 
politically diverse sources. Gas is perceived in contrast as a vulnerable fuel requiring 
dedicated infrastructures. 
(c) National policy. This has often influenced choice of technology most notably with the 
French nuclear programme, the use of indigenous coal in Germany and the construction 
of multi-fuel plant in Italy. This is related to the concern on security of supply. 
The extent to which these concerns limit the demand for gas will depend on the electricity 
market environment. In an uncompetitive environment, a large discount may be required to 
secure large amounts of additional demand. In a competitive environment, demand may be 
expected to expand rapidly to its full potential at a relatively modest discount to coal parity. 
B2.2.2. Commercial sector 
Demand from commercial customers is expected to be price inelastic. Consumption is not 
greatly restricted by price as prices are a small proportion of total costs and the performance of 
the business is the primary concern. A cut in price is therefore unlikely to raise consumption in 
the market significantly. 
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These features extend to the portion of the demand curve where oil becomes a substitute. A 
large amount of inertia is likely to be present in the market, which will be exacerbated by the 
long lived nature of equipment, which tends to be dedicated to a single fuel. This inertia is 
confirmed by anecdotal evidence from the industry. 
B2.2.3. Industrial sector 
Gas and low sulphur fuel oil (LSFO) are close substitutes in many industrial applications, 
especially steam raising. There is therefore a high elasticity of demand close to thermal parity 
between the two fuels. This is recognized in gas pricing throughout much of Europe, most 
explicitly in Germany. Demand for gas is expected to be highly elastic at this point. Below this 
it is unclear how elastic demand is, but there seems little reason to suppose it will be highly 
elastic. A figure of relative prices of LSFO and gas across Europe shows only a weak 
correlation between market share and relative price. 
B2.2.4. Residential sector 
The price in this sector tends to be highly inelastic. The strongest evidence of this is from the 
UK market, as noted above. 
Figure B2.1 British Gas residential demand, 1980­1993 
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Table B2.1. UK gas demand and prices, 1980­94 
GDP at current prices (£million) 
GDP at 1990 prices (£million) 
Implied GDP deflator 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
231772 254927 279041 304456 325852 
423490 418026 425252 440888 451131 
1.827184 1.639787 1.523977 1.448117 1.384466 
GDP at current prices (£million) 
GDP at 1990 prices (£million) 
Implied GDP deflator 
1985 
357344 
468071 
1.309861 
1986 
384843 
488122 
1.268367 
1987 
423381 
511615 
1.208403 
1988 
471430 
537215 
1.139544 
1989 
515957 
548940 
1.063926 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
GDP at current prices (£million) 
GDP at 1990 prices (£million) 
Implied GDP deflator 
551118 575321 597242 630707 668866 
551118 540038 537448 549589 570722 
1 0.938672 0.899883 0.871386 0.853268 
Residential Gas Sales (GWh)" 
Number of Residental Customers (Thousands) 
Sales per Customer (kWh) 
Standing Charge (p/dny)* 
Unit Charge (p/kWh)" 
Standing Charge, 1990 prices (p/day) 
Unit Charge, 1990 prices (p/kWh) 
Average Unit Revenue (p/kWh)b 
Average Unit Revenue, J990 prices (p/kWh) 
1980* 1981* 1982* 1983* 1984* 
236626 242516 257990 248847 263529 
14485 14725 14929 15135 15427 
16336 16470 17281 16442 17082 
8.8 10.1 10.1 
0.928 1.143 1.143 
0.00 0.00 13.41 14.63 13.98 
0.000 0.000 1.414 1.655 1.582 
0.669 0.826 1.041 1.297 1.358 
1.222 1.354 1.586 1.878 1.880 
Residential Gas Sales (GWh)a 
Number of Residental Customers (Thousands) 
Sales per Customer (kWh) 
Standing Charge (p/day)b 
tini« Charge (p/kWh)b 
Standing Charge, 1990 prices (p/day) 
Unit Charge, 1990 prices (p/kWh) 
Average Unit Revenue (p/kWb)b 
Average Unit Revenue, 1990 prices (p/kWh) 
1985* 
267925 
15715 
17049 
10.1 
1.201 
13.23 
1.573 
1.410 
1.847 
1986* 
290082 
15973 
18161 
10.1 
1.262 
12.81 
1.601 
1.460 
1.852 
1987* 
299812 
16235 
18467 
9 
1.297 
10.88 
1.567 
1.475 
1.782 
1988* 
288968 
16495 
17519 
8.5 
1.239 
9.69 
1.412 
1.439 
1.640 
i 989* 
314670 
16842 
18684 
9.1 
1.314 
9.68 
1.398 
1.501 
1.597 
Residential Gas Sales (GWh)a 
Number of Residéntal Customers (Thousands) 
Sales per Customer (kWh) 
Standing Charge (p/day)b 
UnitCharge(p/kVVh)b 
Standing Charge, 1990 prices (p/day) 
Unit Charge, 1990 prices (p/kWh) 
Average Unit Revenue (p/kWh)b 
Average Unit Revenue, 1990 prices (p/kWh) 
1990* 
323433 
17054 
18965 
9.5 
1.358 
9.50 
1.358 
1.562 
1.562 
1991* 
328093 
17311 
18953 
10.3 
1.512 
9.67 
1.419 
1.683 
1.580 
1991 
336416 
17510 
19213 
10.3 
1.566 
9.67 
1.470 
1.738 
1.564 
1992 
343981 
17802 
19323 
10.3 
1.507 
9.27 
1.356 
1.729 
1.507 
1993 
346693 
18094 
19161 
10.1 
1.477 
8.80 
1.287 
1.682 
1.435 
1994 
355228 
18359 
19349 
10.1 
1.477 
8.62 
1.260 
N/A 
Ν/Λ 
*Year ended 31 March. 
'Tariff sales only. Figures for 1989 onwards are adjusted to average température. 
h Where prices changed during the course of a year the price in force for the majority of the year is given. 
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B2.3. Effect of elasticities on prices under monopoly 
Consider a much simplified market for gas which involved a monopoly producer selling to a 
monopsony transmission company which sells to the final market. Let the unit price that the 
producer sells to the transmission company be Pp, and the price that the transmission company 
adds to this when selling to the final market be Px. The price which consumers face is then Ρ = 
Pp + Pi. Suppose that both producer and distributor have costs of C p (0 and C,(0 
respectively, and that the demand for gas is linear and described by Q = a - b*P, where O is 
the total number of units consumers buy at price P. Further assume that the demand function 
and both cost functions are common knowledge to the transmission company and the 
distribution company. The profits are then: 
np=Q*PP-CP(Q) = (a-bPp-bP,)*Pp-Cp(Q);and 
n,=Q*Pt-Ct(Q) = (a-bPp-bP,)*Pl-Cl(Q) 
for the producer and the distributor respectively. If both the producer and the distributor set 
their prices simultaneously, then the price reaction functions are: 
a-bP, +bcn 
Pn = p- ; and 
* 2b 
ρ Ρ ' 
2b 
where cp and ct are the marginal costs of the producer and the transmission company 
respectively. 
The Nash equilibrium occurs when both these optimal reaction functions are simultaneously 
satisfied. This results in prices: 
a - be, +2bcn Pn = p- ; and p 3b 
a-be„ +2bc, 
P.=-
3b 
If we further assume that both companies have constant average costs (i.e. average cost equals 
marginal cost), the Nash equilibrium profits are then: 
{a-bcp-bc,f 
9b2 
= (a-bcp-bc,Y 
9b 
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B2.4. Monopoly-monopsony analysis under a kinked demand curve 
Consider a demand curve which is piece-wise linear, with Q = a\-b\P above the price of oil 
and 0 = ai-bjP below the price of oil. This demand curve thus has a kink at the oil price. We 
denote this price. Pk. 
Q=a\- bi(Pp + P,) for PP + P, > Pk 
O = ai - bi{Pp + Ρ,) for PP + P,< Pk 
Under this piece-wise linear demand curve, profit for the producer is: 
Π,, = («i - b\Pp - b\P,)*PP- Cp(Q) when PP+P> Pk 
Up = {a: -biPp~biPtyPp- Cp ( 0 when PP + P< Pk 
Similarly, profit for the distributing company is: 
Π, = (αϊ - b\Pp -b\P,)*P,-C,(0 when PP+P> Pk 
Π, = (¿72 ­ biPp -biP,)*P,- C,(0 when PP + P< Pk 
We consider a one­off meeting of the two companies to decide prices Pp and Λ­ We assume, 
first, that the two companies set their prices simultaneously and also that prices are set at this 
level for a long period of time. This latter assumption is plausible in the current market 
structure of the gas industry which has long­term contracts. 
A Nash equilibrium in the two companies' pricing strategies requires the following technical 
conditions, where Ρ represents the market price, 
P = PP + Pt 
— < 0 below P; — > 0 above P; dPp dPP 
dY\i „ , , „ dYli n . 
< 0 below P; > 0 above P. 
dP, dP, 
If the demand curve were continuously differentiable (as, for example, with a linear demand 
curve with no kink), both of these inequalities would become exact equalities. In that case, 
both companies would have the standard profit maximizing procedure of setting marginal 
revenue equal to marginal cost. 
However, the demand curve which we have used is not differentiable at the kink point. More 
precisely, the slope of the demand curve above the kink point is very low, given by b\, while 
the slope of the demand curve below the kink point is very high, given by b2. Precisely at the 
kink point, the slope of the demand curve changes instantaneously from b\ to b2. It is therefore 
possible that, if the final equilibrium market price is equal to the oil price 7\. the companies 
are unable to price so that marginal revenue equals marginal cost. 
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For a Nash equilibrium in pricing strategies to hold, both the producer and the transmission 
company must be unwilling to change their prices, given the other's price. Thus, profit for 
both companies must be decreasing in price above the equilibrium price and increasing in 
price below the equilibrium price. The technical equations above are the formalization of this. 
We can divide the companies' pricing strategies into three potential outcomes: 
(a) If the Nash equilibrium is above the kink, then the demand curve is differentiable, with 
slope b\, and the derivative of the two profit functions with respect to their prices are 
equal to zero. 
(b) If the Nash equilibrium is below the kink, then the demand curve is also differentiable, 
with slope bj, and the derivative of the two profit functions with respect to their prices 
are equal to zero. 
(c) If the Nash equilibrium is at the kink, point then the two companies' prices. Pp and Pt 
are such that Pp+P{= Pk_ 
The first two outcomes represent the standard textbook outcome of a monopoly selling to a 
monopsonist. The third outcome is a possibility which could result if the elasticity of demand 
above the kink were sufficiently high. In that case, neither producer nor distributor would want 
to increase price because of the rapidly falling demand above that point. The result is multiple 
Nash equilibria which includes the many possibilities where the sum of the producer's and the 
distributor's price equals the kink (oil) price. 
If the final market price is equal to the kink price, then there is a minimum price that the 
producer and the distributor will accept. This is determined by the elasticity of demand above 
the kink point. The higher the elasticity of demand, the lower the profit margin that either 
party will accept before raising the combined price above the kink point. More precisely, 
under the assumption of constant average costs, the minimum margins that either company 
will accept are given by: 
1. Pp-Cp> — 
ε 
2. P,-ct> — 
ε 
where the elasticity (ε) is evaluated just above the kink price. 
The minimum proportion of rents (price less average cost) that either companies will accept is: 
Pk 1 
Min% = * -
Pk -cp- ci ε 
Thus, a higher elasticity of demand just above the oil price, means that both companies would 
accept a lower share of the total rents accruing from the uncompetitive market. The higher the 
elasticity, the lower the share that they will accept. We note that this minimum condition is the 
same for both companies, but it need not be so. 
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If we assume that the producer 'moves first' by setting a price to the transmission company, it 
will set its price to get the maximum share of the rents. Thus, it will price so that the above 
inequality holds exactly. 
B2.5. Summary of results 
The theoretical analysis can be generalized to give the following results: 
(a) A monopoly producer under TPA will never choose to lower price if the elasticity of 
demand is less than 1, even if costs are low. The higher costs are, the more elastic 
demand will need to be. This implies that a monopolist will never seek to expand 
volumes if it implies lowering price below the kink point in the demand curves set by 
the price of competing fuels, and will always price at least at this level. The extent to 
. which this extends to oligopolists is discussed in the text. 
(b) A monopoly producer under TPA will choose to raise price above the kink point in the 
demand curves only if margins are small and demand is not highly elastic. 
(c) If the transmission company can price discriminate, it will have little incentive to raise 
price above the kink point and restrict the market. It may choose to expand demand by 
selling to some low value customers, but if price discrimination is imperfect, this is a 
risky strategy as it risks lowering total revenues. 
These considerations together imply a strong tendency for monopoly prices at the kink point. 
B2.6. Comparison of demand forecasts 
Several industry participants have made their own forecasts of demand. These are compared in 
Table B2.2, which is based on that published by Stern (1995). They show a range around 
450 bcm p.a. by 2010 for Western Europe. Most of the forecasts have in common an 
assumption of continuation of existing price relationships between oil and gas. The 
conventional wisdom scenario is towards the upper end of the range shown, but appears 
credible in view of the assumptions. 
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Table B2.2. Comparison of gas demand forecast by industry participants 
EU (conventional + wisdom) 
OECD1 
Central/Eastern" 
Total Europe2 
OECD' 
Western Europe4 
Eastern Europe4 
Western Europe' 
Western Europe6 
Western Europe7 
Central/Eastern Europe7 
Western Europe8 
Central/Eastern Europe8 
Western Europe9 
Western Europe10 
1993 
267(1992) 
329 
67 
2000 
378 
380-400 
80-90 
340 
360-400 
2010 
506 
440^170 
110-125 
530-560 
440 
400 
100 
400-480 
400-130 
500 
94 
400-460 
100-120 
450 
500 
Note: This work based on lbcm = 1.201 million toe (38MJ/mJ GCV for gas). 
1 The Development of International Gas Markets (Paris: Cedigaz, 1994). 
2 Gazprom forecast from R. I. Vyakhirev, The Russian Gas Industry in the Context of the Russian and World Economy, paper 
presented to the Conference on 'Natural Gas: Trade and Investment Opportunities in Russia and the CIS', Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, London, 13-14 October 1994. 
3 International Energy Agency. World Energy Outlook (Paris. OECD. 1994). 
4 Statoil estimates; Karen Fossli, 'Western Europe Gas Needs to Rise 60%'. Financial Times, 4 November 1993. 
5 Shell International Gas. 
6 Ruhrgas forecast from Gerhard Enseling. 'Analysing Future Sources of Gas Supply for Europe', paper presented at the 
European Gas Strategies '95 Conference. Amsterdam, Februar}' 1995. 
7 Purvin and Geertz forecast from 'European Gas Demand Will Be Strong to 2010; Costs Cloud Supply Picture'. Oil and 
Gas Journal. 16 May. 1994, pp. 32-53. 
8 SNAM forecast from Dominico Dispenza, 'Europe's Need for Gas Imports Destined to Grow'. Oil and Gas Journal. 
13 March 1995. pp. 45-48. 
9 Wintershall. 
10 Wood Mackenzie. 
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Table B2.3. Market share of gas by sector in EU Member States, 1993, mtoe (%) 
Commercial and Other 
Industrial 
Residential 
Feedstock 
Power Generation (inc CHP) 
El' 
32.82 (24.5) 
77.10(25.9) 
87.00(39.6) 
10.28(19.4) 
31.25(6.4) 
Belgium 
1.30(40.0) 
3.43 (25.0) 
3.03(33.3) 
0.62 (25.0) 
1.61 (9.2) 
Denmark 
0.35(11.9) 
0.56(21.5) 
0.58(12.7) 
0(0) 
0.42(5.3) 
France 
7.8(23.3) 
12.33(27.4) 
8.06 (33.5) 
2.09(23.1) 
0.49 (0.5) 
Germany 
8.22 (23.2) 
18.81 (23.4) 
19.02(30.9) 
1.33(8.3) 
9.42 (6.7) 
Greece 
0.01 (0.5) 
0.06(1.6) 
0(0) 
0.06(54.5) 
0.02 (0.2) 
Ireland 
0.15(11.1) 
0.8(38.1) 
0.22(11.0) 
0.41 (100.0) 
0.96(27.8) 
Commercial and Other 
Industrial 
Residential 
Feedstock 
Power Generation (inc CHP) 
Italy 
0.10(1.2) 
14.46 (36.0) 
18.35(57.2) 
0.96(18.5) 
8.11 (18.8) 
Luxembourg 
0.02(18.2) 
0.3(17.6) 
0.17(5.3) 
0(0) 
0.01 (4.8) 
Netherlands 
7.24 (64.9) 
9.1 (47.4) 
8.5(81.0) 
2.31 (38.3) 
8.7 (54.0) 
Portugal 
0.02(1.7) 
0(0) 
0.04(2.2) 
1.22(100.0) 
0(0) 
Spain 
0.35 (6.0) 
4.27(19.6) 
0.94(11.5) 
0.39(14.8) 
0.17(0.5) 
United 
Kingdom 
7.22(36.4) 
10.29(26.8) 
26.32(63.8) 
1.81 (22.0) 
8.13(10.9) 
Source OECD IEA 1993. 
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B3. Supply 
Table B3.1. Reserves, production and r/p ratios 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
Germany 
Other Western Europe (mainly Italy) 
Norway 
Algeria 
Russia 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
Turkmenistan 
Other FSU 
Iran 
Qatar 
Libya 
Nigeria 
Venezuela 
Reserves (bcm) 
1.900 
600 
300 
600 
2.000 
3,600 
48.100 
1,100 
1,900 
2,900 
2,000 
21,000 
7,100 
1,300 
3,400 
3,700 
Production (bcm) 
70 
69 
16 
33 
30 
50 
598 
17 
46 
35 
11 
33 
14 
7 
4 
27 
r/p 
27.1 
9.6 
19.5 
18.8 
65.6 
72 
80.5 
63.2 
40.2 
81.6 
>100 
>100 
>100 
>100 
>100 
>100 
Source: BP, Cedigas. 
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Table B3.2. Full cost of gas: delivered to European Union border 
Country of origin 
Netherlands: Groningen* 
Netherlands: onshore 
Algeria to Transmed lo Italy 
Norway: Ekofisk to Emden 
Algeria: Maghreb to Spain 
Norway: East Sleipner to Emden 
Netherlands: North Sea 
Norway: Frigg to St. Fergus 
Norway: Heimdal to Emden 
Norway: East Sleipner to Zeebrugge 
Norway: Troll to Emden 
Algeria: LNG Monitor 
UK: Interconnector to Zeebrugge 
Norway: Statfjord to Emden 
Norway: Tordis to Emden 
Norway: Troll to Zeebrugge 
Norway: Oseberg to Emden 
Libya: LNG (10 bcm) to Italy 
Norway: West Sleipner to Emden 
Libya: LNG (4 bcm) to Italy 
Egypt: LNG (5 bcm) to Italy 
Norway: Haltenbanken to Emden 
Nigeria: old boats to Italy 
Norway: West Sleipner to Zeebrugge 
Russia: Western Siberia to EUR-12 
Norway: Haltenbanken to Zeebrugge 
Qatar: pipeline Ashkelon to LNG Italy 
Qatar: pipeline Side Kerir to LNG to Italy 
Russia: Yamal to EUR-12 
Nigeria: LNG to Italy** 
Qatar: LNG to Italy 
Oman: LNG to Italy 
Iran: pipeline Turkey to LNG Italy 
Venezuela: LNG to EU 12 
Iran: pipeline Turkey to Italy 
Norway: Barents Sea to LNG Wilhelmshafen 
Norway: Barents Sea to LNG Zeebrugge 
Turkmenistan: pipeline Turkey to LNG Italy 
Turkmenistan: pipeline Turkey to Italy 
Turkmenistan: pipeline FSU to Germany 
Russia: new gas Barents Sea to EUR-12 
Qatar: pipeline Turkey to Italy 
Production 
costs 
Transport 
costs 
resource 
costs 
Transit 
costs 
Total 
costs 
(USS/MMBtu) (USS/MMBtu) (USS/MMBtu) (USS/MMBtu) (USS/MMBtu) 
0.10 
0.60 
0.50 
1.00 
0.50 
1.10 
1.00 
1.50 
1.25 
1.10 
1.20 
0.50 
1.50 
1.25 
1.30 
1.20 
1.50 
0.50 
2.20 
0.50 
0.70 
1.42 
0.70 
2.20 
0.50 
1.42 
0.50 
0.50 
0.75 
0.70 
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
1.10 
0.5 
1.90 
1.90 
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
1.50 
0.50 
0.15 
0.15 
0.45 
0.34 
0.75 
0.46 
0.60 
0.27 
0.57 
0.79 
0.76 
1.49 
0.60 
0.89 
0.89 
1.09 
0.81 
1.93 
0.46 
2.21 
2.11 
1.50 
2.27 
0.79 
1.88 
1.83 
2.78 
2.82 
1.98 
2.70 
3.01 
3.07 
2.82 
2.73 
2.04 
2.27 
2.30 
2.85 
1.88 
1.99 
3.15 
1.85 
0.25 
0.75 
0.95 
1.34 
1.25 
1.56 
1.60 
1.77 
1.82 
1.89 
1.96 
1.99 
2.10 
2.14 
2.19 
2.29 
2.31 
2.43 
2.66 
2.71 
2.81 
2.92 
2.97 
2.99 
2.38 
3.25 
3.28 
3.32 
2,73 
3.40 
3.51 
3.57 
3.32 
3.83 
2.54 
4.17 
4.20 
3.35 
2.38 
2.49 
4.65 
2.35 
0 00 
000 
0.11 
000 
0.14 
0.00 
0.00 
000 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
084 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.64 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.43 
0.00 
1.55 
0.00 
0.00 
0.90 
2.00 
2.00 
0.00 
2.35 
0 25 
075 
1.06 
1.34 
1.39 
1.56 
1.60 
1.77 
1.82 
1.89 
1.96 
1.99 
2.10 
2.14 
2.19 
2.29 
2.31 
2.43 
2.66 
2.71 
2.81 
2.92 
2.97 
2.99 
3.22 
3.25 
3.28 
3.32 
3.37 
3.40 
3.51 
3.57 
3.75 
3.83 
4.09 
4.17 
4.20 
4.25 
4.38 
4.49 
4.65 
4.70 
Source: IEA. 
Notes: 
EUR-12 is the European Union as of 1994 i e before expansion 
* Delivered at border to neighbouring countries 
** If used tankers are used, lhe lotai cost at the EU border is USS2 97/MMbtu 
10°Ό discount rate used to calculate transport costs 
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B4. Value of gas 
B4.1. Value of gas in power generation 
This section shows the value of gas against other fuels. This is high, even when very 
favourable assumptions are used for other types of plant (e.g. 42% thermal efficiency for coal 
is higher than typically achieved). 
Table B4.1. Value of gas in power generation 
c 
Assumptions: Load factor 
Discount rate (real) 
Year 2000 thermal efficiencies 
Capital cost (USS/kW) 
Interest on capex dur. constr. (%) 
Project life (years) 
Pre-tax discount rate (%) 
Annuity factor (%) 
Capex at commisioning 
Annual capital cost ($/kW) 
Fixed O&M (S/kW p.a.)* 
Variable O&M (c/kWh) 
Load factor (%) 
Electricity per kW (kWh) 
Capex (c/kWh) 
Opex (c/kWh) 
Capex + opex (c/kWh) 
Fuel price 
Thermal efficiency (net - LHV) 
Fuel cost (c/kWh output) 
Total cost of electricity (c/kWh) 
85% 
10% 
GAS 
CCGT 
650 
9% 
20 
10% 
12% 
710 
83 
21 
0.20 
85% 
7446 
1.1 
0.5 
1.6 
4.20 
55% 
2.8 
COAL 
PF+FGD 
1300 
17% 
40 
10% 
10% 
1515 
155 
35 
0.30 
85% 
7446 
2.1 
0.8 
2.9 
50 
42% 
1.6 
4.4 4.4 
Fuel price units S/MMBTU S/TONNE 
6500 KCAL 
/KG NCV 
COAL 
use 
1500 
18% 
40 
10% 
10% 
1773 
181 
35 
0.53 
85% 
7446 
2.4 
1.0 
3.4 
50 
45% 
1.6 
5.0 
S/TONNE 
6500 KCAL 
/KG NCV 
COAL 
IGCC 
1600 
17% 
30 
10% 
11% 
1865 
198 
35 
0.30 
85% 
7446 
2.7 
0.8 
3.4 
50 
49% 
1.5 
4.9 
S/TONNE 
6500 KCAL 
/KG NCV 
OIL 
IGCC 
1450 
17% 
30 
10% 
11% 
1690 
179 
33 
0.25 
85% 
7446 
2.4 
0.7 
3.1 
70 
49% 
1.3 
ORIMULS. 
IGCC 
1450 
17% 
30 
10% 
11% 
1690 
179 
33 
0.28 
85% 
7446 
2.4 
0.7 
3.1 
60 
49% 
1.6 
LSFO 
STEAM 
1000 
14% 
40 
10% 
10% 
1136 
116 
30 
0.28 
85% 
7446 
1.6 
0.7 
2.2 
120 
39% 
2.7 
NUCLEAR 
2400 
26% 
35 
10% 
10% 
3030 
314 
57 
0.40 
85% 
7446 
4.2 
1.2 
5.4 
0.5 
100% 
0.5 
4.4 
S/TONNE 
9750KCAL 
KG NCV 
4.8 
S/TONNE 
6500 KCAL 
/KG NCV 
5.0 
S/TONNE 
9750KCAL 
KG NCV 
5.9 
c/kWh 
Table B4.2. Value of gas in power generation 
Assumptions: Load factor 
Discount rate (real) 
Capital cost (USS/kW) 
Interest on capex dur. constr. (%) 
Project life (years) 
Pre-tax discount rate (%) 
Annuity factor (%) 
Capex at commisioning 
Annual capital cost (S/kW) 
Fixed O&M (S/kW p.a.)* 
Variable O&M (c/kWh) 
Load factor (%) 
Electricity per kW (kWh) 
Capex (c/kWh) 
Opex (c/kWh) 
Capex + opex (c/kWh) 
Fuel price 
Thermal efficiency (net - LHV) 
Fuel cost (c/kWh output) 
Total cost of electricity (c/kWh) 
Fuel price units 
85% 
10% 
GAS 
CCGT 
650 
9% 
20 
10% 
12% 
710 
83 
21 
0.20 
85% 
7446 
1.1 
0.5 
1.6 
4.70 
55% 
3.2 
4.8 
MMBTU 
COAL 
PF+FGD 
1300 
17% 
40 
10% 
10% 
1515 
155 
35 
0.30 
85% 
7446 
2.1 
0.8 
2.9 
50 
42% 
1.6 
4.4 
S/TONNE 
COAL 
use 
1500 
18% 
40 
10% 
10% 
1773 
181 
35 
0.53 
85% 
7446 
2.4 
1.0 
3.4 
50 
45% 
1.6 
5.0 
S/TONNE 
COAL 
IGCC 
1600 
17% 
30 
10% 
11% 
1865 
198 
35 
0.30 
85% 
7446 
2.7 
0.8 
3.4 
50 
49% 
1.5 
4.9 
SATONNE 
OIL 
IGCC 
1450 
17% 
30 
10% 
11% 
1690 
179 
33 
0.25 
85% 
7446 
2.4 
0.7 
3.1 
70 
49% 
1.3 
4.4 
S/TONNE 
ORIMULS. 
IGCC 
1450 
17% 
30 
10% 
11% 
1690 
179 
33 
0.28 
85% 
7446 
2.4 
0.7 
3.1 
60 
49% 
1.6 
4.8 
S/TONNE 
LSFO 
STEAM 
1000 
14% 
40 
10% 
10% 
1136 
116 
30 
0.28 
85% 
7446 
1.6 
0.7 
2.2 
120 
39% 
2.7 
5.0 
S/TONNE 
NUCLEAR 
2400 
26% 
35 
10% 
10% 
3030 
314 
57 
0.40 
85% 
7446 
4.2 
1.2 
5.4 
0.5 
100% 
0.5 
5.9 
c/kWh 
6500 KCAL 6500 KCAL 6500 KCAL 9750KCAL 6500 KCAL 9750KCAL 
/KG NCV /KG NCV /KG NCV KG NCV /KG NCV KG NCV 
cc 
Table B4.3. Value of gas in power generation 
Assumptions: Load factor 
Discount rate (real) 
Capital cost (US$/kW) 
Interest on capex dur. constr. (%) 
Project life (years) 
Pre-tax discount rate (%) 
Annuity factor (%) 
Capex at commisioning 
Annual capital cost (S/kW) 
Fixed O&M (S/kW p.a.)* 
Variable O&M (c/kWh) 
Load factor (%) 
Electricity per KW (kWh) 
Capex (c/kWh) 
Opex (c/kWh) 
Capex + opex (c/kWh) 
Fuel price 
Thermal efficiency (net - LHV) 
Fuel cost (c/kWh output) 
Total cost of electricity (c/kWh) 
Fuel price units 
85% 
10% 
GAS 
CCGT 
650 
9% 
20 
10% 
12% 
710 
83 
21 
0.20 
85% 
7446 
1.1 
0.5 
1.6 
5.00 
55% 
3.4 
COAL 
PF+FGD 
1300 
17% 
40 
10% 
10% 
1515 
155 
35 
0.30 
85% 
7446 
2.1 
0.8 
2.9 
50 
42% 
1.6 
COAL 
use 
1500 
18% 
40 
10% 
10% 
1773 
181 
35 
0.53 
85% 
7446 
2.4 
1.0 
3.4 
50 
45% 
1.6 
COAL 
IGCC 
1600 
17% 
30 
10% 
11% 
1865 
198 
35 
0.30 
85% 
7446 
2.7 
0.8 
3.4 
50 
49% 
1.5 
OIL 
IGCC 
1450 
17% 
30 
10% 
11% 
1690 
179 
33 
0.25 
85% 
7446 
2.4 
0.7 
3.1 
70 
49% 
1.3 
ORIMULS. 
IGCC 
1450 
17% 
30 
10% 
11% 
1690 
179 
33 
0.28 
85% 
7446 
2.4 
0.7 
3.1 
60 
49% 
1.6 
LSFO 
STEAM 
1000 
14% 
40 
10% 
10% 
1136 
116 
30 
0.28 
85% 
7446 
1.6 
0.7 
2.2 
120 
39% 
2.7 
NUCLEAR 
2400 
26% 
35 
10% 
10% 
3030 
314 
57 
0.40 
85% 
7446 
4.2 
1.2 
5.4 
0.5 
100% 
0.5 
5.0 4.4 5.0 4.9 4.4 4.8 5.0 
S/MMBTU S/TONNE S/TONNE S/TONNE S/TONNE S/TONNE S/TONNE 
6500 KCAL 6500 KCAL 6500 KCAL 9750KCAL 6500 KCAL 9750KCAL 
/KG NCV /KG NCV /KG NCV KG NCV /KG NCV KG NCV 
5.9 
c/kWh 
Table B4.4. Value of gas in power generation 
Assumptions: Load factor 
Discount rate (real) 
Capital cost (USS/kW) 
Interest on capex dur. constr. (%) 
Project life (years) 
Pre-tax discount rate (%) 
Annuity factor (%) 
Capex at commisioning 
Annual capital cost (S/kW) 
Fixed O&M (S/kW p.a.)* 
Variable O&M (c/kWh) 
Load factor (%) 
Electricity per kW (kWh) 
Capex (c/kWh) 
Opex (c/kWh) 
Capex + opex (c/kWh) 
Fuel price 
Thermal efficiency (net - LHV) 
Fuel cost (c/kWh output) 
85% 
10% 
GAS 
CCGT 
650 
9% 
20 
10% 
12% 
710 
83 
21 
0.20 
85% 
7446 
1.1 
0.5 
1.6 
6.30 
55% 
4.3 
COAL 
PF+FGD 
1300 
17% 
40 
10% 
10% 
1515 
155 
35 
0.30 
85% 
7446 
2.1 
0.8 
2.9 
50 
42% 
1.6 
COAL 
use 
1500 
18% 
40 
10% 
10% 
1773 
181 
35 
0.53 
85% 
7446 
2.4 
1.0 
3.4 
50 
45% 
1.6 
COAL 
IGCC 
1600 
17% 
30 
10% 
11% 
1865 
198 
35 
0.30 
85% 
7446 
2.7 
0.8 
3.4 
50 
49% 
1.5 
OIL 
IGCC 
1450 
17% 
30 
10% 
11% 
1690 
179 
33 
0.25 
85% 
7446 
2.4 
0.7 
3.1 
70 
49% 
1.3 
ORIMULS. 
IGCC 
1450 
17% 
30 
10% 
11% 
1690 
179 
33 
0.28 
85% 
7446 
2.4 
0.7 
3.1 
60 
49% 
1.6 
LSFO 
STEAM 
1000 
14% 
40 
10% 
10% 
1136 
116 
30 
0.28 
85% 
7446 
1.6 
0.7 
2.2 
120 
39% 
2.7 
NUCLEAR 
2400 
26% 
35 
10% 
10% 
3030 
314 
57 
0.40 
85% 
7446 
4.2 
1.2 
5.4 
0.5 
100% 
0.5 
Total cost of electricity (c/kWh) 5.9 4.4 5.0 4.9 4.4 4.8 5.0 5.9 
Fuel price units S/MMBTU S/TONNE S/TONNE S/TONNE S/TONNE S/TONNE S/TONNE c/kWh 
6500 KCAL 6500 KCAL 6500 KCAL 9750KCAL 6500 KCAL 9750KCAL 
/KG NCV /KG NCV /KG NCV KG NCV /KG NCV KG NCV Β' fro 
Table B5.1. Domestic gas prices and taxes 
Gus taxes in (he Kll 
per ( ¡igajoule 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Ringdom 
Source: Gas Prices 
Category 
Region 
Brussels 
Copenhagen 
National territory 
Hamburg 
Hanover 
Wcser-Eins 
Dortmund 
Dusseldorf 
Frankfurt/Main 
Stuttgart 
Munich 
Berlin 
Dresden 
Madrid 
Barcelona 
Valencia 
North & East 
Lille 
Paris 
Strasbourg 
Marseille 
Lyon 
Toulouse 
Dublin 
Milan 
Turin 
Genoa 
Rome 
Naples 
Luxembourg -ville 
Rotterdam 
Lisbon 
London 
Leeds 
Birmingham 
990-94. Eurostat. 199 
D 1 (ai 
VAT 
2.69 
_ 
2.53 
2.24 
2.08 
2.62 
2.46 
2.49 
273 
2.15 
2.42 
2.93 
I 84 
1.84 
1.84 
-
-
1.95 
2.77 
-
-
-
2.25 
0.85 
0.87 
0.98 
0.97 
1.07 
0.70 
1.94 
-
-
4. 
Prices (ECU) 
Households 
nual cons. 8. 
Other tax 
0.34 
. 
0.51 
0.52 
0.52 
0.52 
0.52 
0.52 
0.52 
0.51 
0.52 
0.52 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.83 
1.03 
1.03 
0.82 
0.79 
-
0.27 
-
-
37 GJ) 
Total tax 
3.03 
" 
3.04 
2.76 
2.60 
3.14 
2.98 
3.01 
3.25 
2.66 
2.94 
3.45 
1.84 
1.84 
1.84 
-
-
1.95 
2.77 
-
. 
-
2 25 
1.68 
1.90 
2.01 
1.79 
1.86 
0.70 
2.21 
-
-
Prices (ECU) 
Households 
D 2 (annual cons. 16.74 GJ) 
VAT 
2.49 
-
2.03 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
76 
57 
84 
86 
90 
27 
70 
42 
16 
62 
62 
62 
-
-
1.86 
2.39 
-
-
-
1.91 
0.77 
0.76 
0.88 
0.87 
0.97 
0.60 
1.46 
-
-
Other tax 
0.34 
-
0.52 
0.52 
0.52 
0.51 
0.51 
0.51 
0.51 
0.52 
0.52 
0.52 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.82 
1.04 
1.03 
0.82 
0.78 
-
0.27 
-
-
Total tax 
2.83 
-
2.55 
2.28 
2.09 
2.35 
2.37 
2.41 
2.78 
2 22 
2.94 
2.68 
1.62 
1.62 
1.62 
_ 
-
1.86 
2.39 
-
-
. 
1.91 
1.59 
1.80 
1.91 
1.69 
1.75 
0,60 
1.73 
-
-
Prices (ECU) 
Households 
D 3 (annual cons. 83 
VAT 
1.47 
-
1.15 
1.13 
0.98 
1.13 
1.20 
111 
1.34 
1.28 
1.43 
1.28 
1.28 
1.28 
1.28 
. 
. 
1.22 
1.39 
. 
. 
. 
0.92 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
0 
1 
35 
20 
31 
35 
28 
31 
09 
-
-
Other tax 
0.34 
-
0.52 
0.52 
0.52 
0.52 
0.51 
0.52 
0.52 
0.52 
0.51 
0.52 
-
-
-
. 
_ 
-
-
. 
. 
3.93 
4.48 
4.48 
3,93 
3.16 
-
0.27 
. 
-
7GJ) 
Total tax 
1.81 
-
1.67 
1.65 
1.50 
1.65 
1.71 
1.63 
1.86 
1.80 
1.94 
1.80 
1.28 
1.28 
1.28 
. 
. 
1 22 
1.39 
, 
. 
. 
0.92 
6.28 
6.68 
6.79 
6.28 
4.44 
0.31 
1.36 
. 
-
Prices (ECU) 
Households 
D 3b(annual cons. 12 
VAT 
1.39 
-
1.11 
1.08 
0.93 
1.04 
1.13 
1.01 
1.23 
1.17 
1.42 
1.19 
1.24 
1.24 
1.24 
. 
_ 
1.15 
1.38 
. 
_ 
_ 
0.92 
1 
2 
2 
-, 
1 
0 
1 
35 
19 
32 
35 
27 
29 
05 
-
-
Other tax 
0.34 
-
0.52 
0.52 
0.52 
0.52 
0.51 
0.52 
0.52 
0.52 
0.52 
0.52 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
4.02 
4,57 
4.77 
4.02 
3.26 
. 
0.28 
_ 
-
5.6 GJ) 
Total tax 
1.73 
-
1.63 
1.60 
1.45 
1.56 
1.64 
1.53 
1.75 
1.69 
1.94 
1.71 
1.24 
1.24 
1.24 
. 
. 
1.15 
1.38 
. 
. 
0.92 
6.37 
6.76 
7.09 
6.37 
4.53 
0.29 
1.33 
. 
-
Prices (ECU) 
Households 
D 4 (annual cons. 1.047 GJ) 
VAT 
1.17 
-
0.95 
0.99 
0.81 
0.99 
1.04 
0.95 
1.00 
I 01 
1.25 
1.00 
0.88 
0.88 
0.88 
. 
1.05 
1.26 
. 
0,92 
Ί 
2 
1 
Ί 
1 
0 
1 
21 
28 
32 
60 
28 
29 
00 
Other tax 
0.34 
-
0.52 
0.52 
0.52 
0,51 
0.52 
0.52 
0.52 
0.51 
0.52 
0.52 
_ 
. 
. 
. 
4.21 
4.76 
4,76 
4,21 
3.47 
. 
0.27 
. 
" 
Total tax 
1.51 
1.47 
1.51 
1.33 
1.50 
1.56 
1.47 
1.52 
1.52 
1.77 
1.52 
0.88 
0.88 
0.88 
1.05 
1.26 
0.92 
6.42 
7.04 
7.08 
6.81 
4.75 
0.29 
1.27 
• 
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Table B5.2. Industrial gas prices and taxes 
Cas l ax« in the EU 
per ('tieajoille (¡'/<U-l¡ 
Category 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
UK 
Region 
National territori' 
National territory 
Hambun; 
Hanover 
Wescr­Ems 
Dortmund 
Dusseldorf 
Frankfurt/Main 
Slungan 
Munich 
Berlin 
Diesden 
Madnd 
Barcelona 
Valencia 
North & East 
Lille 
Pans 
Strasbourg 
Marseille 
Lyon 
Toulouse 
Dublin 
Milan 
Tunn 
Genoa 
Rome 
Naples 
Luxembourg ­ville 
Rotterdam 
Lisbon 
London 
Leeds 
Birmingham 
1 1 (an 
VAT 
1.30 
1.35 
0 9 5 
1.08 
0 8 3 
0 98 
-
0 9 5 
1 03 
1 08 
1 24 
1 05 
1 19 
1.19 
1 19 
1 19 
1.14 
1 14 
1 34 
1.14 
1 14 
111 
0 8 8 
1 50 
1.42 
1 49 
1 69 
2 09 
0 2 9 
1 111 
0 9 2 
Pnces (ECU) 
Industry 
ual cons. 418 6 GJ) 
Other laves 
0.34 
0.52 
052 
0 52 
0.52 
-
0 5 2 
0 5 2 
0 5 2 
0.52 
0 5 2 
-
-
-
0 4 2 
041 
041 
041 
0 42 
0 2 7 
Tot taxes 
1 64 
1 35 
1 47 
1 60 
1 35 
1.50 
1.47 
1 55 
1.60 
1 76 
1 57 
1.19 
1 19 
1.19 
1 19 
1 14 
1 14 
1 34 
1.14 
1.14 
1.14 
0 8 8 
1 92 
1 83 
1 90 
2 10 
2 51 
0 2 9 
1 28 
0 9 2 
Pnces (ECU) 
Industry 
1 2 (annual eons. 4.186 GJ) 
VAT 
0.96 
1.29 
0 9 4 
0 8 8 
0.80 
0.80 
0 8 9 
0.95 
0 9 5 
0 9 8 
0 8 7 
0.66 
0.66 
0 6 6 
0 6 6 
0 9 6 
0 9 6 
1 17 
0 9 6 
0 9 6 
0 96 
0.71 
1 46 
1.35 
1 48 
1 63 
2 0 4 
0 2 7 
0 9 9 
0 79 
Other taxes 
-
0.52 
0 51 
0 5 2 
0.52 
-
0 5 2 
0 51 
0.52 
0 5 2 
0 5 2 
-
--
0 4 1 
0 42 
11.41 
0.41 
0 41 
0 2 8 
Tol taxes 
0.96 
1 29 
1.46 
1.39 
1.32 
1.32 
-
141 
1 46 
1.47 
1 50 
1 39 
0 6 6 
(166 
0 6 6 
0 6 6 
0 9 6 
0 9 6 
1.17 
0.96 
0.96 
0 9 6 
0.71 
1 87 
1 77 
1 89 
204 
2 45 
0 27 
1.27 
0 79 
Pnces (ECU) 
Industry 
13­1 (annual cons. 41.860 GJ) 
VAT 
0 7 6 
0 82 
0 8 7 
0 77 
0 6 6 
0.77 
0 7 9 
0.91 
0 9 0 
0.96 
0 81 
0 3 5 
0.35 
0 3 5 
0 3 5 
0.68 
0 6 7 
0.78 
0 6 8 
0 6 6 
0 6 8 
0 3 8 
0 35 
0 3 5 
0.35 
0 3 5 
0 35 
0 2 6 
0.58 
0 6 4 
Olher taxes 
0.51 
0.52 
0.51 
0.52 
0 5 2 
0.51 
0 5 2 
0.52 
0 52 
-
0.17 
0 18 
0.18 
0.17 
0.17 
0.17 
0 4 2 
0 4 2 
0 42 
0 4 2 
0 42 
0 2 8 
Tot taxes 
0.76 
0.82 
1 38 
1.29 
1 17 
1.29 
1.31 
1 42 
1.42 
1.48 
1.33 
0.35 
0.35 
0 3 5 
0 35 
0.85 
0 8 5 
0.96 
0 8 5 
0 8 3 
0 85 
0 3 8 
0 7 7 
0 7 7 
0 7 7 
0 7 7 
0 77 
0.26 
0 8 6 
0 6 4 
Pnces (ECU) 
Industry 
1 3­2 (annual cons 41.860 GJ) 
VAT 
0 61 
0.82 
0 7 9 
0.76 
0.66 
0.74 
0 7 7 
0.83 
0 7 7 
0.96 
0.79 
0.34 
0 34 
0 3 4 
0.34 
0.66 
0.66 
0.73 
0.66 
0 6 5 
0 6 2 
0.38 
0 34 
0.34 
0 3 4 
0 3 4 
0 3 4 
0 25 
0 5 7 
-
0 6 3 
Other taxes 
-
0 5 2 
0.52 
0.51 
052 
-
0 51 
0.51 
052 
0.52 
0.52 
-
0 17 
0 18 
0 19 
0.17 
0 17 
0.17 
042 
042 
0 4 2 
042 
0 42 
0 2 8 
Tot taxes 
0 61 
082 
1.31 
1.28 
1 17 
1.26 
1 28 
1.34 
1.29 
1.48 
1.31 
0 3 4 
0.34 
0 3 4 
0.34 
0.83 
0 8 4 
0.92 
0 83 
0.82 
0.79 
0.38 
076 
0 7 6 
0 76 
0.76 
0 76 
025 
0.85 
0 6 3 
Pnces (ECU) 
Industry 
1 4­1(annual cons 418.600 GJ) 
VAT 
0 6 1 
0.63 
0.68 
0.74 
0.55 
0 7 0 
0 7 4 
0.77 
0.73 
0.85 
0.59 
0.32 
0.32 
0.32 
0 32 
0.56 
0 5 6 
0 5 6 
0.55 
0 55 
0 2 4 
0 31 
0 31 
0 31 
0.31 
0 31 
0 2 4 
0.47 
0 5 8 
Other taxes 
0.51 
0.52 
0.51 
0 5 2 
0 5 2 
0.52 
0 5 2 
0 5 2 
0.52 
0.28 
0 2 9 
0 2 8 
0 2 9 
0 28 
0,41 
0 41 
0 41 
0 4 1 
0.41 
0 2 5 
• 
Tot taxes 
0 61 
0 6 3 
1.19 
1 26 
1 06 
1.22 
1 26 
1 29 
1 25 
1 37 
111 
032 
032 
032 
0 32 
084 
0 8 5 
0 84 
084 
0 8 3 
0 24 
0 72 
0 72 
0 72 
0 72 
0 72 
0 24 
0 7 2 
0 5 8 
Pnces (ECU) 
Industry 
1 4­2 (annual cons 418.600 GJ) 
VAT 
0.56 
0.63 
0 6 4 
0.53 
0 5 5 
0.68 
-
0.71 
0 6 9 
0.68 
0 76 
0.61 
0 3 2 
0 3 2 
0 3 2 
0 32 
0.55 
0 55 
0 5 5 
0.53 
0 5 4 
0 24 
0.29 
0 2 9 
0.29 
0 2 9 
0 2 9 
0 24 
0 47 
0 5 8 
Olher taxes 
-
-
0 52 
0.49 
0.51 
0 52 
052 
0 52 
0 52 
0 52 
0 51 
-
0 2 8 
0 2 9 
0 28 
0 29 
0 2 8 
0 42 
042 
042 
042 
0 42 
0 25 
Tot laxes 
056 
063 
1 16 
1 02 
1 06 
I 20 
1 23 
1.21 
1.20 
1 28 
1 12 
0 32 
0 32 
032 
0 32 
083 
0 84 
0 8 3 
0 82 
0 82 
024 
0 71 
0 71 
0 71 
0.71 
0 71 
0 24 
0 72 
0 58 
1 5 (ann 
VAT 
0 48 
n.a. 
0 3 8 
0 38 
0 5 0 
041 
0 28 
063 
0 3 8 
0 55 
0 55 
0 55 
1)55 
0 55 
0 24 
024 
0 24 
0 24 
0 24 
0 24 
040 
0 38 
Pnces (ECU) 
Industry 
al cons 4.186.000 GJ) 
Other taxes 
-
n.a. 
049 
0.49 
0.52 
0.52 
0 35 
049 
0.52 
0.23 
0.23 
0.23 
0 23 
023 
0 19 
Tol taxes 
0 48 
π a 
0.87 
087 
1 02 
093 
0 63 
1 12 
090 
0 78 
0 78 
0 78 
0 78 
0 78 
0 24 
024 
0 24 
024 
0 24 
0 24 
0 59 
0 38 
Source Gas pnces 1490­44. Eurostal. 1944 
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Table B5.3. Energy taxes in the EU Member States 
Country 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece * 
Ireland 
Italy ** 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United 
Kingdom 
Heavy fuel oil for industry 
(ECU per tonne) in 1994 
Excise tax 
21.02 
7.99 
20.55 
21.77 
16.75 
15.10 
40.41 
5.86 
22.80 
13.43 
29.30 
35.08 
12.22 
38.12 
6.45 
VAT 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Total tax 
21.02 
7.99 
20.55 
21.77 
16.75 
15.10 
40.41 
5.86 
22.80 
13.43 
29.30 
35.08 
12.22 
38.12 
6.45 
Heavy fuel oil for electricity generation 
(ECU per tonne) in 1993 
Excise tax 
0 
17.71 
n.a. 
12.57 
21.02 
27.18 
42.77 
5.47 
1.47 
n.a. 
28.72 
0 
12.86 
14.70 
n.a. 
VAT 
0 
0 
n.a. 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
n.a. 
n.a. 
0 
0 
0 
0 
n.a. 
Total tax 
0.00 
17.71 
n.a. 
12.57 
21.02 
27.18 
42.77 
5.47 
1.47 
n.a. 
28.72 
0.00 
12.86 
14.70 
n.a. 
Source: IEA 'Energy Prices and Taxes". Paris. 1995. 
* Electricity for industry refers to 1993 prices. 
** Natural gas for households refers to 1993 prices. 
Table B5.4. Percentage breakdown of gas consumption of different end-users (1993) 
Country 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Industry 
51.5 
44.2 
37.6 
95.5 
43.7 
40.9 
85.7 
68.4 
43.6 
63.8 
36.7 
0.0 
76.8 
64.1 
23.5 
Residential 
48.0 
39.0 
38.9 
3.0 
28.6 
41.3 
0.0 
18.8 
55.4 
36.2 
34.2 
80.0 
16.9 
17.9 
60.1 
Others * 
0.6 
16.8 
23.5 
1.5 
27.7 
17.8 
14.3 
12.8 
1.0 
0.0 
29.1 
20.0 
6.3 
17.9 
16.5 
Total 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Source: IEA. 'Energy Balances of OECD Countries 1992-1993". Paris. 1995. 
* It includes transport, agriculture, commerce and public service and non-specified. 
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B6. Modelling and game theory 
B6.1. Further discussions of oligopoly models 
This section contains further discussion of issues raised in the main text. 
B6.1.1. Risk and cost factors 
One possible outcome from TPA is that there is border price parity between producers. This 
would result in the standard oligopoly model where prices must be equal if market share is not 
to be lost. 
However, it is conceivable that segmented markets could appear, determined by the risk 
preferences of consumers and also by consumer location. For example, the FSU could supply 
higher risk, low price gas to risk-averse users. At the same time, producers may be able to 
supply gas more cheaply at locations close to their borders with the EU. If transmission costs 
within the EU are large compared to differences in producers' costs, then markets close to EU 
borders could be dominated by producers close to those markets. 
If segmented markets are formed due to either security of supply or geographic location, there 
is unlikely to be strong competition between producers. This will be partly mitigated by 
consumers being able to buy a mix of gas from different producers in order to match their risk 
preferences. 
This leads to two situations: 
Situation 1: a single market for gas results under TPA 
Under the following three assumptions, we model the European market for gas under TPA as a 
Cournot oligopoly model: 
(a) differences between security of supply are small implying that the risk premium is 
insignificant; 
(b) transmission costs are low within the EC; 
(c) differences in producers' costs are not large enough to induce low cost producers into a 
strategy of forcing out competition. 
No price discrimination is possible. 
The producers must all charge the same price for gas, but they supply different quantities to 
the market depending on their costs. As total supply to the market increases, the gas price must 
fall. 
Pricing disparity with the oil price - if profit maximizing levels of supply imply a price which 
is lower than the oil price, we would expect to get an outcome in line with the standard 
oligopoly result. However, this appears most unlikely. 
Pricing parity with the oil price - at oil price parity producers may be unwilling to increase 
supply to the market because of the inelastic nature of demand below price. At this 'kink 
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point" in demand there may be no unique equilibrium of individual producers' output. 
However, while it is uncertain how much each producer would supply individually, we are 
able to predict the total supply to the market and the final price to consumers ­ a price equal to 
the oil price. 
Relaxing the third assumption of our Hypothesis 1 (differences in producers' costs), without 
relaxing the other two assumptions, may result in Bertrand competition in the gas market and 
possible predatory pricing. For example, if the FSU were a very low cost producer compared 
to Norway and Algeria, then it could price its competitors out of the market. Bertrand 
competition would prove successful for a low cost producer if, in addition to assumptions 1 
and 2: 
(a) cost differentials are large and exit costs are low so that lower profit margins would be 
­ more than compensated by gaining the entire European gas market; or 
(b) re­entry costs for producers are high and exit costs are low enough for the low cost 
producer to pursue a predatory pricing strategy. 
Relaxing the three assumptions in situation 1 results in our second scenario, situation 2. 
Situation 2: TPA results in the formation of segmented markets 
In situation 2. we assume that producers are able to charge different prices because they serve 
different markets. In particular, the markets that are formed under TPA are characterized by 
geographic location and by risk preferences. Norway, as a low security risk producer, is able to 
charge a higher price for its gas. The FSU and Algeria, on the other hand, sell more cheaply to 
risk­neutral and less risk­averse gas users. A likely outcome in this scenario is that consumers 
buy a mix of gas to suit their risk preferences. 
It is possible that a unique equilibrium in price and quantities will exist if the costs of 
suppliers are very different. Specifically, if one supplier has much higher production costs than 
the other, then the lower cost supplier may find it economic to undercut the other by pricing 
just below the others' marginal cost of supply so capturing the entire market of risk­neutral gas 
users. 
The outcome of this scenario is that all producers continue to supply the gas market, but target 
their supply at different segments. They therefore charge different prices, and supply different 
classes of consumer. 
B6.2. A Hotelling approach to gas pricing 
Hotelling's rule43 is a pricing principle which aims to determine the optimal consumption of 
non­renewable resources. The rule states that for the time path of extraction of a non­
renewable resource to be optimal,44 the net price (selling price less marginal extraction cost) of 
a unit of resource must rise at a rate equal to the interest rate. It relies on there being perfect 
competition in the market for the non­renewable resource. 
■" 'The economics of exhaustible resources", H. Hotelling. Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 39. 1931. 
44 By optimal we mean welfare maximizing. 
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The reasoning behind the rule is as follows. If it is assumed that a producer sets prices in each 
period to maximize the present value of profits, then by definition, this yields a profit 
maximizing level of production in every period. The only condition under which the producer 
will not want to alter this level of production is when the marginal present value of profit is 
constant in every period. For this to happen, marginal profit must rise with the discount 
(interest) rate. Since marginal profit is simply marginal revenue less the marginal cost of the 
resource, and price equals marginal revenue in a competitive market, this yields Hotelling's 
rule. 
The last step in the reasoning shows why for Hotelling's rule to hold, it is necessary for there 
to be a competitive producer market for the resource. If, for example, there was a single profit 
maximizing producer, then Hotelling's rule must be modified so that discounted marginal 
profit rises with the interest rate - since price is no longer equal to marginal revenue. 
Two major assumptions that have been both explicitly and implicitly made in Hotelling's rule 
are therefore: 
(a) that the resource is non-renewable, and that the quantity of resource available is known; 
(b) that the producer market is perfectly competitive (i.e. that producers are price-takers). 
In application to gas, both of these assumptions are violated. The amount of resources is 
unknown, as the market is far from perfectly competitive. 
In addition to the first assumption, an optimal pricing problem also arises because the increase 
in the cost of energy must be taken into account, as gas is eventually replaced by a more 
expensive resource. Optimal pricing includes the costs imposed on future generations through 
higher consumption today. These costs can be modelled, but with considerable difficulty due 
to the uncertainty of when gas reserves will be finally depleted and the cost of a replacement 
fuel. 
The market imperfections in the European gas market add further problems in using 
Hotelling's rule to predict future gas prices. Pricing policies will depend on many factors. 
These include their estimates of their own and others' gas reserves, the price of competing 
fuels such as oil, demand for energy, and political considerations. In particular, the high 
reserve to production ratios among key exporters mean that consideration of pricing on the 
basis of a finite resource base is unlikely to figure in practical decision making processes. 
We conclude, therefore, that although Hotelling's rule provides a useful insight into the 
optimal pricing of resources such as gas, it does not provide a robust methodology for 
predicting future prices in the European gas market. 
B6.3. Game theory concepts relevant in modelling the European natural gas market 
Game theory provides a general framework for analysing the interaction of decision making 
agents. It has applications in economics, biology, politics, and social theory. For our purposes, 
game theory allows us to analyse the strategies of producers and transmission companies in the 
European gas market. 
Game theory is particularly relevant to the European gas market because the number of major 
participants is low. When there are few player in a market, the behaviour of each player has a 
greater impact on the market as a whole. Under such circumstances the opportunity for gaming 
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and collusion - either tacit or overt - increases. The European gas market currently has few 
major producers, and the transmission companies are monopolies in the areas they serve. The 
market is also characterized by long-term contracts between producers and transmission 
companies, and the final market price is strongly correlated with oil and coal prices. Such a 
structure and final price suggests that gaming may presently be taking place within the market. 
This appendix outlines the theory we have used in modelling the behaviour of producers and 
transmission companies in the current situation and under the introduction of TPA. 
The appendix is arranged in the following way. In Section B6.3.1 we define the basic concepts 
in game theory. In Section B6.3.2 we describe the results we might expect as an outcome from 
a game. We consider the importance of a specific game (the Prisoners' Dilemma) to oligopoly 
theory in Section B6.3.3. In Section B6.3.4 we return to general games and consider what 
result might occur when more than one solution to a game is possible. Section B6.3.5 
introduces the possibility of uncertainty in players' information. 
In Sections B6.3.7 to B6.3.10 we consider what happens in repeated games and revisit the 
Prisoners' Dilemma to see how tacit co-operation might be brought about in an oligopoly 
market. Section B6.3.11 then looks at some of the major criticisms that are made about the 
results derived from repeating the Prisoners' Dilemma. Section B6.3.12 indicates how the 
model can be improved to take into account these criticisms. 
Finally, in Sections B6.3.13 to B6.3.14, we consider the theory of co-operative games and 
assume that binding contracts are possible. We outline Nash bargaining theory and suggest 
that this is a useful framework for analysing bargaining for profits between firms. 
B6.3.1.Defining a game in economics 
A game in economics is a competitive situation where several agents make decisions, and then 
receive a pay-off resulting from their decisions. An agent's choice at each decision point is 
determined by the final pay-off which it expects to receive. The assumed objective of each 
agent is that they want to maximize their pay-offs from the game. The possibility that actions 
by one player affect the pay-offs of other players results in the formation of players' strategies. 
The assumption of pay-off maximization causes some difficulties in using game theory to 
model real-life applications. One particular problem is that in real-life games players act 
differently given identical situations. This arises because players have different valuations of 
seemingly similar pay-offs. For example, it would be wrong to suggest that any agent playing a 
game which had monetary pay-offs would necessarily maximize the revenue accruing to him. 
Some players would take other considerations into account such as benefit or loss accruing to 
others and time and effort of the player involved. 
In modelling economic behaviour of firms, however, there is usually less modelling difficulty 
since it is generally assumed that they will maximize expected profits. There are instances 
where this may not be the case, but careful evaluation of the real-life situation should allow 
identification of where these instances might occur. Usually, where profits do not appear to be 
maximized in the short run, they are maximized in the long run. For example, a firm may 
make an expenditure to reduce pollution risk. Although this expenditure reduces profit in the 
short run, it also reduces the long-run risk of pollution which the firm could be held 
accountable for in the future. 
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Whilst a firm will pursue the maximization of expected profits, it may turn out that the firm 
has failed to maximize actual profits. This may be due to the unpredictability of the future or 
having insufficient information to analyse the situation adequately. Uncertainty in an 
economic situation gives rise to problems of 'incomplete' and 'imperfect' information. These 
are issues which we discuss in a later section. 
For the rest of this appendix, and in the main report we shall assume that all agents maximize 
their monetary pay-off. 
B6.3.2.The expected result of a game 
We describe in this section what we might expect to see as an outcome from a game. In 
particular, we want to be able to suggest what players might do, given the rules and 
circumstances they find themselves in. If each player wants to maximize his pay-off, given the 
information available to him, what will his strategy be 
When each and every player's strategy in the game maximizes his pay-off, given the strategies 
of the other players, the combined set of strategies is known as a Nash equilibrium. A Nash 
equilibrium implies that no single player should want to deviate from his strategy, since it is 
the optimal strategy given the strategies of the other players. This is not to say that such an 
equilibrium is unique, or that it is the 'best' solution available to all the players: it merely 
means that no maximizing player will unilaterally deviate from it. The Nash equilibrium is a 
useful concept because it means that the players' strategies are unilaterally stable. It does not, 
however, say anything about how the players reach such an equilibrium. 
Β 6.3.3. Importance of the Prisoners' Dilemma in oligopoly theory 
In the previous sections we have described what a game is, what players' objectives are, and 
the relationship between players' optimal strategies - characterized by the Nash equilibrium. 
In this section we digress from the theory and focus on one particularly useful game. 
An important pay-off structure in oligopoly theory is that characterized by the Prisoners" 
Dilemma. The game was originally suggested in terms of two prisoners' dilemma over 
whether to confess or deny a crime, and essentially represents a co-ordination problem 
between selfish individuals. Economists use the Prisoners' Dilemma pay-off structure to 
describe the game played between oligopolists in a market. 
The oligopolists' problem was first examined by Cournot. He considered duopolist producers 
selling an identical product. The producers must sell at the same price, otherwise the cheaper 
producer would make all the sales. Cournot's concept is that although the duopolists do not 
compete in prices, they do compete in quantities. The more each producer wants to sell, the 
lower the market price must be to sell the increased quantity. Since there, is not enough room 
in the market for both companies to extract monopoly rents, the companies must decide on 
how much to supply to the market. For each specific quantity sold by one producer, there 
exists a unique profit maximizing quantity that the other producer should sell. In equilibrium, 
each producer's output will maximize its profits, given the output of the other producer. Such 
an equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. 
Even though this equilibrium level of output maximizes each of the producer's profits 
individually, it is not the 'best' solution available to them. Both producers could make higher 
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profits by agreeing to a restricted total output (at the monopoly level) and sharing the profits in 
some way. However, this restricted level of output is not an equilibrium because at the 
monopoly level of output one producer could cheat on the other by increasing its output and 
thereby increasing its market share. Thus, even though both producers would be better off by 
joint maximization, they are unable to trust the other party not to increase sales unless they can 
sign a binding agreement. 
B6.3.4. Games with more than one solution 
In the Prisoners" Dilemma game we describe above, there is a unique Nash equilibrium 
solution. When there are more than one set of strategies which are optimal - multiple Nash 
equilibrium - the modeller is faced with a choice of which equilibrium to choose as the most 
likely outcome of the game. The modeller must therefore find some way to reject some of the 
Nash equilibria. In this section we consider some of the refinements that can be made to 
multiple solutions. 
One particular criticism of some Nash equilibria is that they implicitly contain 'non-credible 
threats'. This occurs when a player is induced into playing a particular strategy by a threat 
from another player. It is possible, however, that this threat could also worsen the pay-off of 
the threatening player. In this case, if the player's bluff was called, then it would be rational 
for him not to execute the threat. The reason why this type of behaviour is admissible in a 
Nash equilibrium is that, in equilibrium, the player is never required to carry out the incredible 
threat. Thus, the particular Nash equilibrium is brought about by a player's threat of sub-
optimal play away from the equilibrium. 
Many economists believe that Nash equilibria involving incredible threats are 'bad' because a 
threatened player would not be duped into it. This dissatisfaction with the general set of Nash 
equilibria has lead game theorists to attempt to refine the set of Nash equilibria to only 'good' 
equilibria, and preferably a unique equilibrium. 
Perhaps the most compelling refinement of Nash equilibria is the concept of 'Subgame Perfect 
Equilibrium'. The Subgame Perfect Equilibrium is found by working backwards from the final 
pay-offs to the starting move. Each player considers the last decision that he needs to make in 
the game. If each player knows what pay-off he will get at this last move, then simple 
maximization indicates what option to take. Each player then considers his penultimate 
decision. Since his last move, and every other player's last move in the game is already 
decided from the previous calculation, then simple maximization will tell each player what to 
play at this penultimate decision point. This process can be repeated backwards to the first 
decision point. The final result is optimal play for each player from the first decision point to 
the last, giving each player an overall optimal strategy. 
The advantage of a subgame perfect equilibrium is that it does not admit any incredible threats 
since players use an optimal strategy at every stage of the game, whether in equilibrium or not. 
Thus, the players' strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium not just for the entire game, but also 
for every decision point within the game (subgames). However, there are also critiques of 
subgame perfection. The two major difficulties are, first, the reliance on backwards induction 
for a solution, and second, when imperfect information is introduced. The former criticism is 
made because of frequently observed myopia - or 'bounded rationality' - of players (see 
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Section B6.3.11), and the latter requires a detailed knowledge of the beliefs of the players in 
the game. 
In our analysis of the European gas market, we take a pragmatic approach to Nash equilibria 
refinements. In particular we follow the suggestion of Binmore (1992) in taking into account 
all the circumstances of the game before deciding which equilibrium is appropriate for given 
situations. We do not therefore rule out any equilibrium until analysis suggests that the 
equilibrium is unrealistic. 
Β6.3.5. Imperfect information 
Up to now we have considered games in which the rules and the pay-offs are common 
knowledge to all the players. In a situation like the European gas market it is clear that agents 
will hold important private information which is unavailable to others. This private 
information includes costs and estimates of gas reserves, which are vital for agents to form 
pricing policies under any market conditions. In this section, we examine the scope for game 
theory to deal with such information 'asymmetries'. 
In game theory literature, a game is said to have 'imperfect information' when a player is 
unsure as to what happened in previous play by other players. Game theory is structured so 
that each player makes his move sequentially. Imperfect information therefore allows us to 
model situations where players move simultaneously. This is achieved by assuming the player 
which moves second does not know the action of the first player. Thus, the second player is 
unable to distinguish between outcomes within any single information set. 
Uncertainties about, say, producers costs, can be modelled in this way - by assuming that at 
the start of a game, a producer is endowed with a certain cost function. The producer itself 
knows its own cost, but it is not observed by other players. The other players may have some 
approximate idea of the producer's costs but must infer anything more detailed through the 
actions of the producer. Such an information asymmetry may lead the producer into strategies 
which disguise its cost function. 
Inference of costs by the other players can be made by analysing the motives of the producer, 
and by analysing play in the game before that stage. Observations allow the other players to 
form beliefs about the information which they do not currently know. However, in order to do 
this, they must also make important assumptions about how other players will behave. 
B6.3.6. Riskaversion 
Risk aversion is not given a great deal of coverage in game theory, but needs to be considered 
in many modelling contexts. Players are usually assumed to maximize expected pay-offs, 
thereby making them risk-neutral. In practice, most players are risk-averse and therefore 
require a premium for taking risks. This needs to be built into players' pay-off functions in 
order to model the situation accurately. 
B6.3.7. Repeated games 
In real life, economic situations are repeated more than once. For example, competing 
duopolists have the opportunity to change prices over time, and two firms in a bilateral 
agreement may have to renegotiate a contract when the original contract expires. 
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Game theory allows us to model such situations by simply extending the original game for the 
number of times it is repeated in practice. The final game to be analysed becomes a 
'supergame' which is simply a repetition of the original game. This framework allows the 
game theorist to model repeated games between players, and is clearly a very useful tool in 
modelling the European gas market. 
To model a game accurately over time it is necessary to introduce a discount rate which is 
applied progressively to pay-offs throughout the game. This means that the present value of 
the pay-off from later games is lower than previous games. The change in pay-offs due to the 
discount rate can mean that there are different optimal strategies in the repeated game and the 
one-off game. We consider in particular what happens to the duopolist - Prisoners' Dilemma -
game if played more than once. 
B6.3.8. The Prisoners' Dilemma as a repeated game 
In Section B6.3.3 we introduced the 'one-shot' Prisoners' Dilemma and described how the 
pay-offs could be viewed as those faced by competing duopolists. The result can be 
generalized to the oligopoly case. 
The conclusion in Section B6.3.3 was that the duopolists would produce at a non-co-operative 
level. Although they would like jointly to maximize profits by restricting output to the 
monopoly level, they were unable to commit to such a strategy for fear that one of them would 
cheat on the arrangement by increasing output. This section reviews this conclusion in the 
circumstance where the duopolists compete over time, since co-operation in the short term 
could mean higher profits in the future. 
B6.3.9. Repeating the game a finite number of times 
A first attempt at modelling the repeated game is by considering the Prisoners' Dilemma game 
repeated a finite number of times. A vitally important assumption is that both players know 
how many times the game is repeated before it ends. In this circumstance the players could 
solve for their optimal strategy by considering the last stage first. In the last game, players 
have nothing to lose by choosing the non co-operative strategy - since no actions take place 
after this point they choose their strategy in accordance to the one-shot game, ae ard 
induction suggests that in the penultimate game, players will also not co-operate since they 
know that no co-operation will occur in the last game. This reasoning can be employed 
backwards to show that rational players would not co-operate at any stage in a finitely repeated 
Prisoners' Dilemma. Hence, there is a theoretical result in game theory that players do not co-
operate if the Prisoners' Dilemma is repeated only a finite number of times, and both players 
know how many times the game will be repeated. The result is both a Nash equilibrium and a 
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (as described in Section B6.3.4). The equilibrium has the 
property that at every stage each player is playing his optimal strategy. 
B6.3.10. An infinite or uncertain horizon in the Prisoners' Dilemma 
The co-operative dilemma facing the duopolists can be resolved in an infinitely repeated 
setting. In contrast to the one-period game and the finitely repeated game, where it always pays 
to increase output to the non-co-operative level, many equilibria for the infinitely repeated 
game exist. If one producer, for instance, decides to always restrict output, then the other 
producer will always do best by producing at the high level of output. But if a producer 
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decides to restrict output until the other increases its output and never co-operates again, both 
producers could do best by co-operating at every stage. Depending on the discount rates of the 
players, it is feasible that the players will co-operate at every repetition of the game. 
The crucial difference between the infinite horizon game and the finite horizon game is that 
the duopolists are always able to punish non-co-operation in the infinite horizon game because 
players are unsure when the game will end. Thus, under certain assumptions about the market 
structure, we can see why oligopolists may decide to restrict output to the monopoly level. 
This reasoning also applies when the end point of the game is unknown, i.e. players do not 
know how many rounds of the game there may be. This appears to apply closely to the 
European gas industry. 
B6.3.11. Criticism of the Prisoners' Dilemma as a model of an oligopoly market 
The two theoretical outcomes described above under finite and infinite repetition of the 
Prisoners' Dilemma can both be criticized as models of an oligopoly market. Several game 
theorists have expressed some doubts about the validity of the finite game Nash equilibrium of 
non-co-operation. For example, even if the game lasted for a great number of periods - but 
still ended at some point - backwards induction still indicates that rational players would not 
co-operate. If we do not believe in such an outcome in real life then further information needs 
to be built into the game to give it more realism. It is our view that such backwards induction 
does not fully describe the situation faced by producers in the European gas market. 
To model the intuitive idea that oligopolists may tacitly co-operate at a restricted level of 
output, we introduced the concept of an infinite horizon. Under this assumption, and the 
assumption that players have perfect information about pay-offs and market structure, we 
could conclude that co-operation between producers would take place. However, this latter 
assumption is extremely restrictive and highly unrealistic. It is then natural to ask: what are the 
conditions that would make co-operation possible In the following section we describe some 
of the important conditions that affect the potential co-operation of producers in a market. 
B6.3.12. Refinements in the repeated Prisoners" Dilemma 
In this section we conclude our analysis of the Prisoners' Dilemma by examining the 
conditions under which the co-operation between duopolists might break down. The following 
market characteristics could cause producers in the European gas market to end tacit collusion 
and engage in non-co-operative behaviour: 
(a) The pay-off structure. The relative sizes of the pay-offs for each strategy determine both 
what the players wish to do themselves and what they expect their opponents to do. For 
example, there is much less incentive to undercut a competitor if this yields little benefit 
than if it is very profitable. The pay-off from defecting from the restricted output is 
determined by the costs of the companies and the shape of the demand curve. 
(b) The 'noise level. This refers to the extent to which it is possible to infer from 
observations what strategy was chosen by the opposition. A producer can only 
confidently 'punish' non-co-operation by another producer if it knows for sure that the 
other producer has defected. If it is difficult to observe whether a producer has changed 
its strategy, and not simply given a discount to a customer for particular circumstances, 
tacit collusion will be hard to maintain. 
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(c) Predictability of the future. Uncertainty about the future may cause a producer to break 
co-operation at a high price level. The producer may believe that the chances of the 
market structure remaining the same over time are very small. In this case it may decide 
to increase its profits in the short run by increasing output and lowering price. 
(d) The discount rates of the players. If one producer values earnings in the near future more 
than those in the distant future and the other is indifferent, the former may be tempted to 
undercut the latter and test the resolution of the latter to punish such behaviour. 
We can conclude from our survey of non-co-operative game theory that there are instances 
where optimal oligopoly behaviour results in tacit collusion. Under these circumstances, the 
producers will restrict output to the market and price at the monopoly level. We have shown 
that there are also conditions under which tacit collusion is made very difficult, to the point 
where players will eventually decide to price at the non-co-operative level. The exact 
circumstances in the market will determine whether tacit collusion or non-co-operation will 
take place. 
Β6.3.13. Co-operative game theory 
This section stands apart from other sections in this appendix in that we describe the theory of 
games where binding commitments can be made. Such a theory is motivated by the fact that 
many non-co-operative games lead to both multiple equilibrium and jointly 'undesirable' 
outcomes. 
Co-operative game theory is characterized by players bargaining over shares in a total pay-off. 
All the players attempt to get a higher share as possible, but are clearly restricted by the total 
amount to be shared. For example, the one-shot Prisoners' Dilemma could be interpreted in a 
co-operative context if binding agreements were possible. In this case, the players would agree 
to commit to the joint-maximizing (monopoly) position but would be faced with a different 
dilemma - how to split the profits 45 A natural outcome might be to split it 50-50, but this is 
not the only division that is possible. Co-operative game theory formalizes the bargaining 
possibilities of each of the players. 
A bargaining set is the set of all feasible outcomes of the game. For example, if two players 
are bargaining for amounts χ and y from a total of 10, the bargaining set will include all 
possibilities such that the two amounts add to no more than 10. and with no player having 
less than 0. For game theory analysis, some basic technical restrictions are put on the 
bargaining set. These are set out below: 
(a) The bargaining set is convex. This means that players are not restricted from sharing a 
given pay-off in any way they choose. 
(b) The set is bounded above and is closed. This is a technical requirement which says that 
the total pay-off is a finite amount and that all of the pay-off can be shared. 
(c) Free disposal is possible. A second technical requirement which means that the players 
are able (if willing to do so) to give money away. 
Given such a bargaining set, the players will naturally wish to get an optimal agreement for 
themselves. In particular, players will not agree to an allocation which can be Pareto 
45 We assume that one producer has a traditionally high share in the market and so will have higher profits if both 
producers charge the same price. 
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improved.46 The players will therefore choose allocations on the frontier of the bargaining set. 
i.e. there will be nothing left over after shares have been taken. In the example given above, 
this means that the players' shares will always add to £10. 
B6.3.14. Nash bargaining solution 
Nash defined a bargaining problem to be a situation where there is a bargaining set. and where 
this set includes a point of disagreement. Players receive the disagreement pay-off if 
negotiations break down. In some cases this might be zero. In the example of sharing £10. we 
might assume a disagreement point as an allocation of £3 for each player. 
Nash suggested that the shares which each player could negotiate in such instances depended 
on the: 
(a) shape of the bargaining set, 
(b) the disagreement point, and 
(c) the relative bargaining powers of the players. 
Clearly, no player would bargain for less than what he could achieve at the disagreement 
point. At the same time, both players want to be on the frontier of the bargaining set. However, 
this does not define a unique bargaining solution. Nash suggested four axioms (assumptions) 
which, taken together, describe a unique solution - known as the Nash Bargaining Solution. 
The axioms are: 
(a) Invariance to equivalent utility representations. This means that the final outcome should 
not depend on how players' utility scales are calibrated. 
(b) Symmetry. In symmetric situations, both players should receive the same pay-offs. 
(c) Independence of irrelevant alternatives. If the players sometimes agree on the set of pay-
offs X when Y is feasible, then they never agree on Y when X is feasible. 
(d) Pareto efficiency. No pay-off would result where all players could be made better off 
with a different feasible pay-off. 
Under these conditions, Nash showed that a unique equilibrium existed for n players in a 
bargaining game. Defining x, as the pay-off to player i and d¡ as the disagreement pay-off to 
player /', the Nash bargaining solution to the x,'s is the solution to: 
Maximize (xi-di)(x2-d2)....(xn-dn) 
subject to all x, being both feasible (in the bargaining set) and greater than the disagreement 
pay-offs (i.e. x¡>d¡ for all players /). 
Nash generalized the solution to include non-symmetric bargaining powers. For example, in a 
two-player game the bargaining powers of the two players could be described by numbers a 
and b, with a+b=l, a>0, b>0. If a player has a bargaining power of 1, it means that the player 
has all the bargaining power and would get the highest pay-off possible. If both players have a 
bargaining power of 0.5, then the bargaining power is symmetric and they each receive the 
same pay-off. 
A Pareto improvement is possible if an alternative allocation makes all players better off at the same time. 
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In the context of two players with different bargaining powers, the Nash bargaining pay-offs 
are given by: 
Maximize (xi-di)a(x2-d2)b 
subject to all x, being both feasible (in the bargaining set) and greater than the disagreement 
pay-offs (i.e. x¡ d¡ for all players /). 
B6.3.15. Summary 
To summarize, the Nash Bargaining Solution is based on four important assumptions. The 
assumptions of Pareto efficiency, invariance to utility, scale and independence are plausible. 
The assumption of bargaining power requires a further analysis of what determines bargaining 
power. This must be decided through a wider consideration of the positions of the players in 
the bargaining problem. More information is thus needed before estimates of bargaining power 
can be given. Although the Nash Bargaining Solution depends on such estimates, it is still 
useful as a framework for analysing bargaining between firms. 
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B7. Numerical sensitivities 
Table B7.1. Base case 
Summary of value chain 
Value of gas 
Cost of producers 
Cost of transmission 
Rent in trans 
Other rent 
Other assumptions 
Elasticity 
Volume affected (bcm 
Rent allocation 
Present situation 
Producers 
Transmission co 
Consumers 
TPA 
Producers 
Transmission co 
Consumers 
Table B7.2. Base 
pa) 
case: 
PG 
4.20 
2.73 
0.20 
0.10 
1.17 
PG 
-0.5 
50 
Barg/Pow 
1 
0.2 
0 
1 
0 
0.1 
changes in ι 
Industry 
3.50 
2.73 
0.20 
0.10 
0.47 
Industry 
-0.6 
25 
Scenario 1 
% of rent 
83% 
17% 
0% 
91% 
0% 
9% 
producer revenues 
Barg/Pow 
1 
0.2 
0 
1 
0 
0.4 
Scenario 2 
% of rent 
83% 
17% 
0% 
71% 
0% 
29% 
Description 
Change in price 
Change in volume 
Total volume 
Change in border price 
Consumer saving (on present vol) 
Total change in producer revenue 
Sector 
Industry 
Power gen 
Industry 
Power gen 
Knits 
US$/MMBtu 
US$/MMBtu 
bcm pa 
bcm pa 
bcm pa 
Industry 
Power gen 
US$/MMBtu 
US$/MMBtu 
US$m pa 
US$m pa 
Scenario 1 
nTPA 
(0.04) 
( 0 . 1 1 ) 
0.18 
0.63 
0.82 
0.04 
0.09 
255.5 
332.1 
ΤΡΛ 
(0.05) 
(0.12) 
0.22 
0.69 
0.91 
0.13 
0.18 
282.7 
621.2 
Scenario 2 
nTPA 
(0.13) 
(0.33) 
0.58 
1.99 
2.57 
(0.06) 
(0.14) 
802.9 
19.9 
TPA 
(0.16) 
(0.36) 
0.70 
2.16 
2.86 
0.02 
(0.07) 
888.6 
281.6 
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Table B7.3. Base case: elasticities effect on volume 
Scenario 1 
% rent to consumers 
Industry 
Power generation 
Change in prices 
Industry 
Power generation 
Ntpa 
9.1% 
9.1% 
Ntpa 
(0.04) 
(0.11) 
Present final price 
Industry 
Power generation 
New final price 
Industry 
Power generation 
Ntpa 
3.5 
4.2 
Ntpa 
3.46 
4.09 
Percentage change in price 
Industry 
Power generation 
Ntpa 
-1.2% 
-2.5% 
tpa 
9.1% 
9.1% 
tpa 
(0.05) 
(0.12) 
tpa 
3.5 
4.2 
tpa 
3.45 
4.08 
tpa 
-1.5% 
-2.7% 
Percentage change in volume 
Industry 
Power generation 
Present volumes 
Industry 
Power generation 
Ntpa 
0.7% 
1.3% 
Ntpa 
25 
50 
Change in volumes 
Industry 
Power generation 
New volumes 
Industry 
Power generation 
Ntpa 
0.2 
0.6 
Ntpa 
25.2 
50.6 
tpa 
0.9% 
1.4% 
tpa 
25 
50 
tpa 
0.2 
0.7 
tpa 
25.2 
50.7 
Scenario 2 
Ntpa 
28.6% 
28.6% 
Ntpa 
(0.13) 
(0.33) 
Ntpa 
3.5 
4.2 
Ntpa 
3.37 
3.87 
Ntpa 
-3.8% 
-8.0% 
Ntpa 
2.3% 
4.0% 
Ntpa 
25 
50 
Ntpa 
0.6 
2.0 
Ntpa 
25.6 
52.0 
tpa 
28.6% 
28.6% 
tpa 
(0.16) 
(0.36) 
tpa 
3.5 
4.2 
tpa 
3.34 
3.84 
tpa 
-4.7% 
-8.6% 
tpa Elasticity 
2.8% -0.6 
4.3% -0.5 
tpa 
25 
50 
tpa 
0.7 
2.2 
tpa 
25.7 
52.2 
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Table B7.4. Base case: border prices 
Cost of producers 
Ntpa 
Industry 2.7 
Power generation 2.7 
Present rents 
Ntpa 
Industry 0.5 
Power generation 1.2 
tpa 
2.7 
2.7 
tpa 
0.5 
1.2 
Present % rent to producers 
Ntpa 
Industry 0.8 
Power generation 0.8 
Present border price 
Ntpa 
Industry 3.1 
Power generation 3.7 
New % rent to producers 
Ntpa 
Industry 0.9 
Power generation 0.9 
tpa 
0.8 
0.8 
tpa 
3.1 
3.7 
tpa 
0.9 
0.9 
Efficiency under TPA and nTPA 
Ntpa 
Industry 0.0 
Power generation 0.0 
tpa 
0.1 
0.1 
Rents under TPA and nTPA 
Ntpa 
Industry 0.5 
Power generation 1.2 
New border price 
Ntpa 
Industry 3.16 
Power generation 3.79 
Change in border price 
Ntpa 
Industry 0.04 
Power generation 0.09 
tpa 
0.6 
1.3 
tpa 
3.25 
3.88 
tpa 
0.13 
0.18 
Ntpa 
2.7 
2.7 
Ntpa 
0.5 
1.2 
Ntpa 
0.8 
0.8 
Ntpa 
3.1 
3.7 
Ntpa 
0.7 
0.7 
Ntpa 
0.0 
0.0 
Ntpa 
0.5 
1.2 
Ntpa 
3.07 
3.57 
Ntpa 
(0.06) 
(0.14) 
tpa 
2.7 
2.7 
tpa 
0.5 
1.2 
tpa 
0.8 
0.8 
tpa 
3.1 
3.7 
tpa 
0.7 
0.7 
tpa 
0.1 
0.1 
tpa 
0.6 
1.3 
tpa 
3.14 
3.64 
tpa 
0.02 
(0.07) 
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Table B7.5. Base case: consumer saving 
Scenai 
Present expenditure 
Industry 88 
Power generation 210 
New exp at old volumes 
Industry 86 
Power generation 205 
Difference = $m pa 
Ntpa 
Industry 43 
Power generation 213 
rio 1 
88 
210 
86 
204 
tpa 
52 
231 
Scenario 2 
88 
210 
84 
193 
Ntpa 
134 
669 
88 
210 
83 
192 
tpa 
163 
726 
Table B7.6. Base case: change in producer revenue 
Present revenue=US$m pa 
Ntpa 
Industry 3122 
Power generation 7410 
New revenue=US$m pa 
Ntpa 
Industry 3180 
Power generation 7683 
Change in revenue=US$m 
Ntpa 
Industry 59 
Power generation 273 
332 
tpa 
3122 
7410 
tpa 
3277 
7876 
pa 
tpa 
155 
466 
621 
Ntpa 
3122 
7410 
Ntpa 
3136 
7415 
Ntpa 
15 
5 
20 
tpa 
3122 
7410 
tpa 
3225 
7589 
tpa 
103 
179 
282 
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Table B7.7. Lower gas value 
Summary of value chain 
Value of gas 
Cost of producers 
Cost of transmission 
Rent in transmission 
Other rent 
PG 
3.50 
2.73 
0.20 
0.10 
0.47 
Indu 
3.10 
2.73 
0.20 
0.10 
0.07 
Other assumptions 
Elasticity 
Volume affected (bcm pa) 
Rent allocation 
Present situation 
Producers 
Transmission company 
Consumers 
TPA 
Producers 
Transmission company 
Consumers 
PG 
-0.5 
50 
Industry 
-0.6 
25 
Scenario 1 
Barg/Pow 
1 
0.2 
0 
1 
0 
0.1 
% of rent 
83% 
17% 
0% 
91% 
0% 
9% 
Scenario 2 
Barg/Pow 
1 
0.2 
0 
1 
0 
0.4 
% of rent 
83% 
17% 
0% 
71% 
0% 
29% 
Table B7.8. Lower gas value: changes in producer revenue 
Description 
Change in price 
Change in volume 
Total volume 
Change in border price 
Consumer saving (on present vol) 
Total change in producer revenue 
Sector 
Industry 
Power generation 
Industry 
Power generation 
Units 
US$/MMBtu 
US$/MMBtu 
bcm pa 
bcm pa 
bcm pa 
Industry 
Power generation 
US$/MMBtu 
US$/MMBtu 
US$m pa 
US$m pa 
Scenario 1 
nTPA 
(0.01) 
(0.04) 
0.03 
0.31 
0.34 
0.01 
0.04 
91.8 
118.5 
TPA 
(0.02) 
(0.05) 
0.07 
0.37 
0.44 
0.10 
0.13 
119.1 
406.0 
Scenario 2 
nTPA 
(0.02) 
(0.13) 
0.10 
096 
1.06 
(0.01) 
(0.06) 
288.6 
8.1 
TPA 
(0.05) 
(0.16) 
0.24 
1.16 
1.40 
0.06 
0.02 
374.3 
266.8 
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Table B7.9. Lower gas value: elasticities effect on volume 
Scenario 1 
% rent to consumers 
Ntpa tpa 
Industry 9.1% 9.1% 
Power generation 9.1% 9.1% 
Change in prices 
Ntpa tpa 
Industry (0.01) (0.02) 
Power generation (0.04) (0.05) 
Present final price Ntpa tpa 
Industry 3.1 3.1 
Power generation 3.5 3.5 
Scenario 2 
Ntpa tpa 
28.6% 28.6% 
28.6% 28.6% 
Ntpa 
(0.02) 
(0.13) 
Ntpa 
3.1 
3.5 
tpa 
(0.05) 
(0.16) 
tpa 
3.1 
3.5 
New final price 
Industry 
Power generation 
Percentage chang 
Industry 
Power generation 
Ntpa 
3.09 
3.46 
e in price 
Ntpa 
-0.2% 
-1.2% 
tpa 
3.08 
3.45 
tpa 
-0.5% 
-1.5% 
Percentage change in volume 
Industry 
Power generation 
Present volumes 
Industry 
Power generation 
Ntpa 
0.1% 
0.6% 
Ntpa 
25 
50 
Change in volumes 
Industry 
Power generation 
New volumes 
Industry 
Power generation 
Ntpa 
0.0 
0.3 
Ntpa 
25.0 
50.3 
tpa 
0.3% 
0.7% 
tpa 
25 
50 
tpa 
0.1 
0.4 
tpa 
25.1 
50.4 
Ntpa 
3.08 
3.37 
Ntpa 
-0.6% 
-3.8% 
Ntpa 
0.4% 
1.9% 
Ntpa 
25 
50 
Ntpa 
0.1 
1.0 
Ntpa 
25.1 
51.0 
tpa 
3.05 
3.34 
tpa 
-1.6% 
-4.7% 
tpa 
0.9% 
2.3% 
tpa 
25 
50 
tpa 
0.2 
1.2 
tpa 
25.2 
51.2 
Elasticity 
-0.6 
-0.5 
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Table B7.10. Lower gas value: border prices 
Cost of producers 
Ntpa 
Industry 2.7 
Power generation 2.7 
Present rents 
Ntpa 
Industry 0.1 
Power generation 0.5 
tpa 
2.7 
2.7 
tpa 
0.1 
0.5 
Present % rent to producers 
Ntpa 
Industry 0.8 
Power generation 0.8 
Present border price 
Ntpa 
Industry 2.8 
Power generation 3.1 
New % rent to producers 
Ntpa 
Industry 0.9 
Power generation 0.9 
tpa 
0.8 
0.8 
tpa 
2.8 
3.1 
tpa 
0.9 
0.9 
Efficiency under TPA and nTPA 
Ntpa 
Industry 0.0 
Power generation 0.0 
tpa 
0.1 
0.1 
Rents under TPA and nTPA 
Ntpa 
Industry 0.1 
Power generation 0.5 
New border price 
Ntpa 
Industry 2.79 
Power generation 3.16 
Change in border price 
Ntpa 
Industry 0.01 
Power generation 0.04 
tpa 
0.2 
0.6 
tpa 
2.88 
3.25 
tpa 
0.10 
0.13 
Ntpa 
2.7 
2.7 
Ntpa 
0.1 
0.5 
Ntpa 
0.8 
0.8 
Ntpa 
2.8 
3.1 
Ntpa 
0.7 
0.7 
Ntpa 
0.0 
0.0 
Ntpa 
0.1 
0.5 
Ntpa 
2.78 
3.07 
Ntpa 
(0.01) 
(0.06) 
tpa 
2.7 
2.7 
tpa 
0.1 
0.5 
tpa 
0.8 
0.8 
tpa 
2.8 
3.1 
tpa 
0.7 
0.7 
tpa 
0.1 
0.1 
tpa 
0.2 
0.6 
tpa 
2.85 
3.14 
tpa 
0.06 
0.02 
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Table B7.11. Lower gas value: consumer saving 
Scenario 1 
Present expenditure 
Industry 78 
Power generation 175 
New exp at old volumes 
Industry 77 
Power generation 173 
Difference = USSm pa 
Ntpa 
Industry 6 
Power generation 85 
78 
175 
77 
172 
tpa 
15 
104 
78 
175 
77 
168 
Ntpa 
20 
269 
Scenario 2 
78 
175 
76 
167 
tpa 
49 
326 
Table B7.12. Lower gas value: change in producer revenue 
Present revenue=US$USm 
Ntpa 
Industry 2788 
Power generation 6243 
New revenue=$USm pa 
Ntpa 
Industry 2797 
Power generation 6353 
Change in revenue=$USm 
Ntpa 
Industry 9 
Power generation 110 
118 
pa 
tpa 
2788 
6243 
tpa 
2893 
6544 
pa 
tpa 
105 
301 
406 
Ntpa 
2788 
6243 
Ntpa 
2791 
6249 
Ntpa 
2 
6 
8 
tpa 
2788 
6243 
tpa 
2878 
6420 
tpa 
90 
177 
267 
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Table B7.13. More competition 
Value of gas 
Cost of producers 
Cost of transmission 
Rent in transmission 
Other rent 
Power generation Industry 
4.20 3.50 
2.73 2.73 
0.20 0.20 
0.10 0.10 
1.17 0.47 
Other assumptions 
Elasticity 
Volume affected (bcm pa) 
Power generation Industry 
-0.5 -0.6 
50 25 
Rent allocation 
Present situation 
Producers 
Transmission company 
Consumers 
TPA 
Producers 
Transmission company 
Consumers 
Barg/Pow 
1 
0.2 
0 
1 
0 
0.4 
Scenario 1 
% of rent 
83% 
17% 
0% 
71% 
0% 
29% 
Barg/Pow 
1 
0.2 
0 
1 
0 
0.8 
Scenario 2 
% of rent 
83% 
17% 
0% 
56% 
0% 
44% 
Table B7.14. More competition: changes in producer revenues 
Description 
Change in price 
Change in volume 
Total volume 
Change in border price 
Consumer saving (on present vol) 
Total change in producer revenue 
Sector 
Industry 
Power generator 
Industry 
Power gen 
Units 
USS/MMBtu 
USS/MMBtu 
bcm pa 
bcm pa 
bcm pa 
Industry 
Power generatior 
USS/MMBtu 
USS/MMBtu 
USSm pa 
USSm pa 
Scenario 1 
nTPA 
(0.13) 
(0.33) 
0.58 
1.99 
2.57 
(0.06) 
(0.14) 
802.9 
19.9 
TPA 
(0.16) 
(0.36) 
0.70 
2.16 
2.86 
0.02 
(0.07) 
888.6 
281.6 
Scenario 2 
nTPA 
(0.21) 
(0.52) 
0.90 
3.10 
3.99 
(0.13) 
(0.33) 
1.248.9 
(255.0) 
TPA 
(0.25) 
(0.56) 
1.09 
3.36 
4.45 
(0.08) 
(0.27) 
1,382.2 
(19.9) 
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Table B7.15. More competition: elasticities effect on volume 
Scenario 1 
% rent to consumers 
Industry 
Power generation 
Change in prices 
Industry 
Power generation 
Present final price 
Industry 
Power generation 
New final price 
Industry 
Power generation 
Percentage change 
Industry 
Power generation 
Percentage change 
Industry 
Power generation 
Present volumes 
Industry 
Power generation 
Change in volumes 
Industry 
Power generation 
New volumes 
Industry 
Power generation 
Ntpa 
28.6% 
28.6% 
Ntpa 
(0.13) 
(0.33) 
Ntpa 
3.5 
4.2 
Ntpa 
3.37 
3.87 
in price 
Ntpa 
-3.8% 
-8.0% 
in volume 
Ntpa 
2.3% 
4.0% 
Ntpa 
25 
50 
Ntpa 
0.6 
2.0 
Ntpa 
25.6 
52.0 
tpa 
28.6% 
28.6% 
tpa 
(0.16) 
(0.36) 
tpa 
3.5 
4.2 
tpa 
3.34 
3.84 
tpa 
-4.7% 
-8.6% 
tpa 
2.8% 
4.3% 
tpa 
25 
50 
tpa 
0.7 
2.2 
tpa 
25.7 
52.2 
Scenario 2 
Ntpa 
44.4% 
44.4% 
Ntpa 
(0.21) 
(0.52) 
Ntpa 
3.5 
4.2 
Ntpa 
3.29 
3.68 
Ntpa 
-6.0% 
-12.4% 
Ntpa 
3.6% 
6.2% 
Ntpa 
25 
50 
Ntpa 
0.9 
3.1 
Ntpa 
25.9 
53.1 
tpa 
44.4% 
44.4% 
tpa 
(0.25) 
(0.56) 
tpa 
3.5 
4.2 
tpa 
3.25 
3.64 
tpa 
-7.2% 
-13.4% 
tpa Elasticity 
4.3% -0.6 
6.7% -0.5 
tpa 
25 
50 
tpa 
1.1 
3.4 
tpa 
26.1 
53.4 
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Table B7.16. More competition: border prices 
Cost of producers 
Ntpa 
Industry 2.7 
Power generation 2.7 
Present rents 
Ntpa 
Industry 0.5 
Power generation 1.2 
tpa 
2.7 
2.7 
tpa 
0.5 
1.2 
Present % rent to producers 
Ntpa 
Industry 0.8 
Power generation 0.8 
Present border price 
Ntpa 
Industry 3.1 
Power generation 3.7 
New % rent to producers 
Ntpa 
Industry 0.7 
Power generation 0.7 
tpa 
0.8 
0.8 
tpa 
3.1 
3.7 
tpa 
0.7 
0.7 
Efficiency under TPA and nTPA 
Ntpa 
Industry 0.0 
Power generation 0.0 
tpa 
0.1 
0.1 
Rents under TPA and nTPA 
Ntpa 
Industry 0.5 
Power generation 1.2 
New border price 
Ntpa 
Industry 3.07 
Power generation 3.57 
Change in border price 
Ntpa 
Industry (0.06) 
Power generation (0.14) 
tpa 
0.6 
1.3 
tpa 
3.14 
3.64 
tpa 
0.02 
(0.07) 
Ntpa 
2.7 
2.7 
Ntpa 
0.5 
1.2 
Ntpa 
0.8 
0.8 
Ntpa 
3.1 
3.7 
Ntpa 
0.6 
0.6 
Ntpa 
0.0 
0.0 
Ntpa 
0.5 
1.2 
Ntpa 
2.99 
3.38 
Ntpa 
(0.13) 
(0.33) 
tpa 
2.7 
2.7 
tpa 
0.5 
1.2 
tpa 
0.8 
0.8 
tpa 
3.1 
3.7 
tpa 
0.6 
0.6 
tpa 
0.1 
0.1 
tpa 
0.6 
1.3 
tpa 
3.05 
3.44 
tpa 
(0.08) 
(0.27) 
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Table B7.17. More competition: consumer saving 
Present expenditure 
Industry 88 
Power generation 210 
New exp at old volumes 
Industry 84 
Power generation 193 
Difference = USSm pa 
Ntpa 
Industry 134 
Power generation 669 
Scenario 1 
88 
210 
83 
192 
tpa 
163 
726 
88 
210 
82 
184 
Ntpa 
209 
1040 
Scenario 2 
88 
210 
81 
182 
tpa 
253 
1129 
Table B7.18. More competition: change in producer revenue 
Present revenue=US$m pa 
Ntpa 
Industry 3122 
Power generation 7410 
New revenue=US$m pa 
Ntpa 
Industry 3136 
Power generation 7415 
Change in revenue=US$m 
Ntpa 
Industry 15 
Power generation 5 
20 
tpa 
3122 
7410 
tpa 
3225 
7589 
pa 
tpa 
103 
179 
282 
Ntpa 
3122 
7410 
Ntpa 
3098 
7178 
Ntpa 
-23 
-232 
-255 
tpa 
3122 
7410 
tpa 
3179 
7333 
tpa 
57 
-77 
-20 
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Table B7.19. Higher transmission company rents 
Value of gas 
Cost of producers 
Cost of transmission 
Rent in transmission 
Other rent 
Other assumptions 
Elasticity 
Volume affected (bcm pa) 
Rent allocation 
Present situation 
Producers 
Transmission company 
Consumers 
TPA 
Producers 
Transmission company 
Consumers 
Power generation 
4.20 
2.73 
0.20 
0.30 
0.97 
Power generation 
-0.5 
50 
Barg/Pow 
1 
0.2 
0 
1 
0 
0.1 
Industry 
3.50 
2.73 
0.20 
0.30 
0.27 
Industry 
-0.6 
25 
Scenario 1 
% of rent 
83% 
17% 
0% 
91% 
0% 
9% 
Scena 
Barg/Pow 
1 
0.2 
0 
1 
0 
0.4 
rio 2 
% of rent 
83% 
17% 
0% 
71% 
0% 
29% 
Table B7.20. Higher transmission company rents: changes in producer revenues 
Description 
Change in price 
Change in volume 
Total volume 
Change in border price 
Consumer saving (on present vol) 
Total change in producer revenue 
Sector 
Industry 
Power generation 
Industry 
Power generation 
Units 
USS/MMBtu 
US$/MMBtu 
bcm pa 
bcm pa 
bcm pa 
Industry 
Power generation 
USS/MMBtu 
USS/MMBtu 
USSm pa 
USSm pa 
Scenario 1 
nTPA 
(0.02) 
(0.09) 
0.11 
0.52 
0.63 
0.02 
0.07 
200.9 
255.8 
TPA 
(0.05) 
(0.12) 
0.22 
0.69 
0.91 
0.29 
0.35 
282.7 
1.121.2 
Scenario 2 
nTPA 
(0.08) 
(0.28) 
0.33 
1.65 
1.98 
(0.03) 
(0.12) 
631.4 
1.4 
TPA 
(0.16) 
(0.36) 
0.70 
2.16 
2.86 
0.18 
0.10 
888.6 
781.6 
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Table B7.21. Higher transmission company rents: elasticities effect on volume 
% rent to consumers 
Industry 
Power generation 
Change in prices 
Industry 
Power generation 
Present final price 
Industry 
Power generation 
New final price 
Industry 
Power generation 
Percentage change in price 
Industry 
Power generation 
Percentage change in volume 
Industry 
Power generation 
Present volumes 
Industry 
Power generation 
Change in volumes 
Industry 
Power generation 
New volumes 
Industry 
Power generation 
Scenario 1 
Ntpa 
9.1% 
9.1% 
Ntpa 
(0.02) 
(0.09) 
Ntpa 
3.5 
4.2 
Ntpa 
3.48 
4.11 
Ntpa 
-0.7% 
-2.1% 
Ntpa 
0.4% 
1.0% 
Ntpa 
25 
50 
Ntpa 
0.1 
0.5 
Ntpa 
25.1 
50.5 
tpa 
9.1% 
9.1% 
tpa 
(0.05) 
(0.12) 
tpa 
3.5 
4.2 
tpa 
3.45 
4.08 
tpa 
-1.5% 
-2.7% 
tpa 
0.9% 
1.4% 
tpa 
25 
50 
tpa 
0.2 
0.7 
tpa 
25.2 
50.7 
Scenario 2 
Ntpa 
28.6% 
28.6% 
Ntpa 
(0.08) 
(0.28) 
Ntpa 
3.5 
4.2 
Ntpa 
3.42 
3.92 
Ntpa 
-2.2% 
-6.6% 
Ntpa 
1.3% 
3.3% 
Ntpa 
25 
50 
Ntpa 
0.3 
1.6 
Ntpa 
25.3 
51.6 
tpa 
28.6% 
28.6% 
tpa 
(0.16) 
(0.36) 
tpa 
3.5 
4.2 
tpa 
3.34 
3.84 
tpa 
-4.7% 
-8.6% 
tpa Elasticity 
2.8% -0.6 
4.3% -0.5 
tpa 
25 
50 
tpa 
0.7 
2.2 
tpa 
25.7 
52.2 
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Table B7.22. Higher transmission company rents: border prices 
Cost of producers 
Industry 
Power generation 
Present rents 
Industry 
Power generation 
Present % rent to producers 
Industry 
Power generation 
Present border price 
Industry 
Power generation 
New % rent to producers 
Industry 
Power generation 
Ntpa 
2.7 
2.7 
Ntpa 
0.3 
1.0 
Ntpa 
0.8 
0.8 
Ntpa 
3.0 
3.5 
Ntpa 
0.9 
0.9 
Efficiency under TPA and nTPA 
Industry 
Power generation 
Rents under TPA and nTPA 
Industry 
Power generation 
New border price 
Industry 
Power generation 
Change in border price 
Industry 
Power generation 
Ntpa 
0.0 
0.0 
Ntpa 
0.3 
1.0 
Ntpa 
2.98 
3.61 
Ntpa 
0.02 
0.07 
tpa 
2.7 
2.7 
tpa 
0.3 
1.0 
tpa 
0.8 
0.8 
tpa 
3.0 
3.5 
tpa 
0.9 
0.9 
tpa 
0.3 
0.3 
tpa 
0.6 
1.3 
tpa 
3.25 
3.88 
tpa 
0.29 
0.35 
Ntpa 
2.7 
2.7 
Ntpa 
0.3 
1.0 
Ntpa 
0.8 
0.8 
Ntpa 
3.0 
3.5 
Ntpa 
0.7 
0.7 
Ntpa 
0.0 
0.0 
Ntpa 
0.3 
1.0 
Ntpa 
2.92 
3.42 
Ntpa 
(0.03) 
(0.12) 
tpa 
2.7 
2.7 
tpa 
0.3 
1.0 
tpa 
0.8 
0.8 
tpa 
3.0 
3.5 
tpa 
0.7 
0.7 
tpa 
0.3 
0.3 
tpa 
0.6 
1.3 
tpa 
3.14. 
3.64 
tpa 
0.18 
0.10 
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Table B7.23. Higher transmission company rents: consumer saving 
Present expenditure 
Industry 
Power generation 
New exp at old volumes 
Industry 
Power generation 
Difference = $m pa 
Industry 
Power generation 
88 
210 
87 
206 
Ntpa 
25 
176 
Scenario 1 
88 
210 
86 
204 
tpa 
52 
231 
88 
210 
86 
196 
Ntpa 
77 
554 
Scenario 2 
88 
210 
83 
192 
tpa 
163 
726 
Table B7.24. Higher transmission company rents: change in producer revenues 
Present revenue=$m 
Industry 
Power generation 
New revenue=$m pa 
Industry 
Power generation 
pa 
Change in revenue=$m pa 
Industry 
Power generation 
Ntpa 
2955 
7077 
Ntpa 
2988 
7299 
Ntpa 
33 
223 
256 
tpa 
2955 
7077 
tpa 
3277 
7876 
tpa 
322 
799 
1121 
Ntpa 
2955 
7077 
Ntpa 
2962 
7072 
Ntpa 
7 
-5 
1 
tpa 
2955 
7077 
tpa 
3225 
7589 
tpa 
270 
512 
782 
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